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Steering Between Red Lines: A South Korean View
Haksoon Paik
South Koreans have worried for months that a war between the United States and North Korea was imminent, awaiting only the conclusion of the U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq. They have asked what South Korea can do to avert a war and obtain a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. Most urgently, they have asked what should be done to initiate a dialogue and prevent North Korea or the United States from crossing red lines—taking steps that will prompt the other side to retaliate strongly, including the use of military force.
So, even though Seoul was disappointed to be excluded, there was widespread relief in South Korea when the United States and North Korea sat down to talks hosted by China April 23-25. The trilateral talks in Beijing turned out to be half success and half failure. North Korea “set forth a bold new proposal” for the settlement of the nuclear issue1 but admitted that it had nuclear arms and claimed to have nearly completed reprocessing plutonium from more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at Yongbyon.2
Emotions in South Korea have shifted as people have learned more about what went on in talks: from disappointment over North Korea’s admission of its nuclear arsenal and reprocessing claims3 to a more positive outlook after North Korea’s offers and demands in the Beijing talks were disclosed. These developments indicate the difficult nature of the problem and how discouraging and time-consuming it will be to try to end the nuclear standoff, with brief periods of hope interspersed with much longer episodes of mistrust and confrontation. They also indicate that the new South Korean government will face problems gathering accurate intelligence as well as policy challenges in shaping its approach to Pyongyang.
This article will explain South Korea’s objectives in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem and the domestic and external constraints Seoul faces in achieving its policy objectives. It will also examine what Pyongyang has offered and demanded in the Beijing trilateral talks and the hurdles that lie ahead for the South Korean government on the path toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Finally, policy recommendations for the South Korean, U.S., and North Korean governments are proposed.
South Korea’s Objectives
South Korea’s objectives in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem are to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and to secure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The new Roh government has put forth three principles in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem: zero tolerance for North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, a peaceful resolution of the situation through dialogue, and South Korea’s active role in solving it.4
A more immediate and specific goal for South Korea has been to prevent North Korea and the United States from crossing each other’s red lines. The United States and South Korea have not officially specified what actions would constitute such a step in order to maintain flexibility in responding to contingencies. South Korean and U.S. officials, however, have indicated that North Korea would cross the line if it begins reprocessing plutonium from spent fuel rods at the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon. Plutonium reprocessing would mean North Korea has clearly decided to develop nuclear weapons, because it is an activity that serves no purpose in its civilian nuclear power generation. In addition, if North Korea were to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal, it would almost certainly trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, undermining the fundamental security interests of South Korea, Japan, the United States, China, and Russia.
The United States, on the other hand, will cross North Korea’s red line if it places UN sanctions or additional sanctions of its own on North Korea. Such a step would likely provoke a drastic reaction from Pyongyang: the North Korean crisis is at root an economic crisis, and North Korea has repeatedly declared that it would regard any sanctions as an act of war, voiding the armistice treaty that has been the foundation of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Korean War.5
To be sure, the likelihood of a war in Korea is quite slim.6 For President Roh, however, avoiding such a conflict has become almost an obsession; he has refused to contemplate or even give lip service to the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula. His behavior appears to have been based on two strategic calculations. First, that the United States cannot override the South Korean government’s opposition to a war in Korea, and secondly, that a refusal even to consider a war will most effectively prevent a conflict from breaking out.
In this vein, it is noteworthy that Roh explained his decision to dispatch South Korean military engineering and medical units to help the U.S.-led war efforts in Iraq by saying that “extending help to the United States in time of adversity and solidifying Korea-U.S. relations” is “far more helpful to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem peacefully.”7
Domestic Constraints
The South Korean government faces a serious domestic division over how to deal with North Korea and the nuclear problem. This division has much to do with political and ideological fault lines within South Korea and even Roh’s own political base. These divisions reflect different views of how to balance the importance of inter-Korean relations against relations between South Korea and the United States.
