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Finding a Way Out of the NPT Disarmament Stalemate
April 2015
On the eve of the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, there is a stalemate on nuclear disarmament issues between the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states.
That stalemate is typified by controversy over the new focus of the non-nuclear-weapon states on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons; lack of agreement among NPT parties on how best to advance nuclear disarmament, heightened by widespread frustration with the slow pace of achieving the nuclear disarmament goals of Article VI of the NPT; and the attraction of calls to negotiate a nuclear weapons ban even without the participation of the nuclear-weapon states. The review conference is an opportunity for all NPT parties to agree on a way forward to break this stalemate and advance cooperatively the treaty’s goal of nuclear disarmament.
The NPT Disarmament Stalemate
The final document of the 2010 review conference “expresses [the conference’s] deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”[1] There have been three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use, in Oslo in March 2013; in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014; and in Vienna in December 2014. Non-nuclear-weapon states have signed statements in NPT and other forums expressing deep concern about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. The goals of the participants in these conferences have varied. Some want to highlight nuclear risks and encourage action to reduce them, others want to energize the NPT nuclear disarmament process, and still others want to delegitimize nuclear weapons and create support for a new international treaty to ban the possession of nuclear weapons and to abolish them.
None of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) attended the Oslo and Nayarit conferences. Concern about the agendas of the conferences, uncertainty about the goals of the conferences’ organizing countries and some participants, and questions about these conferences’ practical effect in reducing nuclear risks contributed to those decisions. The UK and the United States participated in the Vienna conference; both stressed their understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use. Despite the refusal of China, France, and Russia to participate in the Vienna conference, the humanitarian impact initiative shows no signs of simply fading away.
Differing approaches to advance nuclear disarmament. Following their February conference in London, which was their most recent meeting under the so-called P5 process,[2] the five nuclear-weapon states declared that “a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”[3] Strong arguments can be made to support a step-by-step approach.
This approach has produced significant reductions in Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiles and their delivery vehicles since the height of the Cold War. Although the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) regrettably remains to be ratified by China and the United States, a very robust moratorium on nuclear testing now exists. As called for by the 2010 NPT action plan,[4] the P5 process is now well established. Its annual conferences and ongoing expert working group discussions are producing initial results, including greater transparency and better mutual understanding of how each of them thinks about nuclear weapons through the development of a “Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms.”
Successful pursuit of nuclear disarmament also needs to reflect political and strategic conditions. Otherwise, the result is likely to undermine global security, increase nuclear dangers, and create conditions for further proliferation, including by undermining established nuclear security relationships that still make an important contribution to nonproliferation.
Political and strategic conditions occasionally permit identification and pursuit of specific priorities. For example, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties called for negotiation of a CTBT by the end of 1996. Motivated by that commitment, NPT nuclear-weapon states made the difficult decisions needed to meet that deadline. Although the treaty is not yet in force, this accomplishment greatly strengthens today’s moratorium. By contrast, agreement on a comprehensive set of predefined actions and associated timelines would sever the connection between progress on nuclear disarmament and the conditions required for that progress.
Many actions remain necessary to establish the building blocks of sustained, stable, and secure nuclear disarmament. Essential political, security, institutional, and technical foundations remain very weak or entirely lacking for a world without nuclear weapons.[5] Consider one critical example: despite some progress, the verified reduction, dismantlement, and elimination of nuclear warheads still presents unsolved conceptual, technical, and security challenges. In other cases, building blocks are themselves stepping-stone agreements that would bring NPT parties closer to a world without nuclear weapons, whether such agreements were negotiated bilaterally between the United States and Russia or multilaterally among all NPT parties. The additional one-third cut in Russian and U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons proposed by President Barack Obama exemplifies the former; multilateral negotiation of a treaty limiting production of fissile material for nuclear weapons exemplifies the latter.[6]
Nonetheless, the nuclear-weapon states have not provided a detailed explanation of the step-by-step approach. They also have failed to offer their vision of the nuclear disarmament future. Individual leaders have proposed specific steps, such as Obama’s speeches in 2009 in Prague and in 2013 in Berlin. Neither individually or collectively, however, have the nuclear-weapon states articulated their goals for how a step-by-step process would continue to develop across such critical nuclear disarmament dimensions as numbers of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, the roles of nuclear weapons in security strategies, the safety and security of these weapons, alert levels and decision-making governing use, nuclear modernization and acquisition of new nuclear capabilities, and transparency of past and ongoing nuclear activities.
