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– Lisa Beyer
Bloomberg News
August 27, 2018
September 2002
Edition Date: 
Sunday, September 1, 2002

Russia Opens CW Destruction Plant

Russia opened its first chemical weapons destruction plant in Gorny August 21 but does not plan to begin actually destroying weapons at the site until December.

Diplomats from Europe, the United States, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons attended a ceremony opening the plant, which has been partially funded by international contributions.

Germany will have provided more than $39 million for the plant’s construction by the end of 2002, making it Germany’s largest nonproliferation project in Russia, according to the German embassy in Washington. The European Union has also provided almost $5.9 million.

Russia’s July 2001 chemical demilitarization plan calls for beginning operations at Gorny in 2002 and completing destruction of the weapons stored at the plant, mostly mustard and lewisite agents, by 2005. Under the plan, Russia would begin scrapping chemical weapons at two other facilities, Shchuch’ye and Kambarka, in 2005. (See ACT, September 2001.)

The Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a state-party, calls for member states to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles by 2007, but the Russian plan indicates that Moscow will miss that deadline and not complete its chemical demilitarization until 2012. The convention allows for an extension of up to five years, and Russia has asked the OPCW, which oversees implementation of the CWC, to grant it extra time.

The United States has also said it will miss the 2007 deadline because of delays in its chemical weapon destruction program. (See ACT, November 2001.)

U.S. Steps up Missile Defense Marketing Abroad

The Pentagon and U.S. arms companies have increased efforts following the June 13 U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to get foreign governments and businesses more involved in U.S. missile defense programs, but their labors have yielded few tangible results as yet.

Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, who directs U.S. missile defense programs, has repeatedly said in recent months that one of the chief benefits of withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty was that it opened the door to foreign participation in strategic missile defense work against long-range ballistic missiles. The accord prohibited Washington and Moscow from transferring any strategic missile defense systems or components to other countries and, in Kadish’s words, from sharing “blueprint data.”

Germany, Israel, Italy, and Japan are all currently participating in theater missile defense projects with the United States to protect against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, defenses the ABM Treaty permitted.

The Pentagon held a series of July meetings with foreign governments on ballistic missile defense, including a collective meeting with NATO members July 18 in Brussels. Pentagon officials presented briefings about the current ballistic missile threat as well as the status of U.S. missile defense programs. They also outlined possible ways in which foreign governments could contribute to or participate in various missile defense projects.

U.S. officials further pressed NATO’s other 18 members to agree to include a statement endorsing missile defense in their final communiqué at the upcoming NATO summit in Prague, which is scheduled for November 21-22.

Foreign reaction to the U.S. missile defense push has been mixed, with Germany reportedly expressing the greatest reservation. Although several key European countries made public their skepticism and opposition to U.S. strategic missile defense plans a few years ago, most European capitals have softened their tone after the U.S. treaty withdrawal and Moscow’s muted response.

Boeing, a top contractor for U.S. missile defense systems, signed agreements July 23 with three different European companies to explore possible future cooperation on missile defense, although specific projects or products have not been identified. The agreements, each termed a “memorandum of understanding,” were concluded with BAE Systems, a British company; Alenia Spazio, an Italian company; and EADS, a joint French, German, and Spanish company.

U.S. Opens Door for Arms Sales to Afghanistan

On July 2, the State Department announced that, for the first time in a decade, U.S. arms companies would be permitted to sell weapons and military equipment to Afghanistan. Under the new policy, U.S. arms manufacturers may make deals with the current Afghan government or with UN-authorized international security forces in the country, but arms exports to any other entity in Afghanistan remain outlawed.

Few export licenses have been requested since the policy change. Near the end of August, the Office of Defense Trade Controls, which licenses arms deals carried out directly between U.S. companies and foreign customers, had approved one proposed deal for communications equipment and was reviewing two other export requests. U.S. government officials are not anticipating a flood of possible deals because Afghanistan lacks the funds to make many purchases.

President Bush, however, signed the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act August 2, which authorizes $50 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds for Afghanistan and $20 million for peacekeeping efforts there. Buyers of U.S. arms can use FMF financing, which comes in the form of a grant or a loan, to make purchases of weaponry, military hardware, services, or training from private U.S. companies or the Pentagon. Initial Afghan buys are not expected to be for major weaponry but for items such as canteens and uniforms.

