On January 3, the Biden Administration issued a National Security Memorandum that “updated” U.S. policy on missile-related export controls, including U.S. implementation of multilateral commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is an informal export control arrangement among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology that was formed in 1987 and now has 35 partner countries.
The Biden administration's 11th hour update loosened four key aspects of U.S. policy in place since September 1993 in several ways.
Permitting more exports of U.S. MTCR-class missiles to more countries: The new policy provides “increased flexibility” to decide that “certain” U.S. exports of MTCR Category I military missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and space launch vehicles (SLVs) to unnamed “certain partners [countries] with strong export control systems” will now be among the “rare occasions” under which the United States is permitted to make Category I exports under the MTCR Guidelines, the Regime’s basic rules. The updated policy apparently overturns the traditional U.S. prohibition on all Category I exports to non-MTCR-member countries.
Permitting more U.S. exports to MTCR-member countries’ own military missile programs: Since 1993, the United States has had a general policy of not “encouraging” (including via U.S. exports) MTCR-member countries’ indigenous military missile programs that the U.S. did not support prior to the advent of the MTCR in 1987. Thus, the United States generally only exported to French and UK strategic missile programs. Consistent with the above change, the updated policy will now “facilitate support” for “certain” MTCR-member Category I military missile and UAV programs in “certain partners [countries] with strong export control systems.”
Permitting more U.S. exports to MTCR and non-MTCR SLV programs: The 1993 policy also took a “do not encourage” approach to U.S. exports to so-called “new” MTCR-member country SLV programs, those the United States had not supported prior to the advent of the Regime in 1987. (Thus, the United States only generally exported to European Space Agency and Japanese SLV programs.) The earlier policy also established a general policy not to “support” exports to all non-MTCR-member countries’ SLV programs.
The updated policy will now (a) “facilitate support” for “certain” MTCR-member and apparently non-MTCR-member SLV programs in “certain partners with strong export control systems;” as well as (b) permit “case-by-case” support of both MTCR- and non-MTCR-country SLV programs “for select and vetted partner space programs and participation in international space programs.”
Undermining BM-SLV interchangeability: The MTCR and U.S. missile nonproliferation policy have traditionally treated ballistic missiles and SLVs as essentially interchangeable, subjecting them to the same basic rules. This has been a bedrock of western opposition to SLV programs in Iran, North Korea, and other proliferant states. By now permitting U.S. exports to “certain” non-MTCR-country SLV programs but continuing to ban them to such countries’ Category I “military missile” programs (see below), the updated policy undermines the interchangeability argument—and the United States’s ability to get other countries to oppose proliferant SLV programs.
At the same time, the updated policy reaffirmed the importance of, U.S. participation in, and US support for, the MTCR and its Guidelines. For example, the new policy reaffirmed the Guidelines’ absolute ban on all exports to any country of defined “production facilities,” the Missile Technology Control Regime’s only absolute “thou shalt not.”
The Biden administration would likely contend that in making the above changes, it is continuing to apply and abide by the MTCR Guidelines. It is simply exercising more broadly the United States’ national discretion in how to apply the Guidelines, which explicitly are to be implemented “in accordance with national legislation.” Also, the updated policy continues the 1993 general policy not to “support” (including by approving any export licenses) indigenous Category I “military missile” programs (“not SLV,” as the new policy makes clear) in any non-MTCR-member countries. (The U.S.-Israeli Arrow anti-missile program, which predated the MTCR, had been and presumably still is excepted under various safeguards.)
The Bottom Line
This is the latest example of the Biden Administration loosening missile technology export rules in order to bolster friendly countries’ capabilities and some U.S. commercial opportunities.
Over time, however, the latest changes will badly undercut the U.S. missile, UAV, and SLV industries by allowing exports that support indigenous foreign competitors. At the same time, these relaxations make it harder for the United States to prevent other countries from taking the same “national discretion” approach and making missile-related exports to present and future US adversaries who are their friends, especially in the guise of “SLV-related” technology.
Vann H. Van Diepen is a former career U.S. nonproliferation official and former acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation