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"[Arms Control Today] has become indispensable! I think it is the combination of the critical period we are in and the quality of the product. I found myself reading the May issue from cover to cover."

– Frank von Hippel
Co-Director of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Nuclear Nonproliferation

Grasping at Straws

The Trump Administration and its supporters outside of the U.S. government are laboring mightily to convince the international community that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a bad deal for the United States. Unfortunately for them, Iranian compliance keeps getting in the way. We can see this in the way in which senior U.S. government officials speak to issues of Iranian compliance. During press availability on the margins of the UN General Assembly, Secretary of State Tillerson was careful to note that Iran is in “ technical ” compliance with the JCPOA, but argued that this...

Urgent Need to De-escalate Tensions Between Washington and Pyongyang

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Statement from Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball

For Immediate Release: September 22, 2017

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, (202) 463-8270 ext. 102

(WASHINGTON, D.C.)—The escalating crisis over North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests has now reached an extremely dangerous level. The risk of conflict through miscalculation by either side is unacceptably high.

Mr.Ri Yong Ho, Foreign Ministrer of the Democratic People's Republic of KoreaWe are alarmed and strongly condemn the unecessary and provocative threat of massive retaliation against Pyongyang by President Donald Trump in his UN address on Sept. 19, and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the suggestion by the Foreign Minister of the DPRK on Sept. 22 that his government may conduct a nuclear test explosion in or over the Pacific Ocean in reaction to Mr. Trump’s remarks.

Such a nuclear test would be a threat not just to the United States, but would be a global security and health threat to the entire international community, which has prohibited all nuclear test explosions through the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A nuclear test explosion over the Pacific could trigger events that escalate even further beyond the control of Washington and Pyongyang.

We strongly appeal to key leaders in the region, particularly the United States and North Korea, to immediately take steps ease tensions and refrain from making any further threats of nuclear or missile tests or military action of any kind. Each side must chose their words very carefully and seek open direct channel of communication to avoid miscommunication and miscalculation. The current path being pursued by both sides leads to catastrophe.

We call on the UN Secretary-General to convene a series of emergency, closed-door meetings with senior leaders from the members of Six-Party-Talks to intiate a serious dialogue designed to lower tensions and address issues of mutual concern.

US Special Representative for North Korea Policy Joseph Yun (L) talks with South Korea's representative to the six-party talks, Kim Hong-Kyun (R), during their meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul on March 22, 2017. The meeting came as a new North Korean missile test failed on March 22, according to the South's defence ministry, two weeks after Pyongyang launched four rockets in what it called a drill for an attack on US bases in Japan. (Photo: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)It is past time for a direct dialogue, without preconditions, that sets a new course — toward a negotiated or brokered agreement that addresses the concerns of the international community and the security concerns of the DPRK. Such a course begins with an immediate halt to further nuclear test explosions and intermediate- or long-range ballistic missile tests and any military exercises that could be interpreted to be practice runs for an attack.

As President John F. Kennedy said following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either a humiliating defeat or a nuclear war.”

Now is the time to back away from edge of a conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level all too quickly.


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The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, September 2017

EU Affirms Iran Deal Compliance, Rejects Renegotiation EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stated unequivocally after a ministerial meeting between the P5+1 (China, France Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran that all parties agreed that the nuclear deal is being fully implemented and there are no violations. She said that the agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is delivering on its purpose, and there is “no need to renegotiate parts of the agreement.” Mogherini said that issues outside the scope of the deal should be “...

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons At A Glance

September 2017

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Alicia Sanders-Zakre, (202) 463-8270 ext. 113

Updated: September 2017

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was negotiated by more than 130 states, is a good faith effort to meet their responsibility as signatories of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue effective measures on disarmament. The prohibition treaty further reinforces the commitments of these states against the use, threat of use, development, production, manufacture, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, transfer, stationing, or installation of nuclear weapons. It reinforces states' commitments to the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the prohibition treaty by itself will not eliminate any nuclear weapons, the treaty can help to further delegitimize nuclear weapons and strengthen the legal and political norm against their use.

