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“For half a century, ACA has been providing the world … with advocacy, analysis, and awareness on some of the most critical topics of international peace and security, including on how to achieve our common, shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

– Izumi Nakamitsu
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
June 2, 2022
November 2002
Edition Date: 
Friday, November 1, 2002

North Korea Admits Secret Nuclear Weapons Program

November 2002

By Paul Kerr

North Korea revealed that it has a clandestine nuclear weapons program during an early October meeting with a high-ranking U.S. official. The admission, which the United States made public October 16, indicates that Pyongyang has violated several key nonproliferation agreements, raising concern worldwide.

North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju admitted that Pyongyang has a uranium-enrichment program during October 3-5 meetings with a U.S. delegation after Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted him with intelligence data proving the program’s existence, Kelly stated during an October 19 press conference in Seoul.

The intelligence included evidence that Pyongyang was purchasing material for use in a gas centrifuge program that could enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, according to Bush administration officials. Various press reports have cited Russia, China, and Pakistan as potential suppliers. All three governments have denied any role.

The status of the program is unclear. Kelly said during the Seoul press conference that the enrichment program is “several years old,” but Bush administration officials have reported to Congress and allies that North Korea’s program still appears to be in its “early stages” and would take a relatively long time to produce enough weapons-grade material for a nuclear device. It is unclear how much time that is.

Kelly stated that North Korea’s nuclear program violates “its commitments” under several international agreements: the Agreed Framework, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Pyongyang’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The United States and North Korea concluded the Agreed Framework in October 1994, ending a standoff resulting from the IAEA’s discovery that Pyongyang was diverting plutonium from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors for use in nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework requires North Korea to “freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities,” thereby ending its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program.

In exchange for shutting down its reactors, the United States agreed to provide North Korea with two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWR), to create an international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build them, and to provide shipments of heavy fuel oil in the interim. The first reactor was originally scheduled to be completed by 2003, but construction has fallen behind schedule, and the reactor is not expected to be finished before 2008, barring further delays.

The Agreed Framework requires North Korea to accept full IAEA safeguards when “a significant portion of the LWR project is completed”—a milestone that is approximately three years away. Under those safeguards, Pyongyang must declare the existence of any nuclear facilities and allow the IAEA to inspect them.

The Agreed Framework does not specifically mention uranium-enrichment, a different method of obtaining fissile material for nuclear weapons, but it does require North Korea to remain a party to the NPT, under which non-nuclear-weapon states agree “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The framework also says that North Korea “will consistently take steps to implement” the 1992 Joint Declaration, which states that “South and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”

The Agreed Framework has been controversial, with some Republicans, including President George W. Bush, questioning whether the United States can trust North Korea. The Bush administration refused last March to certify that North Korea was fully complying with the agreement, a congressionally mandated condition for KEDO to receive U.S. funding. Bush waived the certification requirement, however, allowing funding to continue. Then, in August the United States asked North Korea to allow immediate IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, although they are not required by the Agreed Framework at this time.

Meanwhile, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said in September that the agency has not been able to verify that Pyongyang “has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards.” U.S. intelligence estimates that North Korea separated enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons before signing the Agreed Framework. Other spent fuel produced before the Agreed Framework is under IAEA safeguards, but if North Korea decided to reprocess it, the country could recover enough plutonium in six months for approximately six nuclear devices.

The current and future status of the Agreed Framework is unclear. Kelly said during the October 19 press conference that North Korean officials “declared that they considered the Agreed Framework to be nullified” when he met with them. Regarding the agreement, he added that “we haven’t made any decisions since we were informed it was nullified.” In an October 20 interview on ABC’s “This Week,” Secretary of State Colin Powell repeated that Pyongyang had declared the agreement “nullified,” but he would not say that it was “dead.” Powell explained that Washington had to consult with its allies before deciding on the framework’s future.

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said October 25 that past U.S. actions had already invalidated the Agreed Framework, citing reactor construction delays, U.S. economic sanctions, and U.S. threats of pre-emptive attack against North Korea, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The Agreed Framework requires the United States to “provide formal assurances to the DPRK [North Korea], against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” Recent U.S. reports and statements have reportedly raised concerns in North Korea that the United States might consider a nuclear pre-emptive strike on the country, although the United States has not directly threatened North Korea. (See ACT, October 2002.) For example, a leaked version of the Bush administration’s January 2002 classified Nuclear Posture Review lists North Korea as a country against which the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

KEDO’s work continues despite North Korea’s admission, according to a KEDO spokesman, but it is unclear what decisions the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Atomic Energy Community—KEDO’s executive board members—will make in the near future. KEDO’s most recent shipment of fuel oil arrived in North Korea October 18, according to a State Department official interviewed October 30.

International Response

President Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung issued a joint statement October 26 during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, saying that the uranium enrichment program violates Pyongyang’s nuclear agreements. The statement also calls upon Pyongyang to “dismantle” the program “in a prompt and verifiable manner and to come into full compliance with all its international commitments.”

The declaration stresses the three countries’ desires for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue. The declaration also indicates that both Japan and South Korea intend to continue their bilateral engagement efforts with Pyongyang but that “North Korea’s relations with the international community…rest on…prompt and visible” dismantlement of its uranium-enrichment program.

