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Glimmers of Hope for Renewed Nuclear Diplomacy in Tehran
October 2024
By Sina Azodi
After Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in May, Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist politician and a heart surgeon, was chosen his successor in a runoff election. This development has reignited hopes for a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany is known.
Since 2019, when Iran initiated “remedial measures” in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement and the subsequent failure of the European signatories to alleviate the impact of U.S. sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program has expanded significantly. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification mission in Iran has been hampered severely, primarily due to Tehran’s lack of adequate cooperation with the agency. Despite this impasse, there is now an opening for Iran and the world powers to potentially reach a new agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear expansion in return for relief from U.S. sanctions.
Prior to Raisi’s victory in the controversial June 2021 elections, Iran and the other negotiators almost reached a draft agreement to revive the JCPOA, although details still needed to be worked out. According to the framework of the proposed agreement, the outcome of negotiations would have involved a resolution adopted by the JCPOA Joint Commission, which aimed at reviving the JCPOA, and the subsequent return of the United States to the agreement. The resolution had three appendixes, on lifting sanctions, Iran’s nuclear actions, and an implementation plan that addressed the sequencing of steps to be taken by each side. Because of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, the resolution would be passed without U.S. participation; but after the lifting of sanctions, the United States would return as a participant. In response, Iran would roll back its nuclear program to the JCPOA limits.1
Despite this progress, the Iranian president at the time, Hassan Rouhani, could not finalize the agreement; and his top negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, now foreign minister, was not given the authority to sign the draft document. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, apparently had decided that the task of reviving the agreement should be left to the next administration, headed by Raisi. Some reports from Iran indicate that Rouhani had urged that he be allowed to sign the agreement so that the next administration could reap the benefits. Still, his request was denied, most likely by Khamenei.2
Once in office, Raisi initially expressed interest in the nuclear talks, but several factors greatly reduced the possibility of reviving the JCPOA. The new president was a hard-liner and an opponent of the JCPOA who previously criticized the deal for failing to deliver economic benefits and compared it to an “uncashed check.”3 Ironically, Raisi’s chief nuclear negotiator also criticized the JCPOA, questioning its benefits for Iran and its dispute resolution mechanisms.4 In essence, the people who oversaw negotiations to revive the deal did not even believe in it and its benefits for the country.
Furthermore, the new negotiation team came to the table with a new set of demands, including a renegotiation of the previous draft. Although that request was rejected categorically, the Iranian team’s maneuver squandered precious time. The outbreak of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine further complicated the process of reviving the JCPOA by souring the relationship between Russia and other negotiating parties. Meanwhile, the death of Mahsa Amini in Iranian police custody in September 2022 and the ensuing political protests within the country severely restrained the negotiating parties’ space to maneuver and to give concessions.
Concurrently, the Raisi administration rapidly expanded Iran’s nuclear program, leveraging it as a diplomatic tool against the United States and other Western powers. An IAEA report in September 2021 indicated that as of August 2021, Iran had a total stockpile of 2,441.3 kilograms of enriched uranium, of which 10.0 kilograms was enriched to 60 percent uranium-235.5 As of October 28, 2023, however, the IAEA reported that the total stockpile of Iran’s enriched uranium had increased to 4,486.8 kilograms, including 567.1 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 and 128.3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235.6 By July 2024, when Pezeshkian was elected, Iran’s breakout time (the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for one nuclear warhead) had been reduced to between one and two weeks.7
Defeating ‘Talibanism’ in Tehran
During the campaign, Pezeshkian used the opportunity to criticize the handling by Iranian hard-liners of the country’s nuclear file and vowed to resolve Iran’s issues with the IAEA and engage with the outside world.8 “My foreign policy aims to normalize relations with the world. I support the implementation of Financial Action Task Force and JCPOA” demands, Pezeshkian said on July 1.9 A former health minister, he also acknowledged that sanctions have had a devastating effect on the country and that they need to be lifted. “I consider sanctions a serious detriment” because they cause “prices [to] inevitably rise, and we cannot make purchases, leaving the government to dip into people’s pockets,” he said.10 On reviving the JCPOA, Pezeshkian asserted that if the United States fulfills all its commitments, Iran will return to the JCPOA. “We are never supposed to lift all sanctions, but we have to wait and see what we give [to them] and what concessions they will give [to us],” he said.11
Pezeshkian was careful not to antagonize Khamenei by repeatedly emphasizing his obedience and fealty to the supreme leader. Not even that could stop Khamenei from pushing back and criticizing politicians who sought relations with the United States. “Those who are attached to America and think that without America’s favor, nothing can be achieved in the country will not be good partners for you,” Khamenei said.12 Yet, he did not interfere with Pezeshkian’s election victory, a fact that Pezeshkian would recognize. “Without Supreme Leader Khamenei…I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes,” Pezeshkian said after being elected.13 During the cabinet selection, Pezeshkian went even further, ensuring that Khamenei approved his appointments.
