Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: The United States

According to the National Nuclear Security Administration, as of September 2023 the United States possessed a stockpile of 3,748 warheads. Of these, the Federation of American Scientists independently estimates that 1,770 are deployed and roughly 2000 are in the reserve stockpile. In addition, another 2,000 warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement, for a total of about 5,700 nuclear warheads.

In March 2022, the Biden administration finalized its Nuclear Posture Review, detailing its strategy for the role of U.S. nuclear forces. The United States completed destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal in July 2023, just short of a September 2023 deadline. It is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has destroyed its biological weapons arsenal, although Russia alleges that U.S. biodefense research violates the BWC.

Contents

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Negative Security Assurances

Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

• The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview
• Delivery Systems
• Ballistic Missile Defense Systems
• Fissile Material
• Proliferation Record
• Nuclear Doctrine

Biological Weapons

Chemical Weapons

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

• The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
• New START
• Nuclear Reductions Beyond New START
• Conference on Disarmament (CD)
• Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
• Syrian Chemical Weapons

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Negative Security Assurances

For an introduction to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, see our factsheet.

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Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview

According to a July 2024 transparency disclosure by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the United States possessed 3,748 nuclear weapons in its military stockpile as of September 2023. Around 2,000 additional warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. While the number of stockpiled warheads is close to the 3,708 independently estimated by the Federation of American Scientists in April 2024, the number of retired warheads is much larger than expected. Previously, independent experts had believed that warhead dismantlement had resulted in about 1,300 retired warheads left. The July 2024 disclosure showed, instead, that warhead dismantlement has slowed considerably in recent years and that only 122 were dismantled in 2022, and 69 in 2023. 

While the U.S. government disclosed the size of its nuclear stockpile every year between 2010 and 2018, the Trump administration discontinued the process. The Biden administration made a single further declassification of the stockpile size in 2021, reflecting September 2020 numbers, but subsequently denied requests for further disclosures until 2024. The 2021 disclosure confirmed a warhead stockpile of 3,750 nuclear weapons.

Under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the United States can deploy no more than 1,550 treaty accountable strategic warheads on 700 deployed delivery systems until February 2021 when the treaty expires. According to a unilateral disclosure on March 2023, the United States deploys 1,419 strategic nuclear warheads on 662 strategic delivery systems.

The United States also deploys an additional 100 tactical (non-strategic) nuclear warheads based in Europe. While the United States and Russia maintain similarly sized total arsenals, the United States possesses a much larger number of strategic warheads and delivery systems while Russia possesses a much larger number of non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear warheads.

The United States is the only nation to have used nuclear weapons against another country, dropping two bombs (one apiece) on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

Delivery Systems

(For a detailed overview of current and planned U.S. nuclear modernization programs, see our fact sheet here.)

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

•  As of May 2024, the United States Air Force deploys 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs.
  • The Minuteman III has a range of over 6,000 miles (9,650-13,000 km).
  • Each missile is equipped with either one 300 kt W87 warhead or one 335 kt W78 warhead.
• Under New START, the United States reduced the number of deployed ICBMs from 450 to 400. 50 excess silos have not been destroyed but have been kept in a “warm” operational status and can be loaded with missiles relatively quickly if necessary.
• In 2015, the United States concluded a multibillion dollar, decade-long modernization program that will extend the service life of the Minuteman III to beyond 2030.  
• The U.S. Air Force is also developing a new ICBM, known as the LGM-35A Sentinel, which is intended to replace the Minuteman III between 2029 and 2035 but may enter service two years late. 

Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)

Submarines:

• The U.S. Navy operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs submarines, two of which are undergoing overhaul of their nuclear reactors at any given time. The remaining 12 are available for deployment. However, since some operational SSBNs also undergo minor repairs at any given time the actual number of SSBNs at sea usually numbers at between 8 and 10.
• 8 submarines are based out of Bangor, Washington and 6 submarines are based out of Kings Bay, Georgia.
• The submarines originally had 24 missile tubes for Trident II D5 SLBMs, but under New START, the Navy deactivated 4 tubes on each submarine, finishing this process in 2017.
• The Ohio-class submarines have a life-span of 42 years.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs):

• The Trident II D5 was first deployed in 1990 and has an operational range of 7,400-12,000 km.
• The Trident II D5 missile can hold up to eight warheads (but usually holds an average of four to five) and carries 3 variants:
  • the W88—a 475 kt Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warhead.
  • the W76-1—a 90-100 kt MIRV warhead.
  • the W76-2—an 8 kt MIRV warhead.
• To comply with New START, the Navy will not deploy more than 240 missiles. As of September 2022, 220 submarine-launched ballistic missiles were deployed. 
• An ongoing life extension program is expected to keep the Trident II D5 in service until 2042.
• The Trident II D5 is the only strategic missile in the U.S. arsenal that is deployed in a MIRV’ed warhead configuration.

