Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China

China, one of the five nuclear weapons states under the NPT, is estimated, as of January 2024, to possess 440 nuclear warheads, an arsenal that has increased significantly in recent years. It has simultaneously sought to modernize and expand its nuclear delivery systems in pursuit of a robust nuclear triad. China continues to develop road-mobile ICBMs, advance the construction of three new ICBM silo fields, and improve the capabilities of its sea and air-based deterrent. China’s self-stated nuclear policy has been to keep its capabilities at the minimum level required to maintain its national security and deter a potential first strike, and it was the first nation to declare a “No First Use” policy.

Contents

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Negative Security Assurances

Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

• The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview
• Delivery Systems
• Fissile Material
• Proliferation Record
• Nuclear Doctrine
• Nuclear Testing

Biological Weapons

Chemical Weapons

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

• Conference on Disarmament (CD)
• Six-Party Talks

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

*China stated that it will not be bound by the dispute settlement procedures in Paragraph 2, Article 17

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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Negative Security Assurances

For an introduction to the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, see our factsheet.

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Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview 

China does not publicly release information about the size of its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. government and independent sources both generally assess that China’s stockpile has exceeded 400 warheads. Though China’s nuclear arsenal steadily increased from 240 in 2011 to 280 in 2018, the pace of the increase accelerated after 2021.  

The majority of China’s warheads are thought to be kept in storage under central control during times of peace, though some missile battalions conduct “high alert duty.” It is uncertain whether China possesses a low-yield nuclear arsenal.

China's nuclear policy has been defined by possessing the minimum capabilities needed to deter a first strike from a potential aggressor. There is now uncertainty whether the recent growth in China's nuclear forces reflects changed requirements based on continuation of the long-standing policy or a change in nuclear policies altogether.

Delivery Systems

Nuclear Modernization

• By the late 2010s, China had largely completed a modernization effort that replaced older liquid-fueled and limited-range missiles with new road-mobile solid-fueled missiles, many with intercontinental reach.
• China is now expanding its nuclear force through the construction of new silo fields and the addition of silos at existing fields.
• Estimates of the number of launchers and warheads China intends to deploy by the end of this expansion effort vary significantly. The U.S. Department of Defense believes China intends to deploy roughly 1,000 strategic warheads by 2030.
• China has also begun fielding an improved submarine-launched ballistic missile and is developing a new class of ballistic-missile submarines. It has also developed and deployed an intermediate-range nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile for delivery by strategic bombers.
• China is expanding its plutonium production and reprocessing capabilities.

 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

• China has around 350 nuclear-capable land-based missiles capable of delivering approximately 346 warheads. A 2024 Federation of American Scientists report estimates that around 134 of these land-based missiles are ICBMs, whereas the DOD’s 2023 China Military Power Report approximates 350 ICBMs in China’s arsenal. All of China’s ICBMs can target the continental United States. 
• China has embarked on its largest-ever expansion of new ICBM facilities, building approximately 320 new silos for solid-fueled ICBMs across three missile fields, increasing the number of silos for older liquid-fueled ICBMs by about 30 at existing sites, and also modernizing and expanding its road-mobile ICBM force. According to the China Military Power Report, China has begun deploying missiles in some of these silos. 
• The silo fields near the northwest city of Yumen (120 individual silos), Hami (110 individual silos) in Eastern Xinjiang, and Yulin (90 individual silos) in Inner Mongolia are located deep inside the Chinese mainland, beyond the reach of U.S. cruise missiles. 
• The U.S. Department of Defense asserts that the combined number of operational and under-construction Chinese mobile, silo, and training launchers exceeds 500. 
• The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) controls China’s conventional and nuclear land-based missiles.

Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)

• As of January 2024, China has a fleet of 6 Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Originally designed to carry JL-2 SLBMs, they are now equipped with new, longer-range JL-3 SLBMs.
• China possesses two SLBM types:
  • JL-2 (CSS-NX-14): a modified version of the DF-31 ICBM; estimated range of 7,000+ km but some estimates place the number at 8,000-9,000 km.
  • JL-3 (CSS-N-20): likely MIRV-capable, with an estimated range of 10,000 km that enables targeting of the continental United States from the safety of waters near the Chinese coast.
• The DOD reported in 2022 that China “likely began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN class SSBNs.” 

Strategic Bombers

• China continues to update its outdated nuclear-capable bomber fleet.
• The PLA Air Force was assigned a “strategic deterrence” mission in 2012.
• China’s fleet of nuclear-capable bombers consists of about 20 Hong-6 (H-6) bombers based on Soviet designs, with a range of only 3,100+ km. A variant of the H-6 capable of air-to-air refueling known as the H-6N, has been operationally deployed. China arms the H-6N with a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). 
• The H-6 bombers are also capable of delivering an unspecified number of gravity-based bombs.
• Media reports suggest that China may be developing a new strategic stealth bomber, the H-20. U.S. officials believe the bomber will have both conventional and nuclear capabilities, as well as a range of over 10,000 km.

Fissile Material

• China has not publicly declared a halt to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium. China is reported to have last produced HEU in 1989 and last produced separated plutonium in 1991.
• The International Panel on Fissile Material's 2022 report estimates that China maintains a stockpile of 14 ± 3 metric tons of military HEU and 2.9 ± 0.6 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. 
• At present, the limited size of China’s military stockpile restricts its ability to produce more warheads. China may be able to double its arsenal size using current stocks but would have to divert fissile material from two civilian breeder reactors currently under construction to acquire the stockpile of 1500 warheads by 2035 forecast by the DOD. China operates one and is building two plutonium reprocessing plants.
• China has not declared a civilian HEU stockpile and, as of 2016, maintains an estimated civilian plutonium stockpile of only 40.9 kg.