Pezeshkian ultimately secured the presidency in the runoff elections by convincing skeptical Iranian voters that the hard-line alternative presented by candidate Saeed Jalili, the former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, would exacerbate the country’s domestic and international standing. As an Iranian journalist told the author, comparing Jalili’s worldview with that of the Taliban, “Iran was only a few hours from Taliban’s takeover of the country.”14 Despite his victory, winning nearly 54 percent of the 30.5 million votes cast, Pezeshkian now faces the daunting task of navigating a political minefield.15
The new president faces immense pressure to revive Iran’s economy, which is buckling under the pressure of U.S. unilateral sanctions, while steering the nation through unprecedented regional tensions, particularly the war in Gaza. Also, his administration must strive to prevent the extension of UN sanctions on Iran, scheduled to expire in October 2025 under Security Council Resolution 2231, as the JCPOA European signatories grow increasingly frustrated with Iran’s expanding nuclear program, lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.16 Iran’s relationship with the IAEA has deteriorated significantly in the last year, and the agency director-general, Rafael Mariano Grossi, repeatedly has criticized Iran’s lack of cooperation.17 On June 5, 2024, the IAEA adopted a censure resolution that called for Iran’s further cooperation with the agency. If Iran does not comply, this resolution has the potential to take Iran’s nuclear file back to the Security Council.18
Pezeshkian’s Message to the World
Shortly after his election, Pezeshkian published an op-ed outlining his foreign policy agenda. He emphasized his administration’s plan to improve cooperation with regional countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with Iran’s powerful partners, China and Russia. Pezeshkian also called for engaging in “constructive dialogue” with European countries based on “mutual respect and equal footing.” Nonetheless, he criticized the Europeans for failing to protect Iran’s interests in the JCPOA. “Iran’s relations with Europe have known its ups and downs,” he said. “After the United States’ withdrawal…European countries made 11 commitments to Iran to try to salvage the agreement and mitigate the impact of the United States’ unlawful and unilateral sanctions on our economy…. European countries have reneged on all these commitments yet unreasonably expect Iran to unilaterally fulfill all its obligations under the JCPOA.”19
Pezeshkian’s frustrations echo a widespread sentiment in Tehran that following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, European promises to uphold the agreement amounted to little more than empty rhetoric. Some Iranians have suggested that the United States and Europe engaged in a good cop-bad cop strategy by deceiving Iran into remaining in the deal for an additional year while U.S. sanctions crushed its economy.20 This view was reflected in Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s letter to Federica Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief, on November 6, 2018. Zarif stated that he “still does not buy” the good cop-bad cop argument and complained about Europe’s inability to safeguard Iran’s interests.21
In his op-ed, Pezeshkian also addressed the United States. He urged Washington to “recognize the reality” that Tehran will not yield to pressure and emphasized that his country entered the JCPOA negotiations in “good faith” and fully met its obligation under the agreement. The United States “unlawfully withdrew from the agreement motivated by purely domestic quarrels and vengeance, inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to [the Iranian] economy and causing untold suffering, death, and destruction on the Iranian people,” he said.22 Although Pezeshkian did not call explicitly for negotiations with Washington, he hinted at an “open invitation” for constructive engagement on the international stage, adding that his administration “will welcome sincere efforts to alleviate tensions and will reciprocate good faith with good faith.”23
The experiences of the early 2000s and the JCPOA highlight that, without U.S. involvement and consent, European countries are unable to deliver any meaningful trade or commercial benefits to Iran. In both instances, despite Europe’s strong political will to uphold agreements and fulfill commitments, this resolve failed to translate into tangible benefits for Iran due to the absence of U.S. support. In the case of the JCPOA, for example, the European companies that invested in Iran in the aftermath of the agreement chose to kowtow to U.S. sanctions while disregarding the position of their respective governments. As a result, Pezeshkian cannot improve the Iranian economy significantly or bring about any changes without striking some sort of agreement with the United States. This will not be an easy endeavor.
