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Iran Rejects Security Council Demand
Paul Kerr
After more than two months, Iran responded Aug. 22 to a package of incentives and disincentives offered by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to convince Tehran to end its gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. Although Iran indicated that it wants to negotiate a solution to resolve international concerns about the program, it did not agree to the UN Security Council’s demand that it suspend work on enrichment by Aug. 31.
Enrichment can produce low-enriched uranium, used for fuel in civil nuclear reactors, as well as highly enriched uranium, which can be used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
Iran’s response means that the country could face Security Council sanctions. That body July 31 adopted Resolution 1696, calling on Tehran to take several steps to ease concerns about its nuclear program. Fourteen countries voted in favor of the resolution; Qatar voted against it.
The resolution expresses the council’s intention to adopt “appropriate measures” under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII, Article 41, if Iran has not complied with the Security Council’s demands. Article 41 describes measures short of military force that can be employed “to give effect” to Security Council decisions.
To judge Iran’s compliance, the resolution requests that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei submit a report by Aug. 31 to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council on whether Iran has met the suspension requirements and undertaken other measures described in a February IAEA Board of Governors resolution. Such measures include, for example, Iran’s full cooperation with the agency’s investigation of its nuclear programs. (See ACT, March 2006.)
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns said in an Aug. 21 interview with National Public Radio that in September the council would adopt a resolution “with sanctions” if Iran did not comply with the Security Council’s demands.
Such a move could face some resistance. Veto-wielding Security Council members China and Russia have resisted the idea of imposing sanctions.
The resolution underlines that the council must undertake “further decisions…should such additional measures be necessary.” The text also invokes Chapter VII, Article 40 of the UN Charter. According to that article, the council may first “call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before deciding to implement punitive measures.
U.S. officials have indicated that if the Security Council fails to impose penalties, Washington will attempt to persuade other countries to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran.
Meanwhile, Tehran does not appear to be slowing down its programs. Indeed, some Iranian officials have suggested that Iran might undertake new nuclear projects, some of which could well increase international suspicions regarding Tehran’s proclaimed peaceful nuclear intentions.
The Offer
The package contains several proposals for providing Iran with nuclear energy, including multilateral ventures to provide a light-water nuclear power reactor, part ownership of a Russian enrichment facility, and a five-year “buffer stock” of enriched uranium stored under IAEA supervision. (See ACT, July/August 2006.)
Furthermore, marking a shift from previous opposition to any Iranian domestic centrifuge facilities, the proposal states that a final agreement would include a provision for reviewing the program’s suspension and permitting Iran to have an enrichment facility on its own territory. However, it appears unlikely that such permission will be granted any time soon.
The proposal also includes measures for economic cooperation and technology transfers to Iran, such as support for the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization and the modernization of Tehran’s telecommunications infrastructure.
The package also vaguely addresses security issues, saying that the parties would “support a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues.”
In addition to the incentives, the proposal requires Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities for the duration of negotiations. Iran had suspended its enrichment program in late 2004 before beginning negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Those negotiations ended when Iran took several steps to renew enrichment-related activities, beginning in August 2005. (See ACT, September 2005.)
The package also calls on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA investigation and resume implementing an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.
Additional protocols provide the agency with increased authority to detect clandestine nuclear programs, including by inspections of facilities that have not been declared to the IAEA. They supplement mandatory IAEA safeguards agreements, which are required under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has signed but not ratified its additional protocol. Tehran had been implementing the agreement but stopped doing so in February.
The Security Council Takes Action
However, Iran failed to meet the six countries’ demand for an early July agreement to suspend its enrichment activities. In response, their foreign ministers adopted a statement July 12 expressing “profound disappointment” with Iran’s decision and stating that discussions of the matter within the Security Council would resume. (See ACT, June 2006.)
The permanent members of the Security Council and Germany presented their joint incentives package to the Iranian government June 6, after failing to overcome divisions that stymied earlier attempts to craft a Security Council resolution.
The council adopted Resolution 1696 following a debate among the five permanent members. Most of the discussions reportedly centered around the precise wording that the resolution would use to make Iran’s obligations mandatory, as well as an appropriate date for Tehran to comply.
The United States, France, and the United Kingdom favored a resolution that would threaten Iran with punitive measures. But China and Russia favored an approach that would set a more moderate pace for possible Security Council action.
Beijing and Moscow have expressed skepticism about the efficacy of sanctions and have also been reluctant to invoke Chapter VII for fear that it could provide a pretext for military action against Iran. (See ACT, May 2006.)
China’s UN ambassador, Wang Guangya, stated July 31 that the purpose of the resolution was to bolster the role of the IAEA rather than punish Iran. His Russian counterpart, Vitaly Churkin, emphasized during comments to reporters July 19 that Moscow wished to be patient with Tehran.