On October 29 and 30, Japan and North Korea held normalization talks in Kuala Lumpur that covered a variety of issues, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, according to a Japanese Foreign Ministry statement. In the October 26 joint statement, Koizumi indicated that relations could not be normalized without resolution of Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs, but the talks ended without an agreement on the programs, according to an October 30 BBC report.

South Korea has also continued its engagement efforts with the North. The two governments held interministerial talks October 19-22 in Pyongyang. According to a KCNA October 23 statement, the two sides agreed to “make joint efforts to ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula” and “to seek negotiated settlement of…the nuclear issue.” The next meeting is to be held in mid-January 2003, KCNA reported.

Meanwhile, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated after an October 25 meeting with Bush in Texas that Beijing and Washington would “work together to ensure a peaceful resolution” to the North Korea nuclear problem, adding that China is a “supporter of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”

Russia called for talks between Washington and Pyongyang and for both sides “to renounce the policy of mutual threats and military pressure,” emphasizing the importance of adherence to the NPT and “implementation” of the Agreed Framework “by all concerned parties,” according to an October 25 statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry.

What Next?

Pyongyang has proposed that the United States conclude a nonaggression treaty with North Korea in order to resolve the dispute. An October 27 KCNA statement says that Washington should negotiate such a treaty, which would include a guarantee that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea, “if the U.S. truly wants the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.” North Korea “will be ready to clear the U.S. of its security concerns” if the United States does so, according to the statement.

North Korea also proposed further engagement with the United States to discuss its nuclear program during the October 3-5 meeting. When asked during the Seoul press conference if, in exchange for discussions about ending the enrichment program, Pyongyang had requested U.S. diplomatic recognition and guarantees that the United States would not attack North Korea, Kelly stated that North Korea had suggested “measures…generally along those lines” but that North Korea must dismantle the program before any discussions could take place.

Powell stated at an October 26 press conference during the APEC meeting that Washington has “no plans…for a meeting” with North Korea and that the United States would not negotiate for the dismantlement of the uranium enrichment program. He added that the “international community” agreed that applying “political” and “diplomatic” pressure on Pyongyang was the best course of action, but he did not elaborate.

Powell also stated that “we have no intention of invading North Korea or taking hostile action against North Korea”—a promise Bush made earlier this year in Seoul. Powell also restated Washington’s policy of requiring discussions about missile development and proliferation, nuclear issues, human rights abuses, and North Korea’s conventional forces in order for negotiations to begin. Kelly also articulated this position during the meeting in Pyongyang, Powell said.

Pyongyang’s admission occurred against a backdrop of what appeared to be increased engagement between North Korea and the United States. Kelly is the highest-level U.S. official to visit Pyongyang since Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did so in October 2000. The United States had also sent Jack Pritchard, State Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, to the August 7 KEDO ceremony in North Korea marking the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first LWR that the United States agreed to provide under the Agreed Framework. (See ACT, September 2002.) And North Korea had pledged to indefinitely extend its moratorium on testing long-range missiles—a top U.S. security concern. (See ACT, October 2002.)

The Bush administration’s decision to seek a peaceful resolution with North Korea contrasts with its position on Iraq, where it has threatened to use military force to overthrow the government in Baghdad because of its weapons of mass destruction programs.

North Korea Admits Secret Nuclear Weapons Program

U.S., Security Council Debate

November 2002

By Paul Kerr

As weapons inspectors waited to enter Iraq, the United States submitted a resolution to the UN Security Council on October 25 that firmly calls for Iraq to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction but does not directly threaten the use of force if Baghdad fails to comply. Supporting a tough stance against Iraq, Congress passed a joint resolution, which President George W. Bush signed October 16, authorizing the use of force to compel compliance with UN resolutions.

The new resolution, submitted with the United Kingdom, declares Iraq to be in “material breach” of its obligations under “relevant” Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 687, which mandated in 1991 that Iraq give up its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and most missiles. It calls for Iraq to submit “a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its [prohibited weapons] programs.”

The inspection teams would have a strong mandate under the resolution, which specifies that Iraq is to allow “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access” to “facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect.” To prevent Iraq from moving materials, the resolution grants UN inspectors the authority to prohibit the movement of vehicles and aircraft around sites to be inspected. Inspectors would also have the right to interview anyone they choose, without Iraqi officials present, in any location they wish.

The resolution also mandates access to “presidential sites,” superceding a 1998 memorandum of understanding between Baghdad and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that had placed special conditions on inspectors to such sites. Although the memorandum, which was endorsed by a Security Council resolution, did not give Iraq the right to impede inspections, some former UN inspectors have argued that these conditions could enable Iraq to conceal prohibited weapons activities.

Significantly, the new resolution gives the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the right to access “any information that any member state is willing to provide,” an apparent reference to sharing of national intelligence data.

UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix said during an October 28 briefing to the Security Council that access to intelligence about Iraqi weapons activities would be an important tool for UNMOVIC to perform effectively, but he emphasized that UNMOVIC would not give intelligence data to national governments. Allegations that UN weapons inspectors had been gathering intelligence in Iraq for their governments led to a controversy in 1999 that damaged UNSCOM, the previous inspection organization.

