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Right after I graduated, I interned with the Arms Control Association. It was terrific.

– George Stephanopolous
Host of ABC's This Week
January 1, 2005
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

U.S., Security Council Debate

November 2002

By Paul Kerr

As weapons inspectors waited to enter Iraq, the United States submitted a resolution to the UN Security Council on October 25 that firmly calls for Iraq to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction but does not directly threaten the use of force if Baghdad fails to comply. Supporting a tough stance against Iraq, Congress passed a joint resolution, which President George W. Bush signed October 16, authorizing the use of force to compel compliance with UN resolutions.

The new resolution, submitted with the United Kingdom, declares Iraq to be in “material breach” of its obligations under “relevant” Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 687, which mandated in 1991 that Iraq give up its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and most missiles. It calls for Iraq to submit “a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its [prohibited weapons] programs.”

The inspection teams would have a strong mandate under the resolution, which specifies that Iraq is to allow “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access” to “facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect.” To prevent Iraq from moving materials, the resolution grants UN inspectors the authority to prohibit the movement of vehicles and aircraft around sites to be inspected. Inspectors would also have the right to interview anyone they choose, without Iraqi officials present, in any location they wish.

The resolution also mandates access to “presidential sites,” superceding a 1998 memorandum of understanding between Baghdad and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that had placed special conditions on inspectors to such sites. Although the memorandum, which was endorsed by a Security Council resolution, did not give Iraq the right to impede inspections, some former UN inspectors have argued that these conditions could enable Iraq to conceal prohibited weapons activities.

Significantly, the new resolution gives the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the right to access “any information that any member state is willing to provide,” an apparent reference to sharing of national intelligence data.

UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix said during an October 28 briefing to the Security Council that access to intelligence about Iraqi weapons activities would be an important tool for UNMOVIC to perform effectively, but he emphasized that UNMOVIC would not give intelligence data to national governments. Allegations that UN weapons inspectors had been gathering intelligence in Iraq for their governments led to a controversy in 1999 that damaged UNSCOM, the previous inspection organization.

The resolution demands that Iraq “state its acceptance” of the resolution within seven days and submit declarations of its weapons programs within 30 days. UNMOVIC is to resume inspections no later than 45 days after the resolution is adopted and to update the council 60 days later.

Move Toward Compromise

The resolution differs in several respects from an earlier draft resolution that the United States circulated to permanent members of the Security Council in September, particularly in its provision for the use of force. The previous draft stated that failure “by Iraq at any time to comply and cooperate fully in accordance with” the resolution’s demands would “constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations” and authorize “all member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area.”

The current resolution also says that Iraq’s failure to comply would be a “material breach,” but instead of directly threatening force, it merely “recalls” previous Security Council warnings that Iraq will face “serious consequences as a result of …continued violations of its obligations.” In the event that weapons inspectors report Iraqi noncompliance with the resolution, the new resolution requires the Security Council to meet “in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security.” The previous draft did not include such a requirement.

The U.S.-British draft is an attempt at a compromise with other council members, particularly Russia and France, but neither country appears satisfied with the U.S. text. Both Moscow and Paris have composed their own draft resolutions but have not yet decided to submit them formally, according to an October 28 interview with a UN official. Both proposals omit the phrase “material breach,” believing that it sets the stage for the use of military force, according to U.S. sources. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the U.S. law establishing the overthrow of the Iraqi government as U.S. policy, contains the same phrase.

The same sources also indicated that the Russian and French resolutions include somewhat less stringent standards for inspections, as well as assurances that Security Council members would discuss possible responses to Iraqi noncompliance before using force. These changes are consistent with previous Russian and French statements. For example, Russian Ambassador Sergey Lavrov criticized the U.S. proposal’s “automaticity of the use of force” in an October 23 press conference following a Security Council meeting.

France had previously supported a two-resolution process, where one resolution would demand the return of weapons inspectors and the second would authorize necessary action. (See ACT, October 2002.) Russia had previously opposed a new resolution.

Inspections Without New Resolution

Whether weapons inspections would begin without a new resolution has been open to question. After Baghdad announced in September that it would accept weapons inspections “without conditions,” Iraqi representatives met with Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei in Vienna from September 30 to October 1 to finalize necessary logistical arrangements.