Bombers

• As of May 2024, the Air Force maintains 46 nuclear-capable B-52H Stratofortress bombers and 19 nuclear-capable B-2A Spirit bombers. According to a September 2022 New START data exchange, 33 of the B-52Hs and 10 of the B-2As are deployed. 
• The Air Force plans to deploy no more than 60 nuclear-capable strategic bombers under New START.
• An estimated 850 nuclear warheads are assigned to the strategic bombers, but only about 300 are typically deployed at bomber bases.
  • B-52H Stratofortress bombers: dual-capable; can carry 20 AGM-86B cruise missiles. The AGM-86B has a range of 2,500 km and is equipped with a 5-150 kt W80-1 warhead
  • B-2A Spirit bombers: dual capable; can carry 16 B61-7, B61-11, B61-12, or B83-1 gravity bombs.
• The United States also maintains several fighter-aircraft that serve in a dual-capable role. The F-15E and F-16C have provide this capability, carrying the B61 gravity bomb. The new stealth F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter, will replace the F-16 as the U.S. Air Force’s primary nuclear-capable fighter-aircraft.

Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

The United States develops and deploys several ballistic missile defense systems around the world. To learn more, see: "U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance." 

Fissile Material

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

• The United States has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material for weapons purposes. It stopped production of HEU for weapons in 1964 and for naval reactors and other purposes in 1992.
• In March 2016, the United States announced the declassification of its national inventory of highly enriched uranium (HEU) of 585.6 tons, as of September 30, 2013.
• Estimates from 2023 place the U.S. HEU stockpile at around 483 metric tons, including 361 metric tons of military HEU in weapons or available for use in weapons and 89.5 metric tons reserved for naval fuel. 
• As of the end of 2022, the United States has about 18 metric tons of HEU remaining to be downblended of the 187 metric tons it declared as excess to defense requirements and has committed to dispose.

Plutonium

• The United States ended production of separated plutonium in 1988.
• At the end of 2014, U.S. military plutonium stockpiles amounted to a total of 87.6 declared metric tons (49.3 metric tons of which are declared as excess military plutonium).
• The United States possesses no separated civilian plutonium but at the end of 2014, an estimated 625 metric tons of plutonium were contained in spent fuel stored at civilian reactor sites.
• Under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), finalized with Russia in 2000, the United States committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium beginning in 2018. The agreement was amended in 2010 to change the agreed disposition methods, allowing Russia to abandon using mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in light-water reactors in favor of irradiating plutonium in its fast-neutron reactors. The amendment also expressed renewed U.S. commitment to provide $400 million towards the Russian disposition program. 
• Russia suspended cooperation with the agreement in November 2016. Russia contends that U.S. plans to abandon the conversion of plutonium into MOX fuel in favor of a cheaper and faster downblending method does not meet the terms of the deal because doing so would fail to change the composition of the plutonium from weapons-grade to reactor grade. 

 Proliferation Record

• A close relationship exists between U.S. and British nuclear weapons programs. The United States supplies the United Kingdom with the Trident II D5 SLBM.
• Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey all host U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements. The estimated 100 weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime, but some may be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war.
• Beginning with President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” initiative, the United States has engaged in extensive worldwide trading and exchanging of fissile materials and technical information for nuclear science research and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In 1954, an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act allowed bilateral nuclear agreements with U.S. allies to proceed, with the intent of exporting only low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel; however, this soon expanded to include HEU.
• Under the “Atoms for Peace” program a number of former, aspiring, and current nuclear-weapon states such as South Africa, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Israel all received, directly or indirectly, training and technology transfers utilized in their nuclear weapons programs. For example, in 1967, the United States supplied Iran with a 5 megawatt nuclear research reactor along with HEU fuel. Iran admitted to using the reactor in the early 1990s for the production of small amounts of Polonium-210, a radioactive substance capable of starting a chain reaction inside a nuclear weapon.
• Since the end of the Cold War the United States has tried to mitigate the adverse effects of the “Atoms for Peace” initiative and returned exported HEU and plutonium to the United States.

Nuclear Doctrine

The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that U.S. nuclear weapons have three roles: to deter strategic attacks, to assure allies and partners, and to achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails. Although U.S. President Joe Biden campaigned on a promise to adopt a declaratory policy that would have limited the role of nuclear weapons to the “sole purpose” of deterring nuclear attack against the United States or its allies, the NPR “concluded that nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attack, but also a narrow range of other high consequence, strategic-level attacks.”

Declaratory Policy

The NPR says the use of nuclear weapons will only be considered under “extreme circumstances” to defend the “vital interests” of the United States and its allies and partners. While the Trump administration’s 2018 NPR defined “extreme circumstances” as including “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” against “U.S., allied or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities,” the Biden administration’s 2022 NPR does not include a definition. For more on declaratory policy, see: Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Negative Security Assurances.

Negative Security Assurance

The 2022 NPR also includes a negative security assurance that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states that are “party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.” For more on negative security assurances, see: U.S. Negative Security Assurances at a Glance.

