“[My time at ACA] prepared me very well for the position that I took following that with the State Department, where I then implemented and helped to implement many of the policies that we tried to promote.”
European Missile Defense: A Congressional Perspective
In January 2007, the Bush administration announced that it was beginning negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic about the possibility of placing missile defense interceptors and a radar, respectively, on their territories. The administration argues that placing such capabilities in Europe will allow the United States to protect itself and its European allies against potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile threats in the future.
I believe Congress, on a bipartisan basis, strongly supports the need to work with our allies to defend against the mutual threats that we face, including ballistic missile threats. However, as Congress reviews the administration’s proposal, we will insist on several key principles before giving our approval to move forward with the project. First, NATO must play a central role with regard to future discussions on European missile defense. Second, any future long-range U.S. missile defense system deployed in Europe should be fully integrated with the missile defense systems that NATO is developing. We also need to ensure that the system protects all allies and does not leave certain allies unprotected against short- and medium- range missile threats from Iran. Third, the system must be properly tested to ensure that we have a high degree of confidence that it will work and thereby deter potential adversaries.
European Missile Defense Must Be “NATO-ized”
Our nation’s most important security relationship is with our allies in NATO. Over the past several months, my main concern about the administration’s proposal has been the impact it has had on our relations with NATO. Specifically, I have been concerned that the administration initially sought to bypass NATO on this issue and move forward on a bilateral basis with Poland and the Czech Republic. I thought this was a mistake and publicly voiced my concerns. As I said at a March 2007 hearing of the panel that I chair, “[S]ometimes it’s faster to work with a ‘coalition of the willing,’ but such coalitions usually don’t have strong foundations.”[1] Several of America’s best friends in Europe raised similar concerns. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that “NATO is the best place for discussions on this issue [missile defense],”[2] and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for the discussion and debate on missile defense to be “NATO-ized.”[3]
I suspect that one of the reasons why the administration initially sought to move forward with a purely bilateral approach was that they were concerned that engaging NATO more fully in the program would require it to provide NATO allies with a major role in the command and control of the system. In my view, this was a false choice. There have always been asymmetries with regard to command and control within the alliance. An excellent example of this would be the alliance’s approach to nuclear weapons policy. Under the NATO nuclear model, command and control of nuclear weapons pledged to the defense of the alliance are under the exclusive control of the alliance’s nuclear powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. France, while a nuclear power, does not participate in NATO’s nuclear planning process. Although the decision to use nuclear weapons rests solely with NATO’s nuclear powers, the alliance has a framework, institutionalized through the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and High Level Group, that provides the non-nuclear members of the alliance insight and involvement into nuclear weapons policy, planning, and doctrine. This process has served the alliance well for more than 30 years, and the Bush administration and future administrations would be wise to use this as a model for future missile defense arrangements with NATO.
After a slow start and pressure from Congress, the administration has begun to engage NATO in a sustained fashion and at the appropriate level. This is encouraging. These consultations need to continue, and the administration needs to work with allies to establish a process that keeps them fully engaged on these issues.
Indivisibility of Alliance Security
The U.S. intelligence community assesses that Iran could potentially deploy a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States by 2015. Iran is also continuing its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The U.S. intelligence community’s current estimate is that Iran is five to 10 years away from developing such a capability. The intelligence community is convinced that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. In January 18 testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte stated that “our assessment is that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons. It is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and has shown more interest in protracting negotiations than reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution.” Plainly, this is a very serious threat about which we must be vigilant. Furthermore, although Iran has not yet developed a long-range ballistic missile or nuclear weapons, it currently possesses the largest force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East. These missiles are capable of striking deployed U.S. forces and friends and allies throughout the region, including NATO allies such as Turkey.
The administration’s current proposal would leave parts of southern Europe vulnerable to Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. As de Hoop Scheffer said, “[W]hen it comes to missile defense, there should be no A-League and B-League within NATO.”[4] In my view, the indivisibility of alliance security is a principle on which there can be no compromise. At their June 2007 meeting, NATO defense ministers agreed to initiate a study to examine how the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program might be integrated with the proposed U.S. system to provide protection to areas of southern Europe that would not be defended by the proposed long-range missile defense interceptors in Poland. The ALTBMD program is a command-and-control system that will allow NATO nations to integrate various national weapons systems (e.g., PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense) to defend alliance forces against ballistic missile threats of up to 3,000 kilometers. The system is currently scheduled to achieve an initial operational capability in 2010.
Given the existing short- and medium-range threat to Europe, I believe that NATO should accelerate its efforts to protect its territory and population centers against this current threat. This includes ensuring that the NATO ALTBMD system can be fully integrated with the proposed U.S. system and encouraging individual allies to acquire and deploy missile defense capabilities such as Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which are designed to counter short,- medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
Need for an Independent Review
Before Congress agrees to authorize more than $4.0 billion in total funding over the next several years for the proposed European site, it is imperative that an independent review of the administration’s proposal be performed to determine whether it is the most effective way to provide missile defense protection to our NATO allies. In their respective versions of the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization acts, both the House and Senate armed services committees directed that the secretary of defense enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center to examine the political, technical, operational, and force structure options of the administration’s proposal, as well as examine other technical options (e.g., Aegis, THAAD, the nascent Kinetic Energy Interceptor program) for extending missile defense protection to Europe. The purpose of such a study would be to ensure that Congress has the necessary information to conduct its normal oversight responsibilities. I will not support moving forward with the proposed deployment until this independent review is completed and provided to Congress.
