Holding the CTBT Hostage in the Senate: The 'Stealth' Strategy of Helms and Lott

June/July 1998

In the present climate of partisan political conflict that seems to pervade every foreign and security policy issue before Congress, two powerful Senate leaders are actively blocking consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)—the longest-sought nuclear arms control goal since the dawn of the nuclear age. In the months following President Bill Clinton's September 1997 transmittal of the agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R NC), with the full support of Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), has refused to hold a single formal committee hearing on the pact. Although their opposition to the CTBT is out of step with the vast majority of the American people and a growing majority of senators, including all Democrats as well as other Republicans, their blocking actions will almost certainly push the CTBT debate into 1999 and perhaps beyond. Further delay carries high risks.

Senate inaction on the CTBT threatens to undermine the U.S. leadership role in ending nuclear testing and curbing nuclear proliferation around the globe, especially in South Asia. The May test explosions by India and Pakistan have shaken the non-proliferation regime and threaten a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent unless both nations accede—at the earliest possible time—to a de jure ban on further tests and agree to freeze their nuclear weapons programs. The already difficult effort to secure India's and Pakistan's accession to the test ban, which has now been signed by 150 states, will be undermined as long as Lott and Helms hold the CTBT hostage.

At the end of July, only 17 countries have ratified the treaty, including nine of the 44 states which must ratify the accord to trigger its entry into force. U.S. ratification and leadership on the CTBT is needed to secure ratification by other key nations, including Russia, China, Israel as well as India and Pakistan. Many signatories are no doubt waiting for the United States, Russia and China to act on the treaty (Britain and France ratified in April), as the accord's provisions are primarily intended to halt further improvements and developments in the programs of the five nuclear-weapon states.

Moreover, failure on the part of the Senate to promptly approve the CTBT risks the possibility that the United States will not be a state-party to the treaty when the first significant CTBT "deadline" arrives next year, possibly as early as September. Under the provisions of the treaty, if the test ban has not entered into force three years after it opened for signature, a special conference of states-parties could be convened to help expedite entry into force.

As a signatory, the United States would be able to attend the conference as an observer, but it could be limited in its ability to influence the necessary consensus decision.

Finally, if the United States, Russia and China have not ratified the CTBT by 2000, the next review conference on the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) scheduled for that year may produce further challenges to that treaty's credibility and authority. Indeed, the commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to achieve a comprehensive test ban in 1996 was a major reason why the non-nuclear-weapon states agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.

Ingredients for Success

Presidents and congressional leaders can act on major legislation and treaties expeditiously—when they choose to do so. Thirty five years ago this September, President John F. Kennedy, backed by strong anti nuclear sentiment, secured Senate approval of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) only seven weeks after it was signed in Moscow, and a mere three weeks after he transmitted the treaty to the Senate for its approval. In 1972, only 10 weeks after President Richard Nixon signed the ABM Treaty, the Senate approved it by an overwhelming vote of 88-2.

The records of the 1963 LTBT ratification debate and other Senate arms control treaty debates, including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was approved only last year, demonstrate that securing the support of two thirds of the Senate requires several key ingredients and some fortuitous timing. Among the factors are strong leadership from the executive branch and skill in working with Congress; broad support among the public and opinion-makers and the ability to harness that into Senate support; support from key Senate leaders and other influential senators (particularly Republicans); favorable international events; and, given that elected officials rarely take action on even the most urgent of issues unless they are forced to, the presence of a deadline for consideration of a treaty.

A Promising Start

At the time of the president's State of the Union address in January 1998, in which he called for approval of the treaty by the end of the year, the prospects for Senate action on the CTBT appeared to be improving. The president and his point-man for the treaty, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Bell, kicked off efforts with the powerful endorsement for Senate approval of the CTBT from four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General John Shalikashvili (1993–1997); General Colin Powell (1989–1993); Admiral William Crowe (1985–1989); and General David Jones (1978–1982).

The Joint Chiefs' statement was quickly followed by important votes of confidence from other key constituencies. During Clinton's tour of Los Alamos National Laboratory in February, the directors of the nation's three major nuclear weapons laboratories announced: "We are confident that the [Department of Energy's] Stockpile Stewardship program will enable us to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing." Only days later, the American Association for the Advancement of Science added its voice, urging the Senate to approve the treaty "as soon as possible."