Pentagon officials encouraged the State Department’s July 2 move because they wanted the policy governing commercial arms sales to match their interest in allowing sales to Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which is administrated separately. It is not clear exactly when the Pentagon decided to permit arms sales to Afghanistan through the government-to-government FMS program, but the Pentagon now considers Afghanistan an eligible recipient for U.S. arms.

The United States maintained an informal policy of denying all weapons trade with Afghanistan or any entity in the country from 1992 until June 1996, when the policy became official.

UN-Iraq Talks Fail to Yield Progress on Inspections

September 2002

By Paul Kerr

As Washington debated taking military action against Iraq, representatives from the United Nations and Baghdad exchanged views during July and August over the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq but were unable to resolve their differences.

Following up their previous meetings in March and May, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Hans Blix, executive chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), met with an Iraqi delegation in Vienna July 4 and 5. UNMOVIC is the organization charged with overseeing Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obligations. The officials discussed remaining disarmament issues, as Iraq had requested, and logistical arrangements for inspections, at UNMOVIC’s request, but the meeting ended without agreement.

The crux of the dispute is Iraq’s wish to discuss weapons inspections in conjunction with what it terms a “comprehensive settlement,” which would address other issues, such as the no-fly zones enforced by the United States and the United Kingdom, and compensation payments related to the Persian Gulf War. The UN, however, insists that inspections begin before other issues can be discussed, as required by Security Council resolutions.

After the July meetings failed to reach a resolution, the Iraqi foreign minister, Naji Sabri, sent a letter August 1 to Annan inviting Blix and UNMOVIC experts to Baghdad to review the results of weapons inspections conducted between 1991 and 1998 and to discuss how to resolve outstanding issues. “We cannot think of starting a new stage without solving the pending issues of the previous stage,” Sabri said in the letter.

In an August 6 letter, Annan welcomed Iraq’s “desire to continue our dialogue” but rejected its proposal because it did not allow for inspections to begin immediately. Resolution 1284, passed in 1999, mandates that inspectors start work in Iraq prior to drawing up a list of remaining disarmament tasks, in order to first determine what those tasks should be.

Iraq replied to Annan in an August 15 letter that reiterated its previous proposal and addressed the terms of the “comprehensive settlement” it envisions. Iraq wants an agreement that will link inspections to such issues as economic sanctions, a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East, the no-fly zones, and the U.S. policy of regime change. The letter stated that these issues and Iraq’s compensation payments should be addressed before discussing inspections.

Iraq disputes the United Nations’ contention that Resolution 1284 clearly requires inspections to begin before other issues are discussed. According to Baghdad, Resolution 1382, passed in 2001, states that Resolution 1284 is vague and calls for a comprehensive settlement. The relevant portion of Resolution 1382 states that the Security Council “reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including any clarification necessary for the implementation of resolution 1284.”

U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte characterized Annan’s rejection of Iraq’s August 15 invitation as consistent with the views of Security Council members and said that the council would not take up Iraq’s proposals. The United States held the presidency of the Security Council in August.
Secretary of State Colin Powell said August 3 that the requirements for Iraq to come into compliance with UN resolutions are clear and that “there is no need for further clarification or discussion of a comprehensive approach.”

Iraq also extended an invitation August 5 for members of the U.S. Congress to conduct a fact-finding mission in Iraq and inspect suspected weapons facilities, but no member of Congress accepted.

Debate in Washington

The exchange between Iraq and the United Nations occurred against a backdrop of vigorous debate over whether, when, and how the United States should use military force to counter a potential threat from Iraq, the need for U.S. allies’ support for military action, and the utility of weapons inspections.
The debate was propelled by Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings about Iraq July 31 and August 1, as well as comments from Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger, and James Baker—all of whom held high-level positions in the administration of George H. W. Bush—expressing concern about possible plans the current administration has for attacking Iraq.

Several prominent administration officials have issued statements that are widely regarded as supporting pre-emptive use of military force to overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Vice President Dick Cheney said in an August 26 speech regarding Iraq that “the risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action. If the United States could have pre-empted 9/11, we would have, no question. Should we be able to prevent another…attack, we will.”

