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UN Iran Sanctions Push Thwarted for Now
Senior diplomats from the United States, the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany met Sept. 21 to discuss elements of an additional Security Council sanctions resolution on Iran. Divisions among these states continue, prolonging the consultations on UN sanctions. Washington and its European allies on the council now appear increasingly likely to go outside the UN system to impose further sanctions against Iran.
Sanctions Sought, Inside or Outside Security Council
The six nations, which also included China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, adopted a chairman’s statement after their meeting. It reaffirmed their commitment to “maintain a dual-track approach” to addressing Iran’s nuclear program, offering incentives if Iran complied with the council’s demand to suspend uranium-enrichment activities and the construction of its heavy-water reactor and continued sanctions if Iran fails to meet those demands. Enrichments activities can have peaceful nuclear applications and can also produce fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for nuclear weapons. Further discussions among the countries’ foreign ministers were set for Sept. 28 in New York.
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are now pressing for additional UN sanctions on Iran for failing to comply with demands imposed by Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 to suspend all enrichment activities and the construction of its heavy-water reactor. According to Resolution 1747, adopted March 24, if Iran fails to carry out its suspension obligations, the Security Council shall “adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (See ACT, April 2007.)
Department of State spokesperson Sean McCormack told reporters Sept. 18 that the process of adopting additional sanctions “has not moved as quickly as [the United States] would have liked.” The United States began to call for a third round of sanctions in June after Iran failed to meet a May 24 suspension deadline imposed by Resolution 1747.
Russia and China have opposed imposing additional sanctions at this point, suggesting that such measures could place in jeopardy Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. On Aug. 21, Iran finalized a work plan with the IAEA to provide answers to a number of outstanding questions regarding its past sensitive nuclear activities. (See ACT, September 2007.)
Iran has warned that it might suspend cooperation with the agency if further sanctions are adopted. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s permanent representative to the IAEA, told reporters Aug. 30 that “any action by the UN Security Council will deteriorate the situation.” Iran followed through with similar threats in March when Tehran suspended the implementation of a strengthened subsidiary safeguards arrangement with the IAEA after the adoption of Resolution 1747, a suspension Iran still maintains. (See ACT, April 2007.)
Moscow has consistently called for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and for the agency to be the primary mechanism to address nuclear concerns regarding Iran. Because of the work plan for IAEA-Iran cooperation, Russia is resistant to furthering the sanctions process.
According to Acting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “The [IAEA] is satisfied with Iran’s progress in lifting problem issues related to its nuclear program,” ITAR-TASS reported Sept. 19. Lavrov stressed that “Russia remains committed to the agreement. The UN Security Council will not go beyond the bounds of supporting the IAEA.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit Tehran for a summit of the Caspian Sea littoral states beginning Oct. 14. During the meeting, Putin and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are expected to address a number of bilateral issues, including Russia’s construction of Iran’s first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, which remains plagued by continuous delays. Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency head Sergei Kiriyenko and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Reza Aghazadeh, met in Vienna Sept. 17 to discuss the construction of the plant. Aghazadeh told the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) Sept. 18 that “we were both agreed that setting exact dates for putting into operation of the power plant and delivery of the fuel for it to Iran was in need of more bilateral work.”
China has adopted a similar position as Russia with regard to sanctions. Wang Guangya, China’s permanent representative to the UN, told the Kuwait News Agency Sept. 22 that “[i]t is not the right move for the Security Council to have another [sanctions] resolution because diplomacy is going on between the IAEA and Iran.”
China imports about 12 percent of its crude oil from Iran, and China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation reached an agreement in May to develop Iran’s North Pars natural gas field.
While the pursuit of additional sanctions persists, participation in existing UN-mandated sanctions on Iran appears to be limited to less than half of the UN membership. On Sept. 19, Ambassador Johan Verbeke, chairman of the UN committee overseeing implementation of Resolution 1737, provided his third briefing to the Security Council on how Resolutions 1737 and 1747 have been carried out. He indicated that although all 192 UN member states were required to submit reports to the council on the steps they had taken to implement each resolution within 60 days after their adoption, the committee had only received 81 reports under Resolution 1737 and 67 reports under Resolution 1747.
Non-UN Sanctions
Barring the adoption of another sanctions resolution, the United States and France have each indicated their willingness to seek more expansive sanctions outside of the Security Council. Currently, the United States and the European Union have more stringent sanctions on Iran than those called for by Resolutions 1737 and 1747.
In a Sept. 24 interview with Reuters, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the potential U.S. approach to expanding existing sanctions, stating that “we can designate many more entities” and adding that the United States “can make it hard for Iran to use the international financial system for bad purposes.” In this regard, she referred to the U.S. financial sanctions placed on Banco Delta Asia in 2005 in response to its suspected involvement in laundering North Korean funds. (See ACT, December 2005.) These financial restrictions led to several other foreign banks closing their accounts with North Korean customers.
Two of the largest state-owned banks in Iran, Saderat and Sepah, have already been placed under U.S. sanctions for their suspected roles in financing terrorist activities and proliferation, respectively. Resolution 1747 added Bank Sepah to the list of entities sanctioned under Resolution 1737.
In recent months, a number of European banks, including Credit Suisse, UBS, and Dresdner Bank, have indicated that that they are either withdrawing investments or withdrawing from Iran entirely due to fears of losing U.S. business and to the operating costs in the country.
Congress has also endorsed tighter U.S. sanctions on Iran. At the end of July, the House of Representatives passed two bills aimed at restricting investment in Iran by U.S. firms. (See ACT, September 2007.) On Sept. 25, the House passed the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act, which imposes a wide range of sanctions and encourages the administration to impose additional restrictions on Iranian entities and access to financial markets.
Since Nicolas Sarkozy became president in May, France has become more outspoken in calling for additional sanctions, either within or outside of the UN context. Outlining French policy on Iran in a Sept. 21 interview with the International Herald Tribune, Sarkozy stated that France was interested in seeking “an arsenal of sanctions ” to convince Iran against seeking nuclear weapons.
During a Sept. 21 press briefing, French Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hugues Moret stated that “there are discussions going on in the framework of the European Union, ongoing discussions at the Security Council and ongoing discussions in the EU3 + 3,” referring to the permanent five members of the Security Council and Germany. He added, “[W]e’re working and discussing new sanctions in these different fora.”
France appears to have already begun efforts to reduce French investments in Iran. During the International Herald Tribune interview, Sarkozy said that he was asking French firms to “to refrain from going to Iran” and Paris has already recommended that its major oil and gas firms, Total and Gaz de France, cease bidding on new projects in Iran.
However, no proposal has been formally tabled in Brussels. Javier Solana, the EU high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, told reporters Sept. 24 that, with regard to the potential for additional EU sanctions on Iran, “that debate has not started for the moment in the EU,” adding that “no country has put that kind of issue on the table.”
Due to financial and trade ties between several EU states and Iran, the prospect for additional unilateral EU sanctions appears uncertain. Germany has expressed support for additional Security Council sanctions, but it has been resistant to such actions outside the UN. A German diplomat told Arms Control Today Sept. 24 that Germany is “looking to New York” concerning the expansion of existing sanctions on Iran. The diplomat indicated that Germany believes that further measures outside taken outside the Security Council “might be premature.”
IAEA Board Also Divided on Iran Approach
In addition to the Security Council, divisions regarding Iran’s cooperation agreement with the agency were also apparent at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The 35 state representatives on the agency’s key policy organ met Sept. 10-14 in Vienna.
During the board meeting, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei defended the IAEA-Iran work plan from criticism levied by the United States and some European countries. He said that the outstanding verification issues to be resolved by the plan “are at the core of the lack of confidence about the nature of Iran’s program” and that if the agency were able to provide assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s past and present nuclear activities, this could “create the conditions for a comprehensive and durable solution.”
The United States and the EU countries criticized the plan for addressing issues in a step-by-step manner rather than concurrently. They said this could allow Iran to drag out the process for at least six months, permitting it to expand its nuclear capabilities in the meantime. For example, Germany, in a statement delivered Sept. 10 on behalf of itself, France, and the United Kingdom, stated, “We are...concerned by the sequential nature of the work plan as it may possibly be used to delay the clarification of the outstanding questions.”
ElBaradei expressed his frustration with the lack of support for the agency’s approach when, following a Sept. 11 statement in which the EU merely “noted” rather than expressed support for the IAEA-Iran agreement, he walked out on the meeting.
