Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lessons for U.S. Policy

A little more than one year ago, the world learned that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had provided nuclear-weapons-related technology to a number of countries, including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Yet, the revelations could hardly have come as a surprise: the supply network was used by Pakistan over the past 25 years to obtain technology, components, and materials for its own nuclear weapons.

Far more remarkable was that, although Khan’s activities had been tracked by U.S. intelligence for more than two decades, little attempt had been made to roll up the network he created. Rather than focusing on this profound long-term strategic danger to national security, the United States had chosen to pursue short-term, tactical foreign policy gains with Pakistan.

This misguided policy approach continues today as the Bush administration has chosen to subordinate nonproliferation goals, including fully breaking apart the Khan network, to the short-term goal of building a relationship with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The president has also not proposed a long-term strategy to prevent a similar network from popping up in the future.

A Checkered History
The U.S.-Pakistani relationship has a checkered history: U.S. interests for most of Pakistan’s history have been driven by Cold War considerations, while Pakistan’s interests have been driven by fear of India and the fate of the contested province of Kashmir.

For the United States, Pakistan’s strategic geographical position in South Asia was an obstacle to Soviet access to the Arabian Sea and Moscow’s political designs in the Middle East generally. India, on the other hand, was more sympathetic to Moscow as India’s ruling party was ideologically oriented toward a socialist model of economic development. In 1954, the United States and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement. A year later, Pakistan acceded to the U.S.-backed South East Asia Treaty Organization as well as the Central Treaty Organization, formerly known as the Baghdad Pact. In 1959, a U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation agreement took effect.

By 1959, the Pakistani government had effectively ceded remote areas of its northern provinces to the CIA and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) for the collection of intelligence on Soviet activities. From these facilities, the United States eavesdropped on Soviet nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan.[1] Secret bases in the Peshawar area were used for U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.[2] Despite this, U.S. relations with Pakistan were not stable. During and immediately after the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, the United States suspended military assistance to both sides, causing a cooling of the Pakistani-U.S. relationship.

Meanwhile, the USSR-China split and the Sino-Indo border war of 1962 created conditions for China and Pakistan to pursue a closer relationship, which flourished despite U.S. concerns. The relationship deepened as China provided assistance to Pakistan during the U.S. military embargo.[3]

U.S. assistance to Pakistan was restored in 1975 but was cut off again in 1979 when Pakistan imported nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology following enactment of the Symington[4] and Glenn[5] amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act.

This cutoff did not last long. The mujahideen, a group of Islamic warriors, or jihadists, had taken up arms in revolt against the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government that was attempting to bring some secularization to Afghan society (via, e.g., a literacy campaign for girls, the banning of dowries for brides, and legislated freedom of choice in marriage). The United States saw this as an opportunity to destabilize the Communist government by covertly assisting the mujahideen through the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI). The presidential “finding” approving the covert program was signed in July 1979, and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December, rendering prescient a prediction made in writing by then-national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Jimmy Carter that the Soviets would react in this way to the U.S. aid.[6] Once the invasion began, Brzezinski sent Carter another message on December 26, 1979, saying, “This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.”[7]

In addition to undercutting a key U.S. nonproliferation pillar, the assistance to the mujahideen also boosted Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, including the rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda. It was not the last time that an overemphasis on short-term, tactical foreign policy considerations would lead to long-term damage to U.S. national security.

Still, in the context of the Cold War, Carter’s policy was backed by much of the foreign policy establishment, including by President Ronald Reagan when he took office in 1981. The Reagan administration pushed through a $3.2 billion economic and military assistance package for Pakistan with a legislated six-year waiver of the sanctions against Pakistan for its nuclear violations. Such waivers were extended, and assistance for the mujahideen via Pakistan continued until the Soviets began to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988.

The Origins of the Khan Network
During all of that time, the policy of assistance to the mujahideen was accompanied by a consciously adopted “blind eye” to the Pakistani nuclear program that allowed Khan to obtain all the technology, materials, and equipment needed to build nuclear weapons. In 1984, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Dean Hinton wrote in a classified evaluation letter on the work of CIA station chief Howard Hart, “Collection efforts on the Pakistani effort to develop nuclear weapons is amazingly resourceful and disturbing. I would sleep better if he and his people did not find out so much about what is really going on in secret and contrary to President Zia’s assurances to us.”[8]

The passage of laws in 1985 designed to sanction Pakistan if it was found either to possess the bomb (the Pressler amendment)[9] or attempt to export nuclear-weapon-related materials or equipment from the United States illegally (the Solarz amendment)[10] were rendered ineffective.[11]

To build his bomb, Khan initially stole centrifuge designs and a list of about 100 suppliers of centrifuge parts and materials from the URENCO uranium-enrichment facility in the Netherlands. From Pakistan, he began his shopping spree. He received materials from Africa and components and advanced machinery from Europe, with shipments and payments directed through the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The trade involved firms or agents in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey, among others. “They literally begged us to buy their equipment,” Khan said in a 2001 publication celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Kahuta laboratory that now bears his name.[12] Businessmen flocked to Pakistan to offer high-tech equipment for what they had to know was a Pakistani bomb program.

