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"The Arms Control Association’s work is an important resource to legislators and policymakers when contemplating a new policy direction or decision."

– General John Shalikashvili
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The World

Disputes Continue at UN First Committee


December 2020
By Anna Kim

The 75th session of the UN General Assembly First Committee on disarmament and international security, held remotely this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, revealed growing global concern over the decline of arms control and rising tensions between nations, particularly those armed with nuclear weapons.

South Korean Amb. Cho Hyun speaks to the UN Security Council in 2019. At this year's meeting of the UN General Assembly First Committee, he expressed hopes that a peace process with North Korea could progress. (Photo: Evan Schneider/United Nations)The European Union, Russia, and South Korea noted the challenges COVID-19 posed to nuclear disarmament, including the postponement of treaty-related meetings such as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s pending review conference, now deferred again from an already rescheduled early 2021 date. They also encouraged commitment to collective action and multilateralism. Others noted that the pandemic should raise awareness of biological threats and drive action at next year’s Biological Weapons Convention review conference.

Tension between nuclear-armed powers was highlighted by separate, unsuccessful U.S.-Russian talks on an extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). In the First Committee, Russia reiterated that Moscow stands ready to extend the pact without preconditions, a move that would “buy us time to consider future approaches to arms control.” The United States responded by reaffirming its pursuit of an agreement that “addresses all nuclear warheads” and expressing concern with Russia’s investment in “novel nuclear delivery systems and nuclear weapons that are not constrained by New START.” The impasse suggests that the two sides will not resolve the matter before the end of the Trump administration in January 2021.

Multiple states continued to express concern over the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 arms control agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran’s subsequent buildup of low-enriched uranium exceeding treaty limits.

EU nations said they “deeply regret” the U.S. decision to withdraw and reimpose sanctions on Iran and “strongly urge Iran to refrain from any further actions that are inconsistent with its JCPOA commitments and return to full JCPOA implementation without delay.”

Unlike in 2019, Iran did not mention its enrichment activities or their reversibility. The United States refrained from commenting on the JCPOA at all during its general debate remarks.

Opinions were divided on how to address North Korea’s nuclear program and security on the Korean peninsula. China blamed the United States for “the deadlock of the [U.S.-North Korean] dialogue regarding the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula” and asserted its opposition to “unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction beyond the mandates” of UN Security Council resolutions.

The EU and some European countries, in contrast, expressed concern over North Korea’s missile launches and repeated their support for denuclearization. Poland called North Korean denuclearization “an absolute imperative and priority for the entire international community.” South Korea took a more optimistic tone in its statement. Cho Hyun, South Korean ambassador to the United Nations, said that “[his] government’s resolve to advance the peace process remains unwavering and [South Korean leaders] sincerely hope that [North Korea] will return to the negotiating table.”

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) also received significant attention during general debate in the wake of the August 2020 poisoning of Alexei Navalny, a Russian opposition leader, with a Novichok nerve agent. Russia has denied responsibility for the attack.

Absent verifiable attribution of the attack to Russia by the OPCW, the United States called on Moscow to “fulfill its obligations under the [CWC] by completely declaring and destroying its chemical weapons program under international verification.” The EU said that Russia should “fully cooperate” with the OPCW to ensure an “impartial international investigation.”

The use of chemical weapons in Syria also drew attention, with Germany urging that “all those who continue to support the Assad regime and to provide cover for its crimes—in particular the Russian Federation—[should] finally live up to their responsibility.”

Russia did not respond directly to criticism for the Navalny incident, instead introducing a resolution to update the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (SGM). This was met with significant resistance by other states, which accused Russia of attempting to undermine the SGM’s authority.

The 2020 First Committee session approved 72 draft resolutions and decisions, but rejected two: Russia’s resolution on the SGM and one on the 2021 Disarmament Commission session. The votes revealed continuing disunity between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, with all nine nuclear-armed states voting against a resolution on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) even as the treaty reached the 50 accessions needed to enter into force in January 2021.

The United States cast one of two votes, along with North Korea, against the resolution on the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing unproven claims that Russia and China continue to conduct nuclear weapons test explosions. This was the first time the United States did not abstain from the vote, which fueled concerns that the Trump administration could be planning to resume nuclear weapons testing, as The Washington Post first reported in May. The United States was also the sole vote against the resolution on the Arms Trade Treaty for the second year in a row. President Donald Trump announced in April 2019 that Washington would drop out of the treaty.

Resolutions in support of the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions passed with no votes against, representing continued widespread support for those initiatives. The resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East also passed 169–2–1, with only the United States and Israel voting against it.

As in previous years, First Committee member states were unable to reach consensus on a legal approach to regulating arms in outer space. Five resolutions were introduced on the topic, which reflected highly varied perspectives on disarmament. The United States, Russia, and China each accused others of having intentions to weaponize space while emphasizing their own commitment to developing a legal infrastructure. The First Committee also discussed cybersecurity and emerging technologies.

Russia Fails to Weaken UN Chemical Weapons Investigations

A Russian effort to undermine the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (SGM) was rejected by the UN General Assembly First Committee on Nov. 4. Moscow had offered the resolution and called for a review of SGM guidelines ahead of the First Committee vote, arguing that the guidelines had not been updated since the late 1990s.

The mechanism grants the secretary-general authority to launch an independent investigation into alleged incidents of chemical or biological weapons use on request by a UN member state. For example, the SGM investigated the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, prior to Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s UN representative, said the SGM has “clearly become obsolete.”

The European Union criticized Russia’s efforts as misguided and politically driven. Speaking on behalf of the group, Germany recalled an attempt by Russia in December 2019 to criticize further strengthening of the mechanism, arguing that doing so would create a de facto legally binding verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. “Against this background,” Germany’s representative told the First Committee on Nov. 4, “it seems unlikely that the motive behind this resolution is to strengthen [the SGM].”

