NPT Meeting Marked by Discord

An important meeting of states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) ended in dissension May 7, significantly dimming hopes that a key conference on the treaty next year will generate an international consensus on the accord’s future.

Attempting to set the stage for a formal Review Conference of the NPT next year, more than 120 states-parties met in New York April 26-May 7 to hash out plans. The two-week gathering marked the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before a regular treaty review, which takes place every five years.

Participating delegations were charged with devising consensus recommendations and an agenda for the upcoming conference, but failed to do so because of clashes over whether priority should be given to eliminating existing nuclear weapons, stopping the further spread of nuclear arms, or ensuring access to nuclear technologies and materials for peaceful purposes.

The debate proved so divisive that the delegations only agreed on the bare minimum to enable the Review Conference to take place. They approved a budget-sharing plan; set the conference date for May 2-27, 2005; and named Brazilian Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte as conference president.

In the interim, Duarte will be responsible for consulting with capitals to craft an acceptable agenda for the conference. If he is unsuccessful, states-parties will need to work out the meeting’s agenda at the conference itself before they can even begin substantive discussions on assessing and implementing the treaty.

Duarte’s main challenge will be bridging the gulf between the treaty’s five recognized nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), such as Indonesia, Iran, and Malaysia. Somewhere in between these poles are most European states, which strongly share the nuclear-weapon states’ aim of preventing the nuclear ranks from growing but also sympathize with the NAM perspective that nuclear-armed states should be doing more to reduce their arsenals.

Tensions between the nuclear-weapon states and the NAM states are nothing new. Still, they were exacerbated at this year’s PrepCom by a dispute over Iran’s secret nuclear activities.

U.S. officials used the meeting to highlight and condemn what they view as Iran’s clandestine attempts to acquire nuclear bombs. Although U.S. officials also noted the treaty-breaking nuclear weapons programs of North Korea, Libya, and Iraq, they made clear that Iran was the current focus of U.S. ire and the target of U.S. proposals to crack down on suspected treaty violators and tighten constraints on civilian nuclear cooperation.

“In the past, the international community has focused too much of its attention on benefit-sharing while devoting insufficient attention to NPT compliance,” stated Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter in an April 30 PrepCom address.

In order to prevent non-nuclear-weapon states from using a civilian program to hide an illegal weapons effort, the United States pushed the PrepCom to support several proposals. One initiative, first unveiled by President George W. Bush in February, would require any state that wanted to be eligible for nuclear trade to sign an agreement (known as an additional protocol) that allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out more intrusive inspections on the state’s territory as a check against unlawful nuclear activities. (See ACT, March 2004.)

At the meeting, the United States further argued that countries must more aggressively seek out, confront, and penalize suspected violators before they actually acquire nuclear weapons. States should be judged and treated by their intentions, not simply their capabilities, the United States contended, because by the time weapons-making capabilities can be proved it will be too late. Speaking the same day as DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf asserted, “Debates about evidentiary standards should not be a substitute for exercising common sense and prudence.”

Although the IAEA, which is responsible for verifying NPT compliance, has charged Tehran with activities violating the NPT, the agency has frustrated the United States by refusing to conclude that those activities were intended to build nuclear weapons. “How long will the international community accept Iran’s dissembling and deceit regarding these violations of core obligations?” Wolf asked.

Washington wants all states to cut off nuclear cooperation with Iran and increase pressure on it to abandon certain aspects of its nuclear program. Many countries, such as Russia, are opposed to such actions. “We hope that more active cooperation between Iran and the IAEA…will make it possible to close the ‘Iranian file’ in the nearest future and put it on a more routine track,” Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov said April 27.

The U.S. focus on Iran within the broader context of non-nuclear-weapon state noncompliance with the treaty did not match the concerns voiced by the NAM states and other delegations, such as the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition—Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Mexico. These states made clear their belief that the slow pace of disarmament by the five nuclear-weapon states, most pointedly the United States, and the continued possession of nuclear weapons by India, Israel, and Pakistan outside the treaty pose equal or more serious threats to the NPT’s continued vitality.

Speaking April 26 on behalf of the NAM, Malaysian Ambassador Rastam Mohd Isa said, “The [Non-Aligned] Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.”

That same day, Mexican Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba remarked that the New Agenda Coalition felt that “there has still not been a meaningful commitment by the nuclear-weapon states towards fulfilling their obligations.”

Both ambassadors spoke of the need for the nuclear-weapon states to codify previous pledges. One included formalizing so-called negative security assurances—promises not to use nuclear weapons against states that do not have them—while another was implementation of 13 disarmament steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, such as bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Referring to the 13 steps, de Alba said they “cannot be seen as alternatives à la carte.”

However, the United States opposes binding negative security assurances. The Bush administration also has already acted contrary to several of the 13 steps by, among other things, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue strategic missile defense systems and declaring that it will not ask the Senate to reconsider its 1999 rejection of the CTBT. In fact, U.S. officials insisted at the PrepCom that those commitments no longer be formally referenced. A U.S. government official interviewed May 10 by Arms Control Today explained that the 13 steps are “snapshots in time and that time has changed.”

Washington also came under heavy fire for exploring new types of nuclear weapons. Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi cautioned April 26 that “research and development of new types of easy-to-use nuclear weapons…not only run counter to international trends, but also do harm to international nonproliferation efforts.”

Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker acknowledged new U.S. weapons research May 3 but assured PrepCom attendees that the United States is “not developing any new nuclear weapons” and that “looking at options says nothing about what we will do.” His comments followed a March report from the Bush administration to Congress stating, “Nothing in the NPT…prohibits the United States from carrying out nuclear weapons exploratory research or, for that matter, from developing and fielding new or modified nuclear warheads.” (See ACT, May 2004.)

Washington also found itself at odds with a majority of states over the urgency of establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The NAM and many other states want to use the proposal to pressure Israel to give up its nuclear weapons, but the United States is in no rush and restated a long-standing position that such a zone “will not happen without the achievement of a political settlement that provides safe and secure borders for the parties involved.”

Opposition to North Korea’s bid to become a nuclear power and unhappiness with Indonesian Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat’s attempt as PrepCom chairman to summarize the meeting formally were about the only two things where general agreement emerged. As a result, the PrepCom concluded without an official chairman’s report.