The Treaty

Preamble

The treaty has a 24-paragraph preamble acknowledging the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and the value of existing international disarmament agreements including the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements, as well as the “right” of states-parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Prohibitions (Article 1)

States-parties are prohibited to use, threaten to use, develop, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, station, or install nuclear weapons or assist with any prohibited activities.

Declarations (Article 2)

A state-party must declare, when joining the treaty, whether it has eliminated a previous nuclear weapons program, currently has nuclear weapons, or holds another country's nuclear weapons on its territory. If a state has another country’s nuclear weapons on its territory when it signs the treaty, it must remove them. If it has its own nuclear weapons, it must eliminate them.

Safeguards (Article 3)

Non-nuclear-weapon states are required to have, at a minimum, a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “without prejudice” to any future additional agreements.

Nuclear-weapon states accession (Article 4)

There are two ways for a nuclear-weapon state to accede to the treaty and eliminate its nuclear weapons: it can join the treaty and then destroy its nuclear weapons or destroy its nuclear weapons and then join the treaty. States that “destroy and join” must cooperate with a “competent international authority” designated by the treaty to verify dismantlement. States that “join and destroy” must immediately remove nuclear weapons from operational status and submit a time-bound plan for their destruction within 60 days of joining the treaty.

The treaty does not specify which “competent international authority” would be suited to verify irreversible disarmament of a nuclear-armed state that decides to join the treaty, but the treaty allows for an appropriate authority to be designated at a later date. The treaty requires any current or former nuclear-weapon state that seeks to join the prohibition treaty to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful to weapons purposes.

Positive obligations (Articles 6 and 7)

The treaty obligates states-parties to provide victim assistance and environmental remediation to those affected by nuclear weapon use and testing.

Meetings of states-parties, signature, ratification and entry into force (Articles 8, 13, 14, and 15)

Biennial meetings of states-parties will address implementation and other measures. Review conferences will be held every six years. The treaty, open for signature on September 20th, 2017, enters into force 90 days after the 50th state ratifies it.

Background

The initiative to negotiate a "legally binding instrument" to prohibit nuclear weapons is the result of a years-long process that grew out of a renewed recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, the rising risk of accidental or intentional nuclear use, and a growing sense of frustration that key nuclear disarmament commitments made by the nuclear-weapon states were not being fulfilled.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference unanimously "expresse[d] its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons."

These concerns motivated a group of states, including Norway, Mexico, and Austria to organize a series of three conferences in 2013 and 2014 on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use.

Following the conclusion of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, these and other states agreed to set up an open ended working group in 2016 on advancing multilateral disarmament negotiations. The working group led to the formulation of a resolution in the UN General Assembly to start negotiations in 2017 on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. The resolution passed the UN General Assembly First Committee by a vote of 123-38 with 16 abstentions in November 2016 and was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as a whole.

Costa Rica’s UN Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez (left), president of the UN conference to negotiate a nuclear-weapons ban treaty, chairs a meeting of the conference March 30. Credit: UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

The first negotiating session was held at the UN in New York on March 27-31 with some 130 governments, and dozens of civil society organizations, participating. The president of the negotiations, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez, compiled states' expressed opinions from the first round of negotiations into a draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons issued on May 22 in Geneva. The second and final round of negotiations took place on June 15-July 7 in New York, with participants adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by a vote of 122-1-1. The Netherlands voted against adoption, and Singapore abstained.

Reactions From the Nuclear-Armed States

Nuclear-weapon states and many NATO members have opposed the initiative from the beginning. Although the United States and the United Kingdom participated in the 2014 Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna, leaders from Washington and the other nuclear-weapon states boycotted the working group sessions and the 2017 treaty negotiations.

These states contend that the treaty will distract attention from other disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives, such as negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty or ratifying the CTBT. They have expressed concern that the nuclear prohibition treaty could undermine the NPT and the extensive safeguard provisions included therein by giving states the option to "forum shop," or choose between the two treaties.