In major speeches and op eds, cabinet officials and treaty proponents in the Senate made the case for U.S. leadership on the test ban. Recalling that the negotiation and implementation of a CTBT has been a goal of Democratic and Republican presidents beginning with Dwight Eisenhower, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February:

An essential part of our strategy to reduce the nuclear danger is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now pending before the Senate. By ending testing, we can hinder both the development and spread of new and more dangerous weapons. The CTBT…has the support of 70 percent of the American people. And it holds the promise of a world forever free of nuclear explosions. But if we are to fulfill this promise, America must lead the way this year in ratifying the Treaty, just as we did in negotiating and signing it. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully seek an early opportunity to testify before this Committee on a treaty that our citizens want and our interests demand.(1)

Helms' 'Stealth Campaign'

By January, however, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee had already staked out his position. In a January 21 letter to Clinton, Helms stated that the committee would only consider the CTBT after the panel and the Senate dealt with recently signed agreements related to the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Convention on Climate Change—neither of which have been transmitted to the Senate:

Mr. President, I feel obliged to make clear to you my concern that your Administration has been unwisely and unnecessarily engaged in delay in submitting these treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. Despite your commitment, made nearly eight months ago, to submit the amendments to the ABM Treaty to the Senate, we have yet to see them. Ironically, while the Administration has delayed in submitting these vital treaties to the Senate, some in your Administration have indicated that the White House will press the Senate for swift ratification of the [CTBT], immediately following the vote on NATO expansion. Such a deliberate confrontation would be exceedingly unwise because, Mr. President, the CTBT is very low on the Committee's list of priorities. The treaty has no chance of entering into force for a decade or more.

Of course, Helms' accusation of Clinton administration foot dragging on submitting the ABM protocols conveniently ignores the fact that the administration negotiated and signed the agreements (to multilateralize the treaty and codify restraints on theater missile defense systems) to help induce the Russian Duma to ratify the long delayed START II accord. Senate action on the ABM protocols prior to Duma ratification of START II could unravel the already uncertain U.S. Russian strategic arms control process, especially if the Senate rejected the agreements.

Nevertheless, Helms' refusal to allow his committee to consider the CTBT serves at least two purposes. First, by holding the treaty hostage to the ballistic missile defense goals of right wing critics of the administration's programs, Helms is seeking to shift blame for inaction on nuclear security matters from the Senate leadership to the executive branch. His stalling on the CTBT is a thinly veiled attempt to force early Senate consideration and rejection of the ABM protocols that, in Helms' view, might result in the abrogation of the ABM Treaty itself. Such developments would, at the very least, further reduce prospects for Russian ratification of START II and the pursuit of other nuclear risk reduction initiatives. Second, Helms' strenuous opposition serves to intimidate many Senate Republicans—who are now characterized as undecided on the treaty—from openly expressing support for the test ban. Loathe to expend their political capital fighting the powerful chairman over a treaty for which there is no clear deadline for action, only a handful of Republicans have publicly called for prompt Senate consideration or approval of the treaty.

Delaware Senator Joseph Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has argued that the Republican leaders "do not even want to debate us on the merits. Tangentially, legitimate questions are raised, but [CTBT opponents] refuse to raise them in…either the committee and/or on the Senate floor. And so what you have is a stealth campaign here to kill this treaty by not allowing it to come up." In Biden's opinion, "[I]f we had a hearing and had a vote on the CTBT, we would win overwhelmingly."(2)

Yet, despite the Clinton administration's high profile call to action and overwhelming support for the treaty from editorial writers across the country,(3) undecided senators have refrained from publicly declaring their support for the CTBT even though no new opposition to the treaty materialized through the first several months of the year. As long as this political stalemate continues, Helms' strategy of avoiding hearings and a floor vote on the popular treaty may continue to work.

South Asia's Nuclear Wake-Up Call

Since the 1950s, world leaders have sought a test ban treaty to help curb nuclear arms races through a prohibition on nuclear testing, which is important for the development of new and more advanced bomb types. The basic obligation of the CTBT, which commits states-parties not to undertake "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion," will help end the qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals. Although first conceived to deal with the U.S. Soviet nuclear rivalry, more recently the treaty is also considered vital to putting the brakes on regional nuclear arms competition. The May 1998 nuclear blasts by India and Pakistan certainly made many policy makers, including several senators, reconsider the political and security benefits of the CTBT.

