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Global Missile Proliferation: June 2001
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For more information, contact Alex Wagner
Missile Ranges
1. The ranges and payloads, given in kilometers (km) and kilograms (kg), respectively, are estimates based on unclassified sources. However, these numbers do not reflect either the missiles’ maximum range or their heaviest possible payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range, and likewise a heavier payload would decrease it.
2. Eight states formerly part of or allied with the Soviet Union retain the Soviet SS-21 and Scud-B missiles. Additionally, according to the CIA, Russian and Chinese technological and material support remains critical to any continued development of Iranian and Pakistani missile programs. A February 2001 CIA report notes that “despite overall improvements” in curtailing missile assistance, Russian entities continue to “supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya.” The report says that Russia’s assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program is “substantial,” particularly in accelerating Iranian development of the Shahab-3. Although China has pledged to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime’s prohibition on the transfer of complete missile systems, the CIA contends that continued Chinese assistance is critical to both Pakistan’s rapid movement toward serial production of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and development of the two-stage Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile.
3. Bulgaria is believed to retain eight SS-23 intermediate-range missiles. According to Ambassador Steven Steiner, U.S. representative to the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission, the U.S. government has determined that the Soviet Union “negotiated in bad faith” by failing to notify the United States of the transfer of the missiles to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia at the time of the treaty’s negotiation. As a result, those missiles were not accounted for in the treaty’s prohibitions. Steiner said that the United States has been engaging Bulgaria—which possesses the last remaining SS-23s in Europe—in discussions aimed at dismantling the missiles and that he is “optimistic” that they will “eventually” be eliminated.
4. The status of India’s Agni-2 remains unclear. The Indian Foreign Ministry announced that the Agni-2 had reached its “final operational configuration” after its apparently successful test in January 2001. Indian press reports also cite Indian officials claiming that the missile is ready to enter “serial production” and will be “inducted” in 2001 into India’s arsenal.
5. Iraq’s missiles with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers, as well as Iraq ’s capability to develop and produce them, were to be destroyed as part of the settlement that ended the Persian Gulf War. In December 1992, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) claimed to have destroyed all of Iraq’s proscribed ballistic missiles as well as items related to their production and development. However, in October 1996, UNSCOM admitted that “in the missile area, Iraq has still not fully accounted for all proscribed weapons, items, and capabilities.” In a 2001 report, the Department of Defense notes, “Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and Scud-variant SRBMs…as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others [in anticipation of] the reestablishment of a long-range ballistic missile force.”
Global Missile Proliferation: June 2001
Twenty-eight states besides the five de jure nuclear-weapon states possess ballistic missiles. However, fewer than 10 have the capability to indigenously develop or maintain their missiles, and only five—India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea—have produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges over 1,000 kilometers. The majority of other states with ballistic missiles possess short-range Scuds or SS-21s inherited or purchased from the Soviet Union. According to the CIA, Russia, China, and North Korea are the largest suppliers of ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise.The North Korean and Iranian missile programs are frequently cited as being of concern to the United States and as the rationale for the development of a U.S. national missile defense. Iran most recently tested a variant of the Shahab-3 in September 2000 and continues to develop its medium-range missiles. North Korea flight-tested a 2,000-kilometer-range Taepo Dong-1 in August 1998 but has pledged not to conduct any further flight tests while negotiating with the United States on ending its missile program and exports.