The widespread discussion of invasion signifies a change in emphasis in the Bush administration’s Iraq policy. During its first year, the administration stressed “smart sanctions” and the importance of Iraqi compliance with weapons inspections. As recently as July 31, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer stated that the Bush administration is working with the United Nations, citing efforts to return inspectors to Iraq and earlier work to implement smart sanctions. (See ACT, June 2002.)

The administration maintains that its policy on Iraq is to effect “regime change” in Baghdad while supporting efforts to enforce UN Security Council resolutions. “We continue to leave all our options available regarding Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s regime remains a serious threat…. So we are going to continue working to secure Iraq’s full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions,” State Department spokesman Philip Reeker stated August 8.

Some administration officials, including Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, have expressed doubt that UNMOVIC would be effective in disarming Iraq, even if inspectors were allowed back into the country. Cheney said in his August 26 speech that the “return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam Hussein’s] compliance with UN resolutions…. There is a great danger that it would provide false comfort.”

Blix expressed concern that a U.S. policy committed to invasion could discourage Iraq from accepting inspectors. In an August 23 interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Blix said, “If the Iraqis conclude that an invasion by someone is…inevitable, then they might conclude that it’s not very meaningful to have inspections.”

UN-Iraq Talks Fail to Yield Progress on Inspections

Senate Reviews U.S.-Russian Nuclear Reductions Treaty

September 2002

By Wade Boese

In a series of July and August hearings, senators of both parties signaled that they would support ratification of the latest U.S.-Russian nuclear arms accord, even though several questioned the treaty’s failure to require the destruction of warheads, lay out a schedule for warhead reduction, or establish measures to verify that the promised reductions actually take place. Senior Bush administration officials largely downplayed the senators’ concerns.

Signed May 24 by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty commits the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece by December 31, 2012. The accord, which the Bush administration refers to as the Moscow Treaty, expires that same day. (See ACT, June 2002.)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-DE) left little doubt about the treaty’s fate July 9, when he opened the first hearing on the accord. Although detailing several problems he had with the treaty, Biden concluded that he hoped to see the treaty voted on and approved this fall. Other Democrats echoed Biden, raising questions and concerns but ultimately underscoring that they saw the treaty as a positive step forward.

Most Republicans offered unqualified praise. A notable exception was Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN). A leading proponent of helping Russia secure and destroy its huge weapons stockpiles, Lugar endorsed the treaty but expressed worries about what would happen to Russian nuclear warheads separated from their missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Testifying at different hearings, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed complaints about the treaty’s lack of warhead destruction, claiming that both Russia and the United States would certainly destroy warheads they did not need. Rumsfeld added at his July 25 Armed Services Committee appearance that the administration was unlikely to pursue an agreement on warhead dismantlement in the future.

Rumsfeld explained that the administration did not want to require warhead elimination because the United States must be able to store warheads in case it needs to replace deployed warheads that became unreliable or unsafe. Rumsfeld added that the future cannot be accurately predicted and the world could undergo a dramatic change that would necessitate a buildup in U.S. nuclear forces.

The Bush administration is planning to keep up to 2,400 warheads that it removes from service ready for redeployment in weeks, months, or at most three years. Thousands of other warheads and components will be kept as spares or in lower stages of readiness.

Democratic critics charged that by storing warheads, rather than eliminating them or their delivery vehicles, the administration was being misleading about the true extent of the reductions. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) pointedly told Powell July 9 that “there’s a certain fiction here in addition.” Powell subsequently told Biden at the same hearing, “The treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want.”

Both Powell and Rumsfeld argued that the administration does not care what Russia does with its deployed or stored warheads as long as they are secure against theft or unauthorized use. Both secretaries and General Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, played down past U.S. concerns that Russia might keep or put multiple warheads on its missiles, stating simply that times had changed and multiple-warhead missiles were no longer a worry.

Powell even suggested July 9 that the Bush administration would not be particularly concerned if Russia did not reduce its forces at all, declaring that the administration had decided independently to cut U.S. warheads regardless of whether Russia reciprocated. “Just keep in mind, what we are doing in this treaty, we were going to do anyway,” the secretary told senators.

Responding to a question about why the treaty had no reduction schedule, Powell commented that the United States did not seek any milestones. He explained that the administration desires the freedom to make reductions at whatever pace it wants.

