No Pressure From the People

October 2000

By Mark S. Mellman with Adam Burns and Sam Munger

Survey researchers are usually called upon to write pieces like this about issues that are salient, significant, or electorally consequential. In this case, I am being asked to discuss an issue that is, from the perspective of domestic U.S. politics, insignificant, unimportant, and inconsequential: national missile defense (NMD). This is not to say that national missile defense is substantively irrelevant or that it would have no effect on U.S. relations with allies and adversaries or that it is of only marginal importance to U.S. national security. It is simply to say that the issue will have no impact on this fall's election.

Specifically, Republicans will have no success in challenging President Clinton's decision not to deploy an NMD system or in parlaying that decision into votes against Vice President Gore or other Democrats. The public traditionally trusts Republicans more than Democrats on matters of defense, and the GOP had apparently hoped to use the issue of missile defense in this year's campaign. But national missile defense is unlikely to emerge as a central political issue in November for four basic reasons:

• Americans are paying scant attention to the issue and exhibit little interest in it.
• Defense in general, and missile defense in particular, are extremely low priorities for the American people.
• While, in the abstract, Americans prefer to be protected rather than be left unprotected, they only want a system if it works both technically and politically.
• Given the uncertainty about the viability of a missile defense system, most Americans agree with the president's decision to delay deployment.

Our latest poll, taken just after the president's September 1 announcement at Georgetown University, shows that Americans back the decision not to deploy a missile defense by 58 percent to 30 percent. It will be difficult for missile defense supporters to rally voters against the president's decision when theirs is the minority viewpoint. Furthermore, barring major developments, there is little reason to think that these attitudes will change significantly next year, no matter who is elected president. It is therefore unlikely that there will be any real public pressure on the next president to move forward on national missile defense before he is certain that a system will work effectively.

Little Interest in a Low Priority

It has been clear for some time—certainly well before September 1—that missile defense has little resonance with the American public. In response to a question in a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll in July, only 11 percent of respondents reported that they had been following the issue "very closely." Apparently, many of those supposedly paying close attention nevertheless had very little information about missile defense because a CBS/New York Times poll in June found only 6 percent who had heard or read "a lot" about the debate surrounding NMD.

The reason for this relative apathy is that defense generally, and missile defense in particular, are very low priorities for the public. When we asked voters in April to select from a list of the most important issues facing the nation, 28 percent said education, 14 percent chose protecting Social Security and Medicare, and another 14 percent named healthcare. By contrast, only 4 percent selected maintaining a strong military, and a mere 1 percent believed building a national missile defense should be the country's top priority. (See chart on next page.)

When faced with a trade-off, Americans would rather spend federal dollars on education, Social Security, tax cuts, and crime prevention than on national missile defense. By a 63-point margin, people believe that spending to improve education (77 percent) should take precedence over spending to build a national missile defense system (14 percent). Similarly, by a 55-point margin, they believe that protecting Social Security and Medicare (72 percent) should take priority over missile defense (17 percent). Fighting crime and cutting taxes are also deemed more important priorities by substantial 49-point and 26-point margins, respectively.

Even within the realm of defense spending, missile defense takes a back seat to other priorities that the public considers more pressing. By a 30-point margin (54 percent to 24 percent), Americans believe spending on military training and pay should be a higher priority than spending on missile defense. Spending to develop defenses against terrorist attack is also regarded as more important than missile defense by 56 percent to 28 percent. Only spending to improve our conventional weapons arsenal is deemed less important than missile defense by a narrow 7-point margin (42 percent to 35 percent).

Interestingly, self-identified Republicans deem all spending priorities tested, including spending on conventional weapons, more important than national missile defense. Republican voters give the highest margin (40 points) to spending on education (64 percent for education compared with 24 percent for missile defense) and the slimmest margin (3 points) to spending on conventional weapons (40 percent to 37 percent). Democrats and independents are more likely to support missile defense over a conventional weapons buildup, by 4-point and 18-point margins, respectively.

Only If It Works

Missile defense supporters have made much of polls purporting to show public support for the system. When offered the abstract choice between being protected and not being protected, it is hardly surprising that Americans prefer protection. Indeed, one wonders what could be going on in the minds of those who would simply prefer to be unguarded from nuclear missile attack.

But it is quite clear that Americans are only willing to spend money on such protection if they are confident national missile defense will work, both technologically and politically. In fact, voters think that each of the four criteria President Clinton said he would consider in making a deployment decision—cost, threat, readiness of the technology, and strategic impact, including on arms control agreements—is important and should be addressed.

Americans demand a high degree of accountability for spending on missile defense. Fifty-four percent favor a proposal that would require the Pentagon to certify each year that substantial progress is being made before additional money is spent on national missile defense. If an independent body cannot certify that substantial progress is being made, Americans support an end to funding for the program. Only 14 percent are opposed to such an accountability measure and 31 percent are undecided. Fifty-nine percent of those who favor missile defense support this plan as well.