In a May 13 statement, Senator Tom Harkin (D IA) conveyed the views of many Senate test ban advocates:

I believe we need to press ahead with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty…. In fact, we thought we were going to get it all done in August of 1996, except one nation walked out and refused to sign it—India. And now we know why. Is it too late for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? I don't believe so. In fact, I believe what has happened in India more than anything indicates that we have to act now in the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.(4)

In the days and weeks following the tests, administration officials reiterated that message. In his May 16 radio address from the Group of Eight (G 8) summit in Birmingham, England, Clinton said, "Now it's all the more important that the Senate act quickly [on the CTBT], this year, so that we can increase the pressure on, and the isolation of, other nations that may be considering their own nuclear test explosions."

Most significantly, however, the South Asian nuclear crisis re engaged many senators on nuclear weapons issues, which recently had been overshadowed by other foreign policy concerns such as NATO expansion and the military conflict in Kosovo. Senator Arlen Specter (R PA) was prompted to express his support for Senate approval of the CTBT for the first time. Together with Biden, Specter circulated a non-binding "Sense of the Senate" resolution that calls on the Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings and calls on the Senate to debate and vote on the issue "as expeditiously as possible."

In a May 19 letter to other senators seeking co sponsors, Specter and Biden warned that "failure by the United States Senate to ratify the treaty may give rise to an inference that the United States government is not serious about banning nuclear testing and may, in effect, encourage or at least not discourage such testing."

Other Republican senators joined the call for prompt CTBT hearings, including Judd Gregg (NH), Jim Jeffords (NH) and Olympia Snowe (ME). On May 28, Snowe spoke out for the first time on the test ban: "I strongly believe that the appropriate committees of Congress…must hold hearings and consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before both legislative bodies adjourn for the year in October."(5)

While the South Asian tests injected a new sense of urgency among treaty proponents and led additional senators to express support for the test ban, they also prompted Helms and Lott, at least initially, to dig in, repeating their standard concerns about the CTBT's verifiability and the ability of the U.S. weapons laboratories to maintain a safe and reliable deterrent force without test explosions. But the two senators have since moved even further away from the views of the vast majority of American voters as to how to deal with the crisis. In the majority leader's first significant statement on the treaty, Lott suggested that the CTBT had actually prompted India to conduct the tests: "[I]t now appears that the Administration's push for the CTBT actually accelerated the greatest proliferation disaster in decades: two new nuclear powers emerging in the last few weeks."(6) The assertion is false.

Since the 1960s, India has pursued and preserved its "nuclear option" and now, with the ascendancy of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has long advocated that India "induct" nuclear weapons into its military arsenal, that option has been exercised and demonstrated. The reality is that India has so far refused to sign the CTBT because it wants to retain the nuclear option, not because the United States (and 149 other countries) are pressing for a test ban. As Biden has argued: "…India and Pakistan refused to sign that treaty precisely because they did not want to sign it and then violate it. International norms do matter. That's why we should consider the treaty as soon as possible."(7) And despite the fact that India's and Pakistan's tests did not violate international law because neither country is a state-party to the CTBT or the NPT, Lott claims the May tests make the CTBT "irrelevant." Helms argues, somewhat differently, that the United States should "refuse to allow India to paper over its actions by signing the CTBT," even as he criticizes India and Pakistan for their nuclear blasts.

Such approaches are illogical and counterproductive to the goal of reducing the danger of a regional nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan or India and China. The day after India completed its second test series, Ambassador Paul Warnke warned that "to back off our own commitment to global adherence to the [test ban] treaty would only give aid and comfort to nuclear adventurism in South Asia."(8) It is naive to think that additional nuclear explosions by New Delhi or Islamabad would be of no significance. Such tests would allow additional refinement of nuclear warhead designs—including miniaturization and reliability improvements—and would further escalate tensions and increase the risk of a nuclear conflict.

While Lott and Helms dismiss the CTBT as a key component of the strategy to curb the arms race in South Asia, they fail to offer meaningful alternatives. In a May 29 press statement, Lott suggested that U.S. policy "should shift [to] multilateral sanctions and a reappraisal of U.S. export control, proliferation and arms control policies" as a consequence of the "nuclear spiral in Asia."