Arguments for the Treaty From Proponent States

Supporters of the nuclear prohibition treaty argue that it will close a "legal gap" that exists regarding nuclear weapons, which are not expressly outlawed by the NPT even though their use would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. They argue that the prohibition treaty initiative reinforces the NPT and its Article VI requirement for nuclear disarmament and that it can reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and help prompt more urgent action to reduce nuclear risk and promote disarmament.

Timeline

2010
May 3-28: The final document of the 2010 Review Conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledges the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. 

2013
March 4-5: The first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use takes place in Oslo, Norway. 

2014
February 13-14: The second conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use takes place in Nayarit, Mexico.  
December 8-9: The final conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use takes place in Vienna, Austria.  
December 9: 127 states endorse the Humanitarian Pledge, calling on all NPT states parties to renew their commitment to Article VI of the NPT and to take interim steps to reduce the risk of nuclear use.

2015
October 29: The UN General Assembly First Committee votes 135-12 with 33 abstentions on a resolution to create an Open Ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. 

2016
February 22-26: The first working group to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations meets in Geneva, Switzerland. 
May 2-4 and 9-13: The second working group to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations meets in Geneva, Switzerland.  
August 16-19: The third working group to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations meets in Geneva, Switzerland, approving a final report by a vote of 68-22 with 13 abstentions.  
October 27: The First Committee adopts a resolution to begin negotiations in 2017 on a nuclear prohibition treaty in 2017 on a nuclear prohibition treaty by a vote of 123-38 with 16 abstentions.  
December 23: The General Assembly approves the resolution to begin negotiations on a nuclear prohibition treaty adopted by the First Committee by a vote of 113-35 and 13 abstentions.

2017
March 27-31: The first round of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons takes place at the United Nations in New York.  
May 22: President Elayne Whyte Gómez presents the first draft text of the treaty at the United Nations in Geneva.
June 15-July 7: The second round of negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons takes place at the United Nations in New York. 
July 7: The treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons is adopted by a vote of 122-1-1. The Netherlands voted against the treaty, and Singapore abstained.
September 20: The TPNW opens for signature in New York. Fifty states signed the treaty and three additional states both signed and ratified it by the day's end.

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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More Than 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Reaffirm Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal

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Urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the multilateral accord.

For Immediate Release: Sept. 13, 2017

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext. 107; Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, 202-463-8270 x102.

(Washington, D.C.)—More than 80 of the world's leading nuclear nonproliferation specialists issued a joint statement Wednesday on why the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between six world powers and Iran “has proven to be an effective and verifiable arrangement that is a net plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.”

Centrifuges enriching uranium (illustrative photo: US Department of Energy/Wikimedia Commons)“Since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the JCPOA has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly,” the statement notes.

The statement is endorsed by former U.S. nuclear negotiators, former senior U.S. nonproliferation and intelligence officials, a former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Iran, and leading nuclear specialists from the United States and around the globe.

“We firmly support vigorous efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the JCPOA,” the experts say, “ but we are concerned by statements from the Trump administration that it may be seeking to create a false pretext for accusing Iran of noncooperation or noncompliance with the agreement in order to trigger the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.”

Under the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is fully implementing the nuclear deal. Failure to issue the certification would open the door for Congress, under expedited procedures, to introduce legislation to reimpose nuclear sanctions that were lifted in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that block its pathways to a bomb. The next certification deadline arrives in mid-October.

“Abandoning the deal without clear evidence of an unresolved material breach by Iran that is corroborated by the other EU3+3 partners runs the risk that Tehran would resume some of its nuclear activities,” they warn.

Thus far, reporting from the U.S. intelligence community, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the other parties to the agreement make it clear that Iran is meeting its many JCPOA commitments. These include long-term, verifiable restrictions on Iran's sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, many of which will last for 10 years, some for 15 years, some for 25 years, with enhanced IAEA monitoring under Iran's additional protocol agreement with the IAEA and modified code 3.1 safeguards provisions lasting indefinitely.