“It is not immediately clear why there would be an urgency to review the guidelines and principles again,” he added, noting that Russia’s proposed resolution threatened the SGM’s independence by subordinating it to the UN Security Council. The resolution proposed that the Security Council play a greater role in the mechanism’s work, specifically with respect to investigating incidents of biological weapons use.

The resolution failed to pass the First Committee with 31 votes in favor, 63 against, and 67 abstentions.—JULIA MASTERSON

The annual UN session on disarmament and international security reflected the full range of arms control disputes.

Ban Treaty Set to Enter Into Force


November 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will enter into force Jan. 22, a date set by the Oct. 24 ratification of the pact by Honduras. The treaty terms call for it to take effect 90 days after the 50th nation deposits its ratification or accession with the United Nations.

Honduran Foreign Minister Maria Dolores Aguero Lara signs the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the United Nations on Sept. 20, 2017. Honduras deposited its instrument of ratification on Oct. 24, triggering the treaty's entry into force in 90 days. (Photo: Darren Ornitz/ICAN)For the first time since the invention of the atomic bomb, nuclear weapons development, production, possession, use, and threat of use and the stationing of another country’s nuclear weapons on a state-party's national territory are all expressly prohibited in a global treaty. Negotiations on the TPNW were concluded in July 2017 after a negotiating conference involving more than 120 states. The initiative emerged after a series of three international conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons held in 2013–14.

Stéphane Dujarric, spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres, said in an Oct. 24 statement that the entry into force of the TPNW is “the culmination of a worldwide movement to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. It represents a meaningful commitment towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations.”

The 50th ratification came on the 75th anniversary of the ratification of the UN Charter, which is celebrated annually as UN Day.

Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, said in a statement that “the 50 countries that ratify this treaty are showing true leadership in setting a new international norm that nuclear weapons are not just immoral but illegal.”

U.S. officials, meanwhile, are actively lobbying states to withdraw their support for the treaty. A letter that accompanied a nonpaper listing U.S. concerns about the TPNW sent in October, stated that “[a]lthough we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.”

The U.S. letter, which was delivered to a large number of states and was first reported by the Associated Press, claims that the five original nuclear powers and all of member of NATO “stand unified” in their opposition to the “potential repercussions” of the treaty. The U.S. nonpaper claims that the TPNW is “dangerously counterproductive” to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

One of those five powers, China, issued a more conciliatory view in a Twitter statement on Oct. 24: “China has always been advocating complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, which is fundamentally in line with purposes of [the treaty]. China will continuously make relentless efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.”

TPNW negotiators have repeatedly underscored that the new treaty seeks full complementarity between the NPT and the new agreement. They also note that the pact advances the existing NPT safeguards regime by legally obliging its states-parties to keep in place any additional safeguards arrangements they have voluntarily agreed to implement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

According to Thomas Hajnoczi, director for disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation for the Austrian Foreign Ministry, “[T]he TPNW did not create a parallel universe to the traditional one founded on the NPT.” In an article published in The Nonproliferation Review earlier this year, Hajnoczi argues that, “on the contrary, it makes the existing universe of legal instruments around the NPT stronger.”

The first global treaty to ban nuclear weapons will take effect in January 2021.

CTBTO Clears Path for Leadership Decision


November 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

Following weeks of consultations, members of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) agreed in October to resolve a dispute over which states-parties that are in financial arrears to the organization are eligible to vote to select the organization’s executive secretary. The agreement clears the way for members to decide in late November who will lead the organization after July 31, 2021, when current agency leader Lassina Zerbo will have completed his second four-year term.

Current CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo (left) and Robert Floyd, now director-general of the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office. (Zerbo photo: CTBTO; Floyd photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)The Vienna-based CTBTO is tasked with building up and operating the treaty’s global verification regime in preparation for the treaty’s entry into force, as well as promoting its entry into force. The organization has an annual budget of $128 million that comes from member state contributions assessed on the UN dues scale. More than 70 nations were behind in their dues in July, a larger number than usual, in part due to the economic impacts of the COVID-19 global pandemic. According to the treaty, nations that have extensive arrears may not vote in CTBTO decisions.

After failing to resolve the voting rights issue earlier this year, CTBTO members voted on Oct. 12 on three proposals to enable some nations to vote. (See ACT, September 2020.) Of the states that are behind in their financial contributions to the organization, 29 filed for exceptions due to exceptional circumstances in order to be granted voting rights for the executive secretary selection process.

An African Group proposal that would have allowed all 29 state signatories to vote who applied to the CTBTO with relevant requests failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. The vote was 35–42, with 12 abstentions.

Russia advanced a compromise proposal that would have restored voting rights to 15 of the 29 that are either in partial arrears; have negotiated a payment plan, such as Afghanistan, Gambia, Iran, Libya, and Sudan; or, in the case of Yemen, are engaged in a civil war. The United States voiced strong opposition to this proposal, apparently because it would have granted voting rights to Iran. The vote on the second proposal also did not reach the necessary two-thirds majority, with 43 in favor, 42 opposed, and 14 abstentions. France, Germany, and Switzerland, which had rejected the first proposal, split with the United States and voted in favor of Russia’s proposed formula.

A Canadian proposal that aimed to restore voting rights for nine states dealing with exceptional circumstances was approved 52–20, with 16 abstentions. The nine countries include Afghanistan, Comoros, Ecuador, Libya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, and Yemen. The original proposed list included Botswana, but it settled its arrears by the time of the vote on the proposal, and its voting rights were automatically restored, according to an email from the CTBTO secretariat to Arms Control Today.

The decision brings the number of countries with voting rights for the organization’s next executive secretary to 123.