The United States was hardly unaware of this. The NSA was routinely intercepting faxes and telexes from high-tech firms in Germany and Switzerland looking for a Pakistani nuclear connection,[13] and they were aware of assistance coming from firms in Turkey. Indeed, dozens of démarches were issued to the Turkish government during the late 1970s and 1980s protesting ongoing shipments of electrical components—many of them made in the United States—to Pakistan. Turkey claimed that its export laws were insufficient to allow the government to interfere with such trade. After some time, Turkey passed a stronger export control law, but its enforcement was feeble. Additionally, the U.S. government refused to acknowledge the Turkish role officially because doing so would have required the cutoff of military assistance to an important NATO ally.

Warnings about the dangers of the Pakistani program were being constantly and publicly issued during this period, most prominently by Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio). In speeches, op-eds, and congressional testimony, Glenn warned that Pakistani nuclear weapons development, if not stopped, would lead to weapons technology finding its way to the Middle East, particularly to Iran.[14] It was a natural deduction to make: intelligence reports contained evidence of a Pakistani/Iranian nuclear cooperation agreement, and news reports quoted intelligence sources saying that Saudi Arabia and Libya were helping to finance the Pakistani bomb. These warnings had little effect on the Reagan or George H. W. Bush administrations, who did all they could to keep Congress in the dark about the details of the Pakistani program.

The Pressler amendment was not invoked until 1990, after the Soviets had left Afghanistan and despite intelligence that Pakistan had manufactured their first weapon nearly three years earlier. According to former deputy CIA director Richard Kerr, Pakistan had the bomb by 1987.[15] When then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the United States in 1989, she was told that the determination of “no possession” made that year would be the last one.[16]

Yet, there is little evidence that any of Khan’s suppliers were shut down at the time. Khan realized that he could use the network he had created, now also including Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, to enable other countries with nuclear ambitions to obtain critical components and materials for their own weapon programs, with Pakistan (and Khan) reaping large rewards in the process.

Marketing Khan’s Wares
Khan established his laboratory’s technical bona fides by having his scientists publish papers and reports, beginning in the late 1980s, on the design, construction, and testing of centrifuges.[17] These papers contained just enough details to make them credible without providing a blueprint for others to replicate the Pakistan machines. It was at about that time that Iranian scientists began receiving training in Pakistan (1988) and assistance for Iran’s centrifuge program in 1989. The Khan laboratory began publishing brochures, distributed at arms fairs, advertising equipment for sale that was useful in the construction and operation of centrifuges, including vacuum devices to enable rotors to spin in relatively frictionless chambers.[18]

The Khan laboratory was not the only one, however, touting sales and delivery of equipment useful for nuclear-enrichment purposes. In 1999, following its nuclear-weapon tests the previous year, the Pakistani government put out its own advertisement of procedures for the export of nuclear equipment and components. The ad also listed equipment for sale, including “gas centrifuges and magnet baffles for the separation of uranium isotopes.”[19] Musharraf later stated that the Pakistani government was not aware of nuclear transfers arranged via Khan or his laboratory.

The ads had the desired effect. Other countries began viewing Pakistan as a source for building nuclear weapons. Khan was contacted and began selling off surplus centrifuges and components.[20] Shipments were sometimes made using official government cargo planes to middlemen in other countries, who were used to disguise the origin of the cargo. Khan later arranged for parts to be ordered through his middlemen and to be delivered directly from his network sources. The spectrum of supplies that could be provided by the network included older and advanced centrifuges, bomb design (based on the original Chinese design given to Pakistan in 1983), electronic components, and advanced materials. The network also provided logistical and technical assistance. The network involved suppliers or middlemen located in a dozen countries, including Turkey, Malaysia, the UAE, Japan, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the United States, Germany, Canada, South Africa, and Pakistan.

