August 2000 Pentagon Report on NMD Technology

After having been withheld from Congress by the Pentagon for more than eight months, an internal Defense Department report detailing program delays and testing failures of the national missile defense (NMD) system was made public June 26. (See Congress Releases Pentagon Report Criticizing Clinton NMD for news coverage.) The report concluded that the program was falling behind schedule at a rate of 20 months every three years and warned that it was unlikely that a 2005 target date for having an operational system in place could be met without restructuring the program. Since that report was written last August, the NMD program has experienced further delays.

The report was the contribution of the Pentagon’s office of operational test and evaluation to the broader Department of Defense Deployment Readiness Review, which was conducted last summer to inform the president’s decision on whether to begin NMD deployment. On September 1, 2000, President Bill Clinton announced that he would not authorize deployment, saying there was not “enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system.”

Led by Representative John Tierney (D-MA), members of Congress pushed for copies of the report after learning of its existence through testimony by Philip Coyle, then-director of the office of operational test and evaluation, at a hearing held September 8, 2000. The Pentagon delayed giving Congress the report until May 31, at which time it asked that the report be made available only to members of Congress and their professional staffs, not the public.

Noting that the Pentagon had never claimed that the report or any information in it was classified, Tierney charged in a June 12 letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that he believed the Pentagon was seeking to keep the report “hidden from public view” because it “indicates that there are critical flaws in the missile defense program.” Tierney implied the report would be made publicly available, though he offered to wait until June 15 if the Pentagon wanted to make its case for restricting access to the report. The report became available June 26.

Excerpted below are the Introduction, Summary, and Recommendations sections, including footnotes, from the report. The full report, which provides a program overview and details each flight test extensively, can be accessed on the Web site of the Minority Office of the House Committee on Government Reform at www.house.gov/reform/min/nmd.html.

I. Introduction

The Department of Defense Deployment Readiness Review (DRR) for National Missile Defense (NMD) will recommend to the President whether to begin the process of deploying an initial capability to defend all fifty of the United States against limited attacks from “states of concern”¹ or from accidental or unauthorized launches.² A decision to move toward deployment will permit site preparation for an X-band radar in Shemya, Alaska; construction schedules call for this decision by November 2000 if an operational capability is to be ready by 2005.³

This report provides an independent assessment of the NMD system’s potential operational effectiveness and suitability at this time. Since NMD is still early in its development process, the data available for this assessment is limited, particularly at the system level. There also have been development delays, planned simulations were not available, and several important test events have slipped beyond the DRR. Also, it is unusual for a major defense acquisition program to be placing emphasis on a deployment decision based on limited data four or more years before the scheduled start of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). We recognize that we are making our assessment of operational effectiveness before the system has completed development, and we expect our assessment will change as the system evolves.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has defined—and OSD [office of the secretary of defense] has approved⁴—seven Deployment Readiness Criteria for this DRR. These criteria address the potential of the NMD design and technology to meet the User’s operational requirements, the ability to manufacture, field and sustain the initial system and, lastly, its affordability. This report focuses on the three criteria related to operational effectiveness and suitability,⁵ and our assessment is made relative to the threshold ORD [operational requirement document] requirements for the initial increment of the NMD system called Capability 1 or C1. In addition to assessing how well the criteria have been demonstrated from a technical standpoint, this report also addresses the impact of test limitations and NMD Program evolution on the operational utility of a system to be deployed by 2005. We make only minimal comment on the criteria addressing manufacturing, contractual readiness, and affordability.

This report draws from data from the Integrated Flight Tests, Integrated Ground Tests, and exercises at the Joint National Test Facility (JNTF). We also draw on developmental test data at the element level, such as radar data gathered in Risk Reduction Flights, to the very limited extent that it is available. We have reviewed products from both the Lead System Integrator (LSI) and the joint Operational Test Agency (OTA) team, have monitored tests and exercises, and have attended design review and test analysis meetings. A complete listing of data products used is given in Appendix B.