For more information, contact Alex Wagner
| COUNTRY | SYSTEM | STATUS | RANGE/PAYLOAD1 | SOURCE2 |
| Afghanistan | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | USSR |
| Armenia | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | Russia |
| Azerbaijan | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | USSR |
| Bahrain | ATACMS | To Be Delivered 8/2002 | 165 km/560 kg | USA |
| Belarus | SS-21
Scud-B |
Operational
Operational |
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg |
USSR
USSR |
| Bulgaria3 | Scud-B
SS-23 |
Operational
Operational |
300 km/1,000 kg
500 km/ 450 kg |
USSR
USSR |
| Egypt | Scud-B
Project-T Scud-C Vector |
Operational
Operational Operational Development |
300 km/1,000 kg
450 km/985 kg 550 km/600 kg 685 km/450 kg |
USSR
Domestic/DPRK DPRK Domestic/DPRK |
| Georgia | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | USSR |
| Greece | ATACMS | Operational | 165 km/560 kg | USA |
| India4 | Prithvi-1
Prithvi-2 Dhanush Sagarika (SLCM?) Agni-1 Agni-2 Agni-3 Surya |
Operational
Operational Tested/Development Development Prototype Only Serial Production? Development Development |
150 km/1,000 kg
250 km/500 kg 350 km/1,000 kg 350 km/500 kg 1,500 km/1,000 kg 2,000 km/1,000 kg 3,000-5,500 km/? kg 5,500+ km/2,000 kg |
Domestic Production
Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic/Russia Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic/Russia |
| Iran | Mushak-120
CSS-8 Mushak-160 Scud-B Scud-C Shahab-3 Shahab-4 Shahab-5 |
Operational
Operational Operational Operational Operational Tested/Development Development Concept Stage |
130 km/150 kg
150 km/190 kg 160 km/~500 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 550 km/600 kg 1,300 km/700 kg 2,000 km/1,000 kg 3,000-5,500 km/1,000 kg |
Domestic/China
China Domestic/China Libya/DPRK DPRK Domestic/DPRK/Russia Domestic/DPRK/Russia Domestic/Russia |
| Iraq5 | Ababil-100
Al Samoud Scud-B Al Hussein Al Abbas |
Development
Tested/Development Destroyed Destroyed Destroyed |
100-150 km/300 kg
150 km/300 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 600-650 km/500 kg 900 km/300 kg |
Domestic Production
Domestic Production USSR Domestic/USSR Domestic/USSR |
| Israel | Lance
Jericho-1 Jericho-2 Jericho-3 |
Operational
Operational Operational Development |
130 km/450 kg
500 km/500 kg 1,500 km/1,000 kg 2,500 km/1,000 kg |
USA
Domestic/France Domestic/France Domestic |
| Kazakhstan | Tochka-U (SS-21) | Operational | 120 km/480 kg | USSR |
| Libya | Al Fatah
Scud-B Scud-C Nodong-1 |
Tested/Development
Operational Potential Acquisition Potential Acquisition |
200 km/500 kg
300 km/1,000 kg 550 km/600 kg 1,300 km/750 kg |
Domestic Production
USSR DPRK DPRK |
| North Korea (DPRK) | Scud-B
Scud-C variant Nodong-1 Nodong-2 Taepo Dong-1 Taepo Dong-2 |
Operational
Operational Operational Development Tested/Development Development |
300 km/1,000 kg
550 km/700 kg 1,300 km/750 kg 1,500 km/770 kg 2,000 km/1,000 kg 5,000-6,000 km/1,000 kg |
Domestic Production
Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production Domestic Production |
| Pakistan | Hatf-1
M-11 Hatf-2 Hatf-3 (M-11 Derivative) Tarmuk (M-11 Derivative) Shaheen-1 Ghauri-1 Shaheen-2 Ghaznavi Ghauri-2 |
Operational
Operational Program Canceled? Development Development Tested/Development Tested/Development Development Development Tested/Development |
80-100 km/500 kg
280 km/800 kg 300 km/500 kg 300 km/500 kg 300 km/800 kg 750 km/500 kg 1,300+ km/700 kg 2,000 km/? kg 2,000 km/? kg 2,300 km/700 kg |
Domestic Production
China Domestic/China Domestic/China Domestic/China Domestic/China Domestic/DPRK Domestic/DPRK Domestic Production Domestic/DPRK |
| Saudi Arabia | CSS-2 | Operational | 2,800 km/2,150 kg | China |
| Slovakia | SS-21
Scud-B |
Operational
Operational |
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg |
USSR
USSR |
| South Korea | ATACMS
NHK-1 NHK-2 |
Operational
Operational Not Yet Deployed |
165 km/560 kg
180 km/500 kg 260 km/450 kg |
USA
USA USA |
| Syria | SS-21
Scud-B Scud-C Scud-D |
Operational
Operational Operational Tested/Development |
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg 500 km/600 kg 750 km/200 kg |
USSR
Domestic/USSR Domestic/DPRK Domestic/DPRK |
| Taiwan | Ching Feng
Tien Chi |
Operational
Development |
130 km/270 kg
300 km/500 kg |
Domestic/USA/Israel?