The sales were not only producing funds for support of Khan’s laboratory; they were also helping Pakistan in its development of missile capability, a program that was run out of the Khan laboratory as well. For years, North Korea had been selling missiles to Pakistan. Pakistan had been paying cash for the missiles but ran into a foreign currency reserves crunch around 1996.[21] At that point, it is believed, the North Koreans agreed to a barter transaction involving the provision of centrifuges in exchange for missiles. Khan has apparently made at least 13 visits to North Korea over the past decade that were known to U.S. intelligence.[22] Some reports suggest that North Korea and Iran (and Iraq prior to Operation Desert Storm) may have obtained uranium-melting information from Pakistan in the late 1980s.

In fact, Iran is believed to have been the first customer of Pakistan/Khan nuclear sales. A centrifuge sale took place around 1987, probably pursuant to the 1986 nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries. The precise origin of the Pakistani-Iranian nuclear connection is unclear and includes speculation that then-army chief Aslam Beg saw such cooperation as a way to finance Pakistan’s defense budget.[23] In any event, it apparently ended in the mid-1990s as a result of the civil war in Afghanistan.

Still, the help that Iran received from the Khan network, including advanced (P-2) centrifuge designs,[24] and the transfer of these and other technologies has helped lead to Iran’s emergence as a relatively near-term nuclear proliferation threat. In buying Khan’s wares, Iran took advantage of Article IV of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which made a just-under-the-threshold nuclear weapons program feasible and legal for an NPT signatory; facilitated a demand for nuclear-related components and equipment for such a program; and made it worthwhile for many high-tech companies, factories, and shippers to meet the demand.

Under Article IV, all states-parties to the NPT, including Iran and Libya, have the “inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.” Also, under Article IV, all states have “the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” This language allows a party of the NPT in good standing to develop the means to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—key nuclear weapons materials that also have civilian uses—and stockpile them without limit as long as they are placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Iran clearly desires to develop a facility capable of manufacturing HEU and may plan to escape ultimately from the NPT by invoking Article X. That article allows a party’s withdrawal without penalty by giving three months’ notice and declaring, with an explanation, that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the treaty, have jeopardized [its] supreme interests.” Iran, which has agreed under pressure to suspend its nuclear enrichment development, is in violation of its safeguards commitments by not having informed the IAEA of equipment and materials it had either received from Khan or produced indigenously. The IAEA has taken the position thus far that the violations are technical in nature, not yet calling for referral to the UN Security Council.

9/11 and the Khan Network
The exposure of the Khan network resulted from its dealings with Libya, which began in the early 1990s. In October 2003, a German cargo ship, the BBC China, was intercepted at sea on its way to Tripoli and brought to an Italian port, where its cargo of components for 1,000 high-speed centrifuges were confiscated. The parts were made in Malaysia and shipped through the Middle East. The subsequent investigation by the IAEA resulted in a decision by Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi to dismantle his illegal nuclear program and provide transparency to his interactions with the Khan network. Among the revelations was the startling fact that the Libyans had received an early Pakistani-Chinese nuclear weapon design, suggesting that weapon designs were now in play in the international nuclear black market.

Musharraf, under pressure from the United States, forced Khan to “retire” but still pardoned him for his transgressions. Musharraf has refused to make Khan available for interrogation, but some have suggested that, as a quid pro quo for U.S. forbearance, Pakistan may have passed back some information to the U.S. government concerning the Khan network’s assistance to Iran and perhaps elsewhere.[25]

According to a briefing given to Pakistani journalists on February 1, 2004, by Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, commander of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning and Development Cell, Khan signed a 12-page confession in which he admitted to providing Iran, Libya, and North Korea with technical assistance and components for making high-speed centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium.[26] In addition, according to three of the 20 Pakistani journalists who attended the briefing, Khan was defending himself by saying that he was pressured to sell nuclear technologies by two (now deceased) individuals associated with Bhutto,[27] that nuclear assistance to Iran was approved by then-army chief Beg, and that the deal with North Korea was supported by two former army chiefs, one of whom is now Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States.[28] Musharraf has also served as army chief. An independent interrogation of Khan and an investigation by the IAEA should be carried out to verify these claims.

Also requiring further investigation are the serious indications of possible nuclear collaboration involving Khan with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt[29] and visits by Khan and his associates to Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, and Sudan. Much more precise information is also needed regarding the trafficking routes used by Khan’s network for deliveries. Sea routes were used to deliver centrifuge components to Libya and Iran. Both sea and air were used to deliver missiles from North Korea to Pakistan, and both land and air were used to send uranium-enrichment equipment from Pakistan to North Korea.[30] The extent of available routes makes tracking such shipments a daunting task.