An Experienced Team
Aiming to remove the sanctions, Pezeshkian has brought the right people onto his foreign policy team, but faces domestic challenges. Zarif, a main architect of the JCPOA, joined Pezeshkian from the beginning and, in an unprecedented move, went on the campaign trail to support his presidential bid. On August 1, Pezeshkian appointed the savvy Iranian diplomat as vice president for strategic affairs. Since then, Iranian hard-liners who opposed negotiations with the United States and the JCPOA from the beginning have resumed their attacks on Zarif, accusing him of having a “pro-American” agenda.24 Given Zarif’s familiarity with the intricacy of the nuclear talks, experience in international diplomacy, and unique knowledge of U.S. politics, he can facilitate Pezeshkian’s bid to conclude new talks if the president can secure Khamenei’s approval.
The appointment of Araghchi, Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator, as the new foreign minister should be seen as another indication that Pezeshkian’s administration is serious about striking a nuclear agreement with the United States and the European signatories to the JCPOA. As Zarif’s deputy, he played a key role in the talks that led to the signing of the nuclear deal and has remained a staunch defender of that agreement. Araghchi, who has more revolutionary bona bides than Zarif, is a career diplomat with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and has held several ambassadorial postings. He has argued previously that as long as Iran adheres to its anti-imperialistic discourse, resolving fundamental issues with the United States is impossible but differences can be managed. “Either you abandon the anti-imperialistic discourse, which means you are no longer the Islamic Republic [of Iran], or you must confront the United States,” Araghchi has stated.
In the foreign policy agenda that he presented to the Iranian parliament, Araghchi called for “managing the hostilities” with the United States and for an “honorable” lifting of the U.S. unilateral sanctions through “serious and goal-oriented” negotiations.25 Nonetheless, he recently stated on Iranian state television that although the JCPOA can be a guide in future talks, it cannot be revived “in its current form” because the world has changed as the result of conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. “There will be other forms for an agreement that we will pursue,” he asserted.26 This is a realistic view because Iran’s technological advancements have rendered some of the JCPOA limitations obsolete, including testing and operating advanced centrifuges.
The primary challenge for Pezeshkian and his team will be persuading Khamenei once again that nuclear negotiations with Washington could be beneficial. In 2012, when Iran and the United States began their secret talks in Masqat, Oman, the task of convincing Khamenei to approve the talks fell on Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. He urged Khamenei in a meeting that Iran had nothing to lose by engaging the United States.27 Khamenei had approved the talks reluctantly, under the condition that they would be limited strictly to the nuclear issue and that Iran’s uranium-enrichment rights would be protected.
Throughout the process, Khamenei continued to support the talks, but remained wary, often describing U.S. officials as “deceitful” and “prone to breaking their promises.”28 Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA only reinforced Khamenei’s deep skepticism, leading him to reverse his position quickly. In August 2018, shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, the Iranian leader expressed regret for approving the nuclear talks, adding that, “in the JCPOA nuclear negotiations, I made a mistake.”29 Khamenei also banned any further nuclear talks with the United States, reiterating in November 2020 that negotiations to end the sanctions did not work.30
Convincing the Supreme Leader
To fulfill his promises of improving the economy, Pezeshkian and his advisers face the daunting task of convincing Khamenei that Iran once again must negotiate conditions on its nuclear program and strike a deal with the “Great Satan,” as some Iranian officials refer to the United States. Although Khamenei remains deeply skeptical of the United States, Pezeshkian’s bear-hug approach to Khamenei could help him win the supreme leader’s consent. During a meeting with Pezeshkian’s newly appointed cabinet on August 27, Khamenei hinted that he would not oppose engagement with the United States. “We do not have to pin our hope to the enemy. For our plans, we should not wait for approval by the enemies, but [it] is not contradictory to engage the same enemy in some places. [T]here’s no barrier,” Khamenei said.31
In the search for a new deal with the United States, Khamenei’s approval is necessary but not sufficient. Simultaneously, Pezeshkian must contend with Iranian hard-liners who, after losing the election, are likely to work tirelessly to sabotage his efforts to resolve the nuclear issue and boost the economy. Pezeshkian faces formidable opposition, particularly in the parliament and the Supreme National Security Council. Jalili, a staunch opponent of the JCPOA and defeated presidential candidate, remains a significant obstacle within the council. To some extent, Khamenei’s support can shield Pezeshkian from domestic attacks, but the new president still has to build a domestic consensus to mitigate the influence of these spoilers.
