Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102
On November 24, 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) reached an interim deal on Iran’s nuclear program. The agreement, or Joint Plan of Action, required Iran and the P5+1 countries to take specific steps while negotiators worked on a comprehensive deal.
The obligations under the interim deal remained in place until October 18, 2015. At that point, each side began implementing the obligations under the comprehensive deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed to on July 14, 2015. For more information about the JCPOA, see The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a Glance.
Implementation of the interim agreement, the Joint Plan of Action, began on January 20, 2014 and was to last through July 20, 2014, although it was extended several times and additional commitments for Iran and the P5+1 were added.
During the announcement of the second extension on November 24, 2014, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said both Iran and the P5+1 implemented their commitments from the Joint Plan of Action. In total, the obligations froze Iran’s nuclear program and rolled back the most proliferation-sensitive elements. In return, Iran received limited sanctions relief and access to frozen assets.
The full text of the Joint Plan of Action is available here. A summary of the key actions is listed below.
| Iranian Actions | Status |
| By January 20, halt production of near-20% enriched uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) and commit to only enrich up to 5%. | Completed According to the January 20, 2014, IAEA report, Iran had halted enrichment to 20% UF6. |
| By January 20, disable the configuration of the centrifuge cascades Iran has been using to produce 20% enriched UF6. | Completed According to the January 20 IAEA report, Iran had ceased operating its interconnected centrifuges enriching to 20% UF6. The February 20, 2014, IAEA report said that Iran is now using the four cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to 5%. |
| On January 20, continue conversion of half of its stockpile of near-20% uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) into uranium oxide powder as working stock for fabricating fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. | Completed According to the July 20, 2014, IAEA report, Iran completed the process of converting half of its stockpile of 20% enriched UF6 gas (~104 kg) to uranium oxide powder. |
| On January 20, begin dilution of half of its stockpile of 20% UF6 to no more than 5% enriched UF6 and complete dilution by April 20. | Completed According to the April IAEA report, Iran completed the dilution of half of its stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium. |
| Continue only its safeguarded research and development practices, including its current enrichment research practices, which were not designated for accumulation of the enriched uranium. | Completed In the February 20 IAEA report, the agency verified that Iran was continuing its safeguarded research and development practices at Natanz and was not using the research to accumulate uranium as it tested advanced models. |
| By April 20, provide the IAEA with: | |
| Completed Iran submitted details on site selection for 16 nuclear power plants to the IAEA, its initial plans for 10 future enrichment sites, and a light water reactor. |
| Completed |
| Completed |
| Completed According to the May 23, 2014, IAEA report, Iran had visited the Gchine Mine, the Saghand Mine and the Ardakan Uranium production plant. |
| Completed Iran provided the IAEA with information about source material on April 20, according to the May 23 IAEA report. |
| Submit an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the reactor at Arak (IR-40). | Completed Iran submitted at updated DIQ on the reactor to the IAEA on February 12, according to the agency's Feb. 20 report. |
| Take steps to conclude a safeguards approach with the IAEA for the Arak reactor. | Completed The IAEA and Iran met on May 5 to discuss the revised safeguards approach. According to the June 20, 2014, IAEA report, Iran had reached an agreement with the agency on the safeguards approach. |
| Allow daily IAEA inspector access at Fordow and Nantanz, including scheduled and unannounced inspections and access to surveillance information on a daily basis. | Completed As of the February 20 IAEA report, the IAEA was able to install surveillance measures at Natanz and Fordow to facilitate daily monitoring and came to an agreement regarding the facilitation of daily access. (Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA had accessed Fordow on a weekly basis, and Natanz on a biweekly basis.) |
| Allow the IAEA to conduct monthly inspections of the heavy water reactor at Arak and associated facilities. | Completed The IAEA was able to make its first monthly visit and access the heavy water reactor on Feb. 12, according to the agency's Feb. 20 IAEA report. (Prior inspections were conducted at the reactor once every three months, and other facilities at the site were not included.) |
| Provide information to allow the IAEA inspectors managed access to: | |
| Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7. |
| Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7. |
| Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7.
|
| Completed The IAEA had been able to access Iran's two uranium mines at Gchine and Saghand and the milling facility at Ardakan. |
| Provide figures that will allow the IAEA to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines. | Completed The IAEA had access to Iran's centrifuge workshops and facilities. |
| Cap the size of the 5% enriched UF6 stockpile. | Completed The November 24, 2014, IAEA report on implementation of the Joint Plan of Action noted that Iran's stockpile of UF6 gas was 7,400 kg, below January's level of 7,560 kg. |
| Iran Will Refrain From the Following Actions | Status |
| Refrain from installing a reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide powder to 20% UF6. | Complied The January 20 IAEA report said that Iran does not have a reconversion line in place. |
| Refrain from reprocessing or constructing a facility capable of reprocessing materials. | Complied In a January 18 letter to the IAEA, Iran said it would not engage in reprocessing or construct a reprocessing facility over the six months of the deal. The January 20 IAEA report confirmed that no reprocessing was taking place at the Tehran Research Reactor or MIX facility. |
Refrain from making any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. (This includes not installing new centrifuges and not feeding UF6 into the roughly half the centrifuges at Natanz that are installed but not yet enriching uranium.) | Complied The IAEA verified in the February 20 report that Iran did not made any further advances and no new centrifuges were enriching uranium. |
Refrain from making any further advances of its activities at Fordow. (This includes not installing new centrifuges, not feeding UF6 into the three quarters at Fordow that are installed but not yet enriching uranium, and not interconnecting the cascades.) | Complied The IAEA verified that Iran did not make any further advances and no new centrifuges are enriching uranium. |
| Replacing existing centrifuges only with centrifuges of the same type. | Complied As of the February 20 IAEA report, the agency did not report any violation of this restriction, and surveillance has been set up to monitor any changes. |
| Refrain from commissioning the heavy water reactor at Arak. | Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further the Arak reactor. |
| Refrain from transferring fuel or heavy water to the Arak reactor. | Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further the Arak reactor. |
| Refrain from testing additional fuel or producing more fuel. | Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not manufactured or tested any reactor fuel, and the number of fuel rods produced remains at 11. |
| Refrain from installing any additional reactor components at the Arak site. | Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further advance the Arak reactor. |
| Limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines. | Complied The IAEA has regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops. |
| Refrain from constructing any new locations for enrichment. | Complied In a January 18 letter to the IAEA Iran said it would not pursue any new uranium enrichment sites during the six months of the agreement. |
| P5+1 Actions | Status |
| Pause efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, allowing Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil, including the EU prohibition on providing insurance for vessels carrying Iranian oil. | Complied In a January 20, 2014, press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers announced the suspension of sanctions preventing the insurance of vessels. However, not enough time has passed to determine if Iran's current oil customers were importing at their current average amounts. |
| Enable the repatriation of $4.2 billion of Iranian revenue held abroad on the following schedule: | |
| Completed** Iran received its first installment as scheduled on February 1. These funds were released from Japan. |
| Completed** IAEA Director General Amano confirmed that half of the dilution was completed on time in his remarks to the IAEA Board of Governors on March 3. |
| Completed** |
| Completed** |
| Completed** |
| Completed |
| Completed |
| Completed |
| Suspend US sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and associated services.* | Completed In a January 20 statement, the White House announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions. |
| Suspend US sanctions on Iran's import and export of gold and precious metals as well as sanctions on associated services.* | Completed In a January 20 statement, the White House announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions. |
| Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran imports of goods and services for its automotive manufacturing sector. | Completed In a January 20 statement, the White House announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions. |
| Suspend EU sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and associated services.* | Completed In a January 20 press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers announced the suspension of sanctions. |
| Suspend EU sanctions on Iran's import and export of gold and precious metals as well as associated services.* | Completed In a January 20 press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers announced the suspension of sanctions. |
| License the supply of spare parts and services for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services.* | Completed In a January 20 statement, White House Press announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions. On April 4, Boeing confirmed that it received a license from the Treasury Department for exporting spare aircraft parts. |
| License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran for Iranian civil aviation sector as well as associated services.* | Completed In a January 20 statement, White House Press secretary said that the United States would begin suspending sanctions. |
Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using Iranian oil revenue held abroad:
| Completed |
| Increase the EU authorization thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount. | Completed In a January 20 press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers increased by tenfold the thresholds for authorizing financial transfers. |
| P5+1 Will Refrain From the Following Actions | Status |
| Not pass new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions. | Complied There were no new UN Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iran. |
| Not pass new EU nuclear-related sanctions. | Complied On December 16, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers committed not to impose any further sanctions on Iran during the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action. |
| Not impose new U.S. nuclear-related sanctions. | Complied |
| Iranian Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before Nov. 24, 2014) | Status |
| Convert 25 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium powder from oxide form to fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor | Completed According to the IAEA's monthly progress report, Iran completed the conversion. |
| Convert the stockpile of uranium enriched to less than 2 percent (about 3 metric tons) to natural uranium | Completed According to the November 2014 quarterly IAEA report, Iran completed blending down the tails. |
| P5+1 Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before Nov. 24, 2014) | Status |
| Enable the repatriation of $2.8 billion dollars in frozen Iranian oil revenues held abroad | Completed Iran received $2.8 billion in repatriated funds. |
| Iranian Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before June 30, 2015) | Status |
| Convert 35 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium powder from oxide form to fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor | Completed |
| Expand IAEA access to centrifuge production facilities to double the current frequency and allow for no-notice or "snap" inspections | Complied |
Limit research and development on advanced centrifuges that move the machines to the next level of development including:
(While most of this pre-dated the extension -- the extension helps plug the gaps and ensure that all models of Iran's advanced centrifuges cannot move to the next phase of testing.) | Complied The IAEA has regular access to the research and development area for advanced centrifuges at Natanz and has noted no violations as of December. |
| Forgo any other forms of enrichment, including laser enrichment. | Complied |
| P5+1 Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before June 30, 2015) | Status |
| Enable the repatriation of $700 million per month in frozen Iranian oil revenues held abroad | Complied |
*“Sanctions on Associated Services” means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.
**While the funds were released, there were reported difficulties in transferring portions of the funds to Iranian banks. It was unclear what portion of the funds remained to be transferred.