The reach of the Khan network in today’s technological environment strongly suggests that the arrests and administrative actions taken by various governments have not fully shut down the network or made it impossible to reconstitute interrupted sources of supply. We have also yet to draw appropriate lessons from the history of our involvement with Pakistan and the Khan network.

Lessons Not Learned
Khan’s downfall came soon after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks led to a renewed U.S. relationship with Pakistan. When the United States decided to bring down the Taliban government for hosting Osama bin Laden, it turned to its old friends in Pakistan who had long provided the Taliban with crucial assistance. Under U.S. pressure, Musharraf reversed course and supported the U.S.-led military operation against his former allies.

That move and Musharraf’s current assistance in the hunt for bin Laden has resulted in his being amply rewarded. He has received the lifting of all nonproliferation sanctions and the beginning of a multibillion-dollar aid program, despite his refusal to give up Khan to the IAEA for interrogation. Even another case of a Pakistani agent allegedly attempting to smuggle nuclear-related electronic components out of the United States has had no effect on our current cozy relationship with Musharraf, who presides over a military containing elements friendly to Islamic revolutionary fundamentalism. It is the “blind eye” redux, but with the Cold War replaced by the war on terrorism. Of course, this time there is an added peril: who will gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should Musharraf fall?

One lesson we should have learned from the history of our relations with Pakistan is that taking nonproliferation off the table in favor of pursuing other foreign policy goals may not help you achieve those goals, but will almost certainly result in proliferation. That does not mean that engagement with proliferators or potential proliferators is to be avoided. Rather, it means that engagement should be pursued with an objective of preventing, halting, or at least capping proliferation.

Although each case of proliferation has its own unique elements that must inform both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, if a “norm” is to be respected, there should be consequences for a proliferator if all attempts at diplomacy have failed. This is the most obvious gap in the nonproliferation system: there is no international consensus on the penalties to which a proliferator ought to be subjected. Pakistan has escaped significant penalties despite its horrific proliferation record.

Being able to catch potential proliferators may be of little consequence if there is no agreement on what to do afterward, but catching proliferators early is also crucial if there is to be an effective nonproliferation regime. That requires an integrated, worldwide, intelligence operation, with a substantial human intelligence capability.

An effective regime also requires constant review and improvement of export controls. The Khan network has made it imperative that export controls be applied to smaller specialized components than is currently the case. This evolution is particularly important in the case of fuel cycle facilities.

Khan’s ties with Iran and other countries point to another necessary remedy: the need to establish a new global norm regarding the use of nuclear energy. A new nuclear compact along that line should state that all new, major nuclear facilities are to be multinationally owned and operated. This is not as radical as it may seem; indeed, the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations on nuclear control right after World War II proposed international ownership of the most dangerous nuclear facilities.[31] More recently, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has proposed an idea along this line but limited to new fuel-cycle and waste disposal facilities.[32] Nuclear reactors themselves would not be included in his proposal.

President George W. Bush has a different proposal to limit fuel cycle facilities. In a Feb. 11, 2004, speech, he proposed a ban on assistance by members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group for the construction of new enrichment and reprocessing facilities in countries not currently possessing such plants.[33] He did not back this up with a proposal for sanctions against those suppliers who would violate such a ban.

In his remarks, Bush also called on nuclear exporters to ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to civilian nuclear fuel if they renounce enrichment and reprocessing. It is unclear if Bush is aware that one version of this proposal has been part of U.S. law for more than 25 years. Title I of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 calls on the president to work with other countries to create an International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA) to guarantee nuclear enrichment services to non-nuclear-weapon states that agree not to build enrichment and reprocessing plants. There is some irony here because it has been reported that the president is opposed to the idea of international consortia in this arena.[34]

The president proclaimed correctly that “enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” Further, the administration has supported crafting a treaty, albeit without verification measures, to cut off production of fissile material for weapons. (See ACT, September 2004.) Neither Bush nor his aides, however, have called for a universal fissile material cutoff treaty that would end production of those materials in military and civilian facilities. Nor has Bush said that the United States should seek to amend its nuclear agreements with other countries to bar the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel for plutonium extraction.

A sensible extension of the president’s remarks about fuel cycle facilities would be to propose that nations should only seek nuclear energy when it is cost-effective for them to do so. This suggests that, instead of the Atoms for Peace program, which formed the foundation of the NPT, it would be more sensible from a security standpoint to begin an “Energy for Peace” program that would include cooperative assistance in energy planning to help determine the best, most efficient mix of energy technologies for individual countries. This idea was also made part of U.S. law in Title V of the NNPA but, as with an INFA, has yet to be implemented. Under an “energy for peace” philosophy, nuclear energy would only be used if it competed economically with alternative sources, taking into account environmental and other costs, including security.

Ultimately, the best insurance against the emergence of future Khan networks is the elimination of nations’ motivations for seeking nuclear weapons. The president stated that nuclear weapons “will not bring security or international prestige.” That is unfortunately not the way many view those weapons, including many in the president’s own administration, but the elimination of nuclear weapons is an appropriate goal to pursue. The nuclear-weapon states could take the first steps by a more forceful implementation of their own commitments under the NPT to make good faith efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

ENDNOTES

1. Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 1993.

2. Ibid.

3. Jamshed Nazar, “A History of U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” Chowk, November 22, 2004.

4. The 1976 Symington amendment provided that any non-nuclear-weapon state importing or exporting unsafe, guarded enrichment materials, equipment, or technology would be prohibited from receiving U.S. economic or military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act. Pakistan’s importation of unsafeguarded nuclear materials and equipment for its Kahuta enrichment facility triggered the cutoff of U.S. assistance.

5. The 1977 Glenn amendment extended the Symington prohibitions and penalties to the import or export of reprocessing technology, materials, or equipment by a non-nuclear-weapon state regardless of whether safeguards are attached. It also prohibited the explosion of a nuclear device. Pakistan was in violation of this amendment as well. Both amendments contained presidential waiver authority, but the conditions for exercise of the waiver under the Symington amendment required the receipt of “reliable assurances” that no nuclear weapon was being developed. As a result, legislation was required to allow a waiver for Pakistan, whose assurances were not deemed reliable.

6. Brzezinski revealed this in a 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur.

7. See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).

8. Ibid.

9. The Pressler amendment required that, in order for Pakistan to receive economic or military assistance in any fiscal year, the president had to certify a priori that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the U.S. assistance program would reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan would possess such a device. Pakistan’s continued progress on the bomb in the face of U.S. assistance meant that it was in violation of the Pressler amendment from the first subsequent delivery of U.S. assistance, but the Department of State essentially refused to implement the law, insisting that there was no difference between the “possession” test and the “risk” test. This refusal continued until the Soviets left Afghanistan.

10. The Solarz amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited military and economic assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state that illegally exports or attempts to export nuclear-related items from the United States that would contribute significantly to the ability of that state to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. A presidential waiver of penalties was included.

11. When a Pakistani agent was caught violating the Solarz amendment, President Ronald Reagan imposed the penalty and then immediately issued another waiver to remove it. In another case, the violator was treated as if he was an independent contractor with no connection to the Pakistani government, despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary.

12. William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network,” The New York Times, February 12, 2004.

13. Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge.”

14. See John Glenn, “Pakistan’s Bomb and the Mujahedin,” The Washington Post, November 4, 1987.

15. Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge.”

16. Ibid.

17. David E. Sanger, “The Khan Network,” Paper presented at the Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, CISAC, Stanford University, June 4, 2004.

18. Ibid.

19. Sharon Squassoni, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan,” CRS Report for Congress, RL31900, May 7, 2003.

20. Broad, Sanger, and Bonner, “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation.”

21. Squassoni, “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

22. Seymour Hersh, “The Cold Test,” The New Yorker, January 27, 2003.

23. Gaurav Kampani, “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales From Pakistan,” Report for Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, February 23, 2004.

24. International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General,” GOV/2004/83, November 15, 2004.

25. See Seymour Hersh, “The Coming Wars,” The New Yorker, January 24 and 31, 2005.

26. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe,” The Washington Post, February 3, 2004.

27. David Rohde, “Pakistanis Question Official Ignorance of Atom Transfers,” The New York Times, February 2, 2004.

28. Lancaster and Khan, “Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe.”

29. Christopher Clary, “A.Q. Khan and the Limits of the Nonproliferation Regime,” The Disarmament Forum, 2004.

30. Andrew Prosser, “Nuclear Trafficking Routes: Dangerous Trends in Southern Asia,” Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC, November 22, 2004.

31. “Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,” Washington, DC, March 16, 1946.

32. Mohamed ElBaradei, “In Search of Security: Finding an Alternative to Nuclear Deterrence,” Presented at CISAC, Stanford University, November 4, 2004.

33. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” February 11, 2004.

34. See Carla A. Robbins, “Nuclear Nonproliferation Effort Snags,” The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2005.

Leonard Weiss has worked on nonproliferation issues and legislation for nearly 30 years as a consultant and former staff director of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. He was a chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.