A Challenge to Von Hippel Essay on ICBMs

October 2024
By Matthew R. Costlow

I read with some dismay Frank von Hippel’s “The 1970s ICBM ‘Window of Vulnerability’ Still Lingers” in the September 2024 issue of Arms Control Today. In making his case concerning the alleged dangers of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), he errs on matters of policy, strategy, and operations to such a significant degree that I believe a public correction of the record is necessary.

Von Hippel states that “[t]he primary advantage of a launch-under-attack posture is its low cost. Its major disadvantage is the danger of accidental launch.” Addressing both assertions in turn, the U.S. ability to launch its ICBMs under attack is one option among many for a president facing an apparent attack. But the advantage of this posture lies in its deterrence effect, not in its cost. Even an ICBM force in a de-alerted state would constitute a “low cost” posture and thus cannot be why U.S. officials in Democratic and Republican administrations have long seen an advantage in keeping U.S. ICBMs on alert. Instead, as the historical record attests, U.S. officials see a great advantage in complicating adversary targeting plans by retaining the option of launching ICBMs while adversary missiles are still in flight. This approach leaves open the possibility that the adversary will have expended potentially thousands of warheads for no apparent military gain, not to mention the incoming U.S. response.

On the matter of accidental launch, von Hippel expands on his concern by stating without citation or evidence, “In contrast to this redundancy of positive controls to assure the ICBMs would be launched if ordered, there is not a single system to deal with the possibility of a mistaken or unauthorized launch.” He correctly notes that ICBMs can be launched, with proper authorization from the chain of command, from one of five launch control centers or an airborne asset called “airborne launch control system.” What he fails to note is that each of these systems can issue “inhibit launch” orders against the silo or silos in question. Far from “not a single system” to address the possibility of unauthorized launch, there is a host of systems and procedures built for that exact purpose, including manual locks, safing pins, and more.¹

The Air Force is not a passive observer of the issue either. It conducts “Unauthorized Launch Studies” to red-team potential problems and undertakes “Threat Mitigation Plans” if any problems are found.² Unsurprisingly, the Air Force mandates numerous redundant safeguards for the software used in nuclear systems that are biased toward making it far easier to inhibit a launch than to enable it.³ As the Defense Department states, “The U.S. alert system prioritizes surety over speed.”⁴

The policy debate over the value of ICBMs in U.S. nuclear strategy can continue usefully only if all sides have a clear understanding of the safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized or accidental launches.

ENDNOTES

1. See U.S. Air Force, “Safety Rules for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System,” AFI91-114, January 6, 2023.

2. U.S. Air Force, “Unauthorized Launch, Threat Mitigation, and Launch Action Studies,” AFI91-106, August 28, 2019.

3. U.S. Air Force Headquarters, “Department of the Air Force Guidance Memorandum (DAFGM) to Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 91-119, Safety Design Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software,” DAFMAN91-119_DAFGM2024-01, June 11, 2024.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States - 2020,” n.d., p. 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

Matthew R. Costlow is a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy.