“[My time at ACA] prepared me very well for the position that I took following that with the State Department, where I then implemented and helped to implement many of the policies that we tried to promote.”
- Peter Crail
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance
Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102; Julia Masterson, Research Associate, (202) 463-8270 x103
This nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015.
Iran’s compliance with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to certain requirements set forth in the agreement.
The following is a summary of the timeline, key components, and the current status of the multi-year agreement.
Timeline for Implementation
July 14, 2015, Finalization Day: conclusion of the agreement. Finalization day triggers Iran and the United States to begin domestic review processes of the JCPOA. Iran also begins providing the IAEA with information necessary for the agency to complete its investigation into past activities related to nuclear weapons development.
October 18, 2015, Adoption Day: 90 days after the passage of the UN Security Council Resolution endorsing the deal (July 20, 2015). Adoption day triggers Iran and the P5+1 to take steps (outlined below) to meet the commitments to fully implement the JCPOA.
January 16, 2016, Implementation Day: the IAEA certifies that Iran has taken the key steps to restrict its nuclear program and has put in place increased monitoring. The IAEA's report on implementation day triggers U.S., EU, and UN sanctions relief.
October 2023, Transition Day: Eight years after adoption day (or the IAEA reaching its broader conclusion on Iran's nuclear program, whichever is sooner). Transition day triggers the UN to lift missile restrictions, Iran to seek ratification of its additional protocol, the EU to terminate all remaining nuclear sanctions, United States to remove certain entities from the sanctioned list, and the United States to seek legislative termination of certain sanctions.
October 2025, Termination Day: Ten years after adoption day. Termination day terminates Resolution 2231 and the Security Council closes Iran's nuclear file.
Key Requirements and Actions Mandated by the JCPOA
Enrichment
For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines, total machines is 6,104 IR-1s
Excess centrifuges (over 13,000) dismantled and stored under IAEA monitoring
For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235
For 15 years enrichment only at Natanz
For 10 years no production of additional IR-1 centrifuges
Between years 11-13 Iran can replace IR-1s with the equivalent capacity of IR-6 and IR-8 machines and limits lasting to years 14-15
Uranium Stockpile
For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms)
Excess enriched uranium sold, shipped abroad for storage, or diluted to natural uranium levels
Uranium oxide and scrap material enriched up to 20 percent fabricated into fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, blended down, or shipped out
Fordow
Converted to research facility for stable isotope production with Russian cooperation
1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain here, 328 for production, the remaining 700 are idle
For 15 years no introduction of uranium at the facility
Advanced Centrifuge Research and Development
For 8.5 years Iran may conduct research with uranium on a single IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge at Natanz
After 8.5 years test up to 30 IR-6s and 30 IR-8s
After 8 years manufacture up to 200 IR-6s and 200 IR-8s centrifuges without rotors
For 10 years Joint Commission review and approval of changes to the research and development plan
Arak Reactor
Remove and disable the original core of the Arak reactor
Replace the core of the Arak reactor to reduce weapons-grade plutonium output, certified by the Joint Commission
For 15 years no reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel with an intention to never reprocess
Permanent commitment to ship out spent nuclear fuel
For 15 years no heavy-water reactors in Iran
For 15 years no accumulation of heavy water in Iran
Construction of hot cells or shielded glove boxes of certain specifications subject to approval of the Joint Commission
Monitoring and Verification
By 15 October 2015 Iran fully implements PMD “roadmap” agreed with IAEA
For 10 years approval of the purchase of dual-use materials by the Joint Commission working group
For 25 years continuous monitoring of lran’s uranium mines and mills
For 20 years continuous monitoring of lran’s centrifuge production facilities
For 15 years Joint Commission oversight of IAEA access requests to inspect undeclared sites
Permanent prohibition of certain weaponization related activities
Implementation and eventual ratification of an additional protocol to Iran’s safeguards agreement
Permanent implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement
Joint Commission
For 25 years Joint Commission (composed of P5+1, EU and Iran for a total of 8 voting members) will hold quarterly meetings, or by request, to oversee the deal
Dispute resolution mechanism within 35 days; 15 day dispute resolution mechanism within the Joint Commission, with optional 15 day ministerial review and/or arbitration opinion from a 3 member panel, followed by 5 day review of the arbitration opinion. If no resolution and complaining party sees action as “significant non-performance,’ the unresolved issue can be treated as grounds to cease performing commitments in whole or part, complaining party will notify UN Security Council
Any party can go to the UN Security Council to put sanctions back in place if there is noncompliance by vetoing a resolution calling for the continuance of sanctions
For 10 years sanctions are subject to snapback by veto of a resolution calling for the continuation of suspension
After 10 years UN will cease to be seized of Iran’s nuclear file
For 5 years the heavy arms embargo will remain in place
For 8 years the ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place
U.S. Sanctions
Cease the application of economic sanctions against lran’s oil and banking sector allowing Iranian banks and companies to reconnect with international systems
Will remove designation of certain entities and individuals
Allows for licensed non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with lran permitted under JCPOA
Allows for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft to Iran
Allows for license for importing Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs into United States
United States takes appropriate measures to address laws at state or local level preventing full implementation of JCPOA - United States will actively encourage officials to adhere to JCPOA policy
For 8 years after Adoption date, or sooner if IAEA concludes that all nuclear activity in Iran remains peaceful, U.S. will seek legislative action to terminate/modify nuclear related sanctions
U.S. sanctions on Iran targeting human rights, terrorism and missile activities remain
United States can impose additional sanctions for non-nuclear issues (terrorism, human rights, etc.)
EU Sanctions
Terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation related to Iran’s nuclear program
Includes: financial and banking transactions; transactions in Iranian Rial; provision of U.S. banknotes to Iranian government; access to SWIFT; insurance services; efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil and petrochemical product sales; investment; transactions with Iran's energy and shipping sector; trade in gold and other precious metals; trade with lran’s automotive sector
Removes individuals and entities designated under sanctions
EU refrains from re-introducing sanctions terminated under JCPOA (Iran views any re-introduction as grounds to cease performing its commitments)
Refrain from policy intended to adversely affect normalization of economic relations with Iran
For 8 years after adoption day or at the finding of the IAEA broader conclusion EU's arms embargo and restrictions on transfer of ballistic missiles remain
