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June 2, 2022
July/August 2020

Arms Control Today July/August 2020

Edition Date: 
Wednesday, July 1, 2020
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Iran Continues to Stockpile Uranium


July/August 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) continues to grow in violation of the limits imposed by the 2015 nuclear deal, but the country is abiding by the monitoring and verification mechanisms put in place by the accord, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported.

An International Atomic Energy Agency camera monitors activity at Iran's Uranium Conversion Facilities in 2005. As Iran has violated the uranium production limits of the 2015 nuclear deal, it has not curtailed the agency's inspection efforts. (Photo: Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images)According to an IAEA report on June 5 on Iran’s implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has stockpiled 1,571 kilograms of uranium enriched to a level of less than 5 percent uranium-235, significantly more than the 202 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent (the equivalent of 300 kilograms of uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent) allowed by the accord. When the IAEA last reported on Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA in March, the stockpile was 1,020 kilograms.

Kazem Gharib Abadi, Iranian ambassador to the IAEA, emphasized in a June 16 statement to the agency’s Board of Governors that Tehran is ready to “reverse all remedial actions” taken to reduce compliance with its JCPOA obligations if the other parties to the deal take “credible practical steps” to implement their obligations under the accord. He said that “words do not ensure” that Iran benefits from the deal and that actions are needed.

Iran first announced it would begin taking steps to breach limits set by the nuclear deal in May 2019, one year after U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement and reimposed sanctions on Iran lifted by the accord. (See ACT, June 2019; June 2018.) Iranian officials have continued to reiterate that Tehran will return to compliance with the deal if its demands on sanctions relief are met.

Gharib Abadi singled out the three European parties to the deal (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and accused them of succumbing to U.S. bullying and urged them to take steps to meet their obligations under the JCPOA “before it’s too late.”

In a June 19 statement, the foreign ministers of the three European states said they met their obligations to lift sanctions under the deal and “have gone beyond the commitments required by the agreement to support legitimate trade.”

They urged Iran “to pursue substantial discussions and actions in coordination with us” to preserve the deal. The statement said the three countries will seek a ministerial meeting to take stock of the dispute resolution mechanism process. In January, the three countries triggered the process outlined in the nuclear deal to address Iran’s breaches of the accord.

Although Iran continues to breach JCPOA limits, Tehran has refrained from taking new actions that violate the agreement, despite having announced on Jan. 5 that it would no longer adhere to any restrictions on its nuclear activities.

Nevertheless, the IAEA “has not observed any changes to Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in connection with” the Jan. 5 announcement, said agency Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi on June 15.

The United States took no solace in that finding. The IAEA report “makes clear that Iran has continued to expand its proliferation-sensitive activities and is showing no signs of slowing its destabilizing nuclear escalation,” said Jackie Wolcott, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, on June 16. Iran’s actions are “transparent attempts at extortion” and are designed to “raise tensions rather than defuse them,” she said.

Wolcott may have been referring to the growing size of the LEU stockpile and Iran’s expansion of enrichment activities using advanced centrifuges.

Of the 1,571 kilograms of uranium enriched to less than 5 percent U-235, the IAEA noted that 483 kilograms are enriched to about 2 percent, a level that does not significantly affect Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade material for a nuclear bomb, should Tehran make the decision to do so.

Yet, with 1,088 kilograms of material enriched to between 3.67 and 4.50 percent, Iran now has enough LEU that, if enriched to weapons grade, is sufficient for one nuclear bomb. If Iran were to use the 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and the 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow to pursue weapons-grade enrichment, it could produce enough material for a bomb in three to four months, according to expert assessments. When the JCPOA was fully implemented, that timeline was 12 months.

Such an effort would be quickly detected, however, as the IAEA report noted that Iran continues to cooperate with the verification and monitoring mechanisms put in place by the JCPOA, including tracking of enrichment levels in real time.

The IAEA also reported that Iran continues to breach limitations put in place by the JCPOA on research and development of advanced centrifuge machines. According to the June 5 report, Iran is withdrawing enriched uranium from cascades of 164 IR-2 and IR-4 centrifuges and a cascade of 135 IR-6 centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, Iran is only permitted to test a small number of advanced machines with uranium and is prohibited from withdrawing any enriched material.

The IAEA report noted that Iran has not resumed construction on the Arak reactor based on its original, more proliferation-sensitive design or resumed uranium enrichment to 20 percent.

In May, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo terminated sanctions waivers allowing international cooperation on conversion of the Arak reactor and the import of 20 percent-enriched uranium fuel for Iran’s research reactor. (See ACT, June 2020.) The parties to the JCPOA are required under the deal to assist with the conversion and the transfer of 20 percent-enriched uranium fuel to Iran. Without the waivers, however, any continued cooperation could be penalized by the United States.

Gharib Abadi said that the “unlawful conduct” of the United States is “endangering international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and technology” and a “clear contradiction” of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Resolution 2231 endorsed the nuclear deal.

Iranian officials have threatened to resume work on the Arak reactor based on the original design, which would produce enough plutonium for about two nuclear weapons per year, if the international cooperative efforts to convert the reactor were halted. Iran has also threatened to resume enriching uranium to 20 percent, a level that poses much more of a proliferation risk than the current enrichment level of less than 5 percent, if necessary to produce fuel for its research reactor.

The IAEA report said Iran received a shipment of 20 percent-enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor in April, prior to Pompeo’s announcement.

 

Tehran has enriched and stored more reactor-grade uranium while allowing the IAEA to monitor its nuclear activities.

North Korea Pledges to Boost Deterrent


July/August 2020
By Julia Masterson

North Korea slammed the United States on the two-year anniversary of the inaugural summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump, which was held in Singapore in 2018. “Never again will we provide the U.S. chief executive with another package to be used for achievements without receiving any rewards,” North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Son Gwon warned in a statement published June 12 by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). “Nothing is more hypocritical than an empty promise.”

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un congratulates U.S. President Donald Trump after a signing ceremony at their Singapore summit on June 12, 2018. Any goodwill generated there appears to have evaporated with the latest remarks by North Korean officials on the second anniversary of the meeting. (Photo: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)Rather than continue to take steps to promote diplomacy with the United States, as North Korea did in 2018 when it introduced a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing, Pyongyang is now determined to “build up a more reliable force to cope with the long-term military threats” from the United States, Ri said. After introducing the moratorium, Kim met with Trump twice in 2019, in Vietnam in February and Panmunjom in June. North Korean officials also met with a U.S. delegation for a round of working-level talks in October. (See ACT, November 2019.)

Without discernible progress toward constructing a peace regime or an agreement on the terms of North Korea’s denuclearization, Pyongyang formally renounced its testing moratorium in January 2020. (See ACT, January/February 2020.) Since then, North Korea has not tested any long-range missiles, but has tested a host of shorter-range systems.

According to Ri, the United States “professes to be an advocate for improved relations” with North Korea, “but in fact, is hell-bent on only exacerbating the situation. As a result, the Korean peninsula has now turned into the world’s most dangerous hotspot haunted uninterruptedly by the ghost of nuclear war.” Further condemning the Trump administration’s approach, he suggested that Washington’s efforts to improve bilateral relations between the United States and North Korea are a ruse for regime change in Pyongyang.

“Unless the 70-plus-year deep-rooted hostile policy of the U.S. towards [North Korea] is fundamentally terminated, the U.S. will as ever remain to be a long-term threat to our state, our system, and our people,” he said.

Ri’s remarks in his June 12 statement are consistent with other announcements recently broadcast through the KCNA. On May 24, the outlet reported that Kim presided over a meeting of North Korean military officials who discussed national efforts to bolster the country’s armed forces. The meeting concluded with a pledge to implement “new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces on high alert.”

U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, during a May 24 interview with CBS News, said the United States was monitoring developments related to that meeting. He remarked that the United States would continue reaching out to North Korea and, in reference to bouts of bilateral talks and leader summits between the two countries, noted that “the president is engaged in some excellent personal diplomacy” with Kim. O’Brien also reiterated the Trump administration’s position that North Korea must surrender its nuclear weapons program in order to “reenter the world” and bolster its economy.

In March, Pyongyang made clear it was disinterested in further diplomacy with Washington. (See ACT, May 2020.) Where a diplomatic path to achieving North Korean denuclearization, peace on the Korean peninsula, and a strengthened relationship between the United States and North Korea once seemed possible, the North now seems to have shifted its efforts to defend against U.S. aggression. Kwon Jong Gun, who directs the Department of U.S. Affairs within the North Korean Foreign Ministry, said on June 13, “I want to make it clear that we will continue to build up our force in order to overpower the persistent threats from the United States.”

“It is better to stop a nonsensical thinking about denuclearization,” Kwon warned.

The breakdown in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy worsens.

Tensions on Korean Peninsula Rise


July/August 2020
By Julia Masterson

Tensions between North and South Korea have escalated after Pyongyang cut all communications lines and later demolished the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, North Korea, on June 16. South Korean Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul, who previously oversaw relations between South and North Korea, resigned June 19.

Cho Myoung-gyon (left), then South Korean unification minister,  and his North Korean counterpart Ri Son Gwon (center), attend the opening ceremony of the now-demolished joint liaison office on Sept. 14, 2018 in Kaesong, North Korea. (Photo: Korea Pool/Getty Images)The liaison office was established following the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, which laid out a list of commitments shared by the two Koreas “to boldly approach a new era of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity, and to improve and cultivate inter-Korean relations in a more active manner.” The declaration was concluded at an April summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, following a period of newfound bilateral cooperation.

The office was used to facilitate diplomatic relations between the two Koreas. Weekday inter-Korean phone calls took place twice daily through the office since its establishment in September 2018, until North Korea cut that and all other communications lines with South Korea on June 8.

Two weeks later, North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) revealed Pyongyang’s plan to release 12 million propaganda leaflets into South Korea, in response to the scattering of anti-North Korea leaflets at the countries’ border in early June. Seoul came forward to say that move was conducted by several South Korean nongovernmental organizations, but Pyongyang holds South Korean authorities near the demilitarized zone responsible for the act. Propaganda leaflets are a relic of the Cold War and were common across the North-South border in the early 1950s.

The distribution of propaganda leaflets violates the Panmunjom Declaration, under which both countries pledged to cease “all hostile acts” on the Military Demarcation Line that spans their border.

Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, said June 4, “I would like to ask the South Korean authorities if they are ready to take care of the consequences of evil conduct.” She heads the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea, North Korea’s highest political body. “The South Korean authorities will be forced to pay a dear price if they let this situation go on while making sort of excuses,” she said.

North Korea pledged on June 17 to ready its military for deployment near the demilitarized zone that divides the two Koreas, as well as to the southwestern maritime front, but later reneged on that threat. A KCNA statement June 24 clarified that North Korea’s military leadership “took stock of the prevailing situation and suspended military action plans against the south.”

Kim Yong Chol, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, remarked June 24 that a détente of inter-Korean relations could only be achieved “by efforts and patience of both sides based on mutual respect and trust.” He warned, however, that “nothing will turn out favorable when our suspension becomes reconsideration,” adding that South Korea must “realize that self-control is the key to tiding over the crisis.”

Although the scattering of leaflets across the border exacerbated tensions, North Korea’s heightened hostility toward South Korea appears fueled by Seoul’s long-standing efforts to promote U.S.-North Korean dialogue on denuclearization amid souring inter-Korean relations.

Kwon Jong Gun, the, director-general of U.S. affairs in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, noted on June 13 that South Korean authorities had voiced their support for a resumption of U.S.-North Korean talks. “I still remember that exactly one year ago, we advised them to stop fooling around in such a nasty manner,” Kwon said, adding that “it is not because there is not a mediator that the [North Korean]-U.S. dialogue has gone away and denuclearization been blown off.”

A KCNA commentary on June 19 relayed that North Korea was “fed up with the disgusting acts of the South Korean authorities who accepted the ‘South Korea-U.S. working group’ even before the ink on the north-south agreement got dry,” referring to a body established in the fall of 2018 to strengthen coordination between Seoul and Washington on efforts to achieve North Korean denuclearization. Behind the scenes, the June 19 statement continued, South Korea remains “engrossed in military exercises with the foreign force” and has “connived at the leaflet-scattering by the human scum ten times last year and three times this year, reneging on the promise to halt hostile acts in frontline areas.”

South Korea’s presidential Blue House stated on June 17 it would “not endure” continued condemnation from Pyongyang and added that repeated criticism of Seoul transmitted through the KCNA was counterproductive to efforts to build trust between the two Koreas.

Seoul’s chief nuclear negotiator met with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun on June 18 to “assess the current situation on the Korean peninsula and discuss responses.”

 

North Korea has demolished a liaison office used to communicate with the South.

Critics Question U.S. Open Skies Complaints


July/August 2020
By Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos

In the wake of the Trump administration’s decision in May to abandon the Open Skies Treaty, and amid uncertainty about the future of the 34-nation accord, critics are disputing the administration’s rationale for withdrawal.

Swedish soldiers guard a Russian aircraft preparing to conduct an Open Skies Treaty observation flight over Sweden in 2000. (Photo: OSCE)U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a May 21 statement that “Russia’s implementation and violation of Open Skies” has negated the “central confidence-building function of the treaty—and has, in fact, fueled distrust and threats to our national security—making continued U.S. participation untenable.”

Specifically, Pompeo cited Russian restrictions on observation flights over Russian territory and alleged that Moscow “appears” to use treaty flights “in support of an aggressive new Russian doctrine of targeting critical infrastructure in the United States and Europe with precision-guided conventional munitions.”

Members of Congress, former government officials, U.S. allies, and Russia have said that these arguments are based on tendentious reasoning, beset by contradictions, and ignore positive benefits the treaty continues to provide. (See ACT, May 2020.)

Meanwhile, the fate of the treaty is in limbo. Several European treaty parties have said they plan to continue implementing the agreement, while Russia has not specified how it plans to proceed.

To further complicate matters, flights under the treaty have been suspended since mid-March due to the coronavirus pandemic, and it is unclear when they will resume.

Signed in 1992, the Open Skies Treaty permits each state-party to conduct short-notice, unarmed observation flights over the others’ entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities.

The Trump administration alleges that Russian limitations on flights over the Kaliningrad enclave and territory bordering Abkhazia and South Ossetia violate the treaty. Critics argue that the breaches do not defeat the object and purpose of the agreement and are resolvable through diplomacy.

The Kaliningrad issue focuses on Moscow’s demand to limit Open Skies missions over the enclave to less than 500 kilometers in total flight distance. The requirement followed a 2014 overflight by Poland that, according to a May 26 Russian Foreign Ministry paper, crossed “back and forth, thereby creating problems for the use of the region’s limited airspace and for the operation of the region’s only international airport” and “entailed serious financial costs.” Russia maintains that the 500-kilometer limit was “established in line with [Open Skies Treaty] provisions.”