Some non-nuclear-weapon states allied with the United States have supported the step-by-step approach, including at the Vienna conference, even while calling for greater nuclear disarmament progress. Many of these states also have emphasized, as did Australia, speaking for 20 countries during the 2014 UN General Assembly First Committee session, that “the hard practical work necessary to bring us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons must still be done. We need to work methodically and with realism if we are going to attain the necessary confidence and transparency to bring about nuclear disarmament. There are no short cuts.”[7]
For many non-nuclear-weapon states, however, emphasis on a step-by-step approach at best is not convincing and its effectiveness remains to be demonstrated. At worst, the approach is seen as an excuse for lack of action by the nuclear-weapon states. Reductions in Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons and the end of the nuclear arms race after the Cold War are welcomed, but viewed as too little, too slow, and too limited against the full Article VI nuclear disarmament agenda.[8] One result has been growing frustration and a loss of confidence by the non-nuclear-weapon states in the nuclear-weapon states’ commitment to nuclear disarmament. Increasingly, some NPT parties now call for new approaches to advance nuclear disarmament.
The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a 12-member group that includes U.S. allies and nonaligned countries, has called for “future multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, particularly after the next bilateral United States-Russian disarmament round has been achieved.”[9] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a whole has long argued for negotiation of a time-bound framework for eliminating nuclear weapons. The six countries of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) have proposed that the 2015 review conference “call for the elaboration of a clear, legally binding, multilateral commitment to achieving nuclear disarmament.”[10] As envisaged by the NAC in its working paper on Article VI, this new multilateral instrument would define and create the “effective measures” for nuclear disarmament for which Article VI calls. The paper highlights four options for that new instrument, including a nuclear weapons convention “setting out general obligations, prohibitions and an effective basis for time-bound, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament.” It also acknowledges “that other options may suggest themselves or be suggested.”[11] Similarly, Austria spoke for many non-nuclear-weapon states at the conclusion of the Vienna humanitarian impact conference when it “call[ed] on all states parties to the NPT…to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”[12]
Cooperative, multilateral nuclear disarmament action has an important role to play. Yet, negotiation by all NPT parties now of a new, legally binding, multilateral commitment to nuclear disarmament is much more likely to dissipate than to strengthen energies needed to implement Article VI and to take practical steps to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use. By contrast, it is increasingly important to build on the P5 process and bilateral dialogue to bring China further into a continuing global nuclear disarmament process. Russia’s expressed concerns about China’s nuclear capabilities already are a political and psychological brake on more-ambitious bilateral U.S.-Russian reductions. U.S. uncertainties about China’s developing nuclear posture also could well increase, given public reports that China has begun testing technologies to place multiple warheads atop ballistic missiles. Multilateral cooperation also will help to create a shared vision of the nuclear disarmament future and to put in place the building blocks to achieve that vision. Ultimately, for the reasons that support a step-by-step approach, a treaty to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons is better seen as a closing step, not a next step, in the nuclear disarmament process.
A nuclear weapons ban without the NPT nuclear-weapon states? In the most far-reaching rejection of the step-by-step approach, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and outside experts now argue that like-minded non-nuclear-weapon states, with NGO support, should begin negotiations to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons even without participation of the nuclear-weapon states. Their models are the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. A few countries, NGOs, and outside experts led international negotiations to ban those weapons on humanitarian grounds; over time, the major producers and possessors joined the agreements.[13]
So far, non-nuclear-weapon states have not endorsed negotiations without the participation of nuclear-weapon states. Different reasons are at work: fear of damaging the NPT, hope that the nuclear-weapon states will yet agree to negotiate a new legal instrument implementing Article VI or at least to accelerate progress significantly under the step-by-step approach, and the uncertainties and risks associated with a go-it-alone approach.
The latter caution is justified. Given the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons, the landmines analogy is not applicable. The NPT nuclear-weapon states have made clear that they will not participate in new negotiations to make nuclear weapons illegal and that they will not join a nuclear weapons ban or convention negotiated without them. Without the nuclear-weapon states, pursuit of a ban would have no practical payoff for achieving the goals of the humanitarian impact movement. Equally important, negotiation of a nuclear weapons ban without those five states would be more likely to weaken than to strengthen the NPT. The treaty’s effectiveness would be undermined because going outside of the NPT would make it politically more difficult to press the nuclear-weapon states to deliver on their nuclear disarmament commitments, and they very likely will be less psychologically inclined to do so. The treaty’s legitimacy would be undermined by very likely claims by some advocates that a new treaty is necessary because the nuclear-weapon states are not prepared to honor one of the basic bargains at the core of the NPT. Pursuit of a ban without the nuclear-weapon states also would trigger a deeply contentious confrontation between non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states and among the non-nuclear-weapon states that support and those that oppose that approach. Together, these developments could well spill over to undermine the treaty’s other goals of nonproliferation and stable use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Breaking the Stalemate
One possible approach to breaking the stalemate would combine commitment by all NPT parties to rebuilding cooperation in pursuit of nuclear disarmament; creation of new processes of cooperative engagement between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states—that is, sustained dialogue and collaboration for the purposes and via the mechanisms described below; agreement by all NPT parties on some priority nuclear disarmament building blocks, whether necessary foundations or stepping-stone agreements, that they would seek to put in place between the 2015 and 2020 review conferences; and intensified action by the nuclear-weapon states in the P5 process to reduce to an absolute minimum any risk of nuclear weapons use and to sustain a strong and perpetual global nuclear taboo.
A shared commitment to cooperative nuclear disarmament action. The final documents from the 2000 and 2010 review conferences affirmed “the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.” Yet another reaffirmation of that “unequivocal undertaking” almost certainly will not suffice to restore the confidence of the other NPT parties. At a minimum, the nuclear-weapon states should use the upcoming review conference to articulate a more detailed explanation of the logic of the step-by-step approach. It also is time for them, individually or together in the P5 process, to offer their vision for the nuclear disarmament process. Their support for a new process of cooperative engagement among all NPT parties would back up these statements with actions.
At the review conference, the non-nuclear-weapon states should reaffirm their support for cooperative nuclear disarmament within the NPT framework. They need not step back from the humanitarian impact initiative, now an established part of the nuclear disarmament landscape. China, France, and Russia should follow the UK and the United States in joining that process. Cooperative pursuit of nuclear disarmament does not require the NAC and other like-minded NPT parties to drop their call for defining “effective measures” under Article VI, although there will be different definitions offered among all NPT parties.
One important way to demonstrate commitment to cooperation would be for all non-nuclear-weapon states to make clear that they do not support negotiation of a nuclear weapons ban or comparable new legal obligation without the participation of the nuclear-weapon states. Another could be to join a commitment by all NPT parties to work cooperatively to establish the political, security, institutional, and technical building blocks of sustained nuclear disarmament progress.
Cooperative engagement between NPT nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. New means are needed to institutionalize a continuing process of cooperative engagement on nuclear disarmament among the NPT parties. This new process would complement today’s NPT review process.
The purpose would not be engagement for engagement’s sake, but rather the pursuit of a wide-ranging and solution-oriented agenda. First, cooperative engagement should focus on why more-rapid pursuit of nuclear disarmament remains elusive. There are very divergent views among NPT parties on this matter. It is in the interest of all parties to debate and understand the logic behind each other’s views.
Second, a main goal of cooperative engagement should be to reach agreement among NPT parties on the political, military, institutional, and technical building blocks of sustained nuclear disarmament progress and, to the extent practical, to recommend actions to establish them. As sketched below, there is room here for creative thinking and actions by the nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states, and both in collaboration.
Third, the agenda for cooperative engagement should provide continuing opportunities for all NPT parties to identify, debate, and seek agreement on a mutually shared vision of the next steps toward nuclear disarmament. Even if agreement cannot be reached now, it is time for a full exchange on how to define and pursue the “effective measures” called for by Article VI.
Finally, cooperative engagement should encourage and support actions to establish the regional and international security conditions to advance toward a shared nuclear disarmament vision. Sometimes, creating those conditions will be the responsibility of the countries most concerned, as with reversing today’s slide toward political-military confrontation between Russia and the United States or, quite differently, realizing the vision of the top leaders of China and the United States of creating a new type of cooperative major-power relationship. In other cases, however, many countries can contribute politically, diplomatically, and economically, most importantly in addressing regional proliferation challenges in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia.