II. Summary

The NMD system has partially fulfilled the three Deployment Readiness Criteria relating to operational performance, a finding based on the results from ground and integrated flight testing conducted to date. The NMD program has experienced significant delays in development and testing. Unless the program is restructured, the proposed deployment schedule is not likely to be realized. Also, the operational role of the limited system that might be initially deployed is still evolving. Lastly, the NMD Program has not yet developed a plan for growing the initial C1 capability to the full objective system.

A. DEMONSTRATION OF DEPLOYMENT READINESS CRITERIA

Criterion #1: “Demonstration of integrated system/element level functions through integrated ground and flight test [sic], including two intercepts…of which one must be an integrated system test. To protect the FY05 IOC [initial operational capability], a single intercept allows award of construction contracts (but not the start of construction), long haul communications, and approval of necessary long lead hardware.”⁶

This criterion has not been fully met since the NMD system has not achieved two intercepts nor demonstrated integrated system performance with a successful intercept. It did achieve an intercept in IFT-3 [integrated flight test], which permits the award of construction contracts and acquisition of long lead hardware to protect the FY05 IOC. Furthermore, a significant, but not complete, degree of system functionality has been demonstrated with prototypes and surrogates. In each test, new functionality has been demonstrated in one element or another, and the program intends to integrate new performance features as it moves forward. The successful intercept was achieved in a test focused on demonstrating hit-to-kill and was not in an integrated system test with all the system elements represented.

The demonstrations of system functionality have significant caveats associated with them, including reliance on surrogate elements and range assets, e.g., GPS and/or the FPQ-14 range radar for engagement planning including Weapon Task Plan generation. Also, the scope of the threat presented in the flight tests was limited. Chapter V discusses this area in more detail.

Criterion #2: “An assessment of the ability of NMD system design to meet system performance requirements as specified in the NMD ORD.” The assessment addresses four Key Performance Parameters (KPPs):

1. Defense of the United States (at ORD specified levels)
2. Human-in-Control
3. Automated BMC3
4. Interoperability

The NMD system’s ability to defend all fifty states from attacks at ORD-specified levels (KPP #1) can not [sic] be satisfactorily assessed, primarily because the simulations that were to demonstrate this with confidence and high fidelity have not developed as planned.

Integrated Ground Tests (IGTs), using the computer processor-in-the-loop Integrated System Test Capability (ISTC) simulation, were to provide operationally realistic data on 13 “design-to” scenarios. A high fidelity digital simulation, the LSI Integration Distributed Simulation (LIDS), was to have been used by the contractor and OTA team to perform analysis of an even broader set of scenarios to demonstrate that the entire United States would be adequately defended. The ISTC proved to be too immature to provide reliable estimates of performance, and the development of the digital simulation, LIDS, is behind schedule and was not available to support analyses of overall system performance as originally intended.

Battle Planning Exercises and C2Sims [command and control simulations] show that the system has demonstrated satisfactory progress in meeting two of the four required KPPs, namely, Human-in-Control and automated BMC3 [battle management, command, control, and communications]. Demonstration of the interoperability KPP has not yet begun.⁷ Refer to Chapter V for more details.

Criterion #3: Maturity of the deployable system design, including the potential to evolve to counter more sophisticated threats.

Design reviews have not identified any significant issues pertaining to the maturity of the design of the NMD system or elements. However, the ability to perform a credible assessment of NMD design maturity is confounded by the current immature state of ground test facilities and models and simulations. Furthermore, the JPO [joint program office] has not yet developed a formal, credible plan for evolving the design from C1 to C2/C3. In particular, the ability to discriminate more sophisticated countermeasures needs special consideration.

Discrimination is a technical challenge for the hit-to-kill NMD system and a cause of concern regarding the potential of the C1 system to evolve to an effective C2 and C3 capability. The program has presented analysis and simulation results that indicate that techniques to discriminate unsophisticated countermeasures are in hand. However, the target suites flown in the three intercept tests to date included only two objects—an RV [re-entry vehicle] and a large balloon—and the EKV [exoatmospheric kill vehicle] was required to discriminate the RV from only the large balloon and deployment bus, objects with signatures very dissimilar to the RV.⁸ The EKV did successfully discriminate in IFT-3, but this demonstration is modest relative to the C1 threat space of unsophisticated countermeasures. Tests using balloons that match elements of the RV’s signature begin with IFT-9, scheduled for late FY 2002. The present lack of a high fidelity hardware-in-the-loop facility precludes convincing demonstrations of discrimination against the broader set of unsophisticated countermeasures, except in flight test.