According to an Oct. 12 diplomatic note from the CTBTO chair, there are two candidates for the position of executive secretary: incumbent Lassina Zerbo and Robert Floyd, who was formally nominated by Australia ahead of an Oct. 9 deadline. Floyd is currently the director-general of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, which oversees operation of the 23 CTBTO International Monitoring System stations located on Australian territory.

 

After resolving a voting rights issue, CTBTO members are now able to select the organization’s next leader.

U.S., Allies Spar Over Iran Sanctions


October 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

The United States threatened to sanction any country that does not enforce UN restrictions on Iran that the Trump administration claims were reimposed last month, but the UN secretary-general said he will not take any steps to implement those measures, and other states dismissed U.S. claims as invalid.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell speaks to the media in Brussels on Sept. 21. He indicated that month that the United States has no standing to demand the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran. (Photo by Thierry Monasse/Getty Images)UN sanctions on Iran were lifted or modified in 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the seven-party deal that limited Iran’s nuclear activities. Recently, the Trump administration asserted on Sept. 19 that the sanctions had been restored after the United States initiated a so-called snapback mechanism, created by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which contains language allowing participants in the nuclear deal to reimpose UN sanctions in a manner that cannot be vetoed. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 has created a dispute over U.S. standing to demand the return of UN sanctions under the terms of Resolution 2231.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Sept. 19 that the United States expects “all UN member states to fully comply with their obligations under these reimposed restrictions.” Pompeo said failure to do so would result in the United States using “domestic authorities to impose our consequences for those failures.” He later threatened that “no matter who you are, if you violate the UN arms embargo on Iran, you risk sanctions.”

But Reuters reported on Sept. 19 that UN Secretary-General António Guterres told the Security Council in a letter that due to “uncertainty” over the status of the UN sanctions, he will not take any action to implement the measures. Guterres said that “it is not for the secretary-general to proceed as if no such uncertainty exists.”

The same day, Majid Takht Ravanchi, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, tweeted the U.S. “illegal and false ‘deadline’ has come and gone” and that Security Council “member states continue to maintain [the] U.S. is NOT a JCPOA participant, so its claim of ‘snapback’ is null and void.”

The United States issued a snapback notification to the Security Council president and Guterres on Aug. 20, but Security Council members, including the presidents in August and September, rejected the Trump administration’s claim that it was entitled to use the mechanism in Resolution 2231 to reimpose UN sanctions. The Trump administration took that step after it failed to pass a Security Council resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran, which is set to expire in October according to the terms of the nuclear deal and Resolution 2231. (See ACT, September 2020.)

The United States argues that it is still listed as a participant in the nuclear deal under Resolution 2231, despite having withdrawn from the accord. The Security Council presidents and other Security Council members, including the remaining parties to the nuclear deal, have argued that the United States lacks the standing to trigger a snapback, despite still being listed as a JCPOA participant.

In a Sept. 18 letter to the Security Council, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom said the U.S. snapback is “incapable of having any legal effect” due to Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA.

France, Germany, and the UK, along with Russia and China, are all parties to the JCPOA and sit on the Security Council.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who coordinates the group of JCPOA participants known as the P4+1, said on Sept. 19 that “sanctions-lifting commitments under the JCPOA continue to apply.” He also referred to a Sept. 1 statement after a meeting of the P4+1 and Iran, which noted that the United States has not participated in JCPOA-related activities since it withdrew in May 2018 and “therefore could not be considered as a participant state.”

Russia’s ambassador to the UN tweeted more bluntly “Is Washington deaf?” and noted that “we all clearly said in August that U.S. claims to trigger snapback are illegitimate.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expressed his appreciation at the UN General Assembly for the Security Council’s “decisive and resounding” rejection of the U.S. attempt to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. The United States is in “self-created isolation,” he said on Sept. 22.

Despite the widespread rejection of the U.S. claim that UN sanctions were reimposed, the Trump administration issued a Sept. 21 executive order aimed specifically at sanctioning entities that engage in conventional arms trade with Iran. The order stated that “transfers to and from Iran of arms or related materiel or military equipment represent a continuing threat to regional and international security.”

It is unclear why the Trump administration issued the order, as existing U.S. authorities already allow the president to sanction arms transfers to and from Iran.

Iran views UN sanctions relief, specifically the expiring arms embargo, as one of the few remaining benefits of continued participation in the nuclear deal after the United States withdrew and reimposed U.S. sanctions in May 2018.

But given the U.S. sanctions on Iran’s arms sales, which remained in place even when the United States was a participant in the JCPOA, the EU embargo on Iranian arms sales, and other UN measures that prohibit arms sales to Lebanon and Yemen, Iranian arms transfers will still face a number of restrictions once the UN embargo expires in October.

The United States also announced on Sept. 21 specific sanctions against individuals that are “directly involved” in Iran’s production of enriched uranium in excess of the nuclear deal’s commitments and individuals involved in Iranian-North Korean missile cooperation.

Iran initially threatened to retaliate if the UN snapped back sanctions on Iran, but did not immediately announce any new steps to violate the accord or ratchet up existing nuclear activities in response to the Trump administration’s actions. The near-universal rejection of the U.S. attempt to reimpose the UN measures appears to have mollified Tehran.

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations on Sept. 21, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif underscored Iran’s continued commitment to the nuclear deal and its willingness to return to full implementation if all parties do the same.

Iran will “absolutely not” renegotiate the JCPOA, he said, but a “more for more” deal may be possible if the United States commits under the nuclear deal “that it will not violate it again, that it will not make demands outside the scope of the deal, [and] that it will compensate Iran for the damages.”

The Trump administration has failed to win support for its effort to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran.

