Officials Testify on National Missile Defense, Assess Program

October 2000

Administration officials testified to Congress September 8 on the limited national missile defense (NMD) program's technology, test failures, rising costs, and the international climate surrounding the defense. The testimony came a week after President Bill Clinton announced September 1 that he would not proceed with deployment of an NMD during his presidency because of doubts about the technology and unwavering foreign opposition to the U.S. plan.

Appearing before a subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, director of the Pentagon agency charged with overseeing U.S. missile defense programs, described the program as making "substantial technical progress" despite the last two intercept test failures on January 18 and July 8. When asked whether his agency, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), had recommended system deployment to top Pentagon officials before the president's decision, Kadish replied that BMDO provided only factual information, not a specific recommendation. Overruled by the president, Secretary of Defense

William Cohen had suggested taking preliminary steps this fall toward deployment by letting construction contracts for an advanced X-band radar on Shemya, an isolated Aleutian island.

At the same hearing, Philip Coyle, director of the Pentagon's office of operational test and evaluation, agreed that the Pentagon had made progress in developing the defense and that some technology looked promising, though he assessed the system as "behind in both the demonstrated level of technical accomplishment and in schedule." Coyle said the NMD program is "probably the hardest thing we've ever tried to do."

Restructured in January 1999, Pentagon plans had aimed for deployment of an initial operational system with 20 interceptors by 2005, with a key decision to determine whether the system's missile interceptor should be built scheduled for 2003. However, Coyle contended that the program's testing record makes it unlikely that there will be enough information available in 2003 to make a deployment recommendation.

Coyle observed that key elements in the program, such as building the booster for the interceptor and producing a computer system to conduct intercept test simulations, had slipped more than a year during the past 19 months. If the program continues to slip at the current rate, Coyle estimated that the date by which the first 100 interceptors could be deployed would be delayed by at least another two and a half years beyond the original 2007 target date.

In addition, Coyle charged that the testing is "not yet aggressive enough to keep pace with the currently proposed schedules for silo and radar construction and missile production." He recommended that more tests be planned for "realistic operational situations," such as intercepts against multiple targets, which are not currently planned. Coyle allowed that "there is nothing wrong with the limited testing program" if the Pentagon's acquisition and deployment schedules match the pace of the testing program, but he implied that this is not currently the case. Coyle did note, however, that the Pentagon is developing plans for more aggressive testing.

Kadish defended the testing program, arguing that the Pentagon is using a "walk-before-you-run approach" and that NMD intercept tests will become "progressively more stressful." The BMDO director said future tests will be conducted at longer ranges and higher closing speeds and will involve both night and day intercept attempts. He also pointed out that the countermeasures used during testing will become more challenging, though he downplayed the likelihood the U.S. defense would actually face sophisticated countermeasures because they are difficult to develop and use.

Simple countermeasures, according to Kadish, "can be readily countered by our system."

While calling the recent test failures disappointing, Kadish concluded that "we know our fundamental design can work." Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction Edward Warner seconded Kadish at the hearing, asserting that "we have the fundamentals to do the job, but I can't say we've yet fully demonstrated it." Coyle maintained that the NMD technology had "yet to be shown practicable" to meet the requirements for deployment.

Under aggressive questioning by Representative John Tierney (D-MA), Kadish admitted that two recent internal Pentagon cost estimates for total acquisition costs starting in 1991 of a 100-interceptor system now totaled more than $40 billion through 2028. In April, the Pentagon had estimated the total cost, adjusted for inflation, at $36 billion through 2026. Kadish said the new cost estimate did not account for additional costs that could be incurred for any future test delays. In a May 2000 report, the General Accounting Office reported that every month of delay in the NMD program would add $124 million to its total cost.

Focusing on the diplomatic implications of U.S. missile defense plans, Avis Bohlen, assistant secretary of state for arms control, emphasized at the hearing that the United States cannot discount the views of other countries, though she repeated Clinton's assertion that no country could have a veto over U.S. decisions. The United States, according to Bohlen, has an "obligation" to try to win allied support for the U.S. system. Many U.S. allies, led by France and Germany, worry that the proposed NMD would upset relations with Russia and China, as well as endanger progress in arms control and disarmament.

Bohlen observed that allied support for the U.S. NMD is "strongly conditioned on first securing Russia's agreement" to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which bars national defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. Moscow has staunchly resisted U.S. proposals to amend the treaty. Russian concerns about the defense are based on a belief that the initial defense would provide an "infrastructure that would allow future breakouts [of more robust defenses]," Bohlen said.

Bohlen also surmised that the Russians are waiting for the next administration to "see exactly what the dimensions of the issue will be." Republican presidential nominee George W. Bush has declared he would pursue a more robust defense than the currently planned NMD, but he does not have any detailed plans for a different system, according to a September 21 Washington Post article that extensively quoted Bush's chief foreign policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice.

In his UN Millennium Summit address September 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin alluded to the U.S. defense, when he described plans for the militarization of outer space as "particularly alarming." Putin proposed that an international conference be held in Moscow next year on preventing outer space militarization. A State Department official said that Washington has asked for more details about the Putin proposal and is "awaiting a response."

Less than two weeks later, on September 18, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned the UN General Assembly that Russia believed further nuclear weapons reductions would be "feasible" only if the ABM Treaty remains "intact." He also said Russia would again introduce a resolution at the General Assembly to support the accord. Last year, only four states (the United States, Israel, Albania, and Micronesia) voted against a similar resolution, though many countries abstained.

Clinton's deferral of an NMD decision does not appear to have eased Chinese concerns either.

Though Chinese President Jiang Zemin did not mention missile defense in his address to the Millennium Summit, China's minister of foreign affairs, Tang Jiaxuan, spoke against the defense September 13 in remarks to the General Assembly. Tang charged that if Washington pursues its plans, then there will be "serious negative consequences to the security of the whole world." China also attacked the proposed defense at the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.