Deterring Potential Adversaries
We must have a high degree of confidence that any future missile defense system deployed in Europe will work effectively. I have continuing concerns about the testing record of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which the administration is proposing to deploy in Europe.
This is not a partisan issue. Last year when Congress was controlled by Republicans, the House Armed Services Committee expressed its concern with the testing of the GMD system. The committee stated that it was “pre-mature to invest in the third site until the existing block 2004/2006 GMD configuration completes integrated end-to-end testing. Accordingly, the committee authorizes no funds for the third site.”[5]
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised similar concerns about the GMD system. In a March 2007 report, the GAO asserted that the GMD program has not completed sufficient flight testing to provide a high level of confidence that the system can reliably intercept ICBMs. The report stated, “In September 2006, the GMD program completed an end-to-end test of one engagement sequence that the GMD element might carry out. While this test provided some assurance that the element will work as intended, the program must test other engagement sequences, which would include other GMD assets that have not yet participated in an end-to-end test.”[6]
The Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation has also raised concerns about the testing program. In March 27 testimony before my strategic forces subcommittee, that office’s director, Dr. Charles McQueary, stated that, “to be confident in my assessment of the effectiveness [of the ballistic missile defense system], I need validated models and simulations.… They don’t exist today because [the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)] doesn’t have enough flight test data to anchor them.”[7]
What the MDA is proposing to deploy in Europe is a two-stage variant of the three-stage interceptor that is presently deployed in Alaska and California. In addition to removing the third-stage of the missile, the MDA plans to incorporate a number of changes to the missile’s avionics package, such as nuclear hardening. The first flight test of the two-stage missile is scheduled to occur in 2010. Therefore, it could be several years before we know whether the two-stage missile will work effectively.
Another area of concern that I have regarding the GMD system is the lack of reliable test targets, which is a problem across the entire missile defense program. For example, the scheduled May 2007 GMD test was aborted as a result of the failure of the target vehicle. The MDA must focus increased effort on improving the reliability of its targets program.
A GMD system deployed in Europe could help deter a potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat if one emerges. However, it would only serve as an effective deterrent if our potential adversaries believe that the system will work with a high degree of confidence. Based on the reports and testimony of the GAO and the director of the Pentagon testing office, I am not yet satisfied that it will. Although the successful GMD intercept test on September 28, 2007 was a step in the right direction, in my view, additional GMD system testing is required.
Managing Russia
Recent statements by senior Russian officials claiming that the proposed deployment of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland is a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent have no basis in fact. The system that the United States is proposing to deploy in Europe is for defense against current and future threats from rogue nations such as Iran. It is not aimed at Russia. Furthermore, Russia’s implied threats to target Poland and the Czech Republic with nuclear weapons if they host missile defense interceptors and radars are unnecessary and unwelcome.
Although I have been very disturbed by recent Russian statements, I nevertheless believe it is important that we continue to engage Russia on possible areas of missile defense cooperation. In June 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a proposal that deserves further review concerning the potential joint use of the Gabala radar located in Azerbaijan. I support the administration’s decision to engage Russia on this and other potential areas of missile defense cooperation. That said, Russia should not expect a veto over U.S. or alliance security and cooperation with Russia should not come at the price of cooperation with our NATO allies.
Engaging European Parliaments and Publics
Having just returned from a trip to Poland, the Czech Republic, and NATO headquarters, I am deeply concerned at how little agreement there is on the need for the administration’s proposed system. Simply put, the Bush administration’s public relations, or “roll out,” strategy for its proposed European sites leaves much to be desired. This has placed some very good friends of the United States, i.e., Poland and the Czech Republic, in a very difficult domestic and international political situation. Public opinion in Europe has been overwhelmingly opposed to the proposed deployment for a number of reasons. A much more sustained and coordinated effort is required to obtain parliamentary and public support on the need to defend NATO from current and future ballistic missile threats. As vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I plan to do what I can to ensure that my European counterparts receive the appropriate information about the mutual threats faced by the United States and its NATO allies.
Conclusion
Congress is committed to working with the administration and our NATO allies to develop a missile defense system to defend against the mutual ballistic missile threats that we face. Any eventual missile defense system that the United States deploys in Europe must protect all NATO allies, be able to work seamlessly with missile defense systems being developed by the alliance, and have been sufficiently tested to ensure a high level of technical confidence that the system will work.
Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
ENDNOTES
1. Ellen Tauscher, Opening Statement at the Hearing on Ballistic Missile Programs, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, U.S. House Armed Service Committee, March 27, 2007.
2. The Financial Times, March 5, 2007.
3. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Remarks before the Munich Security Conference, February 9, 2007.
4. “NATO Warns U.S. Missile Defence May Divide Allies,” Reuters, March 12, 2007.
5. “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007: Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 5122,” H. Rpt. 109-452, 109th Cong., 2d sess., p. 244.
6. Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost,” GAO-07-387, March 2007.
7. Charles McQueary, Statement at the Hearing on Ballistic Missile Programs, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, U.S. House Armed Services Committee, March 27, 2007.