OPCW to Investigate Navalny Poisoning


October 2020
By Julia Masterson

The international agency overseeing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) aided in a preliminary investigation into the recent illness of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who was poisoned by a dangerous chemical agent, according to multiple
test analyses.

Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny marches in a Moscow demonstration on Feb. 29. He fell ill in August after an alleged attack with a chemical agent. (Photo: by Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images)Navalny was reportedly given the agent on Aug. 20 in Russia, where he received initial medical treatment before being flown to Germany, where doctors assessed that he had been exposed to the nerve agent Novichok, a substance banned under the CWC. The finding was corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, according to German government spokesman Steffen Seibert. He said on Sept. 14 that samples of the nerve agent detected in Navalny’s system were also sent to The Hague for additional tests at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the treaty’s implementing body. He called on Russia to “explain these events.”

The OPCW announced on Sept. 17 that it provided technical assistance to Germany regarding the allegations of chemical weapons use against Navalny. According to the OPCW, “[A] team of experts from the Technical Secretariat independently collected biomedical samples from Mr. Navalny for analysis by OPCW designated laboratories.” The analyses of those samples are forthcoming, the watchdog said.

Using toxic agents, even in the poisoning of a single individual, is considered use of chemical weapons and is prohibited under the 1997 CWC. Following news of Navalny’s poisoning, OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias said on Sept. 3, “States-parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention deem the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances as reprehensible and wholly contrary to the legal norms established by the international community.”

The treaty’s near universality strengthens the well-established global norm against chemical weapons use. Just four states—Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan—are not party to the convention and therefore not subject to the treaty’s prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.

Novichok was added to the CWC list of banned substances as a Schedule 1 agent in November 2019, after states-parties voted to amend the treaty’s Annex on Chemical Weapons to include Novichok as among the most tightly controlled agents that states are prohibited from producing, transporting, stockpiling, or using. Under the CWC, these Schedule 1 agents are those with “little or no use for purposes not prohibited” under the treaty. That amendment entered into force on June 7, 2020. (See ACT, December 2019.)

The 2018 poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom triggered the campaign by CWC members to amend the annex, subjecting countries in possession of the nerve agent to the treaty’s most stringent verification and declaration requirements. Moscow is widely believed responsible for that attack, but although the OPCW conducted sample analyses of the agent used on Skripal and confirmed Novichok was used, Russia was never held accountable in the OPCW. (See ACT, May 2018.)

The CWC bans the use of any chemical as a chemical weapon, but the addition of Novichok to the treaty’s list of tightly controlled Schedule 1 agents grants the international chemical watchdog a newfound political ability not only to determine whether the agent used in Navalny’s poisoning originated in Russia, but also to impose punitive consequences for violating the treaty if that conclusion is reached.

“The first step is for the OPCW to complete the assessment of the samples it gathered in Germany,” Gregory Koblentz, an expert on chemical and biological weapons and the director of biodefense graduate programs at George Mason University, told Arms Control Today. Should the OPCW conclude that Navalny was poisoned with Novichok, the other states-parties to the CWC would likely pressure Russia to declare its past research and development of the nerve agent and to destroy any existing stockpiles or production capabilities. If Russia refuses to cooperate, states may demand a challenge inspection under the CWC into any suspected chemical weapons production or storage facilities in Russia.

“Since that provision of the treaty has never been invoked, the OPCW would be entering uncharted waters,” Koblentz said. “It’s too soon to predict how this will play out.”

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Sept. 9 that there is a “substantial chance” that senior officials in Moscow were behind the attack. He warned that “this will prove costly for the Russians.”

Russia has vehemently denied allegations that the Kremlin was involved in the attack on Navalny and has accused Germany and its allies of victimizing Moscow over the dissident’s poisoning.

The governing Executive Council of the OPCW is scheduled to meet next in early October, where the incident will likely be subject to further discussion.

 

Recent changes to the CWC empower the treaty’s implementing organization to undertake more stringent reviews of certain chemicals.

CTBTO Begins Leadership Selection Process


October 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

Divisions among states-parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are creating uncertainty as nations work to select the next leader of the treaty’s implementing body. Lassina Zerbo of Burkina Faso is in the final nine months of his second four-year term at the helm of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and treaty members intend to select the organization’s next executive secretary at their semiannual meeting on Nov. 25-27. Normally a delicate political undertaking, this year’s selection process is further complicated by questions over which states-parties are eligible to vote, given that many are behind in paying their CTBTO financial dues.

Robert Floyd, director-general of the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, has been nominated to lead the CTBTO. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)The process for formal nomination of candidates began Sept. 16 and will close Oct. 9. So far, one candidate, from Australia, has formally been nominated to lead the organization. Additional candidates are expected to come forward before the October deadline, according to diplomats in Vienna.

The executive secretary leads the 260-person organization’s work in building up and operating the treaty’s global verification regime in preparation for the treaty’s entry into force, as well as promoting its universality and entry into force. The Vienna-based organization has an annual budget of $128 million, which comes from member state contributions assessed on the UN dues scale.

More than a quarter-century after its conclusion, the CTBT has not entered into force due to the failure of eight holdout states that have failed to sign or ratify the treaty: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States. But the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS) is more than 90 percent complete, and its International Data Center is fully operational.

In the run-up to the latest meeting of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, which began on June 25, the commission chair, Faouzia Mebarki of Algeria, consulted with states-parties on the election process. On June 12, Mebarki sent a note to Zerbo asking about his “availability to serve for another term.” On June 24, Zerbo indicated he would be available “to serve for another term” if member states so chose.

When the chair announced this just two days later, some states were surprised by the announcement. Although it was not a formal proposal to do so, a few delegations were concerned this was an effort to bypass a more open process, according to diplomatic sources familiar with the proceedings.

The European Union, in a June 26 statement, noted that “nothing in the applicable rules prevents the current executive secretary…from running for a third term in a fair, transparent, and competitive process.”