Domestic Production |
| Turkey | ATACMS | Operational | 165 km/560 kg | USA |
| Turkmenistan | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | USSR |
| Ukraine | SS-21
Scud-B |
Operational
Operational |
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg |
USSR
USSR |
| United Arab Emirates | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | USSR |
| Vietnam | Scud-B | Operational | 300 km/1,000 kg | USSR |
| Yemen | SS-21
Scud-B |
Operational
Operational |
120 km/480 kg
300 km/1,000 kg |
USSR
USSR |
| SRBM | Short-range ballistic missile (<1,000 km) |
| MRBM | Medium-range ballistic missile (1,000-3,000 km) |
| IRBM | Intermediate-range ballistic missile (3,000-5,500 km) |
| ICBM | Intercontinetal ballistic missile (5,500+ km) |
1. The ranges and payloads, given in kilometers (km) and kilograms (kg), respectively, are estimates based on unclassified sources. However, these numbers do not reflect either the missiles’ maximum range or their heaviest possible payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range, and likewise a heavier payload would decrease it.
2. Eight states formerly part of or allied with the Soviet Union retain the Soviet SS-21 and Scud-B missiles. Additionally, according to the CIA, Russian and Chinese technological and material support remains critical to any continued development of Iranian and Pakistani missile programs. A February 2001 CIA report notes that “despite overall improvements” in curtailing missile assistance, Russian entities continue to “supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya.” The report says that Russia’s assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program is “substantial,” particularly in accelerating Iranian development of the Shahab-3. Although China has pledged to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime’s prohibition on the transfer of complete missile systems, the CIA contends that continued Chinese assistance is critical to both Pakistan’s rapid movement toward serial production of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and development of the two-stage Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile.
3. Bulgaria is believed to retain eight SS-23 intermediate-range missiles. According to Ambassador Steven Steiner, U.S. representative to the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission, the U.S. government has determined that the Soviet Union “negotiated in bad faith” by failing to notify the United States of the transfer of the missiles to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia at the time of the treaty’s negotiation. As a result, those missiles were not accounted for in the treaty’s prohibitions. Steiner said that the United States has been engaging Bulgaria—which possesses the last remaining SS-23s in Europe—in discussions aimed at dismantling the missiles and that he is “optimistic” that they will “eventually” be eliminated.
4. The status of India’s Agni-2 remains unclear. The Indian Foreign Ministry announced that the Agni-2 had reached its “final operational configuration” after its apparently successful test in January 2001. Indian press reports also cite Indian officials claiming that the missile is ready to enter “serial production” and will be “inducted” in 2001 into India’s arsenal.
5. Iraq’s missiles with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers, as well as Iraq ’s capability to develop and produce them, were to be destroyed as part of the settlement that ended the Persian Gulf War. In December 1992, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) claimed to have destroyed all of Iraq’s proscribed ballistic missiles as well as items related to their production and development. However, in October 1996, UNSCOM admitted that “in the missile area, Iraq has still not fully accounted for all proscribed weapons, items, and capabilities.” In a 2001 report, the Department of Defense notes, “Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and Scud-variant SRBMs…as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others [in anticipation of] the reestablishment of a long-range ballistic missile force.”
Sources:
Central Intelligence Agency,
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 20 June 2000,
February 2001;
Department of Defense,
Proliferation: Threat and Response,
January 2001;
National Air Intelligence Center:
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,
September 2000;
Arms Control Association; International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance: 2000-2001;
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nonproliferation Project:
World Missile Chart;
Federation of American Scientists.