Myers and Admiral James Ellis, commander-in-chief of U.S. Strategic Command, both highlighted at separate hearings the flexibility to alter the pace of reductions as one of the treaty’s most attractive aspects because it would enable the United States to respond to changes in the strategic environment. “The one cornerstone of [the] treaty is it just provides great flexibility,” Myers remarked July 25.

But some Democratic senators sharply asked administration officials what plausible scenarios dictated preserving large warhead stockpiles and the flexibility to slow, halt, or reverse reductions, particularly since 1,700-2,200 warheads far exceeds the nuclear weapons holdings of any country, excluding Russia.

Rumsfeld acknowledged July 25 that 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads is “a lot.” Such a large force was required, however, he said, to persuade U.S. allies not to develop nuclear weapons for their protection and to dissuade other nuclear powers from trying to achieve parity with the United States. Both Rumsfeld and Powell denied that the force level was based on the size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

Because Russia is no longer the threat driving the U.S. nuclear force size, according to Powell, the administration saw no need to craft ways to watch whether Moscow strictly abided by the treaty. In his July 9 prepared testimony, Powell wrote that during the treaty negotiations “the Administration did not seek any new verification measures.”

Instead, Powell informed senators, who repeatedly quizzed witnesses about the lack of verification measures, that the inspections and data exchanges of the 1991 START accord would provide enough information on Russian activities, at least up to December 2009, when it expires. If the United States wants more information, it could work with Russia through the new treaty’s Bilateral Implementation Commission to develop additional transparency, Powell said. The commission has yet to be set up, but it is supposed to meet at least twice per year.

Rumsfeld, however, offered a completely different take on verification. He testified July 17 that the Bush administration had “repeatedly raised verification and transparency and predictability issues” but had dropped the effort because “there simply wasn’t time to do that.” Further discussions about transparency would not occur in the Bilateral Implementation Commission because it is not a negotiating body, Rumsfeld said July 25. He said such talks would be held within the recently created Consultative Group for Strategic Security, a forum that he and Powell and their Russian counterparts will chair. The forum’s first meeting is September 20 in Washington.

Senators are not yet done reviewing the treaty. There may be at least two additional hearings in September, one of which might include a witness from the U.S. intelligence community to testify on the treaty’s verifiability. It remains uncertain when a vote on the treaty could take place.

Senate Reviews U.S.-Russian Nuclear Reductions Treaty

U.S. Irked by Potential Growth in Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran

September 2002

By Paul Kerr

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed a draft document July 26 that includes plans to build five nuclear reactors in Iran in addition to the reactor currently under construction near the Iranian city of Bushehr, according to U.S. and Russian sources. The document created friction between Moscow and Washington, which has opposed Russian nuclear assistance to Iran.

The draft document was released shortly before Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, arrived in Moscow for a series of meetings with Russian officials concerning nonproliferation issues. Abraham and Bolton expressed opposition to the proposal to expand nuclear cooperation at a July 31 meeting, arguing that building the reactors might help Iran develop nuclear weapons, according to a Bush administration official. “We will continue to urge the Russian government to take a clear position against any plan to build additional nuclear reactors in Iran,” the official said.

The reactors proposal was particularly controversial because of its timing and approval by high-level government officials. The announcement “that Russia intended to pursue additional nuclear cooperation with Iran was inconsistent with the assurance that Putin gave Bush,” an administration official said August 15, referring to a pledge to combat proliferation that the U.S. and Russian presidents made at the G-8 summit in June.

However, presidents Bush and Putin had acknowledged their disagreement about Russian nuclear aid to Iran at the May 24 signing ceremony for the new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reduction treaty. Putin stated during May meetings with Bush that Russia would continue with the Bushehr project, but no plans for additional reactors were discussed. (See ACT, June 2002).

Russian officials downplayed the proposal for additional reactors after meeting with Bolton and Abraham. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko stated July 31 that “the prospects of cooperation with Iran in the field of peaceful uses of the atom, [speak] only of the available potentialities, the realization of which depends on many factors, including, of course, political.”

The First Deputy Atomic Energy Minister, Lev Ryabev, said August 13 that “no concrete agreements have been achieved…. No contracts have been signed,” according to the Russian news agency Interfax. “I would not like to say that we will build only one reactor. But I also would not like to say that we will certainly build six or any other number of reactors, since any such statements would be premature,” he added.