As the U.S. presidential campaign nears a reckoning, Iranians, having witnessed the United States reneging on its commitments, are likely to wait for the outcome of the November election before considering any new agreements. Washington also appears unhurried about striking a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. On July 9, White House spokesperson John Kirby stated that the United States “was not ready” to resume nuclear talks with Iran under the new president.32 This is shortsighted. Amid unprecedented tensions in the Middle East, Washington should not overlook any opportunity that could help deescalate the situation. Raisi’s death has provided a rare opening for Iran and the United States. After decades of missed opportunities due to reluctance on one side or the other, Tehran seems ready to strike a deal that could lead to a mutually beneficial diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis.
Trump’s potential return to the White House could jeopardize any chance of a deal, but a Harris administration likely would be much more conducive to reaching a nuclear agreement. In the short term, a limited-scope, transactional arrangement could create the necessary political space for negotiating a more comprehensive deal. This interim arrangement should prioritize freezing and rolling back the most sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, such as halting enrichment to higher levels and reducing Iran’s growing stockpile of enriched uranium. Such measures could extend Iran’s breakout time and move it further away from a nuclear bomb.
For any agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis effectively, it must involve reciprocal concessions from all parties. Although an ideal outcome for one side might seem like unconditional surrender by the other, this is simply impractical. Iran’s nuclear program, thanks to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, is now far more advanced, and Iran effectively is a nuclear threshold state. Its nuclear program is here to stay. Regime changes will not fundamentally change Iran’s nuclear posture. The question remains, after repeated failed attempts, how the United States will approach one of its enduring foreign policy dilemmas.
ENDNOTES
1. Javad M. Zarif, Raaz-e Sar be Mohr: The Nuclear Deal; Untold Story of JCPOA Protecting Iran’s Security, Rights and Development (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies [IPIS], 2021), pp. 580-581.
2. “Behzad Nabavi: Dar Dolat e Rouhani Ehyaye Barjam dar Dastras Bud vali Ejazeh Nadadand” [Behzad Nabavi: Reviving JCPOA was attainable under Rouhani but they were not allowed to], Rouhanihassan.com, August 23, 2023, https://www.rouhanihassan.com/Fa/News/103157/آگاهی-نو-بهزاد-نبوی-در-دولت-روحانی-احیای-برجام-در-دسترس-بود-اما-اجازه-ندادند. All translations by the author.
3. BBC, “Rast Azmayi e Monazere Dovom” [Fact checking the second debate], May 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-39821825.
4. “Goft-o-goo ba Ali Bagheri kani” [A conversation with Ali Bagheri Kani], Aparat, n.d., https://www.aparat.com/v/dH2jD (accessed September 15, 2024).
5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021.
6. IAEA, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/2023/57, November 15, 2023.
7. Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “Blinken Says Iran’s Nuclear Weapon Breakout Time Is Probably Down to 1-2 Weeks,” CNN, July 20, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/19/politics/blinken-nuclear-weapon-breakout
-time/index.html.
8. Iranian Students News Agency, “Pezeshkian: agar barjam bad ast beguyand an raa edame nemidahand” [If JCPOA is bad they should say that they will not continue it- and what their alternative is], June 24, 2024, https://www.isna.ir/news/1403040402796/پزشکیان-اگر-برجام-بد-است-بگویند-آن-را-ادامه-نمی-دهند-و-جایگزینشان.
9. “Pezeshkian: On the Issues,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 8, 2024, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/jul/08/pezeshkian-issues.
11. Mehr News Agency, “Pezeshikian: Amrika bayad tamam-e ta’ahodatash ra anjam dahad ta ma be barjam bargardim” [Pezeshkian: The U.S. must fulfill all its commitments so that we return to the JCPOA], July 2, 2024, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6155077/پزشکیان-وارد-صدا-و-سیما-شد.
12. Keyvan Hosseini, “Khamenei aab e paaki ra rikht rooye dastan-e mozakere ba Amrika. Hala Taklif chist?” [Khamenei has definitively ruled out negotiations with the U.S.; what course of action will Pezeshkian take now?], BBC, June 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cl77ydldekeo.