The sanctions imposed by the United States and other governments do help send a message to India, Pakistan and others that nuclear testing is contrary to the will of the international community. But sanctions are only useful if they are combined with efforts to encourage the offending states to abandon the policies and behaviors that triggered sanctions and prod them to adopt policies that contribute to international stability and security. In the case of India and Pakistan, the international community must encourage both states to join the CTBT without conditions; refrain from nuclear weapons deployment; end fissile material production for weapons purposes; and resolve their dispute over Kashmir, perhaps the key for heading off a future conflict on the subcontinent. Sanctions and policy reappraisals alone will do nothing to reverse the dangerous course of events in South Asia.

Lott also suggests that U.S. policy should shift from pressing for implementation of the CTBT—the very treaty that would prohibit the tests that set off the recent crisis—to the construction of "effective" missile defenses. Not only are such defenses not cost effective, but to date there is no evidence that such systems can work. While missile defenses may play some future role in protecting forward deployed U.S. military personnel from very limited attack, ballistic missile defenses have no practical bearing on the nuclear arms crisis that exists today in South Asia.

The CTBT critics' argument of last resort is that the accord's entry-into-force provision means that the treaty is unlikely to take effect for several years, and that the South Asian tests underscore the non-support of two of the 44 named states. In fact, the May tests have shaken the Indian government's previously firm position against participation in the CTBT. U.S. diplomacy, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, combined with global criticism and economic and financial sanctions have led both India's and Pakistan's political leadership to reconsider joining the test ban regime. While an affront to the global non testing norm, India's and Pakistan's tests may in the long run help expedite the CTBT's entry into force. However, leadership on the test ban by the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states will be necessary to realize that goal.

Reaction to the Indian and Pakistani tests and the CTBT from American opinion-makers outside the capital contrasts sharply with that of the treaty's opponents in the Senate. Since India's tests on May 11, nearly every major newspaper editorial on the subject expressed strong condemnation of the decision of both Indian and Pakistani leaders to conduct the tests and the need for U.S. leadership on the CTBT. Over 40 newspaper editorials have advocated prompt Senate consideration or approval of the CTBT; only two editorials appeared opposing the treaty. Even Denver's conservative Rocky Mountain News blasted Helms for his delaying tactics:

Because of its Helms inspired lollygagging, the United States has sacrificed moral authority as well as leadership on the issue. U.S. action on the treaty could prompt action by other nations. Once it is in force, there would be enormous political pressure on all nations to live up to its terms. Because it takes testing to further develop weapons, current U.S. advantages would be locked in. The best way for Helms to serve America's national security interests is not to keep thwarting a vote by the full Senate, but to allow one.(9)

Vox Populi

Perhaps the most powerful factor working in favor of Senate approval of the CTBT is the American public's decades-long call for a comprehensive test ban treaty. While some treaty opponents believed that the Indian and Pakistani explosions would severely test the public's support for the CTBT, the results of new bipartisan opinion polls indicate that an overwhelming majority of American voters want the Senate to approve the CTBT and that voters strongly disagree with the arguments put forth by Helms and Lott. Moreover, support for the treaty is strong among Republicans, Democrats and independents, and among all demographic and geographic groups in six states considered pivotal to the outcome of the ratification debate.

On July 29, during a press briefing on Capitol Hill sponsored by CTBT supporters, Senators Biden and Specter released the results of new public opinion survey data on the CTBT, the South Asian tests and appropriate U.S. responses to the crisis. The opinion surveys were conducted jointly by Wirthlin Worldwide, a Republican firm, and The Mellman Group, Inc., a Democratic polling firm, for the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. The findings are based on surveys conducted jointly by the two companies in June 1998 in six states where there are one or more undecided senators (Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee and Utah), and a national survey conducted days after India's May 11 and 13 nuclear blasts.(10)

When asked: "Do you think the U.S. Senate should approve a Treaty with 140 other countries that would prohibit underground nuclear weapons explosions worldwide?", approximately three out of every four voters say the treaty should be approved. In the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani tests, public support for a treaty in the six states is stronger than that found in the nationwide poll conducted in May. (See Figure 1.) In no state does support for the test ban from Republican, Democratic, or independent voters drop below 70 percent. (See Figure 2.) Support for the CTBT is also strong among all demographic groups, including veterans and voters with family members who have served in the military.

The results of the new surveys are consistent with those from 11 nationwide polls on the test ban conducted since 1957, when President Eisenhower first sought a nuclear test ban. While poll questions have varied somewhat over the years, the public has steadily and strongly supported an end to nuclear weapons testing at levels ranging from 61 percent to 85 percent.(11)(See Figure 3.)