Although there is no formal agreement, Iran stated its belief that Russia will follow through on the terms of the draft proposal. The plan also calls for expanding trade and industrial and technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. According to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, Iranian ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Shafei stated August 9 that “the Russian government has approved of the plan, and it has no intention of backtracking on the issue of cooperation with Iran.”

Russia’s cooperation with Iran on nuclear power projects has long been a source of concern for the United States. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea testified before the Senate July 29 that “Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, and we are concerned that the Bushehr nuclear power project is, in reality, a pretext for the creation of an infrastructure designed to help Tehran acquire atomic weapons.” The CIA has argued that cooperation on civilian nuclear projects with Russia could provide Iran with knowledge that could be used to build nuclear weapons. These concerns have been magnified by Iran’s advancing missile program and its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Iran and Russia argue that the Bushehr reactor project poses no proliferation threat. “This cooperation bears an entirely peaceful and mutually beneficial character and is fully consistent with all the international obligations of Russia, primarily in the domain of nuclear nonproliferation,” Yakovenko said. Iran is a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the reactors are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The IAEA has stated that it “has not found any evidence of diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards in Iran.” The agency noted, however, that Iran has not concluded an Additional Protocol designed to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to discover clandestine nuclear weapons programs. The Additional Protocol provides for more rigorous inspections, including inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities.

Moscow has said that it will take steps to ensure that spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor would not be used for nuclear weapons. Russia announced August 21 that it had signed an agreement with Iran to take back spent fuel from the reactor, Agence France-Presse reported. Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Andrei Malyshev said August 5 that the reactor would be operational in June 2004, according to Interfax.

U.S. Irked by Potential Growth in Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran

KEDO Pours Concrete for North Korean Nuclear Reactor

September 2002

By Paul Kerr

The Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) held a ceremony August 7 in Kumho, North Korea, to mark the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first light-water reactor (LWR) that the United States agreed to provide North Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Jack Pritchard, the U.S. representative to KEDO and State Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, attended the ceremony. Pritchard is the most senior U.S. official to visit North Korea since former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did so in October 2000, and his presence was widely regarded as a signal of U.S. support for the Agreed Framework, which has been uncertain throughout the Bush administration.

Under the Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to construct two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors in North Korea in exchange for a freeze on the country’s nuclear program and eventual dismantlement of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. KEDO is the international consortium implementing the agreement. The first reactor was originally scheduled to be completed by 2003, but construction has fallen behind schedule and the reactor is not expected to be finished before 2008, barring further delays.

Washington’s commitment to completing its obligations under the framework has been in question since President Bush put talks with Pyongyang on hold last year. The president subsequently indicated that the United States would like to resume negotiations with North Korea, but in his January 29 State of the Union address he then named the country a member of the “axis of evil,” citing Pyongyang’s attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. (See ACT, March 2002.) On March 20, the Bush administration refused to certify that North Korea was fully complying with the Agreed Framework, a congressionally mandated condition for KEDO to receive U.S. funding. Bush waived the certification requirement, however, and funding for KEDO was not affected. (See ACT, April 2002.)

State Department spokesman Philip Reeker praised the pouring of concrete as evidence of the “tangible progress made in construction and the importance to the reactor project’s ultimate success.” Chang Sun-sup, the chairman of KEDO’s executive board, stated that the ceremony might increase North Korea’s “confidence in the project,” noting that North Korea had been “wary of whether or not the LWR construction would even be completed.”

The United States used the ceremony as an opportunity to urge North Korea to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguarding procedures as soon as possible. The Agreed Framework says that North Korea must fully comply with IAEA safeguards, which are designed to provide an accurate accounting of all North Korean nuclear material and to prevent its diversion to military activities, when “a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components.”

The United States, however, wants North Korea to begin cooperation with the IAEA as soon as possible because the agency needs approximately three to four years to complete inspections, according to a State Department official interviewed August 15. There are concerns that waiting to start inspections until a significant portion of the project is completed would jeopardize the Agreed Framework’s ultimate success because it would further delay completion of the light-water reactors and generate additional political opposition in the United States.