The resolution demands that Iraq “state its acceptance” of the resolution within seven days and submit declarations of its weapons programs within 30 days. UNMOVIC is to resume inspections no later than 45 days after the resolution is adopted and to update the council 60 days later.

Move Toward Compromise

The resolution differs in several respects from an earlier draft resolution that the United States circulated to permanent members of the Security Council in September, particularly in its provision for the use of force. The previous draft stated that failure “by Iraq at any time to comply and cooperate fully in accordance with” the resolution’s demands would “constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations” and authorize “all member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area.”

The current resolution also says that Iraq’s failure to comply would be a “material breach,” but instead of directly threatening force, it merely “recalls” previous Security Council warnings that Iraq will face “serious consequences as a result of …continued violations of its obligations.” In the event that weapons inspectors report Iraqi noncompliance with the resolution, the new resolution requires the Security Council to meet “in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security.” The previous draft did not include such a requirement.

The U.S.-British draft is an attempt at a compromise with other council members, particularly Russia and France, but neither country appears satisfied with the U.S. text. Both Moscow and Paris have composed their own draft resolutions but have not yet decided to submit them formally, according to an October 28 interview with a UN official. Both proposals omit the phrase “material breach,” believing that it sets the stage for the use of military force, according to U.S. sources. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the U.S. law establishing the overthrow of the Iraqi government as U.S. policy, contains the same phrase.

The same sources also indicated that the Russian and French resolutions include somewhat less stringent standards for inspections, as well as assurances that Security Council members would discuss possible responses to Iraqi noncompliance before using force. These changes are consistent with previous Russian and French statements. For example, Russian Ambassador Sergey Lavrov criticized the U.S. proposal’s “automaticity of the use of force” in an October 23 press conference following a Security Council meeting.

France had previously supported a two-resolution process, where one resolution would demand the return of weapons inspectors and the second would authorize necessary action. (See ACT, October 2002.) Russia had previously opposed a new resolution.

Inspections Without New Resolution

Whether weapons inspections would begin without a new resolution has been open to question. After Baghdad announced in September that it would accept weapons inspections “without conditions,” Iraqi representatives met with Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei in Vienna from September 30 to October 1 to finalize necessary logistical arrangements.

The meeting resolved many key areas of potential disagreement, according to an October 8 letter from Blix and ElBaradei to an Iraqi official, but several issues are outstanding. In an October 15 briefing to the Security Council, Blix said that uncertainty remains regarding UNMOVIC’s use of helicopters, the presence of Iraqi officials during interviews of Iraqi citizens, inspectors’ right to supervise the destruction of weapons materials or documentation, and the use of aerial imagery.

Blix also indicated that UNMOVIC had been prepared to resume inspections on October 19 but had decided to wait for the Security Council to adopt a new resolution.

It is uncertain if Iraq will abide by the provisions of a new resolution. An October 24 letter from Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri condemned the decision to wait for a new resolution and blamed the United States for blocking inspectors’ return. Iraq had stated in September that it would allow the inspectors access to any sites they wished to inspect, and Iraq agreed during the Vienna meeting to allow UNMOVIC access to previously restricted “sensitive sites.” Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz stated in an interview aired October 12 on Beirut television that inspectors would be allowed into presidential sites but that the inspectors should not be allowed repeat visits to them.

U.S. Response

Frustrated by delays in the process, the Bush administration has indicated that it may abandon the UN process if the Security Council does not vote for its resolution. On October 26, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting in Mexico, Bush stated that the United States would “lead a coalition to disarm” Iraq if its resolution failed to pass. A date for the vote has not yet been set, but White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told reporters October 29 that “time is running out.”

After several weeks of debate about how much freedom to give the president, the House of Representatives passed a resolution October 8 providing Bush with the authority to use military force against Iraq. The Senate followed suit October 11, and Bush signed the resolution October 16.

The resolution expresses support for Bush’s efforts to work through the Security Council and authorizes the president to use force to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and “enforce all relevant” Security Council resolutions. It also requires the president to notify Congress 48 hours after initiating the use of force, explaining his determination that a peaceful solution will not “adequately protect the national security of the United States” or enforce Security Council resolutions.

The Bush administration has been unclear about the conditions under which it would use military force against Iraq. Bush said in an October 7 speech that, in addition to dismantling its prohibited weapons programs, Iraq must end its support for terrorism, account for military personnel missing from the Persian Gulf War, and end human rights abuses. “Only by taking these steps [can] the Iraqi regime…avoid conflict,” he said.

Secretary of State Colin Powell contradicted Bush in an October 20 interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press.” While pointing out that UN resolutions cover some of the issues Bush raised, he said “all we are interested in is getting rid of those weapons of mass destruction…there are many other resolutions that [Saddam Hussein] has violated…. All of those...have to be dealt with in due course, but the major issue before us is disarmament.”

It is also uncertain whether U.S. military action would attempt to overthrow Iraq’s government. Recent Bush administration statements suggest that a disarmed Iraq would be sufficient to satisfy Washington’s requirement for “regime change,” which the administration previously defined as a change in government.

