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Brazil, Argentina Pursue Nuclear Cooperation
In February, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva and Argentine President Cristina Fernandez released a joint communiqué establishing a binational commission to explore further areas of nuclear cooperation between the two nations.
According to the Feb. 22 communiqué, the commission will work on developing a joint nuclear reactor to meet the electrical needs of both nations, designing a bilateral project to explore aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and establishing a binational company for uranium enrichment. The commission will also organize a seminar of Argentine and Brazilian researchers tasked with assessing strategies for future nuclear cooperation and identifying the necessary human resources and technology needed for bilateral cooperation.
The commission met for the first time in the beginning of March at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna. The communiqué stipulates that the commission has until Aug. 30 to prepare a report outlining the actions that should be taken to promote further bilateral cooperation.
The joint communiqué is the latest development in nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. In the 1980s, each nation agreed to stand down from the weapons-related programs that they were then pursuing as regional rivals. In 1991 they signed a bilateral agreement committing to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. Thereafter, they established the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which is responsible for verifying compliance with the bilateral agreement.
Also in 1991, Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC, and the IAEA signed the Quadripartite Agreement, specifying procedures for IAEA and ABACC monitoring and verification of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations.
Brazil has an operational enrichment facility at Resende, about 100 kilometers from Rio de Janeiro. Argentina had a small-scale facility at Pilcaniyeu, and there has been speculation that Buenos Aires might restart an enrichment program in an attempt to keep pace with Brazil. Although the Resende facility is subject to IAEA and ABACC safeguards, past negotiations with the IAEA regarding verification procedures have been tense. (See ACT, October 2005. )
Moreover, neither Argentina nor Brazil has signed an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Such protocols grant the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and undeclared nuclear sites.
Some outside experts have raised questions about Brazil’s nuclear ambitions and are particularly worried about the country’s aspirations for a nuclear-powered submarine. Most countries rely on nuclear submarines powered by highly enriched uranium, which can also be used in a nuclear weapons program. Although Brazil has said that its submarines will be fueled by low-enriched uranium, concerns remain about the potential for enrichment facilities to be used for a weapons program.
In a recent article published by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, Nelson Jobim, the country’s defense minister, highlighted plans for the modernization of navy facilities needed for the construction, repair, and maintenance of a nuclear submarine. One of the top Brazilian generals, Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira, reiterated in a Feb. 8 interview on the specialized defense website Defesa@net that Brazil’s number one military priority is the development of a nuclear submarine. According to Moreira, Brazil will complete construction of its nuclear submarine in eight to 10 years. Others are more reluctant to specify a timeline for submarine development, citing serious budgetary constraints that must be addressed before the Brazilian dream of a nuclear-powered submarine can become a reality.