Evolution of the C1 system to counter more sophisticated countermeasures has not been described by the NMD program in detail. We are unaware of any significant simulation efforts that address the issue of meeting C2 performance levels using either the EKV alone or with the discrimination capability of the radar. In addition, the current C1 test program does not consider other simple unsophisticated countermeasures—those falling outside the strict definition of “unsophisticated” yet seemingly simple to implement, e.g., tumbling RVs and non-spherical balloons.

B. OPERATIONAL SCOPE

Over the recent course of the development program, the intended operational role of an NMD system has been defined in different ways. These differences are reflected in inconsistencies in requirements documentation and, thus, there is some ambiguity as to what is really desired.

The NMD Program transitioned from a technology readiness program to a Major Defense Acquisition Program in 1996. The 1997 BMDO Report to Congress (RTC) stated the objective of the system “to defend the United States from an emerging Rest-of-World (ROW) rogue state ballistic missile threat or against a limited or unauthorized missile launch.”⁹ That Report also stated that:

The intelligence community has concluded that no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states; only a North Korean missile in development, the Taepo Dong 2, could conceivably have sufficient range to strike portions of Alaska or the far-western Hawaiian Islands, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low. [italics added]

—1997 BMDO Report to Congress, Page 3-3*

Consistent with this threat estimate, thirteen “design-to” scenarios were developed that included both ROW threats and accidental or unauthorized launches by established nuclear powers. Only four of the thirteen scenarios posited launches by ROW or rogue states; the rest postulated accidental or unauthorized launches by the major declared nuclear powers, including launches at targets on the East Coast. The thirteen design-to scenarios assumed unsophisticated countermeasures only.

The NMD Program’s focus appears to have shifted to the threat posed by North Korea with the accidental/unauthorized threat becoming a secondary consideration. The recently issued Defense Planning Guidance Update FY 2002-2007 goes further, defining the purpose of NMD in terms of only rogue nations. The recently revised NMD ORD continues to mention accidental and unauthorized launches prominently. DoD [Department of Defense] and BMDO leadership have identified a limited missile attack from states of concern as a primary threat while continuing to mention some “residual” capability to defend against the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental launch of more sophisticated threats.¹⁰ Thus, there is some ambiguity in the operational requirements, particularly in defining the nature of the residual capability expected from NMD.

Contractually, the LSI contractor is required to deliver a C1 Capability that is effective against threats that deploy only “unsophisticated” countermeasures; this has not changed since the contract’s inception. It is now recognized that accidental or unauthorized launches could employ countermeasures that would be considered sophisticated according to the definition in the LSI contract. A more aggressive program to complete the evaluation of C1 performance against unsophisticated countermeasures and to explore the technology to address more sophisticated countermeasures would better define the residual capability and move development toward realizing a C2 capability.

C. SCHEDULE ISSUES

Since the program was restructured in January 1999, the NMD program has experienced numerous program development delays, while the construction and production schedules have not slipped. To the program’s credit, the flight test program has been event driven, with tests conducted only when the Program Office felt ready. As a result, IFT-3 was conducted 18 months behind the original 1996 schedule and four months behind the 1999 schedule. More recently, as illustrated in Figure II-1 [not shown], additional significant test slips have occurred since the January 1999 program restructure. In particular, IFT-5 was to be conducted about six months before a June 2000 DRR but was actually executed on 8 July. This forced the DRR to be moved to August 2000. IFT-6, which had also been planned to precede the DRR, is expected to occur in January or February 2001.