In 2016, the United States responded to the sublimit by restricting flights over the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and the missile defense interceptor fields in Fort Greely, Alaska.

The Russian Foreign Ministry claims that whereas Western countries can still capture “from 77 to 98 percent of the territory” of Kaliningrad in an observation flight, Russia can observe “just 2.7 percent in Alaska.”

In February 2020, Russia allowed a flight over Kaliningrad by the United States, Estonia, and Lithuania that exceeded the 500-kilometer limit. On March 2, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe James Gilmore described the flight as “very cooperative.”

Christopher Ford, assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, acknowledged in a May 21 briefing that Russia permitted “a very slightly longer flight” over Kaliningrad but argued that the flight “doesn’t undermine the basic point that Russia clearly regards its Open Skies legal obligations as something akin more to guidelines or options for them.”

United States additionally asserts that Moscow not only violates a crucial clause of the treaty but also uses the clause to make a political claim with respect to Georgia.

Under the Open Skies Treaty, states-parties must open all of their territory to overflights, although Article VI prohibits flights within 10 kilometers of borders with countries that are not states-parties.

Russia is one of only a handful of countries that recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent from Georgia. As a result, Moscow has prohibited treaty flights within 10-kilometers of its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as they are not states-parties to the Open Skies Treaty.

The Russian Foreign Ministry argues that “it is possible to reliably obtain images of these zones without flying over them” and that Georgia, a treaty party, is in violation of the accord by prohibiting Russian flights over Georgia.

In a June 22 letter to Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper criticizing the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the treaty, Senators Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), and Mark Warner (D-Va.) write that “instead of withdrawing from the treaty, the United States should diplomatically engage Russia to resolve these issues as it has done successfully in the past, for example when Russian imposed limitations on flights over Chechnya.”

As for the allegation that Russia is misusing treaty flights over the United States to collect military-relevant intelligence, Ford said that he was “not at liberty to go into some of the details of why we think that this is a concern.”

“[W]hile not a violation per se,” he added, “it’s clearly something that is deeply corrosive to the cause of building confidence and trust.”

There appears to be disagreement among military officials about how useful Russian flights are for intelligence gathering.

Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, the former head of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Program, told a Congressional hearing in 2016 that “the information Russia gleans from Open Skies is of only incremental value in addition to Russia’s other means of intelligence gathering.”

The treaty includes provisions that dictate the standards for equipment, including cameras and planes, used during a flight. No equipment is used that is not previously authorized by the states-parties.

Under the treaty, states-parties seeking to conduct an overflight must supply their flight plan at least 24 hours in advance to the host country. The host country then reviews the plan and can raise any concerns about safety or weather. When the flight does take off, there are also representatives of the host country on the plane alongside the observing states-parties to ensure all goes according to plan. All images taken on the flight must then be shared with the other parties to the agreement.

In addition to arguing that Russia is using the treaty to gather intelligence, the Trump administration and other opponents of the agreement also maintain that the treaty has outlived its usefulness and is based on outdated technology.

“[T]echnology has passed by the world of wet film and antiquated aircraft,” Marshall Billingslea, the president’s special envoy for arms control said on May 21. “You can download commercial imagery today in a matter of seconds that really meets the original intent of confidence-building measures in Europe.”

Critics argue that the administration cannot have it both ways. If the treaty is antiquated and replaceable by higher-resolution commercial satellite images, how is Russia using it to capture irreplaceable images of critical U.S. infrastructure?

Russia has responded to the U.S. allegation that it is misusing the treaty by stating that the United States, when flying over Russia, “film[s] not only parks and beaches.” Since the treaty entered into force, the United States has flown over Russia about three times more frequently than Russia has flown over the United States.

A former senior official told Arms Control Today that the United States and its allies have made use of treaty flights “to track infrastructure that it’s otherwise hard to photograph in a single satellite pass.” This includes imagery of Russian rail lines, “which has helped us to understand more about military transport potential, including for nuclear warheads.” The official said the United States has also used the treaty “to help preview inspection sites for…nuclear treaties,” such as the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and to photograph Russia’s nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya.

The Trump administration has told allies that it is exploring options to provide more imagery products to them to address any gaps that might result from the U.S. withdrawal. Many treaty members, including the Baltic states, do not have their own aircraft with which to conduct flights.

But sharing such sensitive imagery may be easier said than done.

Pranay Vaddi, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official, tweeted on May 28 that it takes time to downgrade sensitive images and then coordinate with allies that might have different domestic procedures for handling such information.

He added that “commercial imagery will be contested as if it's [intelligence] information” and “be called unofficial, doctored, biased, etc.”

Pompeo noted in his May 21 statement that the administration might reconsider the treaty withdrawal decision “if Russia demonstrates a return to full compliance with this confidence-building treaty.” Most observers believe, however, that there is little hope the United States will return to the treaty given the wide-ranging reasons the administration has given for its decision to leave.

According to Article XV of the treaty, no more than two months after a state-party decides to withdraw, a conference of the states-parties must take place so as “to consider the effect of the withdrawal on this Treaty.” Canada and Hungary, the depositaries of the treaty, have scheduled this meeting, to be conducted by remote communication, for July 6.

Many allies have expressed regret about the U.S. decision and indicated that they will continue to implement the accord as they still view it as “functioning and useful.” (See ACT, May 2020.)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on June 23 that “we will see the reaction of our Western colleagues during this conference, what Europe thinks about it.”

“We don’t rule out any options of our actions,” he added.

Trump administration justifications for withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty are being challenged from many sides.

Russia Releases Nuclear Deterrence Policy


July/August 2020
By Shannon Bugos

Russia publicly expanded on the circumstances under which it might employ nuclear weapons in a policy document on nuclear deterrence signed by President Vladimir Putin on June 2.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (left) attend a June 24 Victory Day parade in Moscow to mark the 75th anniversary of defeating Germany in World War II. Three weeks earlier, Putin signed a new document outlining Russia's nuclear deterrence policies. (Photo: Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)The 2020 document, called “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” marks the first time Russia has consolidated and publicly released its nuclear deterrence policy, which previously was classified.

The document presents four scenarios that might warrant nuclear use, two of which did not appear in the 2014, 2010, and 2000 versions of Russia’s military doctrine. (See ACT, March 2010; January/February 2000.)

As stated in the two most recent versions of the military doctrine, two of the scenarios in which Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons” include when Moscow is acting “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” The 2000 military doctrine differed slightly in its description of the latter scenario, as it instead allowed nuclear use in response to conventional attacks in “situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”

The two additional scenarios contained in the 2020 document include an “arrival [of] reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies” or an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.”

The two new scenarios had not yet been included in formal policy, but other documents or statements by government officials, including Putin, have hinted at their inclusion, said Olga Oliker, program director for Europe and Central Asia at International Crisis Group, in a June 4 analysis.

Divided into four sections, the document leads with how Russia defines its state policy on nuclear deterrence, which it calls “defensive by nature.” The goal of deterrence is “to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

The document does not explicitly name Russia’s allies and adversaries, but the second section does broadly define adversaries, stating that Russia implements its deterrence “with regard to individual states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances) that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and that possess nuclear weapons and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction, or significant combat potential of general purpose forces.” This definition would include the United States and alliances such as NATO.

The second section of the document further defines Russia’s definition of nuclear deterrence as signaling to adversaries “the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” It also describes military risks presented by adversaries that deterrence is designed to “neutralize,” such as the deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and missile defense systems. The document does not say how Russia would move to neutralize any of these risks should they elevate to “threats of aggression.”

This section additionally details what Moscow views as “the principles of nuclear deterrence,” to include compliance with arms control agreements, unpredictability for an adversary as to Russian employment of its means of deterrence, and readiness of its forces for use.

The third section covers the four scenarios in which Russia might use nuclear weapons.

The fourth and final section notes the roles of the government and related agencies, including the Security Council and Defense Ministry, in implementing Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy. The document maintains that the Russian president makes the decision to use nuclear weapons.

The document does not explicitly address Russia’s purported willingness to use or threaten to use its much larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons to stave off defeat in a conventional conflict or crisis initiated by Russia, a strategy known as “escalate to deescalate.” (See ACT, March 2018.) But, as Oliker points out, “hard[-]core believers” in this strategy may point to the document’s statement that Moscow’s nuclear deterrence policy “provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

Oliker instead suggests an interpretation that Russia will not use nuclear weapons “for simple battlefield advantage.” But if Russia decides to use nuclear weapons, it “will do so intending to prevent further escalation and end the conflict as favorably (or acceptably) as possible for itself.”

Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and former Russian Foreign Ministry official, said in a June 3 analysis of the deterrence policy that the document has a deescalation strategy but emphasizes deterrence and views deescalation more as a means of preventing rather than waging war.

Following the publication of the signed document, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on June 3 that “Russia can never and will never initiate” the use of nuclear weapons.

Marshall Billingslea, U.S. special envoy for arms control, responded to Peskov on June 11, tweeting, “Where is this reflected in the new doctrine?”

Russia publicly releases its nuclear deterrence policy for the first time.

U.S., Russia Boost Shows of Force


July/August 2020
By Michael Klare

As tensions between the United States and Russia have intensified, both nations have engaged in airborne “show of force” operations intended to demonstrate their intent to resist intimidation and defend their territories. Such operations can prove hazardous when the aircraft of one antagonist come perilously close to those of another, a phenomenon that has occurred on numerous occasions over the past few years. The recent maneuvers, however, appear to have raised the stakes, as the two rivals have increased their use of nuclear-capable aircraft in such operations and have staged them in militarily sensitive areas.

A U.S. F-22 aircraft accompanies a Russian Tu-95 "Bear" bomber during an intercept near Alaska on June 16. (Photo: North American Aerospace Defense Command)The pace and extent of recent air operations have exceeded anything since the end of the Cold War. The United States has flown a number of missions near Russia, sometimes going places for the first time with strategic bombers. These include (1) two missions in March and June by U.S. B-2 stealth bombers above the Arctic Circle in exercises intended to demonstrate NATO’s ability to attack Russian military forces located on the Kola Peninsula in Russia’s far north; (2) a first-time U.S. B-1B bomber flight on May 21 over the Sea of Okhotsk, a bay-like body of water surrounded by Russia’s far eastern territory on three sides; (3) a May 29 flight by two B-1B bombers across Ukrainian-controlled airspace for the first time, coming close to Russian-controlled airspace over Crimea; (4) a June 15 mission by two U.S. B-52 bombers over the Baltic Sea in support of a NATO exercise then under way, coming close to Russian airspace and prompting menacing flights by Russian interceptors in the area; and (5) a June 18 flight by two U.S. B-52 bombers over the Sea of Okhotsk, a first appearance there by that type of aircraft, again prompting Russia to scramble fighter aircraft to escort the U.S. bombers away from the area.

For its part, Russia conducted a March 12 flight of two nuclear-capable Tu-160 “Blackjack” bombers over Atlantic waters near Scotland, Ireland, and France from their base on the Kola Peninsula in Russia’s far north, prompting France and the United Kingdom to scramble interceptor aircraft. In addition, nuclear-capable Tu-95 “Bear” bombers, accompanied by Su-35 fighter jets, flew twice in June within a few dozen miles of the Alaskan coastline before being escorted away by U.S. fighter aircraft.

In conducting these operations, U.S. and Russian military leaders appear to be delivering two messages to their counterparts. First, despite any perceived reductions in military readiness caused by the coronavirus pandemic, they are fully prepared to conduct all-out combat operations against the other. Second, any such engagements could include a nuclear component at an early stage of the fighting.

“We have the capability and capacity to provide long-range fires anywhere, anytime, and can bring overwhelming firepower, even during the pandemic,” said Gen. Timothy Ray, commander of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, the unit responsible for deploying nuclear bombers on long-range missions of this sort. Without saying as much, Russia has behaved in a similar manner. From his post as commander of U.S. air forces in Europe, Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian observed, “Russia has not scaled back air operations in Europe since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, and the number of intercepts of Russian aircraft [by NATO forces] has remained roughly stable.”

Leaders on both sides have been more reticent when it comes to the nuclear implications of these maneuvers, but there is no doubt that such considerations are on their minds. Ray’s talk of “overwhelming force” and “long-range fires” could be interpreted as involving highly destructive conventional weapons, but when the aircraft involved are primarily intended for delivering nuclear weapons, it can have another meaning altogether.

Equally suggestive is Harrigian’s comment, made in conjunction with the B-52 flights over the Baltic Sea on June 15, that “long-range strategic missions to the Baltic region are a visible demonstration of our capability to extend deterrence globally,” again signaling to Moscow that any NATO-Russian engagement in the Baltic region could escalate swiftly to the nuclear level.

Russian generals have not uttered similar statements, but the dispatch of Tu-95 bombers to within a few dozen miles of Alaska, which houses several major U.S. military installations, is a loud enough message in itself.

Although receiving scant media attention in the U.S. and international press, these maneuvers represent a dangerous escalation of U.S.-Russian military interactions and could set the stage for a dangerous incident involving armed combat between aircraft of the opposing sides. This by itself could precipitate a major crisis and possible escalation. Just as worrisome is the strategic implications of these operations, suggesting a commitment to the early use of nuclear weapons in future major-power engagements.

The nuclear adversaries have recently increased flights of strategic bombers near each other’s borders.

U.S. Aims to Expand Drone Sales


July/August 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

The Trump administration intends to unilaterally reinterpret how the United States will participate in the 35-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in order to allow U.S. companies to export more drones, presumably to states that had sought them but been denied access, according to news reports.

A U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone aircraft taxis at a 2016 airshow. The Trump administration is seeking to reinterpret export restrictions to enable more sales of such weapons systems. (Photo: Dennis Henry/U.S. Air Force)The policy change could open up sales of U.S. remotely piloted aircraft, also known as drones, to countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia that have been forbidden from buying them under the MTCR guidelines, Reuters reported on June 12. To date, U.S. defense manufacturers have only been allowed to sell large drones to Australia, France, and the United Kingdom.

The MTCR requires that exports of most missile systems, including cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft that have a range of at least 300 kilometers and the ability to carry a payload of at least 500 kilograms, are subject to a “strong presumption of denial.”

The Obama administration policy for the export of military unmanned aerial systems, which was finalized in 2015, explicitly sought to reinforce U.S. obligations under the MTCR.

That policy also requires that all potential sales be considered on a case-by-case basis and “puts in place stringent conditions” on potential drone sales. Recipient countries also may be required to agree to end-use assurances as a condition of sale or transfer or more specific end-use monitoring, as well as specific “principles for proper use” included as a condition of the transfer.

The revised U.S. policy will reportedly reinterpret how the MTCR applies to drones that travel at speeds under 800 kilometers per hour, such as the Predator and Reaper drones, which are made by General Atomics, and the Global Hawk, which is made by Northrop Grumman. Under the proposed U.S. reinterpretation, Reuters reported, the United States will treat these drones as if they belong in a lower category that falls outside MTCR jurisdiction. Whether the new policy alters other elements of current policy is not yet clear.