Zerbo, a geophysicist by training, has a long history with the CTBTO. He first joined the organization in 2004 to head its International Data Center (IDC), and he was chosen to be executive secretary in 2013. Since then, he has led work to complete the monitoring and verification system, including by bringing key monitoring stations in China online, strengthening the connections between the CTBTO and the global scientific community. He has also overseen efforts to provide access to IMS data products for member states in real time to assist with tsunami early warnings, responses to North Korean nuclear tests, and other applications.

The potential for a third term was received positively by several delegations as a way to provide continuity during a challenging time for the CTBTO amid the COVID-19 pandemic and disagreements between major nuclear powers. In a July 6 statement posted online, Alexey Karpov, Russia’s deputy permanent representative in Vienna, said “it would be the most painless decision, oriented for consolidation rather than division of member states.”

Several other key member states, however, expressed different views. In a June 25 statement, the U.S. delegation, in understated terms, expressed its opposition to reappointing Zerbo. “The United States generally does not favor more than two terms for the head of an international organization,” the statement said, reiterating the U.S. accusation that Russia has engaged in activities inconsistent with the treaty’s zero-yield standard.

According to sources familiar with the Preparatory Commission discussions, some EU states, including Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, also oppose a third term for Zerbo, as do other notable countries such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Australia, historically a strong supporter of the CTBT, has put forward Robert Floyd as its own candidate for the executive secretary position. He is currently the director-general of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), which implements the CTBT, Australia’s nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards and physical security commitments, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and Australia’s 25 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. As head of ANSO, Floyd oversees operation of Australia’s 23 IMS facilities.

“A successful candidature would build on Australia's continuing commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and would be the first appointment from the Indo-Pacific, a region that was the scene of so much nuclear weapons testing in the past,” said Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne in a Sept. 18 press statement.

States-parties will resume consultations on Oct. 8. As of press time, Zerbo’s name has not been formally put forward into nomination.

One key factor that may affect decisions regarding additional candidates and the selection process itself will be which countries will have a vote on the matter.

As of July, some 73 CTBTO member states had not fully discharged their financial obligations to the CTBTO, which has resulted in the withholding of their voting rights. With this in mind, the Group of 77 and China said in their June 25 statement that “the inclusive participation of all state signatories in the election process is essential for the legitimacy of the entire process.”

Other states, primarily from Europe, countered that allowing voting by states-parties that have not fulfilled their financial obligations would set a bad precedent.

Unpaid dues are a chronic problem for many intergovernmental organizations that depend on a prorated system of contributions from member states. The problem has become more acute this year as many countries’ economies have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Several delegations, including Australia, the EU, Japan, and Russia have said the issue could affect the organization's financial stability and urged all states to fully pay their assessed dues.

After considerable debate and unable to reach agreement on the selection process or eligibility, the June commission meeting was suspended to allow for further consultations in July to try to resolve the matter. The Preparatory Commission meeting was reconvened on July 10, 20, and 24 to reach an agreement on procedures for the executive secretary election, including on how to decide whether states in arrears will be allowed to vote.

According to the final report of the June-July meeting, it was decided that states must meet their financial obligations to the CTBTO by Sept. 15 to be able to vote and put forward a candidate, but exceptions for certain circumstances will be allowed for “conditions beyond the control of the state signatory.” Consideration will be given to states who are making progress toward their annual assessed contribution or to states, such as Iran, who have negotiated a payment plan to meet their financial obligations.

As of Sept. 13, 17 states had made partial payments toward their current-year assessment, a group that includes smaller states such as Côte d'Ivoire and Niue and wealthier states including South Korea and the United States. A group of 65 states, including the Marshall Islands, which was subjected to atmospheric nuclear testing by the United States; Yemen; and even wealthier countries such as Brazil are in financial arrears with voting rights suspended. To date, only 79 of the treaty’s 184 states-parties have fully paid their assessed contributions.

Sources indicate that more than 30 states in arrears have filed for exceptions in order to be granted voting rights for the executive secretary selection process.

On Sept. 10, the African Group issued a joint statement calling on all state signatories to make efforts “within their means, to meet their financial obligations” and for the Preparatory Commission to grant voting rights to countries that are unable to pay their contributions due to factors outside their control.

As CTBTO member states wrangle over difficult procedural and financial matters, there are bigger issues looming on the horizon that may affect the broader CTBT regime: the slow pace of progress toward entry into force, the possibility that North Korea may soon decide to end its unilateral nuclear testing moratorium, the Trump administration’s discussions about the resumption of nuclear tests and possible withdrawal from the CTBT, and unresolved accusations from Washington about Russian violations of the treaty.

 

Financial difficulties among the nuclear test ban treaty’s states-parties are complicating efforts to select the next leader of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.

ATT Takes On Arms Diversion


September 2020
By Jeff Abramson

Members of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) focused on preventing the diversion of conventional weapons to unauthorized uses and users as they conducted the treaty's sixth annual conference Aug. 17–21. While primarily making procedural decisions and continuing to avoid discussion of controversial arms transfers, conference participants formalized a mechanism for sharing confidential information that drew criticism from civil society for its potential to exclude stakeholders.

Peter Maurer, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross speaks in China in 2018. In a statement to the Arms Trade Treaty's sixth annual conference in August, Maurer questioned the arms trade practices of many states. (Photo: Thomas Peter/pool/Getty Images)Concern over the coronavirus pandemic spurred conference organizers to conduct the meeting via written statements only, rather than using in-person or virtual platforms that allowed for real-time dialogue.