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Biological Weapons

• In the early 1970s, the United States destroyed its entire stockpile of biological weapons, which had been developed between 1943 and 1969.
• The United States ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975.  However, in 2001, the Bush administration opposed and killed an effort dating back to 1995 to augment the Biological Weapons Convention with a legally binding verification protocol. U.S. officials said the protocol would be too burdensome on legitimate governments and private biodefense programs, while at the same time failing to deter cheaters.
• According to a 2016 State Department report, “In December 2015 at the annual Meeting of States Parties to the BWC, the delegation of the Russian Federation asserted that the United States had knowingly transferred live anthrax spores to a foreign country for use in open-air testing, and that this constituted a ‘grave violation’ of Articles III and IV of the BWC [Biological Weapons Convention].”
• The United States maintains that these transfers were a blunder. The report also notes that, “All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the BWC. The United States continues to work toward enhancing transparency of biological defense work using the BWC confidence-building measures.”

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Chemical Weapons

• Second only to Russia, the United States had one of the largest declared stockpiles of chemical agents at the time of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s (CWC) 1997 entry into force.
• As of 2018, the United States had destroyed about 25,402 metric tons, or about 91.5 percent, of its declared chemical weapons stockpile. The United States continues work on the destruction of its Category 1 chemical agents. All of the United States’ Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons have been destroyed.
• Destruction of the United States’ remaining stockpile of chemical weapons began in 2015 at Colorado’s Pueblo Chemical Depot and in 2019 at Kentucky’s Blue Grass plant. Over half of the chemical agents once stored at the Pueblo facility and nearly 7 percent of those stored at the Blue Grass facility have been destroyed. As of March 2020, the remaining U.S. chemical weapons stockpile consists of 1,731.8 metric tons of Category 1 agents.
• The United States received several extensions on its initial deadline for chemical weapons destruction under the CWC, and it now projects that destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal will be completed by September 2023.

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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities  

New START 
In April 2010, the United States and Russia signed a successor agreement to the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) accord. The 2010 agreement, known as New START, commenced on Feb. 5, 2011. It requires that both sides reduce their arsenals to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons on no more than 700 ICBMs, SLMBs, and bombers by Feb. 5, 2018 and both sides met the limits by the deadline. In addition, it contains rigorous monitoring and verification provisions to ensure compliance with the agreement. President Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned the value of New START, calling it a “one-sided” agreement.

New START allows for a five-year extension subject to the agreement of both parties. The Trump administration conducted an interagency review on whether to extend the treaty and weighed several factors, including the lack of China’s participation in the agreement, Russia’s new and developing strategic systems, and Russian tactical delivery systems not covered by the treaty. Before the 2020 election, the Trump administration declined to confirm whether it would seek an extension, although National Security Advisor John Bolton called it “unlikely” in June 2019.

Following the inauguration of the Biden administration, the United States and the Russian Federation confirmed their agreement to extend the treaty for five years on Feb. 3, 2021.

Nuclear Reduction Beyond New START 
In February 2013, President Obama announced that the United States intended to engage with Russia to further reduce deployed strategic warheads by one-third below the New START limit to around 1,100 to 1,000 deployed warheads. However, there has been little progress toward achieving such reductions due to the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russia’s insistence that other issues, such as limits on U.S. missile defenses, be part of negotiations on further reductions. In the spring of 2019, the White House told reporters that the administration is seeking a new trilateral arms control agreement that limits all types of nuclear weapons and includes China in addition to the United States and Russia. 

In June 2023, the White House proposed that Russia and the United States pursue a follow-on treaty without preconditions. 

Conference on Disarmament (CD) 
The Conference on Disarmament was established in 1979 as a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum by the international community. At the 65-member CD, the United States has expressed support for continuing discussions on the CD's core issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and negative security assurances. The United States has been a prominent supporter of a proposed FMCT.

In March 1995, the CD took up The Shannon Mandate which established an ad hoc committee directed to negotiate an FMCT by the end of the 1995 session. A lack of consensus over verification provisions, as well as desires to hold parallel negotiations on outer space arms control issues, prevented negotiations from getting underway. Later, in May 2006, the United States introduced a draft FMCT along with a draft mandate for its negotiations. However, following an impasse in negotiations on a FMCT in 2010, the United States (and others) signaled its desire to look at alternative approaches outside the CD and called for negotiations to be moved to the United Nations General Assembly where the agreement could be endorsed by a majority vote. However, the United States no longer makes comments to this effect.

The United States does not support negotiations on PAROS, deeming it unnecessary because there are no weapons yet deployed in outer space. China and Russia continue to articulate a desire to hold parallel negotiations, a point which has further stalled efforts to begin FMCT negotiations.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
Under the Obama administration the United States played the central role in the brokering of the July 2015 JCPOA, better known as the “Iran deal,” which limits and rolls back Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Congress in September 2015 debated a resolution that would have blocked implementation of the accord, but it failed to receive enough votes to pass the Senate. In January 2016, sanctions on Iran, including those targeting the financial and oil sectors, were lifted and $100 billion worth of frozen Iranian assets were released after international inspectors confirmed that Iran had rolled back large sections of its nuclear program and met more intrusive monitoring requirements.

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