The meeting resolved many key areas of potential disagreement, according to an October 8 letter from Blix and ElBaradei to an Iraqi official, but several issues are outstanding. In an October 15 briefing to the Security Council, Blix said that uncertainty remains regarding UNMOVIC’s use of helicopters, the presence of Iraqi officials during interviews of Iraqi citizens, inspectors’ right to supervise the destruction of weapons materials or documentation, and the use of aerial imagery.

Blix also indicated that UNMOVIC had been prepared to resume inspections on October 19 but had decided to wait for the Security Council to adopt a new resolution.

It is uncertain if Iraq will abide by the provisions of a new resolution. An October 24 letter from Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri condemned the decision to wait for a new resolution and blamed the United States for blocking inspectors’ return. Iraq had stated in September that it would allow the inspectors access to any sites they wished to inspect, and Iraq agreed during the Vienna meeting to allow UNMOVIC access to previously restricted “sensitive sites.” Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz stated in an interview aired October 12 on Beirut television that inspectors would be allowed into presidential sites but that the inspectors should not be allowed repeat visits to them.

U.S. Response

Frustrated by delays in the process, the Bush administration has indicated that it may abandon the UN process if the Security Council does not vote for its resolution. On October 26, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting in Mexico, Bush stated that the United States would “lead a coalition to disarm” Iraq if its resolution failed to pass. A date for the vote has not yet been set, but White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told reporters October 29 that “time is running out.”

After several weeks of debate about how much freedom to give the president, the House of Representatives passed a resolution October 8 providing Bush with the authority to use military force against Iraq. The Senate followed suit October 11, and Bush signed the resolution October 16.

The resolution expresses support for Bush’s efforts to work through the Security Council and authorizes the president to use force to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and “enforce all relevant” Security Council resolutions. It also requires the president to notify Congress 48 hours after initiating the use of force, explaining his determination that a peaceful solution will not “adequately protect the national security of the United States” or enforce Security Council resolutions.

The Bush administration has been unclear about the conditions under which it would use military force against Iraq. Bush said in an October 7 speech that, in addition to dismantling its prohibited weapons programs, Iraq must end its support for terrorism, account for military personnel missing from the Persian Gulf War, and end human rights abuses. “Only by taking these steps [can] the Iraqi regime…avoid conflict,” he said.

Secretary of State Colin Powell contradicted Bush in an October 20 interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press.” While pointing out that UN resolutions cover some of the issues Bush raised, he said “all we are interested in is getting rid of those weapons of mass destruction…there are many other resolutions that [Saddam Hussein] has violated…. All of those...have to be dealt with in due course, but the major issue before us is disarmament.”

It is also uncertain whether U.S. military action would attempt to overthrow Iraq’s government. Recent Bush administration statements suggest that a disarmed Iraq would be sufficient to satisfy Washington’s requirement for “regime change,” which the administration previously defined as a change in government.

The text of the 1998 legislation reads, “[I]t should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.” In his October 7 speech, however, Bush said that Iraq’s compliance with his demands would “change the nature of the regime.”

U.S., Security Council Debate

U.S. Reportedly Offers Russia Deal on Bushehr

November 2002

By Paul Kerr

The United States has reportedly offered Russia access to spent nuclear fuel if it ends its role in constructing a nuclear reactor near the Iranian city of Bushehr. The State Department would not directly confirm that the lucrative offer had been made but said October 23 that the United States would be willing to offer the transfer “of spent reactor fuel currently held by third countries” to Russia as incentive to halt nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Yuri Bespalko expressed doubts about the sincerity of Washington’s proposal, however, citing Washington’s failure to fulfill a promise of removing trade restrictions imposed by the 1974

Jackson-Vannick Amendment, according to the October 22 Washington Post article that first reported the deal. A Bush administration official interviewed October 30 differed with the Post’s account, saying that a spent fuel deal has been discussed for several years and that Russia was more receptive to it than the spokesman’s statement suggests.

The official said that several countries are seeking ways to dispose of their nuclear waste and would be interested in paying Russia to take it from them. Washington would have to approve the transfer of most of the material because the United States originally supplied it and has agreements with recipient countries requiring Washington’s permission for shipment to third parties, the official explained. (See ACT, July/August 2001.) The official said that a decision has not yet been made as to whether Russia would store or reprocess the fuel, but said that the United States prefers storage.

The State Department placed the deal’s value at “potentially…over $10 billion”—significantly more than the Bushehr project, which is widely reported to be worth about $800 million.