U.S. export oversight agencies, including the departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Energy, and Justice, agreed to the change in May, Reuters reported, and the first State Department approval of new drones sales could come this summer. The administration has already notified Northrop Grumman and General Atomics, which are the largest U.S. drone manufacturers.

The push to relax U.S. arms export standards, including drone sales, has been underway for nearly a decade as sales to U.S. defense and intelligence agencies has flattened out and overseas interest in advanced drone surveillance and attack drones has grown. Since 2017, the defense industry and some members of Congress have launched a more intensive effort to encourage the Trump administration to revise U.S. policy to allow manufacturers to sidestep MTCR restrictions.

Defense industry lobbyists and spokespersons have argued that, without changes to the existing U.S. policy for drone exports, the United States will fall behind in the fast-growing, multibillion-dollar global drone market. They fear that some states will turn to other suppliers, including China, to acquire drone capabilities for their military and intelligence agencies.

Critics in the U.S. government, Congress, and the arms control and human rights communities have argued that relaxing rules for the export of advanced remotely piloted aircraft, particularly those capable of carrying weapons, could result in sales to governments that have abused human rights, flouted international humanitarian law, or have been involved in proxy wars outside their borders.

In addition, they point out that if the United States seeks to create loopholes in the MTCR in order to expand its share of the global market, it will likely undermine efforts to ensure compliance with MTCR guidelines by other missile- and drone-producing states.

The Trump administration hopes to expand sales by reinterpreting the Missile Technology Control Regime.

U.S. Sets Global Partnership Priorities


July/August 2020
By Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson

The United States is prioritizing the security of chemicals to help restore the norm against chemical weapons use during its chair of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction for 2020, a State Department official told Arms Control Today.

A scientist works at a laboratory of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in Rijswijk, the Netherlands. The OPCW has received support from the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction to help nations prevent their chemical industries and materials from being misused. (Photo: OPCW)Increasing biological security will also be a key area of focus for the Global Partnership, as the coronavirus pandemic has renewed attention on the “catastrophic impact” that a biological weapon could have, the official said in a June 17 interview.

The Global Partnership is a multilateral initiative founded in 2002 to prevent the use and proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

Initially focused on disposing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related facilities in former Soviet countries, the Global Partnership expanded its geographic scope in 2008. The initiative now implements projects worldwide to secure and destroy WMD-related materials and support partnering countries’ efforts to adhere to international nonproliferation instruments. Its work is guided by six core principles, which include managing and destroying WMD materials, implementing effective border and export controls, protecting facilities that house dual-use materials, and implementing international treaties aimed at preventing WMD proliferation.

The Global Partnership is now comprised of 30 member states plus the European Union. The chair of the initiative rotates on the same schedule as the Group of Seven. The United States last chaired the Global Partnership in 2012. (See ACT, January/February 2013.)

Currently, the partnership has four working groups: nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) security. The initiative implemented more than 180 projects valued at more than $534 million in dozens of countries in 2019.

Although there is continuity in the scope of the working groups, the chair of the initiative can determine priorities for each over the course of a year.

The State Department official said the United States is focused on building capacity through donations during its chairmanship and on strengthening dialogue between partnership states to take into account their threat assessments and programming priorities. The official said the United States also wants to emphasize the importance of donor involvement and challenge all partners in the initiative to make substantial contributions. This includes focusing on the Global Partnership’s matchmaking process for implementing projects across the range of WMD threats. Such matchmaking pairs countries in need of assistance with state donor funding and expertise. As chair, the United States will seek to “tap into an evolving set of requirements on one side, and the priority of funding on the other, and try to match the two,” the State Department official explained.

The official said the United States takes seriously the full range of WMD threats, but the repeated use of chemical weapons over the past several years makes restoring the norm against chemical weapons usage a key priority for the initiative, which the United States will continue to emphasize in 2020.

The partnership’s significant efforts to strengthen chemicals security over the past few years has strengthened the regime and contributed to the capacity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The United States plans to build on this work, and efforts to restore the norm against chemical weapons use will be a “centerpiece” of the Global Partnership’s work in 2020, the official said. The official noted that the working group plans to further develop best practices for chemicals security infrastructure and continue to build a network of experts on which the international community can draw.

The Global Partnership has a number of ongoing projects that support these goals. The United States announced $7 million in funding for the OPCW’s center for chemistry and technology and has funded a project since 2011 to assist states in securing chemicals and assessing the evolving threat of chemical weapons use. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan are some of the states that have benefited. Germany, in connection with the OPCW, funded workshops on chemicals security from 2009 to 2020 for professionals working in chemicals industries in Africa, Asia, and South America.

In the biological security working group, the official said the United States is concerned that nefarious actors are “paying attention to the consequences of the current pandemic” and may too become interested in biological weapons. The officials said that the pandemic has highlighted gaps in biosecurity and noted that some states have already requested help through the initiative to respond to the coronavirus pandemic. Requests for assistance have included training for using personal protective equipment correctly.