The text of the 1998 legislation reads, “[I]t should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.” In his October 7 speech, however, Bush said that Iraq’s compliance with his demands would “change the nature of the regime.”

U.S., Security Council Debate

Central Asian States Negotiate Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone

November 2002

By Christine Kucia

After five years of negotiation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan reached agreement September 27 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) treaty. United Nations Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala, who assisted in the talks, called the treaty “a great step forward for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.”

The NWFZ agreement follows criteria outlined in a 1975 UN General Assembly resolution that defines a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty as “the statute of a total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject” and calls for “an international system of verification and control…to guarantee compliance.” The resolution outlines the responsibilities of the five UN-recognized nuclear-weapon states to respect the zone’s absence of nuclear weapons, to refrain from acts that may violate the treaty, and “to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against States included in the zone.”

Prior to signing the treaty, Central Asian governments are consulting with the nuclear-weapon states to secure their agreement on a protocol to the treaty that would outline nuclear-weapon states’ responsibilities under the new NWFZ. Delegates from China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the UN—met with representatives of the Central Asian countries October 8 at the United Nations in New York to discuss the treaty and draft protocol. After the nuclear-weapon states requested more time to review the documents, the Central Asian governments delayed the signing ceremony they had originally planned to hold October 18 at Semipalatinsk, a former nuclear-weapons site in Kazakhstan, according to Tsutomu Ishiguri of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. A new signing date is still undetermined.

Difficulties between the Central Asian countries and the nuclear-weapon states have stymied agreement throughout the drawn-out discussions. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan had negotiated a collective security treaty with Russia in 1992, and the three states attempted to insert language in the treaty to preserve Russia’s prerogative to deploy nuclear weapons on their territories, according to a report by the Monterey Institute for International Studies.

After intense negotiations in August and September of this year, the five countries settled on language in the draft NWFZ treaty saying that, although the pact would not interfere with existing security arrangements, all states would strive to execute the principles of the NWFZ. According to a source familiar with the negotiations, the language helps preserve the existing arrangement with Russia while making “it very clear that the spirit and objectives of the treaty will not be vitiated at the expense of other security arrangements.”

Obtaining nuclear-weapon states’ agreement on the protocol to the treaty, however, presents further challenges, according to an official familiar with the process. For example, the draft protocol notes that the nuclear-weapon states respect the treaty and agree not to use a nuclear weapon against the treaty signatories—a “negative security assurance”—but it is not clear that all five states will agree to such a condition.

The NWFZ treaty makes securing the nuclear-weapon states’ negative security assurance important for the treaty’s full implementation, but the Central Asian states are adamant that the treaty will proceed even if nuclear-weapon states do not agree to the protocol. Issatai B. Sartayev, first secretary at Kazakhstan’s UN mission in New York, confirmed that the Central Asian countries are “strongly committed” to finalizing the pact. “This is our contribution to nonproliferation and disarmament, and it sends a positive message to the international community,” he said October 23.

The Central Asian states should sign the treaty quickly, according to Ishiguri. After giving the five nuclear-weapon states opportunities to review the documents over the past three years, he said, the Central Asian states proposing the NWFZ “must come up with a framework with a view to signing the treaty as soon as possible.” He indicated that reopening the treaty to negotiation—a step the Central Asian states might consider to resolve the concerns of the nuclear-weapon states—might impinge on the “significant achievements [that] have been made after intensive negotiations over five years” and stressed that “these should be kept intact.”

The Central Asian states’ next meeting with the five nuclear-weapon states to discuss the treaty and protocol is expected in December.

Central Asian States Negotiate Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone

GAO Says Multilateral Export Control Regimes Too Weak

November 2002

By Wade Boese

Concluding a 13-month study of four international regimes designed to stem global weapons proliferation, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported October 25 that the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement are not working as effectively as they should and need to be made more robust.

While noting that governmental and nongovernmental nonproliferation experts believe the four regimes have successfully helped institute standards limiting worldwide exports of dangerous goods and kept such items out of the hands of troublesome governments, GAO asserted that measuring the actual impact of the regimes is difficult, and it identified several shortcomings that undercut their utility.

Established over a span of 21 years, beginning with the 1975 creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and ending with the 1996 founding of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the four regimes each deal with a specific area of proliferation concern, although they are largely comprised of the same members. More than 30 countries, including the United States, have committed to adhere voluntarily to the regimes, which were established separately to regulate the global trade of dangerous materials by harmonizing national export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group limits nuclear materials and technologies; the Australia Group addresses chemical and biological weapons-related goods and technologies; the MTCR restricts missiles and related technologies; and the Wassenaar Arrangement covers conventional arms and goods with both military and civilian uses.

GAO, which conducts investigations and studies for Congress, said two chief problems hamper the regimes: members do not share adequate information with each other in a timely manner about their approval and denial of exports, and they fail to implement regime decisions quickly and consistently enough so that members’ export controls are uniform. Making agreed-upon changes to national export controls has taken some countries, including the United States, more than a year.