The offer was reported while John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, was traveling in Moscow October 20-22. Bolton acknowledged that he had discussed Russia’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs with Russian officials, but he denied that the United States had offered any incentive to halt this assistance. “The idea of that kind of quid pro quo trade-off is simply an inaccurate representation of the nature of the relationship between Russia and America today. We wouldn’t offer such an arrangement, and the Russian government wouldn’t accept it,” he said during an October 22 press conference in Moscow.

Russia’s assistance on the Bushehr project has long concerned the United States. The State Department asserted that such assistance could aid Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, according to an October 23 statement. Moscow raised Washington’s ire when it released a draft document July 26 that called for the construction of additional nuclear reactors in Iran. (See ACT, September 2002.)

 

The United States has reportedly offered Russia access to spent nuclear fuel if it ends its role in constructing a nuclear reactor near the Iranian city of Bushehr. 

Iraq To Accept UN Inspectors; U.S. Officials Skeptical

October 2002

By Paul Kerr

UN weapons inspectors can return to Iraq “without conditions,” Baghdad said September 16, reversing a stance that has barred inspectors from the country for almost four years. The announcement followed a September 12 speech by President George W. Bush before the UN General Assembly, calling on the United Nations to enforce its resolutions on Iraqi disarmament and suggesting that, if it did not, the United States would take unilateral action.

UN Security Council Resolution 687, passed in 1991, required Iraq to submit to UN weapons inspections and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs, but Iraq has refused entry to inspectors since they were withdrawn just prior to U.S. and British air strikes in December 1998. The Bush administration has repeatedly cited Iraqi noncompliance as a potential justification for military action against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

After Iraq and the United Nations failed several times to reach agreement earlier this summer, Iraq finally sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on September 16, four days after the Bush speech, saying it would allow inspectors to return. At first, Baghdad did not promise unfettered access to all sites, but on September 24 Amir al-Saadi, an adviser to Hussein, stated that UN inspectors “would have unfettered access and [can go] wherever they want to go,” according to a Reuters news report.

In addition, when asked during a September 23 press conference about the possibility that Iraq would restrict inspectors’ access, Annan replied that he viewed the Iraqi letter as “a commitment” for inspectors to work in “an unimpeded manner.” Annan had advised the Iraqis on the letter.

How much freedom inspectors will actually have in Iraq, however, remains unclear. Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri read a letter from Hussein before the United Nations September 19 asserting that Iraq “is clear” of weapons of mass destruction and stating that the inspectors are expected to “respect” Iraqi “national security and sovereignty.” Iraq has used these conditions to restrict inspectors’ access in the past. The letter also stated that Iraq wanted to discuss inspections “on a comprehensive basis,” echoing demands the country made in August.

A day after Iraq sent the letter to Annan, members of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) met with an Iraqi delegation to hold “preliminary talks related to the resumption of inspections,” according to an UNMOVIC statement. UNMOVIC, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iraqi delegates are scheduled to meet again in Vienna from September 30 to October 1. UNMOVIC is responsible for verifying Iraq’s dismantlement of its chemical, biological, and prohibited missile programs, and the IAEA is responsible for Iraq’s nuclear program.

One of the items on the agenda for the Vienna meeting is Iraq’s backlog of semi-annual reports, which it was required to provide to inspectors, listing its holdings of dual-use equipment and materials related to weapons of mass destruction. The reports, which Baghdad has said it will deliver to UNMOVIC at the meeting, include information on the location and use of the equipment and materials since 1998.

According to an informal UNMOVIC paper circulated in the Security Council September 19, an advance party of inspectors could arrive in Baghdad as early as October 15. The paper estimates UNMOVIC will need two months to procure equipment and recruit inspectors, as well as conduct preliminary inspections of certain sites, before it can officially begin inspections and determine what key disarmament tasks remain.

Iraq’s announcement represents significant progress from recent diplomatic exchanges between the United Nations and Iraq. The last meeting between Iraqi officials, Annan, and UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix took place in Vienna July 4-5 but failed to reach an agreement for returning inspectors. Annan also rejected an August invitation for UNMOVIC experts to visit Baghdad, saying it did not allow for the immediate admission of inspectors, as required by Security Council Resolution 1284. (See ACT, September 2002.) Annan met with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz September 3 during the Johannesburg summit on sustainable development but again failed to make progress on an agreement.

