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Bush Budget Revives Cut Warhead
Lawmakers last year dealt what many thought was a knockout blow to research into a new type of nuclear warhead, but the Bush administration is seeking to raise the program off of the canvas with renewed funding in its fiscal year 2009 budget request.
Submitted Feb. 4 to Congress, the Bush administration’s request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) totals almost $9.1 billion, including $6.6 billion for maintaining the nuclear weapons complex and the U.S. stockpile of some estimated 5,000 nuclear warheads. (See ACT, January/February 2008. ) The NNSA is the semi-autonomous entity of the Department of Energy that produces, maintains, and dismantles nuclear warheads. The latest budget request would fund the NNSA for the year beginning Oct. 1.
As part of its weapons activities request, which is about $100 million higher than last year’s bid, the NNSA is seeking $40 million in connection with the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Lawmakers last year refused to fund the NNSA request of nearly $89 million for the program, contending that the United States first needed to conduct a long-term review of its nuclear weapons policies before embarking on a project to develop new types of warheads. (See ACT, January/February 2008. )
Initiated in 2004, the RRW program entails research into a new type of warhead that supposedly would be easier and safer to build and maintain and less susceptible to unauthorized or accidental detonation than existing warheads. NNSA officials claim that it should be possible to manufacture and certify a RRW design as valid without having to conduct a proof test. The United States is currently abiding by a 1992 nuclear test moratorium.
But last year, an independent panel of scientists, JASON, questioned in a study whether the RRW design could be certified without a test and stated that there needed to be more investigation into what might cause the design to fail. JASON further recommended more evaluation of proposed surety mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized use. (See ACT, November 2007. )
As part of its latest budget request, the NNSA is seeking $10 million to follow up on the JASON study’s concerns by maturing the RRW design. In addition, the agency is requesting $20 million to establish an “accredited warhead certification plan without nuclear testing.” The NNSA is supposed to report on its findings in a May report to Congress. Another $10 million is being sought to explore surety options for warheads, including possible RRW designs.
Despite the congressional defeat of the RRW program funding last year and the scientific questions surrounding it, Thomas D’Agostino, the head of the NNSA, continues to herald the initiative as essential for his agency’s efforts to transform the nuclear weapons enterprise. The NNSA plan is to create a revamped complex that can produce weapons on an as-needed basis rather than maintaining thousands of warheads in storage for possible emergencies. The agency describes this approach as an “industrial hedge against geopolitical or technical problems.” The RRW concept fits into this vision because it is supposed to be a simplified warhead that is easier to manufacture.
The NNSA also makes the case for the RRW program on the grounds that current practices to preserve and extend the lifetimes of existing weapons may be unsustainable and might diminish confidence in the performance of those warheads over time by introducing gradual changes that may stray from the original design. D’Agostino argued in a Jan. 31 speech, “[W]hile today’s stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable, the weapons laboratories, the Department of Defense, and I are concerned about our future ability to maintain the stockpile without nuclear testing.” He added that maintaining and certifying the past “finely tuned designs…is becoming increasingly difficult absent nuclear testing and involves increasing risk.”
Key lawmakers last year rebuked the administration as “irresponsible” for suggesting that not going ahead with the RRW program could require a return to nuclear testing to validate existing warheads. In an Aug. 1, 2007, letter to the administration, Reps. Peter Visclosky (D-Ind.) and David Hobson (R-Ohio), the chairman and ranking member of the appropriations subcommittee that takes the lead on nuclear weapons funding, noted that Congress had received no evidence indicating that renewed testing might be necessary to verify existing warhead capabilities. (See ACT, September 2007. )
Although the NNSA is raising questions about the long-term practicality of its life extension programs for existing warheads, it is continuing to ask Congress to fund those efforts. The latest budget request includes $211 million for extending the lives of B61 gravity bombs and W76 warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. An additional $338 million is being sought for maintaining those two types of warheads, as well as six others.
The agency also is seeking almost $199 million to ramp up pit production capabilities for existing warheads. The pit is the core trigger element of nuclear warheads, and Congress repeatedly defeated Bush administration plans to establish a new plant for their production. Under this new plan, the administration will seek to increase the minimal pit production capacity of Technical Area-55 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory to between 50 and 80 pits annually.
On the other end of the spectrum, the NNSA is seeking $64.7 million to dismantle retired warheads, approximately $12 million more than last year’s request. Although actual figures are secret, the agency last year claimed an accelerated rate of dismantlement and contends it aims to continue increasing the dismantlement throughput. The agency’s last projected timeline for finishing all planned warhead dismantlements is 2023.
The agency also is seeking $77.4 million to start shrinking the size of the nuclear weapons complex by eliminating excess buildings. Part of the NNSA vision for a revamped nuclear weapons complex is to consolidate nuclear materials, people, and missions in fewer facilities within its existing group of sites to help reduce security costs.