Argentina, which held the presidency of the conference, chose information sharing and transparency for preventing diversion as a special theme. To further that effort, conference president Federico Villegas presented a working paper with eight recommendations. The first was to continue work to establish a forum for states to discuss diversion cases. States-parties adopted the idea, deciding to establish the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF), with a first formal meeting to be organized by the next ATT president, and to review its usefulness during the eighth conference of states-parties.

The DIEF’s terms of reference, however, were only available to states-parties and signatories, and the mechanisms for others to participate were not fully clear. Numerous civil society leaders and groups expressed concern about the possible exclusion of civil society and other stakeholders from the process.

Those concerns were also echoed in findings from the ATT Monitor, the civil society-led initiative for monitoring treaty implementation led by the Control Arms campaign. That research found an increasing number of annual reports were being kept confidential, with 11 percent of reports in 2018 marked that way, as opposed to just 2 percent in 2015. The report also expressed concern about declines in on-time reporting, recognizing that the pandemic may have posed challenges for some states. It found that only 37 percent of states-parties met this year’s May 31 deadline for submitting reports on last year’s arms transfers, down from nearly 50 percent a year earlier.

As at past conferences, states-parties also generally avoided discussing controversial arms transfer decisions, such as those allowing arms to go to countries engaged in the civil war in Yemen or to Libya where a UN arms embargo was in place. In his written statement, Peter Maurer, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, drew attention to the need for change in state practices. “I remain gravely concerned by the apparent disparity between the treaty’s obligation to ensure respect for [international humanitarian law] in arms transfer decisions and the arms transfer practices of too many states. This calls into question the treaty’s credibility and effectiveness,” he said.

Despite the challenges of holding a meeting during the pandemic, Villegas cited many accomplishments in a video address closing the conference. He also noted that treaty membership has increased to 110 states-parties, with six countries—Afghanistan, China, the Maldives, Namibia, Niue, and Sao Tome and Principe—joining since the 2019 conference. He saw the addition of these countries, China in particular, as indications of the value of the treaty and as support for multilateralism.

China’s accession had been anticipated, making it the third of the top five global exporters of major conventional weapons to join the treaty, along with France and Germany, who were among the original 2013 signers and ratified the treaty in 2014. Neither the United States nor Russia, the world’s largest arms exporters, are states-parties.

China rebutted international concerns about its arms trade practices, declaring in its statement to the meeting that it “has always taken a prudent and responsible approach and exercised strict control on its arms export[s].” China also took the opportunity to criticize the United States, calling it “some country” that “by abusing arms trade as a political tool, flagrantly interferes in the internal affairs of other countries and pursues hegemony and bullying policy, which undermines international and regional peace and stability.” It also appeared to take a jab at U.S. President Donald Trump’s frequent blaming of China for the pandemic, saying that geopolitical tensions and other ills are “driven by the political ‘virus’ from some country.”

The United States, which in 2019 did not attend the annual conference and moved away from the treaty by stating it had no legal obligations arising from its 2013 signature, participated in the conference and other meetings this year. (See ACT, May 2019.) Although not issuing a formal statement at the conference, a State Department official told Arms Control Today on Aug. 20 that Washington was participating in 2020 meetings as an “observer in order to protect and promote U.S. interests in the international arms trade.” The official also said, “[W]e look forward to China complying with the obligations it has assumed by becoming a state-party and becoming a responsible participant in the international arms trade.”

 

The Arms Trade Treaty’s annual conference established a controversial closed forum to address the diversion of arms to unauthorized uses and users.

IAEA Nuclear Oversight Grew in 2019


June 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitored a growing amount of nuclear material in 2019, but persistent security and political challenges prevented the agency from understanding the full scope of nuclear activities in some nations. The agency circulated its annual report of its safeguards activity in April, disclosing that its personnel conducted 2,179 inspections in 183 states in 2019. It now oversees over 8 percent more nuclear material than the previous year. Overall, the material would be enough for more than 216,400 nuclear weapons, which the agency calls “significant quantities.”

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi (left) tours the agency's Nuclear Material Laboratory in January. The lab is one of the tools the agency uses to monitor nuclear activities around the world. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)The annual safeguards implementation report reflects the global scale of the IAEA’s role in ensuring that nuclear materials in peaceful facilities are not diverted to military uses. It summarizes the agency’s activities to implement safeguards across member states and its conclusion about the status of nuclear materials in states where safeguards are conducted. The agency has given the report only to its member states. A copy of the document was provided to

The report also highlights difficulties in meeting those safeguards goals. In the case of Libya, for example, the IAEA was no longer able to confirm that there was “no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities” or any diversion of nuclear material. According to the report, the IAEA cannot verify “the actual status of nuclear material previously declared by Libya” at a particular location. It is likely that the country’s unstable security situation has made it difficult for IAEA inspectors to conduct their routine work.

The report also highlighted difficulties in understanding all nuclear activities in North Korea and Syria. The agency has not conducted any on-site inspections in North Korea since April 2009, when IAEA inspectors were asked to leave. But the agency intensified its efforts in 2019 to enhance agency readiness “to play its essential role in verifying” the country’s nuclear program once a political agreement is reached, according to the report.

The report concluded that there were “no indications of the operation” in 2019 of North Korea’s five-megawatts electric reactor, which produces plutonium for nuclear weapons, or at a facility that separates plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel. But there have been “indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility.”

In Syria, IAEA inspectors visited the nation’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, which contains less than one kilogram of weapons-grade uranium, and another site in Damascus in 2019, but the agency continues to press Syria to cooperate with the agency’s investigation into a building destroyed in 2008 that “was very likely” a nuclear reactor that Syria failed to declare to the IAEA.