As recently as August 15, Iraq had demanded a “comprehensive settlement” that would link discussing the return of weapons inspections to resolving a series of other issues, including economic sanctions, a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in the Middle East, the removal of the U.S.-and U.K.-enforced no-fly zones, and the U.S. policy of creating regime change in Iraq. The United States and the United Nations both considered this position unacceptable.

Bush Calls on UN to Act

The Iraqi decision to accept inspections came on the heels of President Bush’s September 12 UN address, in which he encouraged the United Nations to take action on Iraq’s continued refusal to obey Security Council resolutions.

During the speech, Bush presented the U.S. case for action and listed steps Iraq must take if it “wishes peace,” including eliminating its weapons of mass destruction programs, ending support for terrorism, ceasing its violations of the oil-for-food program, and respecting human rights. The inclusion of these issues represented a shift in the administration’s justification for its Iraq policy, which had previously focused on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs.

Bush added that the United States would work with the Security Council to “hold Iraq to account” and suggested that Washington might take unilateral action against Iraq if the United Nations did not enforce its resolutions. “The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced…or action will be unavoidable,” Bush said.

Earlier that day, Annan had made a speech stressing the importance of multilateralism, adding that “for any one state…choosing to follow or reject the multilateral path must not be a simple matter of political convenience,” signifying disagreement between the United Nations and the United States as to how best to proceed.

A September 12 White House background paper for the speech listed Iraqi violations of Security Council resolutions, including its pursuit of weapons programs and human rights violations. In addition, British Prime Minister Tony Blair released a dossier September 24 charging that Iraq is producing chemical and biological agents, trying to obtain uranium for weapons purposes, working to extend the range of its missiles, and conducting other activities prohibited under UN resolutions.

Despite Iraq’s promises, U.S. leaders expressed doubt that Iraq intends to actually provide complete access to inspectors. In September 19 testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that “there is absolutely no reason at all to expect” that Iraq’s offer “is not another ploy,” citing Iraq’s past refusal to comply with inspectors. He also indicated in a interview with National Public Radio the same day that the administration reserves the option to take unilateral military action. Iraq’s subsequent offer of unfettered inspections did not change this stance, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said September 24.

It is unclear if Iraqi compliance with inspectors would affect the U.S. goal of removing Hussein from power. Washington expressed skepticism about the efficacy of inspections, and Fleischer said in a September 20 press briefing that “the inspection process is not the end result…. The end result is destruction of weapons.” In a September 25 interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Powell said that the best way to disarm Iraq was to effect regime change.

Meanwhile, the White House sent a resolution to Congress September 19 seeking authorization to take military action against Iraq. The resolution would give Bush broad power to “use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force” in order to enforce UN Security Council resolutions and “defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq.” Congress is divided over the measure because of its broad mandate and endorsement of unilateral action. It is uncertain when a vote will take place.

U.S., U.K. Seek New Resolution

The United States and the United Kingdom have drafted a resolution to present to the Security Council in an attempt to strengthen the inspection regime, igniting sharp debate among its members. They argue that Iraq has repeatedly violated its obligations under earlier resolutions and that the United Nations must pass a new resolution augmenting inspectors’ authority and identifying the consequences of noncompliance. It is uncertain when the draft resolution will be formally presented.

One of the top U.S. and British concerns is the status of “presidential sites” under existing resolutions. Resolution 1154 endorsed a February 23, 1998, memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Annan and Iraq, which placed special conditions on inspections of these sites. Although the MOU does not give Iraq the right to impede the inspectors, Iraq has used these sites to conceal potential weapons activities, according to some former UN inspectors. The terms of the MOU are still in force, according to a September 25 interview with a UN official.

In his September 19 testimony, Powell said that the United States would take a hard line on a new resolution, requesting that the Security Council find Iraq in “material breach” of existing resolutions and specifying that must comply with conditions called for in Bush’s September 12 speech. Powell said that inspectors would need a stronger resolution “that removes any weaknesses” of the previous inspections system. He added that the resolution must “produce disarmament, not just inspections,” and implied that it could call for the use of force, saying “[T]here must be hard consequences…. Iraq must comply…or there will be decisive action to compel compliance.”

Some Security Council members, however, have questioned the need for a such a resolution. “We favor a rapid resolution” based on existing resolutions, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, according to a September 26 Associated Press report. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan also called on countries September 19 to resolve the situation “on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolution.”