To institutionalize cooperative engagement, proposals for a new UN open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament—that is, a group with membership open to interested countries—offer a possible starting point. The open-ended working group that met in 2013 had a wide-ranging, substantive, and productive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues. A new working group might meet periodically during the 2015-2020 review cycle.
The nuclear-weapon states declined to participate in the earlier working group. To enhance the prospects for participation, it would be helpful to find ways to reassure them about the mandate of such a group, the way it will do its work, and the requirement for consensus for any recommendations. Similarly, careful consideration should be given to the name of any new working group.
The U.S.-proposed International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification also should be part of a solution-oriented process of engagement among NPT parties. As stated by Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, the partnership is intended “to further understanding of the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament, and to work to surmount those challenges.”[14] An approach that features collaborative exploration and development by all NPT parties of verification concepts, procedures, and technologies, within the limits set by the NPT’s legal obligation not to assist proliferation, recognizes that no single country has a monopoly on good ideas. The acceptability and legitimacy of eventual solutions would be stronger for such an approach. Working together also would help to build habits of cooperation. All NPT parties should seize this opportunity.
Increased interaction with the P5 process by the non-nuclear-weapon states should be part of cooperative engagement. The London conference in February broke important new ground by providing for outreach to the non-nuclear-weapon states after the conference. A next step would be to create a subgroup within the P5 process for dialogue with the non-nuclear-weapon states. Membership could be drawn from past review conference officers from cross-cutting NPT groups such as the NPDI and the NAC and from the NAM.
Other possibilities for cooperative engagement could be explored at the review conference. A group of governmental experts on nuclear disarmament could be established at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). With the CD deadlocked and unable to begin work on any issue, this group could address the full set of political to technical issues of nuclear disarmament. Its purpose would be to pave the way for later action at the CD or elsewhere. Better use also could be made of the strengthened NPT review process, perhaps allocating a new type of “special time” at each of the three preparatory committee meetings for reports and discussion of the work accomplished in the preceding new processes.
Priority actions for nuclear disarmament building blocks. The activities suggested as part of cooperative engagement all would use today’s nuclear disarmament lull to lay the groundwork for progress later. Building on the 2010 action plan, the NPT parties should seek agreement on a few priority actions to pursue between the 2015 and 2020 review conferences to strengthen the building blocks of nuclear disarmament.
First, the review conference should call for intensified work within the P5 process on the verification and transparency requirements of nuclear disarmament. This activity would complement the new international partnership and help address one of the most critical technical foundations for nuclear disarmament progress, including for a necessary next phase of Russian-U.S. nuclear reductions that should include the verified elimination and dismantlement of nuclear warheads. Follow-on work in the P5 process on the nuclear glossary also will pay off in strengthening a shared conceptual foundation for later multiparty actions. The review conference also could call for the five nuclear-weapon states, either individually or together, to report their vision of the nuclear disarmament process to the 2019 Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
Second, the review conference should call for continued work by the group of governmental experts established by the UN secretary-general on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This group has explored and clarified issues related to a future treaty. Limits on fissile material production for nuclear weapons are fundamental to further nuclear disarmament. For that reason, the review conference also should call for the completion of negotiations of such a treaty by 2020, whether in the CD or elsewhere. A commitment by all nuclear-weapon states to national moratoriums on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons would add momentum. At the least, all five states could announce at the review conference that they are not now producing such material.