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires its states-parties to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to ensure that nuclear activities are peaceful. The safeguards agreements are to be negotiated within 180 days of ratifying the treaty, but the 2019 report noted that 10 states have not yet completed safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Since 1997, IAEA member states have had the option to implement a more intrusive additional protocol to their safeguards agreement, which gives inspectors more information about a country’s nuclear program, expands access to sites, and allows for shorter-notice inspections. Of the 183 NPT states with safeguards agreements, 131 also implemented an additional protocol in 2019, an increase from the 129 states with additional protocols in 2018.

The IAEA concluded that, in 69 of the 131 states, “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities” and that there was “no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities” or any diversion of nuclear material. Libya was the only country that was included in that list for 2018, but not 2019.

For 62 of those states that implement a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, the IAEA determined that “declared nuclear material remained in peaceful purposes” in 2019 but that “evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities” remain ongoing. Iran is one of the 62 countries.

The IAEA noted that some states that have negotiated additional protocols have yet to provide the agency with all of the required information under the agreement and that some states restricted access to inspectors, but that progress is being made in providing more timely information.

The safeguards report also said that three states did not allow inspectors to access certain areas within declared facilities, only one of those cases was resolved in 2019, and five states did not provide “timely access” for inspectors. The report did not specify the states.

Forty-four states are implementing safeguards but not additional protocols. The IAEA noted that, for these states, “declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities” and conducted 146 inspections at sites in these countries.

States that are not party to the NPT can also conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA. India, Israel, and Pakistan have all negotiated safeguards agreements for specific locations.

The IAEA conducted 93 inspections at locations under safeguards in those three countries in 2019, a slight increase from the 78 inspections the prior year. The agency also recorded an increase in the nuclear materials under safeguards in those countries, from 3,938 kilograms in 2018 to 4,260 kilograms in 2019.

The IAEA also conducts safeguards inspections in the five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), which are not required to implement safeguards under the NPT. All five, however, have negotiated what are called “voluntary offer” safeguards and additional protocols with the IAEA, which covers more than 35,000 significant quantities of nonmilitary nuclear materials and facilities. The agency conducted 79 inspections at sites in the five nuclear-weapon states in 2019.

In addition, the report contains information about IAEA efforts to address new technical challenges. According to the report, the IAEA continued to work on safeguards applications for new types of facilities, including small modular reactors and geological repositories for spent fuel. One of the new technologies successfully tested in 2019 is an unattended monitoring system for cylinders of uranium gas at enrichment facilities.

The report also documents IAEA sampling and deployment of technologies used for conducting safeguards inspections. According to the report, the IAEA collected 442 uranium samples, 40 plutonium samples, and 405 environmental samples in 2019. The report noted that the total installation of surveillance cameras was 1,425 by the end of 2019, including new underwater cameras for spent fuel ponds, and that inspectors tested new software for reviewing data collected by IAEA surveillance systems.

 

IAEA Iran Inspections Increased in 2019

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted more inspections in Iran in 2019 than the prior year, according to an annual report on the agency’s application of safeguards.

The IAEA’s annual safeguards implementation report noted that Iran received 432 inspections during 2019, an increase from 385 the previous year. The IAEA also conducted 33 complementary access visits in Iran in 2019, according to the report, which accounted for about 20 percent of 149 total complementary access inspections conducted in 183 states throughout the year.

Complementary access provisions allow inspectors to visit sites on short notice and are included in an additional protocol to a state’s safeguards agreement that many have adopted. In addition to allowing complementary access inspections, the additional protocol provides the agency with expanded access to sites and information about a country’s nuclear program.

Iran is provisionally implementing the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement as part of the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The IAEA concluded that Iran, along with 61 other states implementing safeguards agreements and additional protocols, had not diverted any nuclear materials from peaceful activities during 2019, but stated that “evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities” remain ongoing.

The IAEA has used similar language to describe Iran’s nuclear program in its quarterly reports on the country’s implementation of the JCPOA.

Kazzem Gharibabdi, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, said on May 6 that the report highlights Tehran’s cooperation with the agency. But he warned that cooperation is “not the only option” available to Iran, and the country may revise its safeguards commitments in light of Iran not receiving sanctions relief envisioned by the JCPOA after U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal and reimposed sanctions.

Iran has not complied with all agency requests to visit undeclared facilities, according to a February report on Iran by the IAEA. The safeguards implementation report did not provide any details on the agency’s outstanding access requests.

The report also noted that the IAEA Iran team comprised of 269 inspectors in 2019, down slightly from 276 the previous year, and spent 20.4 million euros implementing Iran’s safeguards and JCPOA-related monitoring provisions.—KELSEY DAVENPORT

The International Atomic Energy Agency issued its annual safeguards report.

Security Council Fails on Global Ceasefire


June 2020
By Greg Webb

 

The UN Security Council has been unable to support Secretary-General António Guterres’ call for a worldwide ceasefire as COVID-19 ravages the globe. The United States reportedly scuppered a May 8 council resolution that would have supported the ceasefire but referred to the World Health Organization (WHO), a target of President Donald Trump’s criticism.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres speaks outside UN Headquarters on March 9. His call for a global ceasefire to allow the world to address the coronavirus pandemic has met with limited success. (Photo: EuropaNewswire/Gado/Getty Images)The council began to consider ways to back Guterres after his March 23 proposal. “The fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war. That is why today, I am calling for an immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world. It is time to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight of our lives,” he said.

The draft resolution that followed initially included a direct mention of support for WHO, but after U.S. objections, that language was watered down. The new draft resolution “emphasizes the urgent need to support all countries, as well as all relevant entities of the United Nations system, including specialized health agencies.” Even that formulation could not find U.S. support, Reuters reported, as it too obviously referred to WHO.

“This would have been a much more effective appeal for a ceasefire if it had come a month ago. Now it feels a bit lame and late,” Richard Gowan, the UN director for the Crisis Group, told Reuters. “The council has lost some credibility as the weeks have gone by, mainly thanks to U.S. obstructionism.”