The French position is more ambiguous. A French Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated September 20 that Paris does not believe a stronger resolution to be necessary but that a “resolution that would firmly remind Iraq of its [disarmament] obligations…could be useful.” French President Jacques Chirac supports a two-step process in which one resolution would demand the return of inspectors and the second would authorize any action needed to be taken, according to a statement by French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin quoted on the ministry’s Web site.

Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan said Iraq would not accept any new resolution regarding inspections, The Washington Post reported September 28, adding to the uncertainty of the degree of access inspectors will have.

 

Iraq To Accept UN Inspectors; U.S. Officials Skeptical

Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions

Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions

An ACT Update

687: Cease-Fire Terms (April 3, 1991)

Demanded that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless” of its chemical and biological weapons; ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; and related components, research programs, and facilities. Required that Iraq pledge “not to use, develop, construct or acquire” chemical and biological weapons or the specified missiles.

Established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify that Iraq complied with the resolution’s disarmament tasks.

Demanded that Iraq “unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons” or weapons-grade material and to end related research and development programs. Called for placing all weapons-grade nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control “for custody and removal” with UNSCOM assistance.

Required the UN secretary-general, with the cooperation of UNSCOM, and the IAEA to develop plans for the “future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance” with the ban on weapons of mass destruction and prohibited missiles. The resolution did not specify an end to these monitoring activities.

Maintained the economic embargo against Iraq established in Resolution 661 in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Specified that the UN Security Council would lift the embargo when the council agreed that Iraq had met all its disarmament obligations.

707: Condemning Iraqi Noncompliance (August 15, 1991)

Found Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament commitments under Resolution 687. It was the first of several resolutions—including Resolutions 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1194, and 1205—to condemn Iraq’s refusal to comply with weapons inspections.

Demanded that Iraq “provide full, final and complete disclosure” of its weapons of mass destruction programs and prohibited ballistic missiles, including the location of weapons components, production facilities, and civilian nuclear infrastructure.

Called upon Iraq to immediately grant inspections teams unconditional access to areas they wished to inspect and halt efforts to move or conceal weapons-related materials and equipment or “other nuclear activities.”

715: Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (October 11, 1991)

Approved the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification developed by UNSCOM and the IAEA, and submitted by the secretary-general to the Security Council, as required by Resolution 687. Demanded that Iraq “unconditionally” comply with the plan and “cooperate fully” with UNSCOM and the IAEA.

986: Creation of the Oil-for-Food Program (April 14, 1995)

Created a program allowing Iraq to sell up to $2 billion of oil every 180 days, although the Security Council later removed the limit on the amount of oil Iraq could sell. The UN holds proceeds from these sales in an escrow account, and the funds are reserved for buying medicine, health supplies, food, and other supplies “essential” for civilian needs. The rules governing the import of civilian goods were later changed by Resolution 1409.

1154: Addressing Inspections of Presidential Sites (March 2, 1998)

Endorsed the February 27, 1998, memorandum of understanding between UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Iraq, in which Baghdad agreed to cooperate fully with the inspectors. The memorandum also established “special procedures” for inspecting eight “presidential sites,” to which Iraq had wanted to restrict access:
• At least two senior diplomats appointed by the UN secretary-general will accompany inspectors to presidential sites.
• The Iraqi government will be provided with information prior to the inspection of a presidential site, including the number of inspectors and the time of inspection.
• Inspectors must show respect for Iraqi sensitivities regarding presidential sites.

Called on Iraq to comply immediately and fully with its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions, including providing unfettered access to inspectors, warning that “any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq.”

1284: Creation of UNMOVIC (December 17, 1999)

Authorized the creation of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM and verify that Iraq has fulfilled its disarmament obligations under Resolution 687. Required UNMOVIC and the IAEA to develop a program for implementing a monitoring system and to create a list of remaining disarmament tasks within 60 days of beginning work in Iraq.

Said the Security Council intends to suspend sanctions for 120 days after it determines that Iraq is in compliance with its disarmament duties. Specified that “Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to all areas the teams want to inspect and allow them to interview any Iraqi officials.

1409: Smart Sanctions (May 14, 2002)

Allowed Iraq to import most civilian goods through a streamlined review process, although sanctions on military items remain in effect. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will review proposed contracts with Iraq and send any items on a new “goods review list” to a UN committee for additional scrutiny. The list includes items with potential military applications, and the UN committee can block their export to Iraq. Items not on the list will be quickly approved.

Cuba Will Accede to NPT

Cuba announced September 14 that it will accede to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which would leave India, Israel, and Pakistan as the only countries that have not joined the treaty.