The report warned that countries or groups seeking outlawed or deadly capabilities might exploit an exporter’s outdated controls or incomplete knowledge of what exports other suppliers are denying.
The regimes’ voluntary nature also hinders them from working effectively, according to GAO. None of the regimes have monitoring or enforcement mechanisms, and all the regimes operate by consensus, meaning that a single country can block proposals or initiatives to strengthen a regime. Although the consensus rule can frustrate efforts to reform regimes, U.S. officials told GAO that it can also work to the U.S. advantage by permitting Washington to block proposals it does not like.

The regimes are also limited by the difficulty export controls have keeping pace with rapid technological changes; the growing number of countries outside regimes, such as China and North Korea, that are capable of manufacturing and selling weapons and related technologies; and the lack of criteria by which to judge regime performance.

The GAO report painted Russia, which belongs to three of the four regimes (the Australia Group is the exception), as pursuing policies at odds with the regimes’ purposes. GAO stated U.S. officials claimed that “Russia does not yet have an effective export control system in place,” and they cited Moscow’s January 2001 shipment of nuclear fuel to India, despite the objections of 32 other capitals, as the clearest violation of a regime commitment. The Nuclear Suppliers Group forbids members from nuclear cooperation with countries that do not have internationally approved safeguards on all their nuclear facilities, which India does not.

Yet, Russia is not the sole country violating its nonproliferation pledges. GAO reported that the State Department provided it with roughly 100 diplomatic demarches that Washington issued between 1998 and 2002 to a dozen foreign governments, including Russia, raising questions about their exports. The problem may be even broader, however, because the State Department did not supply GAO with copies of all the demarches sent in recent years, and U.S. officials estimated that in 2001 100 demarches were issued regarding MTCR matters alone.

In general, GAO contended that its limited access to data prevented it from completely assessing “how regime members comply with their commitments or how well efforts to encourage compliance work.”

U.S. and foreign government officials told GAO that judging how well the regimes work is complicated by the fact that it is not possible to know how widely dangerous technologies might have spread had the regimes not existed. One U.S. official interviewed October 29 about the GAO report commented that past experience shows that the regimes “are better than nothing.”

To enable countries to make more informed decisions about their arms exports and to improve adherence to export control regimes, GAO urged the secretary of state to press for increased information-sharing among regime members, to work for more consistent implementation of export controls, and to identify possible ways to make regimes operate better, such as changing decision-making procedures. GAO further encouraged more frequent U.S. reporting on its export denials, thereby enabling other countries to take similar actions, and the development of criteria to evaluate regime successes and failures.

In an October 16 reply to a draft copy of the GAO report, the State Department said it would consider GAO’s recommendations as part of a recently initiated review of the regimes ordered by the president.

When asked, however, several State Department and White House officials were unaware of the reportedly ongoing review. Only one State Department official knew of the review and she would only say, “The president has directed a review of the nonproliferation regimes.” She explained she could not provide any other details, such as when the president ordered the review, who is conducting it, when it is supposed to be completed, or what it entails.

GAO Says Multilateral Export Control Regimes Too Weak

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Hits Again

November 2002

By Wade Boese

The Pentagon destroyed a mock strategic warhead in space October 14 with a ground-launched missile defense interceptor for the fourth consecutive time. Nearly identical to prior intercept trials, the latest test’s only new wrinkle was the addition of a ship-based radar operating in a shadow mode, meaning it observed but did not aid the intercept.

Delayed almost two months while program officials replaced rocket motors on the interceptor’s two-stage booster, the October test improved the ground-based midcourse missile defense system’s record to five hits in seven tries. A booster problem caused one of the system’s two misses, in July 2000.

Following the pattern of earlier tests, the Pentagon launched a target missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California over the Pacific Ocean and, roughly 20 minutes later, an interceptor from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Approximately six minutes after being launched, the interceptor’s exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), which uses its own onboard sensors and data from a Kwajalein-based radar to seek out the target, collided with the mock warhead, obliterating it more than 225 kilometers above the Earth.

Preprogrammed with information on the target’s characteristics, the EKV selected the right target from among three decoys, believed to be one large and two small balloons, as used in the system’s March 15 test. A couple months after that test, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) decided to classify certain information on its future tests, including decoy details.

Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, who heads MDA, explained in June that keeping decoy information secret was intended to prevent potential adversaries from learning how to counter a U.S. missile defense system. Democratic lawmakers, however, have objected to the new secrecy, arguing that the move lessens outside scrutiny of the missile defense program and helps insulate MDA from charges of employing simple decoys that do not resemble the mock warhead. That practice makes it easier for the EKV to discriminate between the target and decoys.

Although the Pentagon hailed the October test as the first strategic missile defense test to involve a U.S. ship, the USS John Paul Jones, the naval vessel played no active role in the intercept. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, from which the United States withdrew in June, ruled out using sea-based systems or components to track or shoot down strategic missiles.

Having abrogated the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration is now exploring whether a sea-based missile defense system under development to protect against theater ballistic missiles, which was permitted by the 1972 accord, has any utility against long-range ballistic missiles. Past Pentagon reports concluded that the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar used on the John Paul Jones and similar ships would not be able to support an expanded mission due to its limited detection and tracking ranges.