Despite the ceasefire call, major conflicts have continued in several regions. Violence in Afghanistan, for example, continues even after a Feb. 29 U.S.-Taliban peace agreement appears to have reduced Taliban attacks on U.S. and allied forces.

“On average, we see more than 100 people killed daily, which includes between 20 to 30 civilians,” Mir Afzal Haidari, a member of the Afghan parliament’s defense committee, told Radio Free Afghanistan. “The annual cost of the war in Afghanistan is more than $5 billion annually, which means that we end up spending at least $13 million every day.”

On May 12, gunmen attacked a maternity hospital in Kabul, killing at least 16 people, while another assault the same day left 24 dead at a funeral in the Nangahar province, NPR reported.

In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia said it was adhering to a self-declared April 10 ceasefire in Yemen that appears to have quieted but not eliminated violence. Refugees in the war-torn nation have continued to be victims of air strikes, the Norwegian Refugee Council reported on May 25.

Meanwhile in North Africa, Libya’s internationally recognized government rejected a ceasefire called by its opponents in the nation’s civil war, The Guardian reported on April 30. The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord said it did not trust the Libyan National Army of renegade leader Khalifa Haftar, according to The Guardian.

Nearly a month after UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for a global ceasefire, the council was stymied by a dispute over the World Health Organization.

Pandemic Disrupts Security Meetings


May 2020
By Julia Masterson and Shannon Bugos

The global spread of the novel coronavirus has thrown into disarray the schedule of numerous international convenings on arms control and nonproliferation planned for this year.

Argentine diplomat Gustavo Zlauvinen, the president-designate of the 2020 review conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, speaks to the UN Security Council on Feb. 26. He announced in April that he was seeking to postpone the review conference until January 2021. (Photo: Evan Schneider/UN)One of the largest conferences that has been postponed is the 10th review conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which will now take place no later than April 2021. (See ACT, April 2020.) Previously scheduled to begin April 27 at UN headquarters in New York City and last a month, the conference usually involves dozens of side events and the participation of hundreds of government officials from the 191 states-parties to the treaty, nongovernmental organizations, and meeting support personnel.

In a message dated April 17 to NPT states-parties, the president-designate of the review conference, Gustavo Zlauvinen, said, “Unfortunately, the lack of clarity surrounding when the current circumstances will end, combined with the number of General Assembly-mandated meetings that have been postponed, as well as the already heavy schedule of meetings for 2021, has led to significant constraints on the availability of rooms and conference services for the foreseeable future.”

Zlauvinen said that, “in light of those constraints, the only option that meets the requirements of States Parties between now and August 2021 is to hold the Review Conference at UN Headquarters from 4–29 January 2021.” He said he will seek a formal decision from states-parties to hold the review conference on those dates. Other options, he said, would require “significant downsizing, both in terms of the number of weeks for the Conference and the number of parallel meetings.”

The fourth conference of nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, scheduled to be held April 24, 2020, at the United Nations in New York, was also postponed. The group has met prior to NPT review conferences since 2005 to “analyze ways of cooperating that can contribute to achieving the universal goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.” Participation in the conference is open to states-parties of the five extant free zones and Mongolia, which declared itself a nuclear-free territory in 2000. (See ACT, October 2012.) According to UN General Assembly Resolution 73/71, the conference planned for 2020, when held, will focus specifically on enhancing “consultations and cooperation” among the nuclear-free states. The April 24 conference has not been rescheduled.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), located in Vienna, postponed its third Science Diplomacy Symposium likely until November. The CTBTO, which operates the International Monitoring System and data center to verify compliance with the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), holds this symposium every two years in order to highlight the CTBT’s contribution to international peace and security. The 2020 symposium aims to spotlight the value of increasing access to and use of scientific advice in policymaking and collaboration and cooperation between scientists and policymakers.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) postponed the 35th meeting of its Advisory Group on Nuclear Security scheduled to be held April 20–24 in Vienna. The group is comprised of experts who collaborate with the IAEA director-general to strengthen IAEA efforts to deter, detect, and react to nuclear and radiological terrorism. The group meets two times each year.

In the conventional arms space, Carlos Foradori of Argentina cancelled the April working group and preparatory meetings for the 6th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force in 2014 and currently has 104 states-parties. The conference is still scheduled for August 17–21. As president of the conference, Foradori made the decision based upon UN guidelines and said he will develop “a plan that will allow our work to continue remotely in the intersessional period to ensure necessary decisions can be taken by [the conference] guiding the work of the next … cycle.”

Meetings regarding emerging technologies have also been modified due to pandemic-related public health restrictions, including the Berlin Forum on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, originally scheduled for April 1–2, 2020. Instead, the German Foreign Ministry opted to convene the meeting virtually, drawing participation by 300 governmental and nongovernmental representatives of 70 countries worldwide. A statement published April 2 by the ministry reminds that, “in times of crisis, it is crucial that we continue to address urgent issues through international cooperation.”

The forum met to exchange ideas on guiding principles for a future framework governing the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Participants discussed definitions of the human role in the use of lethal force and norms surrounding these systems. According to a readout of the virtual meeting published by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the ministry intends to detail key points from the forum and to hold a follow-up conference in November 2020.

The majority of international events and conferences scheduled for late May or later have not yet officially addressed whether they will still take place. The second part of this year’s session of the Conference on Disarmament, for instance, remains scheduled to begin May 25. A meeting of the group of governmental experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems
is still planned for June. But the United States has shifted the 46th Group of Seven summit on June 10–12 to a video conference due to coronavirus concerns. The heads of state summit was originally intended to take place at Camp David, Maryland.

The coronavirus has forced the delay or cancellation of a wide range of arms control and nonproliferation meetings in the months ahead.

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