In an address to the United Nations General Assembly, Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Felipe Perez Roque said that Cuba’s decision was motivated by a desire to provide a “signal of the clear political will of the Cuban government and its commitment to an effective disarmament process.” He cited the NPT’s “discriminatory” nature and the lack of nuclear weapons states’ “concrete disarmament-oriented commitments” as the reasons for Cuba’s previous refusal to sign the treaty.

Roque also announced that Cuba would ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which opened for signature in 1967. The treaty prohibits the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by its signatories and establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Cuba is the last country in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean to ratify the treaty. Cuba signed the treaty in 1995 but did not ratify it.

The announcement was well received by the international community. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei praised Cuba’s decision in a September 17 statement and called upon Cuba to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement, as required by the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

A U.S. State Department official stated September 23 that the United States supports Cuba’s decision, adding that “Cuba has always claimed that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. We have no reason to challenge that assertion.” The NPT allows member countries to have civilian nuclear programs.

The Task of Disarming Iraq

Daryl G. Kimball

Despite the overall success of the global nonproliferation regime, a small number of nuclear and non-nuclear states threaten to undermine the norm against the development, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The record of Iraq is particularly troublesome, and it remains vital that the United States and the international community firmly, appropriately, and effectively respond to Baghdad’s proliferation behavior.

Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein violated the rules established by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In the decade since, he has resisted United Nations Security Council mandates to allow weapons inspectors to dismantle Iraq’s proscribed weapons and missile capabilities.

Despite Iraq’s failure to cooperate and the gradual erosion of Security Council consensus on inspections, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1991 to 1998 succeeded in ridding Iraq of most of its WMD capabilities and stockpiles. It has been four years since UN weapons inspectors operated in Iraq, however, and it is now difficult to assess Iraq’s capabilities with precision. It is therefore prudent to assume that Iraq has or will soon have biological and chemical weapons and that it may, within a matter of years, acquire nuclear weapons.

It is vital that the response to Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction reinforce the rule of law and the norm against WMD everywhere. The necessary, though difficult, next step is for the United States to secure the Security Council’s reaffirmation and Iraq’s acceptance of a UN inspections regime under new, more effective rules.

Upon arriving in office, President George W. Bush supported the readmission of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. More recently, top-level Bush administration officials argue that UN inspections are bound to fail and that nothing short of a pre-emptive military invasion and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein will suffice.

Such an approach risks greater instability in the Middle East and would require a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq. It would also increase the likelihood that Iraq might use weapons of mass destruction to lash out at its neighbors and the invading force. This scenario could provoke Israel to launch a pre-emptory or retaliatory strike against Iraq, possibly involving nuclear weapons. The cure could be worse than the disease.

Furthermore, pre-emptive military action—particularly in the absence of Security Council backing—would reinforce the perception and the growing reality of the Bush administration’s arrogant and unilateralist approach to foreign affairs. Worse still, asserting a world order based on U.S. interests and military primacy would undermine the international security principles and institutions the United States has long sought to uphold.

A successful policy toward Iraq begins with winning consensus from the five permanent Security Council members for a new resolution that fortifies Resolutions 1284 and 687 by calling on Iraq to admit the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The resolution should authorize unconditional access by UNMOVIC to inspect and dismantle Iraq’s WMD capabilities and use of appropriate and necessary means by Security Council members to enforce its activities.

Gaining Iraq’s acceptance of the current or a fortified inspectorate will not be easy. Washington must focus diplomatic pressure on France, Russia, and China, who can help persuade Saddam to readmit the inspectors. Given the choice of supporting nonproliferation norms or allowing a rogue state to defy the Security Council and risk U.S. military action, President Bush should be able to win Security Council support. Iraq must also be convinced that its cooperation and compliance with no-notice, intrusive inspections on an indefinite basis would protect it from invasion. If a unified Security Council tries and fails to persuade Iraq to submit to new inspections, the United States would be in a far better position to pursue UN authority for military enforcement of UN resolutions.

Given what UNSCOM and Western intelligence sources have learned about Iraqi weapons programs, new inspections of suspicious sites are likely to reveal important evidence of any ongoing WMD-related activities. What if UNMOVIC and the Security Council determine that Iraq is effectively blocking the implementation of the inspectors’ work or that it continues to develop prohibited weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them? The new Security Council resolution should make it clear that the cost of Iraqi noncooperation outweighs that of cooperation.

