State Department Reorganization Approved

An approved merger of two Department of State bureaus devoted to dealing with nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons has produced a mixed reaction among current and former State Department officials. Some applaud the move as long overdue, while others condemn it as shortsighted and misguided.

The State Department currently divides work on controlling or stopping the spread of dangerous weapons primarily among three bureaus: arms control, nonproliferation, and verification and compliance.

In general, responsibility for negotiating new and implementing past agreements to limit or reduce existing arms stockpiles rests with the arms control bureau. The nonproliferation bureau is tasked with denying dangerous weapons to states or nonstate actors that do not already possess them. The verification and compliance bureau assesses whether other countries are complying with their treaty commitments or following international norms of behavior.

An internal Feb. 9 State Department memo informed employees that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had approved in principle combining the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus. She also reportedly asked Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker to provide her with options on how a new bureau should be structured and function. Many expect that Rademaker will eventually head the new bureau.

Fusing the two bureaus was recommended in a report last fall by the State Department’s inspector general’s office and endorsed by Rice’s predecessor, Colin Powell. Charged with evaluating the State Department’s inner workings, the inspector general’s office is supposed to review department entities roughly every five years.

The recent report marked the first time that the inspector general’s office had assessed the workings of the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus since they were created in April 1999. That year, congressional legislation merged the formerly independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department.

In its report, the inspector general’s office concluded that the arms control bureau had too little to do and the nonproliferation bureau was overtaxed, according to sources familiar with the unreleased report. It also faulted the two bureaus and the verification and compliance bureau for conducting duplicative work.

In addition, the inspector general’s office reportedly recommended that the verification and compliance bureau also have its role and functions narrowed. Such a makeover would require congressional approval, however, as the bureau was granted independent status in the legislation passed by Congress in 1999. Some lawmakers, such as Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and co-author of the ACDA-State Department legislation, would be expected to oppose significant changes to the verification and compliance bureau’s status.

By contrast, lawmakers generally accept the idea of combining the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus, according to congressional sources. However, these sources said Congress could assert itself and hold up the process if it dislikes the final plan.

Reactions in the two bureaus to be merged vary greatly, aside from a widespread uneasiness with how the change will play out. This conclusion is based on Arms Control Today interviews with roughly a dozen current State Department officials, all of whom asked to remain anonymous.

Some officials adamantly oppose the consolidation. They argue that creating one bureau out of two will inevitably lead to some lost expertise and some issues falling through the cracks. No employees are expected to be fired, although some might be shifted elsewhere in the department.

Some former top State Department officials have been more openly critical. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former ACDA Director John Holum, who oversaw the 1999 ACDA merger, sent a Jan. 18 letter to selected legislators, expressing qualms that the proposed consolidation would “undercut nonproliferation.” Implying that the arms control bureau is not busy enough because the current administration has put little effort into arms control, the two former Clinton administration officials warned that “downplaying an activity is one thing; disabling ourselves from ever pursuing it is quite another.”

A few current officials told Arms Control Today that they believe ideology played a role in the merger. They charge that Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, an outspoken critic of some past arms control agreements who is rumored to be leaving his post, pressed for bureaucratic changes that would hobble arms control proponents or minimize the prominence of arms control within the department down the road.

Bolton’s office would not publicly comment on these claims. Other State Department officials contend the assertions are baseless. Instead, they argue an overhaul is needed because times and priorities have changed, and traditional arms control treaties are incapable of addressing threats posed by terrorists and regimes that would not abide by agreements even if they signed them.