Those internal political and ideological divisions most recently surfaced in an unprecedented National Assembly debate on a resolution authorizing the dispatch of engineering and medical troops to Iraq. The vote was 179 in favor of the dispatch and 68 against, with 9 abstentions.8 Particularly noteworthy was that almost half of the legislators of the governing Millennium Democratic Party who were present voted against the resolution, despite a personal appeal from Roh. The president had to rely for most of his support on the conservative opposition Grand National Party, which strongly supported the measure.
The fact that this vote did not fall strictly along traditional party lines indicates that Roh faces a complex and tricky future in trying to steer between U.S. demands and his own political base when it comes to North Korea. He also faces pressures from civic groups that aided him in his recent election. South Koreans’ national pride, amply demonstrated during and since the presidential election last year,9 tends to defy what they see as unjust and unfair foreign intervention, including heavy-handed policies by the United States toward North Korea, and will constrain the scope of Roh’s actions in a serious way. At the same time, South and North Korea are fundamentally competing authorities in a divided Korea, engaged in a rivalry for the loyalty of the Korean people.
In addition to the difficulty of obtaining a national consensus on how to strike a balance between inter-Korean national cooperation and the South Korean-U.S. alliance, a more serious problem is the lack of communication between those who uphold nationalistic ideas of inter-Korean cooperation and those who advocate a South Korean-U.S. alliance in dealing with North Korea.
North Korea’s confusing behavior has complicated the problem further. Although it demanded that Seoul give inter-Korean cooperation greater emphasis than cooperation with the United States, North Korea blocked South Korea from participating in the aforementioned multilateral dialogue to be held in Beijing.10 North Korea then followed this rebuke to Seoul the next day by requesting food and fertilizer assistance from South Korea.11 North Korea’s self-contradictory and cold water-throwing behavior of this kind poses an additional challenge for Roh in conducting his North Korea policy and nuclear diplomacy.
External Constraints
There are several external constraints for the South Korean government in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. First, North Korea lacks trust in the United States, particularly after President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” statement in his 2002 State of the Union address, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and last year’s U.S. national strategy document calling for efforts to change regimes if necessary to remove weapons of mass destruction from rogue states.
That was not only the bit of Bush rhetoric that rankled Pyongyang. For instance, Bush’s declaration to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward that he “loathed” North Korean leader Kim Jong Il12 indicates that it will not be easy for Bush to develop a working relationship with Kim even if dialogue begins between Washington and Pyongyang for a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem.
North Korea has also grown more distrustful of South Korea’s handling of inter-Korean relations, as demonstrated by its decisions to postpone the North-South Korean ministers’ talks until late April and exclude South Korea from the multilateral dialogue to be held in Beijing.
At the same time, the United States’ complete lack of trust in North Korea also represents a serious constraint for Seoul. North Korea violated the 1994 Agreed Framework, withdrew from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and even admitted in the Beijing talks that it possessed nuclear weapons and was completing the process of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods. Whatever the explanation, these actions have strengthened U.S. distrust in North Korea and emboldened hardliners opposed to negotiations.13
Meanwhile, in order for Seoul’s views to receive more credence in the United States, South Korea will have to overcome continued U.S. concerns about Roh. The South Korean president’s image in Washington has improved greatly since his decision to dispatch military units to Iraq, but Roh does not only have to convince U.S. government officials. He also faces pressure from international investors worried about war and U.S-South Korean tensions. Only five years after a major financial crisis battered the South Korean economy, Roh is deeply concerned that a worsening of the nuclear standoff, let alone a military confrontation, will sap the strength of the South Korean economy.
Taken together, the pressure from government and business circles in the United States is encouraging Roh to pursue policies to tamp down the crisis and soothe strains with Washington. In this regard, the first summit meeting between Roh and Bush to be held in mid-May 2003 will be a crucial opportunity for both leaders to dispel any remaining doubts.
The Beijing Talks
North Korea appears to have offered “a new bold proposal” that included a nonaggression pledge from the United States, normalization of relations between the two countries, and U.S. support for North Korean economic cooperation with South Korea and Japan. The North Korean proposal also called for compensation for the electricity loss incurred from the long-delayed construction of two light-water reactors (LWRs) called for under the 1994 Agreed Framework and the delivery of the reactors to North Korea as soon as possible. It is important to note that Pyongyang appears to have dropped the demand that the nonaggression pledge take the form of a treaty and has not demanded a new economic assistance package.
In return, North Korea would agree to dismantle its nuclear facilities and have the United States verify that it had done so. Pyongyang said that such a deal could also include suspending tests and exports of long-range ballistic missiles.
North Korea’s offer addresses all of the basic concerns and demands of the United States regarding the North Korean nuclear and missile problems. North Korea’s proposal represents a reasonable compromise that could lead to a comprehensive give-and-take and a resolution of the nuclear crisis.
Hurdles
The South Korean government has preferred to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem outside the UN Security Council. Seoul believes that North Korea is resistant to any discussion of the North Korean nuclear problem at the United Nations, given that North Korea believes UN discussions of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction encouraged the U.S. invasion of that country.14 So, the Roh government has proposed to work in such a way that tension would be diffused and war averted in Korea without involving the United Nations and without provoking North Korea. The multilateral format of dialogue held in Beijing caters to South Korea’s preference to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis outside the United Nations.
It appears, however, that the hurdles the South Korean government has to overcome in solving the North Korean nuclear crisis lie on both the domestic and external fronts: how to minimize domestic criticism for not having stood against or resolutely punished North Korea’s effort to develop nuclear weapons; how to make North Korea include South Korea and ensure its participation in future dialogue and negotiations at the earliest possible time; how to goad China and the United States into heeding South Korea’s interests; how to ensure that decisions reached at the end of the negotiations fairly share the burden; and above all, how to ensure that North Korea destroys its nuclear weapons and reverses its reprocessing of plutonium from the spent fuel rods (if North Korea had done so as was indicated in the April 18, 2003 statement15) or how to prevent it from reprocessing.
Another obstacle is U.S. opposition to South Korea taking a mediation role with North Korea rather than giving the straightforward support that the United States has come to expect from its ally. The Roh government has tried to ease this concern by emphasizing that South Korea is trying to contribute proactively to solving matters of common security for the common good of the United States and South Korea.
Finally, some segments in the South Korean political and civil societies, mostly conservative presses and opposition politicians, tend to echo the arguments and demands of the neoconservative elements in the United States. This reflects the political and ideological division in South Korean society, but it could also unintentionally serve the purpose of raising tension on the Korean Peninsula.
Policy Suggestions
The dialogue and negotiations for a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem has now become a more complex and time-consuming process after the unsuccessful multilateral talks in Beijing. The problems involved, including the lack of trust between the two countries, are complicated and deep-rooted, and there are other important pending issues to be solved between the United States and North Korea besides the nuclear issue. In addition, an increase in the number of the states involved in negotiations will make talks more complicated.
A wide range of policy options and instruments should be considered for a comprehensive solution of the North Korean nuclear problem, but a few suggestions should be considered by the South Korean, U.S., and North Korean governments.
First, the United States should treat North Korea’s demands and offers at the Beijing talks very positively and put forth its own demands and offers in the same constructive spirit. In addition, South Korea should encourage both the United States and North Korea to proactively accommodate each other’s demands and offers.
Second, North Korea must give up its nuclear bombs and must not reprocess plutonium from the spent fuel rods and test fire long-range ballistic missiles, however bumpy the path of negotiations lying ahead might be. If North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, it must dismantle them. If North Korea has already reprocessed plutonium, it must agree to transfer it to a third country under IAEA supervision. All these should be accomplished through good-faith negotiations that take into account the security concerns of all of the countries involved.