13. “Pezeshkian: Agar Magham-e Moazam-e Rahbari Nabud, Fekr Nemikonam Esme ma be Rahati Az in Sandough Ha dar miamad” [Pezeshkian: Without Supreme Leader Khamenei…I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes], Hamshahri Online, July 6, 2024, https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/865040/پزشکیان-اگر-مقام-معظم-رهبری-نبودند-فکر-نمی-کنم-اسم-ما-به-راحتی.
14. Iranian journalist, telephone interview with author, July 5, 2024.
15. Nadeen Ebrahim and Michael Rios, “Reformist Lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian Wins Iran’s Presidential Vote,” CNN, July 6, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/middleeast/pezeshkian-wins-irans-vote-intl-hnk/index.html.
16. Laurence Norman, “Biden Administration Presses Allies Not to Confront Iran on Nuclear Program,” The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2024.
17. Radio Free Europe, “IAEA Chief Says Cooperation From Iran ‘Completely Unsatisfactory,’” May 7, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/grossi-iran-nuclear-iaea/32937031.html.
18. See International Crisis Group, “Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President,” Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 245, July 30, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/245-gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/man-wire-way-forward-irans-new-president.
19. Masoud Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World,” Tehran Times, July 12, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/501077/My-message-to-the-new-world.
20. For example, see “Police-e Khub va bad Orupa Va Amrika Dar Barjam” [Europe and the U.S. Good Cop, Bad Cop], Iranian Diplomacy, February 2018, http://irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/1981673/پلیس-خوب-و-بد-اروپا-و-امریکا-در-برجام.
21. “Letter of 6 November 2018 to JCPOA Coordinator on Iran’s Exhaustion of All DRM Procedures and Its Initiation of Remedial Action Under Paragraph 36,” in Javad Zarif, Letter to the UN Secretary-General: Documenting Six Years of Western [Non-] Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal (Tehran: IPIS, 2023), p. 88.
22. Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World.”
24. See Hamid Resaeee (@hamidresaee), “Mr. Mezeshkian, the appointment of this individual with his pro-American views as your Vice President, a day after Haniyeh assassination, does not send the proper message to our people,” X, August 2, 2024, 5:35 a.m., https://x.com/hamidrasaee/status/1819305954573263013?s=46.
25. “Araghchi Barname-hayash ra Baraye Vezarat-e Khareje Tashrih Kard” [Araghchi outlined his agenda for the Foreign Ministry], Jamaran News, August 12, 2024, https://www.jamaran.news/بخش-سیاست-12/1640074-عراقچی-برنامه-هایش-برای-وزارت-خارجه-را-تشریح-کرد-هماهنگی-کامل-میدان-دیپلماسی-رفع-شرافتمندانه-تحریم-ها-با-مذاکرات-هدفمند-غیر-فرسایشی-ادامه-روابط-مستحکم-با-چین-روسیه-ایجاد-پیوندهای-نوین-با-اقتصادهای-نوظهور.
26. BBC, “Abbas e Araghchi vazir-e Khareje Jadid-e Iran Miguyad Barjam Ghabel-e Ehya Nist” [The new foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, says that the JCPOA cannot be revived], August 24, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/czx6n53dy09o.
27. Ali-Akbar Salehi, Passage in History: Memoirs of Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi (Tehran: Iranian Foreign Ministry, 2018), p. 472.
28. Khamenei.ir, “11 Answers to Questions About the Nuclear File,” January 20, 2015, https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=29440#1.
29. BBC, “Ayatollah Khamenei: Dar Mozakerat e Barjam Eshtebah Kardam” [Ayatollah Khamenei: I made a mistake in the JCPOA negotiations], August 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-45167008.
30. Khamenei.ir, “We Tried Negotiations to End the Sanctions and It Did Not Work,” November 24, 2020, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8141/We-tried-negotiations-to-end-the-sanctions-and-it-did-not-work.
31. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Opens Door to Talks With ‘Enemy’ US Over Tehran’s Nuclear Programme,” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3276141/irans-supreme-leader-opens-door-talks-enemy-us-over-tehrans-nuclear-programme.
32. Iran Front Page, “US Says Not Ready to Resume Nuclear Negotiations With Iran Under Pezeshkian,” July 9, 2024, https://ifpnews.com/us-nuclear-negotiations-iran-pezeshkian/.
Sina Azodi, an expert on Iran’s nuclear program and national security policies, is a professorial lecturer of international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.