“[U]nilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States. In doing so, the United States would discourage Iran and others—including Washington’s EU3+3 partners—from supporting any U.S. proposal for negotiations on a new agreement while simultaneously damaging the agreement in place,” the experts say.

The statement concludes: “we urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the accord and to refrain from actions that undermine U.S. obligations in the agreement.”

“Given that we are already struggling to contain the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis, it would be extremely unwise for the president to initiate steps that could unravel the highly successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which could create a second major nonproliferation crisis,” said Kelsey Davenport, nonproliferation policy director for the Arms Control Association, which organized the statement.

The full text of the statement is below and available in a PDF version.


Statement from Nuclear Nonproliferation Specialists on the Iran Nuclear Deal

September 2017

More than two years after the conclusion of negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by the United States, its international negotiating partners (EU, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom), and Iran, the agreement has proven to be an effective and verifiable arrangement that is a net plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

The JCPOA is also considered an important success of multilateral diplomacy, the full implementation of which is critical to international peace and security.

Since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the JCPOA has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly. By blocking Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons, the JCPOA has also decreased the likelihood of destabilizing nuclear competition in the region.

To meet its JCPOA obligations, Iran dismantled more than 13,000 centrifuges, placed them in monitored storage, and shipped out more than 11 tons of low-enriched uranium. Since implementation day, Iran has met its commitments to enrich uranium only up to 3.67 percent uranium-235, retain no more than the equivalent of 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent in its stockpile, and enrich using only 5,060 first generation, IR-1 centrifuges.

Taken together these restrictions ensure that Iran’s capability to produce enough bomb-grade uranium sufficient for one weapon would be approximately 12 months for a decade or more. This conclusion was underscored by Daniel Coats, Donald Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, who stated in the May 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment, that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year.” Prior to commencing negotiations with Iran in 2013, that timeline would have been 2-3 months.

The JCPOA has effectively eliminated Iran’s ability to produce and separate plutonium for a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years. Iran removed the vessel that would hold the core of the Arak reactor, filled it with cement, and is working with the EU3+3 on new core reactor design in which plutonium production would be reduced ten-fold. Iran also committed not to research how to reprocess spent fuel, much less engage in it, which would delay even more significantly Iran’s ability to ever extract plutonium from any nuclear fuel it possesses. Additionally, Iran agreed to ship its spent fuel out of the country for 15 years.

Since implementation day in January 2016, Iran’s compliance with its obligations has been effectively verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an intrusive, multilayered monitoring regime that spans Iran’s nuclear supply chain. The JCPOA mandates continuous surveillance of key activities, such as uranium mining and centrifuge production, and application of Iran’s Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors additional information about, and access to, Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran’s enrichment levels are also monitored in real time.

Taken together, these rigorous limits and transparency measures will make it very likely that any future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly, providing the opportunity to intervene decisively to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The JCPOA has proven flexible and responsive to implementation problems that emerge. When Iran’s supply of heavy water twice marginally exceeded the limit set by the JCPOA, the IAEA noted the excess and Iran promptly rectified the situation, which never posed a proliferation risk. While exceeding the limit by any amount is unhelpful, the way it and other definitional disagreements have been promptly rectified demonstrates the effectiveness of mechanisms established by the deal to resolve technical concerns. As of August, no international organization or national government has made any allegations of Iranian violations.

We firmly support vigorous efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the JCPOA, but we are concerned by statements from the Trump administration that it may be seeking to create a false pretext for accusing Iran of noncooperation or noncompliance with the agreement in order to trigger the re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.

Abandoning the deal without clear evidence of an unresolved material breach by Iran that is corroborated by the other EU3+3 partners runs the risk that Tehran would resume some of its nuclear activities, such as enriching uranium to higher levels or increasing the number of operating centrifuges. These steps would decrease the time it would take for Iran to obtain enough nuclear material for a warhead.