Development delays have already caused schedule slips of flight tests of the tactical booster to beyond the DRR. Boost Vehicle (BV) test #1 was originally scheduled for February 2000, then July 2000, and now [the] second quarter of FY01. BV2 has slipped about a year. BV3, the first test to integrate the EKV with the booster, is behind about a year and a half. Additionally, the first use of the operational booster stack in an intercept test will now occur in IFT-8, vice IFT-7 as originally planned. As a result, the authorization of long lead acquisition for the Capability 1 (C1) interceptor system will have to be delayed commensurate with that testing.

Delays in the flight test program are the most visible, but developmental problems in simulation and ground test facilities may have an even greater impact. Since the flight test scenarios are severely constrained, ground testing and simulation are critical to evaluating system performance and the fulfillment of ORD requirements. The shortfalls in ISTC and delays in the LIDS delivery have already been mentioned.

Unless these trends are reversed, an IOC in FY05 appears unlikely. Figure II-2 illustrates the trend of development schedule slips and estimates schedules slipping at a rate of 20 months every three years. If these trends persist and efforts by the NMD Joint Program Office (JPO) to “buy back” schedule are unsuccessful, the first flight test with a production representative interceptor (IFT-13), scheduled for the first quarter of FY03, would slip about two years.

VI. Recommendations

A. FLIGHT TESTING

1. Testing Complexity

Testing is currently designed to accommodate an aggressive pace of development. Flight testing, however, needs to aggressively increase in complexity to keep pace with NMD C1 development and to adequately stress design limits, particularly for the missile system.

—How will an EKV respond to another EKV in its field of view, or multiple RVs in its field of view?

—How is the performance of an EKV seeker affected by a thrusting EKV or another EKV intercepting an object in its field of view?

—Can the X-Band radar simultaneously track multiple RVs that require different antenna orientations?

—Can the IFICS communicate with multiple KVs?

• Target suites used in integrated flight tests need to incorporate challenging unsophisticated countermeasures that have the potential to be used against the NMD C1 system (e.g., tumbling RVs and non-spherical balloons). Use of the large balloon should be discontinued, as it does not mimic in any way the current test RV. True decoys that attempt to replicate RV signatures as well as balloon-type countermeasures that have been examined by the Countermeasures Hands-On Program (CHOP) need to be integrated into flight-test target suites.
• Engagement times of day and solar position need to be planned to stress the acquisition and discrimination process by all of the sensor bands. Additionally, the effects of weather on radar, telemetry and satellite operations need to be tested either during intercept or risk reduction flight tests or other targets of opportunity. Radar discrimination, IFICS transmission/reception, and DSP/SBIRS [Defense Support Program/Space Based Infrared System] launch detection may be operating at their technical limits, and heavy rain or dense cloud conditions may have significant effects on their performance.
• Category B engagements are engagements in which an interceptor is launched against a target cluster (based on radar track) before the threat RV is resolved and discriminated. Since such engagements are expected to be common during NMD missions, this capability will need to be demonstrated in an integrated flight test before IOC. Such engagements are currently not included in the defined test plan.
• Multiple engagements will be the expected norm in tactical situations, therefore, simulated extrapolation from 1-on-1 scenarios to M-on-N need to be validated through intercept flight testing. Multiple engagements of at least 2-on-2 scenarios need to be flight tested, as too many technical challenges to the system exist beyond merely the command and control software. Identifying the impact of the interaction of one kill vehicle to another and assessing the performance of ground tracking systems in M-on-N scenarios lead to several questions:
• Radar discrimination with limited a priori knowledge of the target complex needs to be flight tested prior to the FY01 radar decision. This type of test (“pop quiz” type) of flight test needs to be executed, at least during a risk reduction flight. This test should employ multiple decoys designed to mimic the RV radar signature but should not provide unrealistically detailed target or decoy information to the GBR-P radar prior to the engagement.

2. Testing Artificiality

Current test range limitations need to be removed to adequately test the NMD system.

• Use of the FPQ-14 range radar as the source of Weapon Task Plan data needs to be phased out. Target trajectories or radar surrogate locations need to be changed to permit the organic NMD system to provide early radar cueing with the appropriate degree of position and velocity accuracy.
• Engagement geometries need to be devised that will provide higher speed engagement conditions for the EKV, as would be expected in the C1 timeframe with the tactical booster.