In addition to certification of progress, Americans overwhelmingly (62 percent) believe that all 19 of the scheduled tests of the missile defense technology should be completed before the decision is made to authorize deployment of the system. Very few (11 percent) agree that deciding to deploy an NMD after only four (subsequently changed to three by the Pentagon) of the 19 tests is appropriate. Republican voters (64 percent) are even more likely than Democrats (59 percent) to want all 19 tests of the technology completed prior to the decision to deploy.

When asked to rate the importance of a variety of considerations to an NMD deployment decision ("very important," "somewhat important," "not too important," or "not important at all"), Americans said that a number of factors should be considered before missile defense is deployed. Most important is whether upcoming tests of missile defense technology show that the system works (54 percent "very important," 82 percent total "important"). Americans also say that, before deploying a missile defense, it is important to determine whether the threat of missiles being fired at the United States is real (54 percent "very important," 81 percent total "important").

Nearly half say that determining whether our nation can afford to build a missile defense system is a very important factor to consider as well (48 percent "very important," 79 percent total "important"). Important to only somewhat fewer are whether Russia will agree to changes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which bans each country from building a national missile defense system (40 percent "very important," 73 percent total "important"), and whether deployment of this defense will lead to an increase in the number of Russian and Chinese nuclear missiles aimed at the United States (39 percent "very important," 70 percent total "important").

CBS/New York Times pollsters took a different approach but reached the same conclusion. When asked what their view would be if many scientists concluded that the system would not work, only 25 percent favored continuing to try to build it. In response to another question on this poll, only 25 percent supported continuation of the program if it meant the United States would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Our own polling in April found that, after arguments both for and against deciding to deploy a national missile defense system this year were presented (see box), a majority supported waiting until after the 19 tests are completed. Fifty-nine percent (43 percent strongly) favored waiting until testing is complete while only 20 percent (16 percent strongly) favored deciding this year. One-in-five were undecided (21 percent).

Support crossed demographic lines, with large majorities of both men (59 percent to 21 percent) and women (58 percent to 20 percent) favoring waiting until testing is complete. Fifty-nine percent of whites and 63 percent of non-whites also favor completing tests, as opposed to 21 percent and 16 percent, respectively, who oppose waiting. Support also extends across education level—majorities of those with no high school education (50 percent to 23 percent), a high school education (55 percent to 18 percent), some college education (63 percent to 20 percent), and a college degree or beyond (60 percent to 22 percent) all favor waiting until testing is complete before deploying a missile system. The desire to wait is clear across the country: Northeasterners (65 percent, 13 percent), Midwesterners (59 percent, 21 percent), Southerners (57 percent, 23 percent), and Westerners (55 percent, 22 percent) all prefer to wait on a decision to deploy rather than to decide now.

Even after the system passes its tests, Americans harbor grave doubts about its long-term utility. More than two-thirds (68 percent) believe that within five to 10 years our enemies will develop technology to evade whatever missile defense system we build. In short, voters believe the system is likely to be obsolete before it is fully deployed.

Americans further believe that pursuing international agreements to eliminate nuclear weapons, implementing a nuclear test ban treaty, and continuing to assist Russia with the dismantling of its nuclear arsenal are more effective ways to protect the United States from the nuclear threats posed by other countries than building a national missile defense. More than half (56 percent) say that continuing to pursue arms control agreements and weapons dismantlement programs is a more effective defense against nuclear threats than having a national missile defense system. Just over a quarter (27 percent) believe pursuing missile defense would be more effective protection. Support for more traditional arms control crosses party lines with a majority of both Democrats (57 percent to 24 percent) and Republicans (50 percent to 33 percent) believing international agreements and dismantling weapons are a better defense against nuclear threats than a missile defense system.

Conclusions

Some issues are truly compelling, generating real public interest and animated debate over kitchen tables. Not so national missile defense. The public is far more interested in domestic issues, and to the extent that they do care about defense policy, the American people consider issues like military pay and our ability to deal with terrorist threats more important than NMD.

Given these factors and the fact that voters support President Clinton's decision by an almost two-to-one margin, NMD will likely be an inconsequential factor in the 2000 presidential election. Voters are not going to decide to vote for one candidate over another on the basis of their stances on missile defense. The polling data also suggest that there will be little to no public pressure on the next president, whoever he is, to act on missile defense before he is ready. Of course, should there be a Republican Congress, it may well continue to push the White House toward a decision to deploy a missile defense. But the public wants the next president to make a considered decision and deploy only a system that works from both a technical and a political perspective.

It is difficult to make political hay out of an issue to which no one is paying attention, and it is even harder to inject an issue into the political fray about which no one cares. For better or worse, defense and foreign affairs are low priorities for voters, and NMD ranks low even among those issues. This is simply not the stuff of an electorally significant issue, now or in the future.