Third, the United States and South Korea should jointly make clear that they will not tolerate North Korea possessing nuclear bombs or reprocessing plutonium. If North Korea does not cooperate in giving them up, it should be given an unequivocal warning that such an act would demonstrate that North Korea is abandoning efforts to improve its relationship with the outside world, hastening its own collapse. The United States should also start preparing a series of contingency measures in order to avoid a worst-case scenario.
Fourth, Washington should refrain from imposing additional sanctions of any kind on Pyongyang before exhausting non-sanction options. South Korea should make sure that any sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council or by the United States be preceded by substantial dialogue between the United States and North Korea. Sanctions will end any chance of dialogue and will not be easy to revoke once applied.
Fifth, the United States should accept that, even though the U.S.-North Korea dialogue might take place within a multilateral framework, bilateral discussions must take center stage. North Korea should not continue to exclude South Korea from participating in the multilateral dialogue, however, and South Korea should make clear that if its participation in a future dialogue is not guaranteed at the earliest possible time, its cooperation will be limited because of domestic political reasons.
Finally, South Korea and the United States should each establish a special North Korea policy coordinator. An individual of high caliber with proven negotiation experience should be appointed and given comprehensive negotiating power. Policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan is needed more than ever for a successful resolution of the nuclear crisis.
1. “DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on U.S. attitude toward DPRK-U.S. talks,” Korean Central News Agency, April 25, 2003.
2. Kessler, Glenn. “N. Korea Says It Has Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2003, p. A1.
3. David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal,” The New York Times, April 24, 2003.
4. “Explanation of the Peace and Prosperity Policy,” Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, March 10, 2003.
5. “Spokesman for Panmunjom Mission of Korean People’s Army Issues Statement,” Korean Central News Agency, Feb. 19, 2003; “South Korean ‘National Assembly’s’ Argument about ‘Sanctions’ Failed,” Korean Central News Agency, April 7, 2003.
6. There are several reasons for this. On the U.S. side, President George W. Bush does not appear to want to take politically foolish measures to further split public opinion at home and estrange friends and allies abroad after the war in Iraq. Nor does he seem to want to have another war with North Korea, whose geopolitical environment and topography are vastly different from those of Iraq. It is also clear that several U.S. Army divisions will have to be tied to Iraq for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, Bush has to have an economic recovery at home more than anything else for his re-election next year. On the other hand, North Korea has begun to accommodate new developments in international politics. A military confrontation with the United States would mean a beginning of the collapse of the North Korean regime. Against this backdrop, North Korea decided to accept a multilateral format of dialogue, which the United States has demanded. The April 18 announcement on reprocessing plutonium is yet to be confirmed.
7. Address by President Roh Moo-hyun at the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, April 2, 2003.
8. Minutes No. 1 of the Plenary Session of the 238th National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, April 2, 2003.
9. Roh Moo-hyun’s victory in the presidential election in December 2002 was seen to symbolize a rebirth of national pride in South Korea. South Koreans chose Roh as their leader in an effort to continue national reconciliation with North Korea, show support for a negotiated resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, and stop perceived unfair U.S. treatment of the Korean people, as was demonstrated in the huge candlelight protest against two girls’ death by a U.S. armored vehicle in June 2002. In contrast, his contester, Lee Hoi-chang of the Grand National Party, was viewed as pro-American during the presidential campaign.
10. Yonhap News Agency, April 16, 2003.
11. Yonhap News Agency, April 17, 2003.
12. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 340.
13. David E. Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea,” The New York Times, April 21, 2003, p. A15.
14. “Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.N. Security Council’s Discussion of Korean Nuclear Issue,” Korean Central News Agency, April 7, 2003.
15. As of April 25, 2003, there is not enough evidence that North Korea has been reprocessing plutonium except the country’s announcement to that effect. Haksoon Paik is director of the Inter-Korean Relations Studies Program at the Sejong Institute in Korea, an independent think tank devoted to the research of security, unification, and foreign policy issues for the development of South Korea’s national strategy.