3. Operational Realism

Avoidable limitations to operational realism must be removed before conduct of IOT&E [initial operational test and evaluation].

• Rehearsed engagements with a priori knowledge of target complex, target trajectory, and time of launch need to be discontinued during operational testing. Situations employing lack of a priori knowledge also need to be examined in DT to assure acquisition and discrimination algorithms are properly designed.
• The flight testing artificialities addressed above must be eliminated for IOT&E. Alternative intercept test scenarios must be devised that employ inbound or crossing targets rather than outbound relative to the Early Warning Radar. GPS and midcourse radar tracking using a transponder cannot be used by the NMD system to perform its mission. The Weapon Task Plan must be prepared based on organic NMD tracking systems. Option for higher speed intercepts must be investigated.
• Deployed element usage needs to be maximized for IOT&E. The X-Band Radar and/or Upgraded Early Warning Radar should be used. Deployed IFICS ground antennas and tactical communications should also be tested as part of the IOT&E.
• Multiple engagements must be accomplished during IOT&E. Furthermore, this type of engagement should be flown in IFTs before IOT&E to maximize the chance of success in IOT&E.

4. Spares

Plans for providing adequate spares should be developed, especially for targets where current target components can be as much as 30 years old.

• Adequate GBI booster spares need to be procured as a risk reduction effort, to preclude further schedule slip should a failure occur in preflight booster testing.
• NMD is currently employing what is referred to as a “rolling spare” concept for its targets. It can take up to six weeks to prepare for and reset the IFT launch date. A “hot spare” approach for which an additional target is prepared at the target launch site would eliminate the need to stand down operations at the interceptor launch site in the event of a failed target launch. This could be more significant as flight testing becomes more complex or critical, such as in the small number of OT [operational test] shots, when a failed target launch might be much more costly to the program. The delay to the target launch during IFT-5 is a strong example of this potential problem. If the last minute target problems could not have been corrected, IFT-5 would have slipped an additional month.

B. GROUND TESTING AND SIMULATION

1. Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWIL)

An innovative new approach needs to be taken towards HWIL testing of the EKV, so that potential design problems or discrimination challenges can be wrung out on the ground in lieu of expensive flight tests.

• HWIL development needs to focus on the EKV, since this is the most challenging technical area for NMD hit-to-kill. Funding and development needs to be accelerated or the required capability in this area will not be available to support C1 testing.
• The HWIL facility and test approach needs to be done at the highest level of EKV system integration achievable, so that all component interaction, from sensors to the divert systems, can be examined simultaneously.
• An innovative approach should be taken that provides an interactive scene generation capability that adapts to changes in EKV and target aspect angles.
• Scene generation should have the capability to challenge target acquisition by the EKV, discrimination and homing algorithms with anticipated or potential countermeasures.

2. Lethality

Current analysis of exoatmospheric lethality is limited to computer simulations and light gas gun tests.

• New techniques or facilities need to be developed to achieve higher speed intercepts on the ground in full scale to validate hydrocode simulations and ¼ scale light gas gun test.
• Investments need to be made in the Holloman High Speed Test Track to permit lethality testing of medium to high fidelity representations of the kill vehicle to at least the low end of the range of potential intercept velocities.

3. Simulation

LIDS development had taken much longer than originally promised. Additionally, it is practically a hard-wired simulation that only the Boeing developers can modify. This precludes independent, Government sensitivity analysis and assessment.

• LIDS needs to evolve to a fully validated high fidelity simulation. It should be flexible enough to allow both DOT&E [director, operational test and evaluation] and Service Operational Test Agencies to examine subsystem drop-outs and graceful degradation or other areas of sensitivity or design margin analysis. There is currently no apparent plan by the LSI to do this.

C. PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES

1. Performance Criteria

Discrimination by the radar and weapons system (EKV) should be given more weight in performance criteria. All other aspects of the NMD performance requirements appear to be within the state of the art of technology. Discrimination by the EKV on the other hand will be the biggest challenge to achieving a hit-to-kill intercept. Decoys that provide a close representation of the RV or modify the RV signature have only been minimally investigated.

