On July 27, 2015 the United Nations will host the first multilateral negotiations on the proposed code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (henceforth the code). The code seeks to set norms and shape behavior in outer space for the mutual benefit of all countries. It is voluntary, non-binding and open to all states. It is intended to enhance transparency and confidence building measures between countries. The code is not a treaty, and the United Nations Office for Space Affairs says that the code is intended to lay a foundation to increase the probability of space treaties in the future.
The Obama administration should take the July negotiations on the code seriously. As a number of experts have argued, creating transparent rules of the road for outer space conduct is in the best interests of the United States. The globe is becoming increasingly dependent on space technology. The need for international space regimes is rising. These regimes need to promote the sustainable and peaceful use of space while balancing the right of countries to self-defense.
Space Sustainability
Many modern technologies depend on the use of space based satellites. Farmers use GPS to plow their crops, banks use communication satellites to transfer funds around the world, and the United States military uses space based surveillance to protect U.S. national security.
Yet, all of this technology is placed at risk by orbiting space debris. NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office estimates that the average impact speed between a satellite and any given piece of space debris in low earth orbit would be 10 kilometers (approximately 6 miles) per second. This means a collision with even a small piece of debris could cause considerable damage.
The code, first proposed in 2008 by the European Union, seeks to reduce or eliminate the creation of space debris by fostering procedures and guidelines for space travel. As the code is currently written, Section 2b would require all parties to incorporate the space debris mitigation guidelines of the UN General Assembly. Guideline number four is to “avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities.”
Guideline number four may be a controversial topic in the coming negotiations. The Obama administration has repeatedly said that it “has no plans to propose the negotiation of a debris generating [anti-satellite weapons] ASAT test moratorium.” This stance is reckless. It would be in the best interest of U.S. security to promote an ASAT test moratorium within the framework of Section 2b of the code.
U.S. military dependency on space technology to transfer data is rapidly increasing. During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military had access to 200 million bits per second of data, according to the Department of Defense’s Gulf Air Power Survey authored by Thomas A. Keaney, director of strategic studies at John Hopkins University, and Eliot A. Cohen, director of strategic studies at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. . A little over one decade later, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military transferred 2.4 gigabytes per second through satellites, according to Parameters, the strategic studies institute of the U.S. Army. This amounts to fifty times the capacity that was available in Desert Storm. The U.S. military needs to protect its satellites from orbital debris.
Space is also vital for U.S. and global economic interests. Satellites transmit information vital for trade and investment around the world. The United States Space Surveillance Network estimates that there are currently over 1,200 satellites orbiting earth. Each of these satellites costs millions to place in space.
Space debris could destroy United States military, communication, and commercial satellites. A moratorium on ASAT testing is the best way to prevent the creation of space debris.
In 2007, China conducted an ASAT test. China targeted and destroyed a nonfunctioning weather satellite. This test produced more space debris than any other event in history. NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office estimates that the January test produced 2,317 pieces of debris that can be tracked (larger than 10 cm) and around 150,000 debris particles. The Orbital Debris Program Office says that around a third of the debris 10 cm or greater would still be in orbit by 2035.
These tests threaten the sustainability and peaceful use of space for future generations. Further, they place vital satellites worth hundreds of millions of dollars at risk. Prohibiting a test moratorium is very much in line with the security interests of the United States and the world.
It is worth noting that ASAT technology that does not produce debris does exist. “Soft kill” ASAT weapons, such as lasers and frequency jamming technology, could still be developed within the framework of the code. Developing this form of ASAT, though perhaps more technologically challenging, would allow for security interests to be met without creating debris that would threaten the sustainability of space technology.
The Right to Self Defense
The code has been drafted several times and gone through multiple bilateral and multilateral consultations between countries. The most recent consultation took place from May of 2013 to May of 2014. During this year, the European Union says that over 95 countries were involved.
The United States has been wary of agreeing to a code that would seek to limit the right to self-defense. Because of this, the code has incorporated a reference to Article 51 of the UN charter. Article 4.2 of the code guarantees, “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,” reiterating the language of Article 51.
The United States sees this addition as necessary to provide meaningful limits on the code. The United States wants to preserve its ballistic missile defense systems (BMDS). However, some countries think this language should not be included.
Officials from Brazil and many other South American countries have said that the explicit reference to Article 51 undermines several important aspects of the code. They fear that Article 4.2 of the code will be used to justify weaponizing space and create an arms race in space under the veiled claims of defense. Many of these countries do not currently have viable space programs, or the capabilities necessary to defend themselves from future weapons in space. This space debate is likely to play out in the coming July negotiations.
Article 51 of the UN Charter guarantees states the right of self-defense. But Article 51 is really just a fallback should UN Charter Article 2 (4) fail. Article 2 (4) prohibits the threat or use of force by any country. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the Observer Research Institute in New Delhi argues that the code could include a reference to the prohibition on the threat or use of force.
This addition would help to allay several of the fears of many countries that oppose the self-defense language currently in the code. In addition, referencing a prohibition on the threat or use of force would make Article 2 (4) and the code stronger.
The Obama administration should devote substantial resources to the upcoming July negotiations of the code. This means promoting the viability of a code to strengthen national and international security.