The Indian and Pakistani tests have penetrated the public's consciousness: at least eight out of every 10 voters in each state surveyed say they have heard about the tests, and equal numbers say the tests pose a "serious threat to international security." In several states, the more voters have heard about the tests, the greater their support for the CTBT.

CTBT Not 'Irrelevant'

The arguments offered by Lott and Helms suggesting that the South Asian tests make the CTBT "irrelevant" and make early deployment of national missile defense all the more important are clearly at odds with the views of the voting public in the six key states. According to the bipartisan polls, approximately seven out of 10 voters in each state believe the recent tests by India and Pakistan "demonstrate how important it is for the U.S. to ratify and encourage global implementation of the CTBT." (See Figure 4.)

Voters in five of the states were asked whether they "favor" or "oppose" seven possible responses to the Indian and Pakistani tests, and again, their views are at odds with those of Helms and Lott. The policy options include:

Urging India and Pakistan to approve the test ban treaty: 84 percent to 91 percent favor; 6 percent to 9 percent oppose;
Utilizing the United Nations to mediate: 79 percent to 86 percent favor; 11 percent to 16 percent oppose;
Senate ratification of the CTBT: 70 percent to 79 percent in favor; 13 percent to 18 percent oppose;
Imposing strong economic and political sanctions: 58 percent to 70 percent favor; 22 percent to 31 percent oppose; and
Increasing military spending to develop and deploy a nuclear missile defense: 23 percent to 39 percent favor; 55 percent to 73 percent oppose.

The voters' staunch support for the CTBT may be attributed to their belief that the test ban affords the United States more protection than would the resumption of nuclear tests. By a wide margin (with 71 to 85 percent in favor), voters in the five states believe that "having an international treaty that prohibits all tests" is a better way to protect the United States from the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries than "having the U.S. resume conducting nuclear tests" (favored by 8 to 18 percent).

Deadlock Remains

In the absence of hearings and a scheduled vote on the treaty, most Republican senators who are likely to vote for CTBT ratification have thus far chosen not to openly disagree with their party's leaders and risk political retribution on other matters. This factor, combined with the view of many observers that the executive branch has still not committed sufficient political capital on the treaty to make action in 1998 likely, has led several key senators to withhold their support of the Specter Biden "Sense of the Senate" resolution. One Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he believes that the Senate should consider the CTBT "more quickly," but he does not believe that the Specter-Biden resolution is "the appropriate way" to pursue committee consideration of the treaty.(12)

Specter and Biden have suggested that they might try to remind the Senate of its test ban responsibilities in other, if less direct, ways. Despite concerns about verifying compliance with the treaty, some CTBT critics on the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations seek to eliminate $28.9 million in fiscal year 1999 funding for the CTBT Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). The PrepCom is responsible for establishing the treaty's International Monitoring System (IMS), the global network of over 320 official monitoring stations, and the International Data Center (IDC), which collects and disseminates monitoring data for test ban verification. Specter and Biden seek to restore full funding, arguing that the matter illustrates the hypocrisy of those who question the verifiability of the CTBT but fail to support global test ban monitoring and verification systems that would improve U.S. intelligence capabilities—whether the CTBT is ratified or not.

Into 1999

Not unlike the circumstances that delayed consideration of the CWC in 1996 and pushed debate and final approval into 1997 (only days before the convention was to enter into force), Helms, in his role as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, is again blocking Senate consideration of an important treaty that would serve U.S. security interests. Helms' strident opposition to the CWC and his linkage of the treaty's consideration by his committee to unrelated "Republican priorities"—including the same ABM Treaty and missile defense issues—prevented the committee from ever "reporting out" the accord. It was only after Lott, as Senate majority leader, reached a unanimous consent agreement with the Democratic leadership and the White House that the CWC was released from Helms' committee and scheduled for a vote. Following Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole's last minute announcement that he was dropping his opposition to the treaty and now favored its approval—the day before the floor vote—the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification in a 74-26 vote. In the end, even Lott supported the treaty, citing the "real and lasting consequences" of a U.S. failure to ratify and that "the credibility of commitments made by two presidents, one Republican and one Democrat, is at stake."

While it appears the final vote on the CTBT has been pushed back another year, the recent debate on the treaty and the results of the bipartisan public opinion surveys confirm that the political elements essential to winning Senate approval are present today. These key ingredients, however, have not yet been combined to reach the critical mass necessary to overcome the Senate leadership's ability to block hearings and the floor vote that would likely result in Senate approval.