The final resolution, which was the first to address the Iranian nuclear issue, came about three months after a nonbinding March Security Council presidential statement called on Iran to take the steps outlined in the February IAEA resolution. (See ACT, April 2006.)
The Security Council resolution endorses the June package and “encourages” Iran to enter into negotiations with the relevant countries. It also states that Iran will not face punitive council action if it complies with the resolution.
In addition to the requirements outlined for Iran’s nuclear program, the resolution says that states should act to prevent the transfer of technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment or ballistic missile programs.
Iran’s Response
Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator, gave Tehran’s response to the ambassador from each country, except for the United States. The Swiss government gave the response to Washington.
Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, described Iran’s response Aug. 22 as “extensive,” requiring a “detailed and careful analysis.”
Iran reportedly did not agree to suspend its enrichment activities, a response consistent with past statements from Tehran. Larijani, however, said Aug. 22 that Iran was willing to begin negotiations on all aspects of the proposal.
The details of the response have not been made public, but some Iranian statements have hinted at Tehran’s answer.
For example, Iranian officials have publicly complained that the proposal contains ambiguities that need to be resolved. For example, Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who also heads Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said that Iran wants more detail about the package’s provisions for supplying Iran with nuclear reactors and fuel, an Iranian newspaper reported Aug. 16.
Furthermore, Mohammad Saidi, deputy head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, told the semi-official Mehr News Agency Aug. 22 that the package does not mention Article IV of the NPT. This omission, he said, raises doubts about Iran’s international interlocutors’ commitment to respect its right under the treaty to peaceful nuclear endeavors, as well as help with nuclear technology and fuel.
Additionally, Larijani indicated that Iran had questions about the proposal’s security provisions, the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported Aug. 24.
Larijani also said in an Aug. 26 television interview that, despite a proposal to establish a “fuel bank,” which would provide Iran with a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel, Iran still needs to be able to enrich its own uranium as a hedge against possible future supply disruptions. (See ACT, June 2006.)
Iran’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mohammad Javad Zarif, voiced doubts in an opinion piece published by CNN Aug. 14 that the other parties would allow Iran to enrich uranium, arguing that the resolution is “aimed at imposing pressure on Iran to abandon” the program.
Moreover, Saidi said that Iran would re-examine a proposal included in the June package that would allow Iran to own part of an enrichment facility located in Russia. (See ACT, November 2005.) He claimed that the Security Council resolution necessitated such reconsideration, but he did not elaborate.
Mohsen Rezai, secretary of Iran’s Expediency Council, indicated that Iran’s response was designed to neutralize the push for sanctions, the semi-official Islamic Students News Agency reported Aug. 28. But at least some of Iran’s interlocutors found Iran’s answer lacking.
An Aug. 23 Department of State press release said that Washington would review Iran’s offer but added that Tehran’s answer “falls short of the conditions set by the Security Council.” Burns accused the Iranians of “trying to delay…so that they [can] continue their nuclear research.”
France and Germany also expressed dissatisfaction with Iran’s response, with French Foreign Minster Philippe Douste-Blazy describing Iran’s response as “not satisfactory,” Agence France Presse reported Aug. 29.
Iran Looks to the Future
Larijani said that the UN deadline is not “the end of diplomacy,” adding that “it may be possible to move forward with this package, on another occasion, with another proposal.” But he noted that “[t]his type of diplomacy may not be appropriate at that time. The form will need to be changed.”
Larijani also warned that Iran would “reduce IAEA inspections” if the international community attempts to “deprive” Iran of its enrichment program. IAEA inspections are one tool that the agency uses to monitor NPT states-parties’ compliance with their safeguards agreements. He also said, however, that Iran does not currently intend to withdraw from the NPT.
Asked about the possibility of a U.S. military “confrontation,” Larijani replied that such an attack was unlikely, asserting that the United States “will run into problems.”
Larijani said that Iran “will endure” any UN-imposed sanctions rather than end its enrichment program. He also implied that Iran might cut off oil supplies to Europe if such sanctions are imposed.
New Nuclear Programs?
Despite the controversy, Saidi suggested in an Aug. 22 interview with the semi-official Fars News Agency that Iran might undertake new nuclear projects.
For example, Saidi said that the country intends to conduct research on more-advanced centrifuges, stating that “ Iran does not restrict itself to first-, second-, or third-generation machinery.”
If these claims are true, such research would likely cause more tensions with the UN. The IAEA is investigating whether Iran has conducted secret research on more-advanced P-2 centrifuges. Iran is known currently to utilize a relatively primitive model called the P-1. (See ACT, July/August 2006.)
Saidi also indicated that Iran may build nuclear power reactors moderated by heavy water, a move that could also raise concerns. The IAEA has already called on Iran to “reconsider” its construction of a heavy-water research reactor. The agency is concerned that Iran may use the reactor to produce plutonium, which can also be used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched the operation of a heavy-water production plant that has been under construction, IRNA reported Aug. 26.