The Nonproliferation Credibility Gap

Daryl G. Kimball


You don’t get something for nothing. More than three decades ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up.

The treaty’s success depends on universal compliance with tighter rules prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology. It also requires that nuclear-weapon states fulfill their disarmament obligations and give credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be subjected to nuclear attack.

Tension regarding the mutual obligations of NPT members is nothing new. Yet, at the recently concluded Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, U.S. officials pushed for greater limitations on other states while arguing the United States needs to do little or nothing more on disarmament. As a result, states-parties are more divided than ever about how to enforce the treaty, deal with the three nonsignatories (India, Israel, and Pakistan), and tighten restrictions on the availability of nuclear weapons technology.

Recall that, in 1995, the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states pledged to a set of principles and objectives on nonproliferation and disarmament. They did so in order to win an indefinite extension of the treaty. These goals were reaffirmed and refined at the 2000 NPT conference. The extension of the NPT did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. The United States can ill-afford to abdicate its disarmament responsibilities and interests.

Rather than build broad support for a plan to strengthen the treaty in all of its aspects, Bush administration officials chose to use this NPT meeting to level a blunt critique of illicit Iranian and North Korean nuclear activities. With Iran in mind, U.S. officials called on others to support proposals to limit the sale of nuclear technologies that can be used to make bomb material.

This initiative could produce useful but hard-to-win additional limitations on non-nuclear-weapon states’ access to some forms of “peaceful” nuclear technology. Iran’s previously undeclared uranium-enrichment activities do indeed create the possibility that it intends to become the next nuclear-weapon state. There is broad agreement that Iran must fulfill its pledges to allow more intrusive nuclear inspections and make its temporary uranium-enrichment halt permanent.

But achieving these outcomes involves heavy diplomatic lifting. Nonnegotiable U.S. ultimatums, however justifiable, will not do the trick. Nor will they make it any easier for an ongoing British-French-German initiative to convince leaders in Tehran that full compliance with the NPT is in their best interest.

U.S. delegates to the NPT meeting also did their best to block discussion of further disarmament measures, including the possibility of multilateral talks on weapons of mass destruction issues in the Middle East. In an April 27 speech at the conference, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton declared, “[W]e cannot divert attention from the violations we face by focusing on [disarmament] issues that do not exist.”

Or do they? Surely, the United States and Russia have made steady progress in dismantling and securing large portions of their Cold War nuclear stockpiles declared excess under treaties signed more than a decade ago. With the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the two states have pledged to reduce deployed strategic nuclear forces to fewer than 2,200 warheads by 2012. Nevertheless, these actions are based on decisions taken years ago and are woefully behind pace.

The situation is even worse in other areas. Talks with Russia on verification measures and tactical nuclear weapons remain on the backburner. The administration has initiated research on new types of more “usable” nuclear weapons, stiff-armed progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and dithered on the fissile material cutoff treaty. President George W. Bush has also approved nuclear-use policies that undercut previous commitments to nonuse of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states in the context of the NPT.

Sensing that the Bush administration wants to erase any memory of earlier U.S. commitments to these and other disarmament commitments, leading non-nuclear-weapon states, including several U.S. allies, cried foul at the NPT meeting. Arab states continue to be frustrated by the failure to confront the reality of Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal; perhaps as a consequence, they have said little about Iran’s transgressions. The impasse blocked agreement on next steps and even a basic agenda for next year’s Review Conference.

Although there is consensus on the need to strengthen and preserve the NPT, there must also be agreement on how to do so. In the coming months and years, the United States must pursue a more balanced and credible approach that addresses the fundamental obligations of all states. The president’s own nonproliferation proposals, the NPT’s future, and U.S. national security depend on it.