An MDA spokesperson said October 22 that a complete test analysis has not yet been completed, but that preliminary evidence suggests the ship’s radar performed “quite well.” The ship was stationed approximately 500 kilometers from Vandenberg Air Force Base and tasked with gathering information on the target in its boost and midcourse phases of flight.

MDA plans call for deploying at least one ship to track targets in all future tests of the ground-based midcourse missile defense system. According to the MDA spokesperson, the ship will be limited to an observing role for the next test, which may occur before the end of the year.

The upcoming test, formally referred to as IFT-10, is the last in which MDA expects to use a surrogate two-stage booster to carry the EKV into space. A new three-stage booster, which will accelerate much faster than the surrogate booster and put more stress on the EKV, is expected to be integrated into intercept testing after MDA selects a model from two competing versions, one by Lockheed Martin and the other by Orbital Sciences Corporation. The two companies are scheduled to flight-test their boosters next summer or fall, meaning that after IFT-10 there will not be a strategic missile defense intercept test until late next year.

Development of the three-stage booster has been significantly delayed. Initially, the Pentagon planned to flight-test the booster three times between February and July 2000 and then integrate it into intercept tests in the first few months of 2001. But the booster’s first flight test did not occur until August 2001, and a second one failed shortly after launch in December 2001.

Boeing, the primary contractor for the U.S. ground-based midcourse missile defense program, was developing the three-stage booster itself, but earlier this year it awarded Orbital Sciences a contract to develop an alternative booster and let Lockheed Martin take over work on the Boeing version.

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Hits Again

Deadlines Extended for Russian Chemical Demilitarization

November 2002

By Kerry Boyd

States-parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) decided at an October 7-11 meeting to extend “in principle” two interim deadlines for Russia to destroy part of its chemical weapons stockpile, but they postponed a decision on Russia’s request to extend two other deadlines, including the deadline for destroying its entire stockpile.

The decision, made during the seventh session of the Conference of the States-Parties held in The Hague, affects the deadlines for Russia to destroy 1 percent and 20 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile, which consists of agents with high potential for offensive use. The states-parties, however, did not establish new specific deadlines. The conference authorized the executive council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees implementation of the CWC, to establish a specific date for the 1 percent deadline and to recommend a new deadline for the 20 percent mark, which will be considered when the conference reconvenes for its eighth session in October 2003.

Under the CWC’s original terms, Russia committed to destroy 1 percent of its stockpile by April 29, 2000, and 20 percent by April 29, 2002. The states-parties had already extended the 1 percent deadline for Russia from 2000 to 2002. (See ACT, June 2000.) The convention also requires member states to destroy 45 percent of their Category 1 weapons by April 29, 2004, and the remainder of their stockpiles by April 29, 2007, but Russia has said it will miss those deadlines. It has asked the OPCW to extend the final deadline until 2012. The conference has not yet decided whether to grant Russia an extension for its 45 percent and 100 percent deadlines.

In opening remarks to the conference, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter noted that the executive council emphasized at its last meeting that Russia must do everything possible to meet its deadlines for destruction. The council had also called on states-parties that provide assistance to the Russian chemical demilitarization program to continue their support, he added. (See ACT, October 2002.)

Meanwhile, the United States and India “have met their obligations to destroy 20 percent of their declared chemical weapons stockpiles within five years after the entry into force of the Convention,” Pfirter said, adding that all states-parties with declared Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons “have fulfilled their obligation [to complete destruction] within the five-year time frame established by the Convention.”

The conference, which was attended by representatives from 109 of the 146 CWC states-parties, approved a 2003 OPCW budget of more than $67.9 million—about a 10 percent increase over the 2002 budget.

Despite some positive changes, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report October 25 that concluded the OPCW’s inaccurate budget projections have been principally responsible for its large deficits. “The organization has consistently overestimated its income and underestimated its expenses,” the report says. The budget deficits have hindered the organization’s ability to conduct inspections, as required by the CWC.

The organization has counted unpaid assessments owed by member states as income and “overestimated reimbursement payments for inspections conducted in member states with chemical weapons-related facilities,” according to the report. Such member states owed the organization more than $2 million from inspections as of June 2002, including the United States, which owed more than $1.4 million.

The report calls on the U.S. secretary of state to work with the OPCW to develop a “comprehensive” budget plan and to report annually to Congress on progress improving the OPCW’s budgeting system.

 

Deadlines Extended for Russian Chemical Demilitarization

Serb Arms Companies in Illegal Deals With Iraq

November 2002

By Wade Boese

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) fired two public officials and launched a government investigation October 22 in response to evidence that Serbian companies have been illegally upgrading Iraqi combat aircraft. The United States, which recently suspended some U.S. aid to Ukraine for its president’s authorization two years ago of arms sales to Iraq, welcomed the Yugoslav moves and urged all countries to abide by the 1990 UN arms embargo on Iraq.

NATO troops conducted an October 11-13 inspection of the Orao aviation firm in the Republika Srpska, discovering contracts revealing unreported, illegal weapons exports. A NATO spokesperson refused to specify October 22 where the exports were going, but U.S. officials reported the deals were with Iraq and done in cooperation with Yugoimport, a company based in the FRY. An additional report appeared a few days later in The Washington Post, claiming that the United States also suspects FRY companies of helping Iraq develop cruise missiles, but U.S. officials refused to comment on the issue.