Complete and verified elimination of Iraq’s WMD programs, as called for in Resolution 687, is probably unattainable without full Iraqi cooperation, which is unlikely. But, if the inspection effort is focused on, and measured by, its contribution to the more fundamental objective of preventing Iraq from developing or using weapons of mass destruction, it will have made an enormous contribution to international peace and security.

Despite the overall success of the global nonproliferation regime, a small number of nuclear and non-nuclear states threaten to undermine the norm against the development, possession...

Do As I Say, Not As I Do

Daryl G. Kimball

As tensions mounted in recent months between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir, massive troop deployments, cross-border shelling, and tough talk in New Delhi and Islamabad brought the two nuclear-armed rivals to the brink of war. Though leaders in both countries had professed confidence that neither side would deliberately resort to nuclear weapons, they have said in recent days that they were prepared to wage nuclear war.

The international community, including the United States, realized the danger of a deliberate or accidental nuclear exchange between the rival states and sought to remind both sides of the grave consequences of such a war. Mindful of the possibility that Pakistan might be tempted to use nuclear weapons to counter India’s overwhelming conventional forces, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that he told the leaders of both states, “I can see very little military, political, or any other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it. But to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age seems…to be something that no side should be contemplating.”

Despite the wisdom of Powell’ s words, the Bush administration apparently subscribes to a different set of rules for its own nuclear arsenal. The Pentagon’s recent nuclear posture review asserts that nuclear weapons “provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and large-scale conventional military force.” The review calls for contingency plans for nuclear strikes against non-nuclear weapon states or in conflicts that may begin as conventional wars. It calls for new nuclear weapons capabilities to destroy targets, such as deeply buried bunkers.

Worse still, in a speech this June President George W. Bush said that the United States will take the battle “to the enemy…and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” This implies that President Bush may be willing to use nuclear weapons not only in retaliation for a WMD attack but also to pre-empt possible WMD attacks. These attempts to reinforce the believability of U.S. threats send mixed and dangerous signals to allies, adversaries, and would-be proliferators.

Current U.S. efforts to enhance the credibility and range of options for the use of nuclear weapons blur the bright line that has separated nuclear and conventional warfare since the bombing of Nagasaki. Coming from the United States, the world’s pre-eminent military and political power, such policies only undermine nonproliferation efforts by suggesting to other states that nuclear weapons are legitimate and necessary tools that can achieve military or political objectives.

To date, no nuclear-weapon state has declared as a matter of national policy that it would respond to or pre-empt the use of chemical or biological weapons with nuclear weapons. It is one thing to threaten a “devastating response” to a biological or chemical weapons attack. It is quite another to say explicitly that the United States is prepared to counter or attempt to pre-empt such attacks by striking with nuclear weapons.

When preventive diplomacy and arms control fail to head off proliferation (and from time to time they will), military force backed with the rule of law and supported by the international community can be the option of last resort. But force should not become the sole or even the primary policy option, and in no case should nuclear weapons be employed. As a primary solution, all nations must work to strengthen, effectively implement, and universally adhere to the nonproliferation norms established by the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

If the Bush administration fails to follow through on U.S. NPT disarmament commitments, and if it renounces its longstanding pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states in good standing with the NPT, some states may see that the rule of law is breaking down and conclude that they too need nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to ward off attack. And if the United States asserts that pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against terrorist-related WMD threats is justified, a state such as India might assert the same right and consider launching its own pre-emptive strike against Pakistan.

Rather than explore new roles for U.S. nuclear weapons—even in the name of WMD counter-proliferation—American leaders have a practical and moral responsibility to practice what they preach. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said last month, “These are not just larger weapons, they are distinctively different weapons.” Consequently, the role of nuclear weapons, until they are eliminated, must be strictly limited to deterring a nuclear attack by other nuclear-weapon states.

Bush Urges Senate Approval of IAEA Protocol

On May 9, President George W. Bush transmitted to the Senate for its approval the “additional protocol” to the U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards agreement. It is the first time since taking office that the administration has forwarded an arms control treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.

In his message to the Senate, Bush urged “early and favorable consideration” of the agreement. He emphasized that “universal adoption” of the protocol is “a central goal” of his nuclear nonproliferation policy. The United States signed the protocol in 1998.