The United States is also looking to prioritize building biological incident response capabilities and developing sustainable practices to minimize the risk of a future, intentional biological incident, the official said. The official also noted important progress on linking global health and security efforts in 2019 and said the United States will continue that work.

Past projects funded by the partnership have focused on capacity building to respond to biological threats. Germany funded a project in the Sahel region of Africa from 2016 to 2018 that established a regional response network, and Japan funded work during 2017–2019 to build capacity to diagnose infectious tropical diseases in Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In the nuclear and radiological security working group, the United States is focusing on a range of issues, including enhancing operational resilience; supporting implementation of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the parties to which will hold a conference in 2021; and priorities identified in the action plan released during the 2016 nuclear security summit.

The Global Partnership was one of five organizations tasked with continuing the work of the nuclear security summits, which aimed to secure and minimize weapons-usable nuclear materials in civil programs and raise awareness of the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The partnership’s action plan includes supporting efforts to increase cybersecurity and insider threat mitigation and working with the IAEA on nuclear security priorities.

The working group is scheduled to meet in July to discuss how the partnership can build on the IAEA’s February 2020 nuclear security conference.

The partnership has also contributed to continuing efforts to secure nuclear and radiological materials. The United States, for instance, is funding a 10-year effort through 2024 to secure high-threat radioactive sources in Kazakhstan, and Canada is working with nine Latin American countries from 2018 to 2022 to set up nuclear detection architecture to detect material outside of regulatory control.

The CBRN working group is taking a different approach to its mandate in 2020, the official said, noting that efforts will focus on implementing export controls and creating consensus recommendations on areas including addressing sanctions evasion and countering proliferation financing. The official said the working group will continue to advance implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to prevent WMD proliferation to nonstate actors and work more closely with the World Customs Organization on its capacity-building programs. The United States also hopes to revitalize matchmaking on CBRN projects and make strategic trade controls a permanent focus of the working group.

The United States is currently engaged in a multiyear program with a number of states in the Asia Pacific and East African regions to devise strategic trade controls and better enforce UN Security Council sanctions targeting North Korean proliferation.

The Global Partnership’s 31 members are primarily located in North America and Europe, but the United States has no plans to expand the initiative’s membership at this time. The State Department official said Washington hopes to strengthen existing members’ participation and to implement new project proposals through the matchmaking process.

The State Department official said that the pandemic has created new challenges for the initiative, but noted that the Global Partnership is taking an innovative approach to virtual meetings that allow the initiative’s threat reduction work to continue. Partners now facilitate virtual engagements, remote training, and distance learning in place of their regular activities.

Holding the rotating chair of the 30-nation group, the United States plans to focus on chemical weapons.

China Deploys New Missile Submarines


July/August 2020

China deployed two new submarines capable of carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in April, expanding the sea-based leg of the country’s nuclear triad to include six vessels categorized as nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

A Chinese Jin-class nuclear submarine participates in a 2019 naval parade in in Shandong Province. (Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/AFP/Getty Images)The two new subs shore up the third leg of China’s air-, land-, and sea-based nuclear triad. An effective sea-based leg is likely intended to demonstrate China’s second-strike capabilities and to deter first-strike nuclear attacks from other states. Fielding a robust SSBN fleet is consistent with Beijing’s nuclear doctrine, which is believed to center on a small but effective nuclear arsenal to be used only in self-defense. Beijing’s 2009 white paper on its nuclear doctrine states that “China remains committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with another country.”

The two newly deployed SSBNs are variants of China’s Type 094, or Jin-class, submarine. They are outfitted with sophisticated radars and sonars and are equipped to carry up to 16 of China’s JL-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles. (See ACT, June 2013.)

According a 2020 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the current JL-2 missiles may soon be replaced with a longer-range and more advanced JL-3 missile. The JL-3 is not yet in service, but initial flight tests suggest its range nears 10,000 kilometers. (See ACT, July/August 2019.)—JULIA MASTERSON

China Deploys New Missile Submarines

Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment


July/August 2020

Japan will not deploy two U.S.-made Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense systems designed to protect Japan against North Korean ballistic missiles, officials announced in June, citing growing financial costs, unresolved technical issues, and local opposition.

“Due to considerations of cost and timing, we have stopped the process of introducing the Aegis Ashore system,” said Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono on June 15. The cost was too high, he said, to develop enough confidence that the system’s rocket booster would not fall on Japanese residents and buildings after detaching from the interceptor. Attempts to revise the missile’s software to ensure this outcome had failed, and costly hardware modifications will be necessary, Kono said. Japanese officials had proposed to site the two systems at the north and south ends of the nation’s main island, a decision met with protests from local communities and officials.

Purchasing, operating, and maintaining the two Aegis Ashore systems for 30 years had been estimated to cost about $4.2 billion, and Japan has already invested about $1.8 billion in the project, according to Japanese news sources.

With the cancellation, Japan’s missile defense capabilities will now rely solely on naval vessels armed with Aegis weapons. Japan plans to deploy eight such destroyers, the last of which began sea trials in June and is scheduled to be commissioned in 2021, Defense News reported.—MACKENZIE KNIGHT

Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment

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