Third, the review conference should reaffirm the 2010 action plan’s emphasis on the importance of compliance with the treaty’s nonproliferation obligation and call on all NPT parties to support actions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council to resolve outstanding compliance concerns. In part, such a reaffirmation would show support for full implementation of any negotiated agreement between Iran and the six-country group known as the P5+1, assuming agreement is reached. It also would signal the NPT parties’ support for IAEA efforts to resolve its concern about Iran’s possible nuclear weaponization activities. More broadly, nonproliferation compliance remains a vital security condition for nuclear disarmament progress. Creating confidence in the abilities of international institutions to address today’s compliance issues can build longer-term confidence in international institutions’ ability to ensure compliance in a nuclear-disarmed world. Without such confidence, the risks of nuclear disarmament will be thought too high by nuclear-weapon states.[15]
Intensified cooperation among the nuclear-weapon states to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use. In their joint statement after their February conference, the nuclear-weapon states in the P5 process “reiterated their shared understanding about the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and underlined their resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening.” At the review conference, the nuclear-weapon states should describe their continuing actions to address concerns about nuclear use raised in the humanitarian impact conferences. They also should affirm their intention to deepen engagement among themselves as part of the P5 process and individually to minimize the risk of nuclear use and to strengthen the global nuclear taboo, pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
As a first step, how to avoid any use of a nuclear weapon should become a regular focus of the agenda of meetings under the P5 process. Discussion could focus on generic pathways to nuclear use and actions that the nuclear-weapon states, individually or together, could take to prevent any use. In addition, governmental experts from the five countries also should meet periodically to identify areas for cooperation to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. Cooperation could cover areas such as heading off a possible terrorist nuclear incident and preventing escalation in a regional proliferation crisis. As part of their internal deliberations, the nuclear-weapon states also could seek agreement on their own “code of nuclear conduct.” The code’s purpose would be to define agreed safety and security standards, the most stable operational and decision-making practices, and guidelines for behavior in peacetime and in crisis, again pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. These actions would demonstrate the five states’ commitment to practical and effective measures to address concerns at the heart of the humanitarian impact initiative.
Stepping Up to the Challenge
Breaking today’s NPT nuclear disarmament stalemate will not be easy. Taken together, the four elements suggested here—a commitment to cooperation, creating a new process of cooperative engagement, agreement to pursue some priority nuclear disarmament building blocks between the 2015 and the 2020 review conferences, and action by the nuclear-weapon states to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use—are a package that offers one possible way out of that stalemate. Difficulties and obstacles exist among the nuclear-weapon states and among the non-nuclear-weapon states. Reaching agreement, moreover, would not resolve today’s substantive obstacles to near-term nuclear disarmament progress, typified by Pakistan’s blocking the beginning of negotiations at the CD on a fissile material cutoff treaty, Russian rejection of U.S. proposals for new strategic nuclear reductions, or the hurdles facing U.S. CTBT ratification.
One wild card or another still could block an overall consensus final document at the review conference. Nonetheless, all NPT parties have an important stake in breaking today’s NPT nuclear disarmament stalemate. At the upcoming review conference, all parties should step up to the challenge and find a way out of that stalemate.
Lewis A. Dunn, who served as U.S. ambassador to the 1985 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, is a principal with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of SAIC or any of its sponsoring organizations.
ENDNOTES
1. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Final Document, Volume I, Part I,” NPT/Conf.2010/50 (Vol. I), 2010, p. 19 (hereinafter 2010 NPT Review Conference final document).
2. The five countries that the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes as nuclear-weapon states also are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
3. See Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement From the Nuclear-Weapon States at the London P5 Conference,” February 6, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237273.htm.
4. 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, p. 21 (Action 5).
5. See George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Adelphi Paper, No. 396 (September 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf.
6. For other examples of such proposed building blocks, see Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Building Blocks for a World Without Nuclear Weapons: Working Paper Submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Ukraine,” NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP 23, April 15, 2014.
7. John Quinn, “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons” (statement, UN General Assembly First Committee, October 20, 2014), http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/1com/1com14/statements/20Oct_Australia.pdf.
8. NPT Article VI states, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.”
9. See Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Nuclear Disarmament Post-New-START: Working Paper Submitted by the Members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates),” NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.9, March 17, 2014.
10. See Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Nuclear Disarmament: Working Paper Submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa, as Members of the New Agenda Coalition,” NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.25, April 17, 2014.
11. See Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Working Paper Submitted by Ireland on Behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa),” NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.18, April 2, 2014.
12. Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs, “Austrian Pledge,” December 9, 2014, http://fundipau.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/HINW14_Austrian_Pledge.pdf.
13. See Patricia M. Lewis, “A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning From International Humanitarian Law Success,” ICNND Paper, No. 13 (January 2009), http://www.abolitionforum.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/A-New-Approach-to-Nuclear-Disarmament_Learning-from-International-Humanitarian-Law-Success.pdf.
14. Rose Gottemoeller, “The Vision of Prague Endures” (speech, Prague, December 4, 2014), http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/234675.htm.