The IAEA drafted the protocol to strengthen its ability to detect covert nuclear weapons programs after it was unable to discover clandestine programs in Iraq and North Korea in the early 1990s. The protocol expands the IAEA’s legal authority beyond the original safeguards agreements the agency has with its member states. Those agreements, which aimed to allow the IAEA to verify that the products of civil nuclear programs were not being diverted to weapons programs, restrict the agency to inspecting and monitoring only declared nuclear sites.

Under the new protocol, the IAEA is allowed to conduct short- or no-notice inspections and employ new environmental-sampling and satellite-monitoring techniques at any suspect site. The protocol also requires states to provide the IAEA with additional information about aspects of their civilian nuclear programs, such as fuel-cycle activity and nuclear-related exports.

However, as one of the five states allowed to retain nuclear weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States is not required to give the IAEA access to any facility it deems “of national security significance.” In effect, U.S. ratification of the protocol primarily serves to set a good example for those states that have yet to sign or ratify, according to a Senate staffer familiar with the agreement.

It is not clear when the Senate might take up the protocol since the White House has yet to submit a draft of the legislation detailing how it plans to implement the protocol. The staffer said it was possible that the Foreign Relations Committee would consider the protocol before the end of the year.
In March, China notified the IAEA that it had completed ratification of its protocol, becoming the only NPT nuclear-weapon state whose agreement has entered into force.

Bush Urges Senate Approval of IAEA Protocol

On May 9, President George W. Bush transmitted to the Senate for its approval the “additional protocol” to the U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards agreement. It is the first time since taking office that the administration has forwarded an arms control treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.

In his message to the Senate, Bush urged “early and favorable consideration” of the agreement. He emphasized that “universal adoption” of the protocol is “a central goal” of his nuclear nonproliferation policy. The United States signed the protocol in 1998.

The IAEA drafted the protocol to strengthen its ability to detect covert nuclear weapons programs after it was unable to discover clandestine programs in Iraq and North Korea in the early 1990s. The protocol expands the IAEA’s legal authority beyond the original safeguards agreements the agency has with its member states. Those agreements, which aimed to allow the IAEA to verify that the products of civil nuclear programs were not being diverted to weapons programs, restrict the agency to inspecting and monitoring only declared nuclear sites.

Under the new protocol, the IAEA is allowed to conduct short- or no-notice inspections and employ new environmental-sampling and satellite-monitoring techniques at any suspect site. The protocol also requires states to provide the IAEA with additional information about aspects of their civilian nuclear programs, such as fuel-cycle activity and nuclear-related exports.

However, as one of the five states allowed to retain nuclear weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States is not required to give the IAEA access to any facility it deems “of national security significance.” In effect, U.S. ratification of the protocol primarily serves to set a good example for those states that have yet to sign or ratify, according to a Senate staffer familiar with the agreement.

It is not clear when the Senate might take up the protocol since the White House has yet to submit a draft of the legislation detailing how it plans to implement the protocol. The staffer said it was possible that the Foreign Relations Committee would consider the protocol before the end of the year.
In March, China notified the IAEA that it had completed ratification of its protocol, becoming the only NPT nuclear-weapon state whose agreement has entered into force.

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and Joint Statement

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,

Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,

Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: [signed]
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: [signed]

Source: White House


Joint Statement

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved;

Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation, common values, trust, openness, and predictability;

Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for our relationship;

Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, and free world and to strengthening strategic security;

Declare as follows:

A Foundation for Cooperation

We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.

We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation.
The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges.

Political Cooperation

The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism.

The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan people’s efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the ‘Six-Plus-Two’ diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United States and Russia reject the failed model of “Great Power” rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in these efforts.

On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security.

As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the “Quartet,” to overcome the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the Goods Review List.

Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security, and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security and health of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002.

Economic Cooperation

The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms.

Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation.

We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently.

The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region.

Strengthening People-to-People Contacts

The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries.

Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence, protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand their cooperation.

Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and International Terrorism

The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally.

The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to combating proliferation.

To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Missile Defense, Further Strategic Offensive Reductions, New Consultative Mechanism on Strategic Security

The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington.
The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed nature of the strategic relationship between them.

The United States and Russia acknowledge that today’s security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation.

The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights.

The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe.
The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.

A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.

The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security issues. To that end we have decided to:

• establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials. This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest; and

• seek ways to expand and regularize contacts between our two countries’ Defense Ministries and Foreign Ministries, and our intelligence agencies.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Moscow
May 24, 2002.


 

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