North Korea told the United States, South Korea, and Japan that it would not allow IAEA inspections for at least three years, the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported August 8—an expression consistent with past North Korean positions on inspections, according to the State Department official. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman stated August 13 that “the U.S. just started the ground concrete tamping recently, far from meeting the target to complete…construction by 2003 as it had promised to do,” according to the state-owned Korean Central News Agency.

Pyongyang said that delays in completing the reactor project might motivate it to pull out of the agreement. The Foreign Ministry spokesman added that the Agreed Framework “stands at the crossroads of abrogation or preservation…. The reality is pushing us to the phase where we should make a final decision to go our own way.”

KEDO Pours Concrete for North Korean Nuclear Reactor

Pentagon Opts for Sea-Based Missile Defense Radar

September 2002

By Wade Boese

Shelving earlier Pentagon plans to build an advanced missile defense radar on a remote Alaskan island, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awarded a $31 million contract August 1 to Boeing to begin development of a sea-based X-band radar for missile defense testing.

MDA wants the floating X-band radar, which is designed to track and discriminate among warheads, decoys, and debris in outer space with high precision, operational by September 2005. MDA estimates that completing the project will total $900 million.

The August 1 contract only covers activities during the first phase of a four-part program. During the initial phase, which lasts until October of this year, Boeing will do preliminary design work and reserve construction materials for building the sea-based platform.

Congress will need to authorize funding for the radar, which will be done through reprogramming existing money rather than requesting new funds. In other words, MDA is not planning to ask for additional money to pay for the radar, but will take funds from other missile defense projects.

MDA decided to pursue a sea-based version of the radar rather than building it on land because the sea-based version’s mobility would enable more varied testing of proposed missile defense systems, according to an MDA spokesperson. The official explained that the sea-based version would be capable of testing 13 different intercept trajectories, whereas various land-based locations would be limited to tracking objects in up to five scenarios at most.
The Pentagon might still build an X-band radar on land as part of a deployed missile defense system, but no deployment decisions have been made, the spokesperson said.

MDA will, however, upgrade the existing Cobra Dane radar, a less precise radar than an X-band radar, on Shemya Island at the western tip of the Aleutians for use in testing missile defense systems. The upgrade is scheduled to be finished by September 2004.
During the Clinton administration, Pentagon plans called for building an X-band radar on Shemya. Department of Defense officials pushed President Bill Clinton to authorize starting construction at Shemya before he left office, but he declined in September 2000.

Building a sea-based X-band radar was not part of the Clinton administration’s missile defense plans. A sea-based radar would have violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which is now no longer in force following the June 13 U.S. withdrawal. (See ACT, July/August 2002.) The ABM Treaty ruled out, among other things, development, testing, and deployment of sea-based components for defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.

Pentagon Opts for Sea-Based Missile Defense Radar

U.S. Sends Conflicting Signals on North Korea

September 2002

By Paul Kerr

Secretary of State Colin Powell briefly met with his North Korean counterpart July 31 in the highest-level exchange between the two countries since the Bush administration took office, but the United States continued to call the North Korean regime “evil” and has not yet decided whether to send an envoy to Pyongyang as had been discussed.

Powell met briefly with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Brunei. The meeting followed a U.S. decision July 2 to cancel a planned delegation to North Korea. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher cited Pyongyang’s failure to respond to a proposed July 10 meeting date, as well as a June 29 naval skirmish between North and South Korea, for canceling the visit.

U.S.-North Korea talks that began during the Clinton administration had focused on implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework and negotiating a new agreement to end North Korea’s missile program and exports. The Bush administration stated in June 2001 that it was willing to meet with Pyongyang but linked progress on nuclear weapons and missiles to a broader agenda, including conventional forces on the Korean Peninsula and Pyongyang’s human rights record.

The administration is now considering whether to send Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to Pyongyang in the near future. “Our view now is that at an appropriate time a trip by Mr. Kelly is probably warranted,” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said August 28.

Despite these signs that the Bush administration is interested in dialogue with North Korea, John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, gave a strongly worded speech in Seoul August 29 criticizing its government. North Korea is “an evil regime that is armed to the teeth, including with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,” Bolton said, adding that the country “has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on Earth.”