Besides Russia and China, other states have expressed significant support for the work plan. The Nonaligned Movement (NAM), which consists of 118 developing countries, including Iran, and currently accounts for 15 of the current IAEA board members, delivered a statement that characterized the work plan as a “significant step forward.” In an apparent response to calls by the United States and the EU to consider additional actions in the Security Council, the NAM further declared that it “strongly rejects any undue pressure or interference in the agency’s activities…which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.” The NAM has consistently defended the right of all states, including Iran, to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as part of the “inalienable right” to undertake such efforts stated in Article IV of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Iran has also offered to increase its cooperation with the IAEA if the Security Council no longer considers the nuclear issue. Iranian officials have indicated that Tehran might reconsider its implementation of an additional protocol, which allows more invasive inspection measures by the agency, if the nuclear issue was addressed through the IAEA rather than the Security Council. As Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mohamad-Ali Hosseini told reporters Sept. 2, “[I]mplementation of the additional protocol could be resumed if the Iranian dossier would again return from the UN to the IAEA.” Security Council members, however, have shown no indication that they would back such a move.
Slow but Continued Progress at Natanz
The discussion of the IAEA-Iran work plan was also part of a broader consideration of an Aug. 30 ElBaradei report to the board on the status of Iran’s nuclear program. That report indicated that Iran was either running or testing about 2,300 centrifuges in its commercial-scale enrichment plant at Natanz as of Aug. 19. An additional 328 centrifuges were under construction at the time the report was issued.
The number of centrifuges installed is less than the 3,000 centrifuges Iran had expected to have installed at this time. With 3,000 centrifuges running at their intended capacity, Iran would be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon in about nine months. In February, Iran told the IAEA that it intended to “bring into operation” about 3,000 centrifuges by the end of May. After considerable progress in installing centrifuges earlier this year, Iran’s progress appeared to slow in recent months. ElBaradei noted this trend in July, telling reporters July 9 that the IAEA “saw a slowing in the process of commissioning new cascades.”
After the Aug. 30 report to the board, Ahmadinejad tried to buttress claims of Tehran’s enrichment accomplishments. According to the state-run Islamic Students News Agency on Sept. 2, Ahmadinejad stated, “[W]e have taken another step in the nuclear progress and launched more than 3,000 centrifuge machines, installing a new cascade every week.” He was likely taking liberties with the number of centrifuges, possibly counting those in various states of testing. All together, the centrifuges in the commercial and pilot facilities at Natanz add up to just less than 3,000 machines.
The IAEA report further indicates that Iran reported feeding only about 690 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride between February and mid-August 2007. Iran indicated in April 2006 that the maximum amount of uranium hexafluoride it would be able to feed its 164-machine centrifuge cascades would be 70 grams an hour. At that rate, even if Iran were only feeding uranium hexafluoride into the eight cascades that the IAEA reported were operational May 13, 2007, it would have been able to run about 1,200 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride between then and mid-August. The report stated that the 690-kilogram figure “is well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design.” Although Iran appears to be underfeeding its centrifuge cascades, the reasons behind this underfeeding are uncertain.
Ahmadinejad Rival to Head Key Clerical Body
In a domestic political development in Tehran, former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected Sept. 4 as chairman of the 86-member Assembly of Experts, a clerical body responsible for supervising the Supreme Leader as well as selecting his successor or dismissing him from power. Rafsanjani lost to Ahmadinejad in Iran’s 2005 presidential runoff election.
Rafsanjani has been critical of Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach regarding the nuclear issue and has called for dialogue with the West. Although Rafsanjani continues to criticize the United States and other Western powers for their opposition to Iran’s nuclear pursuits, in a Sept. 7 prayer sermon at Tehran University he urged the West “to settle the problem through talks, especially now that the doors to talks have opened.”
Former Swiss ambassador to Iran, Tim Guldimann, told Arms Control Today Sept. 12 that, with Rafsanjani now in control of the Assembly of Experts, “Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei can now be threatened by the assembly’s ability to remove Khamenei from power or at least criticize him for not following Islamic teachings.”
Rafsanjani has indicated that he would like the assembly to play a more active role in policymaking, potentially in contradiction with the supreme leader’s policies. IRNA quoted Rafsanjani as stating Sept. 4 that “[i]f the experts assembly wants to play a more active role in the country’s affairs, it has the religious and legal justification to do that,” adding that “[p]erhaps the assembly will do so in its upcoming term.”
Guldimann states that “this leverage can be used to limit Khamenei’s support for Ahmadinejad.”