Proliferation Record

• China has a record of assisting states with nuclear and missile programs in the past, but in 2000, China made a public commitment not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons.”
• China has aided Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs among other states. Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia have also been identified as recipients of sensitive technologies and materials from China.
• The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC)—with government authorization—has exported Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) to Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Ghana, and Nigeria. These reactors run on highly enriched uranium fuel, albeit a fraction of what is necessary for a nuclear warhead, which has been supplied by China to recipient states.
• There have been efforts made by China to work with those states to convert these reactors to use low enriched uranium fuel, including a 2010 agreement between the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory and the China Institute of Atomic Energy for a new facility in China to produce LEU replacement cores in MNSR's.
• Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) members, including the United States, saw enough improvement in China’s nuclear export behavior that they extended membership to China in 2004.
  • Nonetheless, China has sold reactors to Pakistan, as was revealed in a 2010 agreement between the two nations. This trade, however, contravenes NSG guidelines.
• China’s bid to join the Missile Technology Control Regime failed in 2004, due to continuing concerns about Chinese missile and missile technology transactions. China, however, maintains that it voluntarily abides by the regime’s guidelines.

Nuclear Doctrine  
China was the first nuclear-weapon state to declare publicly that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Beijing has emphasized that this vow stands "at any time or under any circumstances." China reaffirmed its no-first-use policy in its 2015 and 2019 white papers. The 2019 report also states,

"China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China."

Regardless, some scholars theorize that the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, its intention to increase its nuclear warfighting capabilities, and its posture demonstrate a doctrine of counter-nuclear coercion or limited deterrence. The dramatic expansion in ICBM launchers challenges the claim that China keeps its deterrent at a "minimum level," though Beijing’s nuclear buildup can be interpreted as a means of safeguarding Chinese retaliatory capability in the event of a surprise first strike. Scholars remain divided over the reasons for China’s nuclear buildup (see ACT, June 2023).

Nuclear Testing

China has conducted 45 nuclear tests. The first test occurred Oct. 16, 1964, and the last test took place July 29, 1996. See our nuclear testing factsheet for more details. 

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Biological Weapons

• China contends it is in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) despite U.S. allegations asserting the contrary. U.S. State Department compliance assessment reports have said that China possessed an offensive biological weapons capability prior to joining the BWC in 1984, and that the country has never given a full accounting of this program.
• The 2024 report claims that China's military medical institutions have conducted research into dual-use marine toxins that raise BWC compliance concerns.

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Chemical Weapons

• China has declared that it has destroyed all chemical weapon agent production facilities and solely conducts defensive chemical warfare research.
• Beijing’s official position emphasizes the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The United States has expressed its concerns about China's research into pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.
• China inherited approximately 700,000 abandoned chemical weapon (ACW) munitions from the Imperial Japanese Army at the end of World War II. Many of these ACWs are not easily located or properly stored; many of them are buried.
• Japan, as of 2023, continues to jointly work with China to destroy these ACWs. The destruction began in March 2010. In November 2014, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged Japan to speed up the destruction process. As of May 2023, 98,293 ACWs had been recovered in China, of which 65,894 were verifiably destroyed. 

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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Conference on Disarmament (CD)  
At the 65-member CD, China expressed support for the negotiation of an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) while declaring its top priority to be the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Chinese insistence that the conference take some action on the outer space issue in parallel with any negotiations on a cutoff treaty and the U.S. opposition to that approach has, as of 2017, contributed to the stalemate of the conference over the past several years. In 2003, China said it would accept discussions on outer space rather than formal negotiations, but that formulation remained unacceptable to the United States. China, however, did not agree to a 2007 compromise formula, including talks on outer space, which the United States said it would not oppose. China refused to participate in Australian and Japanese-led side meetings at the CD in 2011, insisting that the CD was the only proper conduit for FMCT negotiations. The U.S. has stated that the lack of support by China and other key countries resulted in the failure of the side meetings to make progress. China believes that a FMCT should not restrict the use of existing fissile material for weapons purposes.

Six-Party Talks  
China played a key role in hosting and helping mediate the so-called six-party talks to achieve North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. Although those talks broke down in 2008 and have yet to resume, China maintains that they remain an effective mechanism for achieving disarmament in North Korea.  However, amidst mounting pressure and criticism from U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration for China to take charge of the North Korean threat, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang stated, in February 2017, that “we have said many times already that the crux of the North Korean nuclear issue is the problem between the United States and North Korea,” and that “the Trump White House needs to make the first move and talk to Pyongyang.”

U.S.-China Strategic Stability Dialogue   
The United States has repeatedly urged China to engage in arms control talks over its nuclear expansion through bilateral and trilateral U.S.-Russia-China frameworks and to restart military dialogue, citing concerns over conflict escalation. However, China has resisted U.S. overtures on both issues. Beijing has been more receptive to multilateral formats for diplomacy, with the P5 being one of its preferred venues for discussing nuclear arms reduction. In January 2022, China welcomed a joint statement with France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” 

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