In addition, the State Department announced August 23 that it had imposed sanctions the previous week on Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea and on the North Korean government itself for proliferating missile technology to Yemen. The sanctions prohibit the U.S. government and businesses from participating in North Korean government activities related to the development or production of missile equipment or technology, electronics, space systems, or military aircraft. However, because of existing legal restrictions on U.S. interaction with North Korea, the new sanctions are largely symbolic.

Apparently to indicate that the sanctions were not intended as a diplomatic signal, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said August 23 that the sanctions were a “pro forma requirement under the law for the State Department” and that Washington is willing to “talk with North Korea any time, any place.”

U.S. Sends Conflicting Signals on North Korea

ABL Flies, but Government Agency Warns Sky Is Not Clear

September 2002

By Wade Boese

An aircraft designed to carry a laser that would shoot down ballistic missiles shortly after their launch made its inaugural test-flight July 18. The flight came just days after the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that certain technology key to building the laser has not yet been sufficiently developed and that the program lacks clear criteria for determining when the aircraft will be ready for production and use.

The Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft, a modified Boeing 747, took off from a Kansas air base and flew for about 90 minutes in its first flight, which was aimed at testing the plane’s airworthiness after several modifications, including the installation of a 12,000-pound rotating turret in its nose. Because the laser is not yet fully developed and has not been installed, the aircraft was loaded with metal bearings to help stabilize it.

Since the July 18 flight, the aircraft has flown six additional times. An Air Force spokesperson reported that the flights have gone well, although program officials removed a pod on top of the plane because they believed it was causing air turbulence problems. The pod is designed to house a laser that will track missile targets.

There is no exact schedule for how many more flights will be conducted this year. “We will do as many as necessary to verify satisfactory performance of the aircraft,” the Air Force spokesperson explained.
Current plans, however, call for the Air Force to begin installing the laser next year. During that process, the aircraft will be grounded.

The first ABL attempt to intercept a ballistic missile in flight is scheduled for late 2004, and an official deployment date is set for 2010, although the Pentagon wants two or three ABL aircraft ready for emergency use between 2006 and 2008. When the Air Force initiated the program in 1996, it
originally estimated that it would start to deploy ABL aircraft by 2006.

GAO Critiques ABL

In a July 12 report on the ABL program, GAO charged that the Air Force had underestimated the difficulty of the project, leading to ill-informed estimates about how long it would take to develop the system and what it would cost. GAO is a nonpartisan body tasked with carrying out studies and investigations requested by members of Congress.

To date, $1.7 billion has been spent on ABL. The Air Force initially projected that ABL development would total $2.5 billion, but last year that estimate jumped to $3.7 billion. GAO, however, reported that predicting realistic costs remains “very difficult” because important ABL technologies are still unproven. The cost of the system may therefore continue to rise.

Although finding that some progress has been made in developing ABL, GAO reported that the devices intended to stabilize the laser, as well as the mirrors and windows used to focus and guide the laser beam, have not yet shown that they can work as part of an overall system. GAO determined that the target-tracking hardware, safety systems, and devices that help adjust for air turbulence are more advanced, but said that they are not yet ready for incorporation into a final system. Program officials shared these assessments, according to the GAO report.

GAO and program officials differed only in their evaluations of the laser itself. Program officials ranked it as being further along in the development process than did GAO, which does not believe the laser has proven itself capable of functioning as part of a broader system.

Program officials have only tested a one-module laser with surrogate components under controlled conditions. The laser to be installed on the aircraft next year is intended to be comprised of six modules, although original plans set the requirement for a 14-module laser. (Laser energy is generated within a module; the more modules there are, the more powerful the laser will be.) Air Force officials initially set the weight limit of the 14-module laser at less than 175,000 pounds, but the six-module laser is projected to weigh about 180,000 pounds, suggesting that the program may be having design difficulties.

In addition to highlighting the program’s immature technologies, GAO charged that there is no “disciplined process” by which program officials can effectively manage the program’s development toward production. GAO said the program lacks criteria by which officials can judge whether the program is ready to go from one development stage to the next.

If the ABL program does not institute a clearly defined process for moving the system through the various stages of development, GAO warned that the Pentagon faces “greater cost and schedule risks.”

After reading a preliminary draft of the GAO report, the Pentagon said that it does have such a process in place, explaining that technologies and systems under development move forward when testing proves them reliable.

ABL Flies, but Government Agency Warns Sky Is Not Clear

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