The FRY and the Republika Srpska, which is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are both predominantly Serbian entities of the former Yugoslavia. Republika Srpska is under the jurisdiction of NATO’s Stabilization Force, which was established in 1996 to oversee and help implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that ended fighting in the former Yugoslavia.

Responding quickly to the news, the FRY denied that the illicit Iraq activities were approved by the central government and removed the deputy minister of defense responsible for overseeing its weapons exports and the director of Yugoimport. A special committee was also formed to investigate the matter further.

The Republika Srpska has also reacted by removing three officials: the head of Orao, a top air force official, and the individual in charge of its arms trade. But Washington says Republika Srpska has not done enough because the evidence indicates a concerted program to aid Iraq. Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently banned all arms exports and imports.

Unlike the case with Ukraine, the United States has not imposed sanctions on any of the Yugoslav entities or companies. Washington, however, encouraged both the FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina to improve their controls governing arms exports and, in the words of State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “to make sure it doesn’t happen again.”

The Yugoslav evidence became public the day after U.S. and British officials completed an eight-day visit to Ukraine investigating whether it had actually transferred early-warning systems to Iraq. The investigation team has not yet released a report on its findings.

Serb Arms Companies in Illegal Deals With Iraq

U.S. Funds Released for Shchuch'ye

November 2002

By Christine Kucia

A U.S.-sponsored chemical demilitarization program in Russia received a boost October 23 after President George W. Bush signed the fiscal year 2003 defense appropriations bill, which released funds that had been withheld from fiscal years 2000-2002 “for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility” at Shchuch’ye.

Congress requires that the president certify Russian compliance with certain conditions, such as abiding by arms control treaties, in order to provide funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, which include nuclear, biological, and chemical nonproliferation and disarmament projects.

In fiscal year 2000, President Clinton certified Russian compliance, but Congress denied funding for Shchuch’ye. In addition to the usual CTR certification requirements, some Republicans who questioned Russia’s commitment to destroying its chemical weapons stockpile denied funding again and inserted a provision into the fiscal year 2001 defense authorization bill imposing additional conditions on funds for the chemical demilitarization program. Among the requirements, the secretary of defense must certify that Russia has declared its entire chemical weapons stockpile and that Moscow is committed to allocating at least $25 million per year for Shchuch’ye’s construction and operation.

The Pentagon has been unable to certify these conditions and has therefore been prevented from spending money on Shchuch’ye that was allocated after the legislation was passed. The 2003 appropriations bill provides the president with the authority to waive the certification requirements, allowing the Defense Department to spend the backlogged funds and money to make up the 2000-2001 gap.

President Bush had asked Congress to grant him the authority to waive the conditions and allow the Shchuch’ye project to proceed. The House and Senate finally agreed to grant a one-year waiver authority as part of the appropriations bill in order to release the money withheld from fiscal years 2000-2002.

The congressional requirements and the Pentagon’s decision not to certify Russia’s compliance, however, might still prevent expenditure of funds allocated for fiscal year 2003. Waiver authority for 2003 funds was not in the appropriations bill. Although the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill could grant the president waiver authority for the general CTR program and the chemical destruction project, Congress has not yet completed it.

Before Congress passed the appropriations bill, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), a key proponent of the CTR program in Congress, accused his colleagues in July of dangerous foot-dragging on the waiver issue. He declared, “It has been more than five years since the U.S. and Russia, each, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention but no Russian chemical weapons are being destroyed…. Almost two million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively small and discrete shells [are] awaiting elimination at Shchuch’ye.” Lugar urged Congress to grant the president permanent waiver authority.

U.S. Funds Released for Shchuch'ye

U.S. Releases Information On Cold War Chem-Bio Tests

November 2002

By Kerry Boyd

The Defense Department released new information October 9 regarding 27 chemical and biological weapons tests conducted between 1962 and 1973, revealing for the first time that it had used live chemical and biological agents in some land-based experiments and that civilians had been exposed to some simulated agents during the tests.

The Defense Department documents include information on land-based tests conducted in Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Utah, Canada, and the United Kingdom. They also contain information on sea-based tests that were part of Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense. Of the new documents, 16 describe the use of live chemical or biological agents in tests, and 12 describe tests involving simulants, ostensibly nonharmful materials that behave in a manner similar to real agents.

The new disclosures are part of an ongoing effort to declassify information on 134 chemical and biological tests planned by the Defense Department during the Cold War. The U.S. government never conducted 62 of the 134 planned tests, and it has now released information on 37 tests, including previously released reports regarding tests conducted on U.S. ships during the Cold War.

Defense officials continue to investigate the remaining tests, although William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said in a press briefing October 9 that preliminary findings suggest most of the other planned tests never occurred. The department began investigating the tests in September 2000 at the request of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

“The purpose of these operational tests was to test equipment, procedures, military tactics, et cetera, and to learn more about biological and chemical agents. The tests were not conducted to evaluate the effects of dangerous agents on people,” Winkenwerder said. He added that “things were learned at that time that would have been useful” to offensive use of chemical or biological agents.