But several factors and potential new developments may alter the political dynamics in the Senate in a manner that improves prospects for U.S. ratification of the CTBT. The new political and military dynamics created by the recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests raise the stakes for U.S. ratification and global entry into force of the CTBT.

Ironically, the tests may also create the conditions for Indian and Pakistani participation in the test ban regime, which would vastly improve the prospects for global entry into force. Substantive progress toward Indian and/or Pakistani signature of the CTBT within the next several months would substantially increase pressure on the Senate to approve the treaty. And while the absence of a clear deadline for action on the CTBT hindered efforts to secure Senate hearings and a vote, the convening of a special conference by states-parties to the CTBT as soon as September 1999 may provide the impetus necessary to force Senate action on the treaty.

Helms and Lott may be persuaded to relent in other ways. According to Helms' spokesman, Marc Thiessen, "Chairman Helms hasn't said he was opposed under all circumstances to the CTBT."(13) Though its chances in the Duma look remote now, if Russia finally approves START II the Clinton administration will likely transmit the ABM Treaty protocols to the Senate, meeting Helms' key prerequisite for CTBT consideration. Failing Foreign Relations Committee hearings and a commitment to a vote on the CTBT, senators supportive of the test ban could, at some point, hold up Senate business until the Senate agrees to schedule a vote on the CTBT. It was in such a manner that the Senate leadership finally agreed to debate and vote on START II ratification in January 1996.

Public support for the CTBT is overwhelming, and U.S. opinion-makers seem clearly behind the treaty. However, test ban supporters must more effectively translate this support into political leadership for the treaty, especially from influential Republican senators. Of course, the most important factor affecting the course of the CTBT debate will be the ability of the executive branch to focus its energy and commit the significant political resources necessary to mount an all out effort, at the right time, even as it addresses other foreign policy priorities and political crises.

NOTES

1. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Opening Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 10, 1998. [Back]

2. Transcript of July 29, 1998 press briefing: "National Security Merits of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Washington, DC. Available from the Coalition web site: http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/comb0729.htm[Back]

3. In the period following the transmittal of the CTBT to the Senate on September 22, 1997, and India's first nuclear test series on May 11, 1998, 33 major newspaper editorials expressed support for Senate approval of the treaty while none were written in opposition to the CTBT. [Back]

4. "Nuclear Detonations in India," The Congressional Record, May 13, 1998, page S4817. [Back]

5. "Statement by Senator Snowe on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Office of Senator Olympia Snowe, May 28, 1998. [Back]

6. "Nuclear arms race in Asia makes test ban treaty irrelevant, Lott says," Office of Senator Trent Lott, May 29, 1998. [Back]

7. Laura Meyers, "Test Ban Treaty Faces Uphill Battle," Associated Press, May 30, 1998. [Back]

8. Paul Warnke, "The Unratified Treaty," The New York Times, May 14, 1998. [Back]

9. "Approve Test Ban Treaty," Rocky Mountain News, May 18, 1998, page 36A. [Back]

10. "Presentation of Findings from Statewide Surveys in Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee and Utah," by The Mellman Group, Inc. and Wirthlin Worldwide, July 1998. Interviews of registered voters in Nebraska (n=400), Oregon (n=400), Tennessee (n=503) and Utah (n=400) were conducted June 20–23, 1998. Interviews in Kansas (n=500) were conducted June 20–24, 1998. The statistical margin of error for these surveys ranged from plus or minus 4.4 percent to 4.9 percent. A subset of questions was asked on surveys in Ohio (n=800 with a margin of error of 3.5 percent) from June 8–13, 1998; Colorado (n=400 with a margin of error of 4.9 percent) from December 15–17, 1997; and a national survey of adults (n=1,000 with a margin of error of 3.1 percent) from May 15–17, 1998. All surveys were commissioned by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. This analysis, as well as the analysis for each state survey and the survey questions are available at the Coalition web site. [Back]

11. Based on information compiled from: Gallup Organization; Louis Harris and Associates; The Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc.; ICR Survey Research Group; and The Mellman Group, Inc. [Back]

12. Private conversation with author, July 22, 1998. [Back]

13. "U.S. Senators See Test Ban Treaty Approval Next Year," Bloomberg News, July 29, 1998. [Back]

Daryl G. Kimball is executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, an alliance of 17 national arms control and non-proliferation organizations.