2. ORD Reliability Requirements

The NMD requirements for reliability, availability, and effectiveness are specified in the NMD ORD. When these requirements are allocated to the individual elements of the NMD system, the resulting reliability performance standards are unrealistically high as well as difficult to test. As the program develops, it may be necessary to re-examine the overall requirements for NMD reliability and availability.

3. Risk Reduction Efforts

The following programs can make significant contributions to risk reduction efforts if properly utilized.

• Minuteman Missile OPEVAL [operational evaluation] testing needs to continue to be leveraged, not only for IFT rehearsal, but also to look at the impact of countermeasures to ground radar systems.
• Ballistic Missile Critical Measurements Program tests need to be conducted to examine countermeasure signatures and discrimination algorithms.

4. Countermeasures Hands-On Program (CHOP)

BMDO sponsors a red team approach to the possible development of countermeasures. Operated at very modest funding levels, CHOP develops and demonstrates ROW countermeasures that could be challenging for U.S. missile defense systems. By charter, CHOP does not try to develop “sophisticated” countermeasures. However, the unsophisticated, ROW countermeasures they do develop are realistic and challenging and should be included as an integral part of the NMD flight testing and ground test HWIL simulation programs.

• The CHOP program needs to be supported for aggressively examining the potential of states of concern to develop more sophisticated countermeasures.
• The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) needs to begin tracking CHOP experiments. They should then investigate and bound the ability of states of concern to develop and apply the technologies that the CHOP teams use in their experiments to counter an NMD system. This information should then be fed back to CHOP management for planning and executing CHOP developments.

5. Operations in a Nuclear Environment (OPINE)

The NMD Program Office chartered a red team to look at OPINE testing and facility requirements for the EKV. The red team found the Raytheon-proposed test and parts screening program to be inadequate.

• OPINE testing needs to be conducted at the EKV system level in nuclear environments that replicate expected operational conditions, including expected flux levels.
• OPINE test facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Arnold Engineering Development Center need to receive appropriate and timely funding to support EKV OPINE testing required to begin in FY02.

6. Hit to Kill

The NMD Program Office should investigate lethality enhancement options for dealing with potential countermeasures, using relatively simple techniques, that try to alter the effective RV size or shape in an attempt to foil discrimination and aimpoint selection.

NOTES
* ACT Editor’s Note: Both the italics in the BMDO report quote and the notation “[italics added]” are in the original text.
1. Formerly referred to as rogue states.
2. NMD ORD Revision (Approved 27 June 2000).
3. A DAB is planned for FY 2001 to authorize upgrades to Early Warning Radars and to build the XBR. A DAB in FY 2003 will authorize procurement and deployment of the interceptors.
4. The NMD deployment readiness criteria were approved by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) in June 1999.
5. Traditionally, operational assessments address the Critical Operational Issues (COIs) listed in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). A crosswalk (see Appendix A) between the OSD approved Deployment Readiness Criteria and the COIs defined in Part IV of the TEMP indicates that the criteria pertaining to operational effectiveness and suitability generally span the space defined by the COIs, with one major exception. The Deployment Readiness Criteria do not explicitly address the system survivability and security (COI-5); Criterion 6 (Capability to Sustain the System) could be broadly interpreted to cover this area.
6. Briefing by BG Willie Nance, NMD Decision Criteria, 11 June 1999. Criteria approved by USD(A&T), 23 June 1999.
7. The approved ORD of January 1997 had only KPPs 1-3. The addition of the interoperability KPP was raised in 1999 but was not formally added until the new June 2000 ORD was approved. Assessing interoperability was not part of the LSI evaluation plan for the DRR.
8. The deployment process can create incidental debris in addition to the objects intentionally deployed. On IFT-5, the large balloon was carried but apparently did not deploy.
9. RTC, page 3-1.
10. For example, on February 2, 1999, the Secretary of Defense stated: “The primary mission of the NMD system being developed is the defense of the U.S.—all 50 states—against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack such as could be posed by a rogue nation. Such a system also would provide some capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from more nuclear-capable states.