Winkenwerder said he was “highly confident that civilians were not exposed to live chemical or pathogenic biologic agents.” Civilians in Hawaii, Alaska, Florida, and Puerto Rico, however, might have been exposed to biological and chemical simulants—particularly civilians in Hawaii, officials said. The simulants used were considered harmless at the time of the tests, but scientists have since discovered some of the simulants pose a potential health risk to people with weak immune systems, Winkenwerder added.

Approximately 5,000 service members were involved in the sea-based tests and another 500 in the land-based tests, Winkenwerder estimated.

Known Land-Based Live* Biological and Chemical Tests Conducted During the Cold War
Location
Test Name
Date(s)
Live Agents(s)
Alaska
Whistle Down
Dec 1962-Feb 1963
Sarin, VX
Alaska
Elk Hunt, Phase I
July-Aug 1964
VX
Alaska
Elk Hunt, Phase II
Oct-Dec 1964, June-July 1965
VX
Alaska
Devil Hole, Phase I
Summer 1965
Sarin
Alaska
Sun Down
Feb, Apr 1966
Sarin
Alaska
Swamp Oak
Mar-Apr 1966
Sarin
Alaska
Devil Hole, Phase II
July-Aug 1966
VX
Alaska
Red Cloud
Nov 1966-Feb 1967
Francisella tularensis
Alaska
Watch Dog
Summer 1967
Francisella tularensis
Alaska
Dew Point
June-July 1967
Sarin
Canada
Rapid Tan, Phase II
May-June 1968
Soman, VX, Tabun
Florida
DTC Test 69-75
Oct-Dec 1968
Puccinia graminis var. tritici
Hawaii
Tall Timber
May 1966
Ester of benzilic acid
Hawaii
Pine Ridge
May-June 1966
Sarin, Ester of benzilic acid
Hawaii
Green Mist
Mar-Apr 1967
Sarin
Maryland
DTC Test 69-12
Spring 1969
Sarin, VX, Tabun, Soman
U.K.
Rapid Tan, Phase I
July-Aug 1967
Sarin, VX, Tabun, Soman
U.K.
Rapid Tan, Phase III
Aug-Sep 1968
Sarin, VX, Tabun, Soman
Utah
DTC 68-53
Apr-Dec 1969
CS Riot Control

Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of Defense press releases and fact sheets.

*"Live" agents are chemical and biological substances capable of injuring or killing humans or crops.

 

U.S. Releases Information On Cold War Chem-Bio Tests

Tritium Production Licenses Granted to Civilian Power Plants

November 2002

By Christine Kucia

Breaking the taboo of using civilian nuclear reactors to supply nuclear weapons materials, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved licenses September 24 and October 1 to allow tritium production at two Tennessee nuclear power plants.

Tritium, an isotope of hydrogen, is used in a thermonuclear weapon to boost its yield. It must be replenished regularly because it has a half-life of only 12 years. With the license, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor, is authorized to insert tritium-producing burnable absorber rods into its Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors. The rods will be irradiated over each reactor’s 18-month fuel cycle and then shipped to the DOE-owned Savannah River Site in South Carolina so that the tritium can be extracted for use in nuclear weapons.

The NRC granted the first license amendment September 24, which will allow the Watts Bar reactor to produce tritium in up to 2,304 burnable absorber rods. The Watts Bar reactor is expected to begin tritium production in the fall of 2003. On October 1, the NRC announced the approval of a second tritium production license for the Sequoyah nuclear power plant. Sequoyah’s reactor units 1 and 2 will each irradiate up to 2,256 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods for one fuel cycle. Sequoyah’s two reactors will commence tritium production separately, with Unit 2 beginning irradiation in the fall of 2003 and Unit 1 a year later. The DOE halted all tritium production in 1988. Although the tritium extracted from dismantled weapons can be used to meet short-term needs, the department sought to identify a new production source before 2005 to provide enough tritium to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile at START I levels, as required in a presidential directive. (See ACT, November/December 1998.) As a result of the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty, the tritium requirement might be lower in the future, but for now the DOE’s plans are based on START I numbers.

Following an extensive review of options, including building a linear accelerator or remodeling a mothballed nuclear power plant, in 1998 the DOE chose the less-costly option of using civilian light-water reactors for its production. The department designated the Watts Bar and Sequoyah facilities to produce tritium to help maintain the country’s nuclear arsenal. The license amendments for the two TVA-operated reactors allow the contractor to install and irradiate rods for the life of each power plant.

The United States has traditionally discouraged other countries from using their civilian nuclear capabilities for military purposes. Everet Beckner, deputy administrator for defense programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration, maintained in an October 25 interview that the U.S. tritium decision does not reflect a shift in policy because “the use of the TVA reactors to irradiate [rods] is to support the existing U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.” He emphasized that “the United States is not producing new nuclear weapons and has not since 1989.”

According to Beckner, the United States has no plans to re-examine options for tritium production. “This approach was judged to be the least costly and offered the greatest flexibility in meeting changing demands. With the Moscow Treaty in place, tritium demands in the coming years are expected to decline.”

Tritium Production Licenses Granted to Civilian Power Plants

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