Furthermore, unilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States. In doing so, the United States would discourage Iran and others—including Washington’s EU3+3 partners—from supporting any U.S. proposal for negotiations on a new agreement while simultaneously damaging the agreement in place. Such an approach would also impede the United States’ ability to seek future nonproliferation agreements, both with Iran and in the broader international community.

As long as Iran continues to fully implement the JCPOA, the nuclear deal advances the security interests of the United States, its EU3+3 partners, states in the region, and the entire international community. Abandoning the deal would also increase the likelihood of wider conflict in the Middle East and could trigger a destabilizing nuclear competition in region.

We strongly urge all parties to the JCPOA to meet their respective obligations under the terms of the agreement and to refrain from actions and statements that undermine its continued and effective implementation.

Furthermore, we urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the accord and to refrain from actions that undermine U.S. obligations in the agreement.

Sincerely,

Amb. Nobuyasu Abe, Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission,* former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Director-General for Arms Control and Science Affairs of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

James Acton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament (1989-1993)

Amb. Brooke D. Anderson, former Chief of Staff and Counselor for the National Security Council

Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy, Director Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Bruce Blair, Research Scholar, Princeton University; U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board Member (2011-17)

Barry M. Blechman, Co-Founder, Stimson Center*

Hans Blix, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Hon. Avis Bohlen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control

Des Browne, Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State for Defense of the UK, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN) and Vice Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and former adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Susan F. Burk, former Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State

John Carlson, Counselor, Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Director General, Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

Joseph Cirincione, President, Ploughshares Fund

Avner Cohen, Ph.D., Professor and Senior Fellow, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

Tom Collina, Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund

Thomas Countryman, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation

Philip E. Coyle, III, former Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association

Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs

Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean at the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security Studies at Fudan University

Amb. Sergio Duarte, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs

Robert J. Einhorn, former U.S Department of State Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (2009-2013)

Dina Esfandiary, MacArthur Fellow, Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War Studies, Kings College London

Marc Finaud, Arms Proliferation Cluster Leader, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Trevor Findlay, Senior Research Fellow, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne

Jon Finer, former U.S. State Department Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning

Ellie Geranmayeh, Senior Policy Fellow, Middle East & Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations

Alexander Glaser, Associate Professor, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

Ilan Goldberg, Director of Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security, former Iran Team Chief, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense

Lisbeth Gronlund, Co-Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

Morton H. Halperin, former Director of Policy Planning Staff, U.S Department of State

Amb. Laura S. H. Holgate, former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency

Amb. Bonnie Jenkins, Joint Fellow, Brookings Institution* and University of Pennsylvania Perry World House,* and former Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs at the U.S. Department of State

Colin H. Kahl, former Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden

Mary Kaszynski, Deputy Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund

Togzhan Kassenova, Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Catherine Kelleher, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia

R. Scott Kemp, Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, former science advisor to the U.S. Department of State's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control

Amb. (ret.) Laura E. Kennedy, former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association

Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, Stimson Center

Ulrich Kühn, Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Ellen Laipson, President Emeritus, Stimson Center and former Vice Chair, National Intelligence Council

Jeffrey Lewis, Adjunct Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*

Rebecca Lissner, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

Jan M. Lodal, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense

Robert Malley, former Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North African and Gulf Region

Jessica Matthews, former Director, National Security Council Office of Global Issues

Fred McGoldrick, former Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, U.S. Department of State

Brian McKeon, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense

Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)*

Zia Mian, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

Nicholas Miller, Assistant Professor, Dartmouth College

Adam Mount, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress*

Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, former Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the U.S. Department of State, and Director for Iran on the National Security Staff

Götz Neuneck, Professor of Physics and Acting Co-Director of the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) *

George Perkovich, Ken Olivier And Angela Nomellini Chair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Amb. Thomas R. Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Russian Federation, India, Israel, and Jordan

Amb. (ret.) Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution*

Paul R. Pillar, former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia

Valerie Plame, former CIA covert operations officer

Joshua Pollack, Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*

Dr. William C. Potter, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*

Edward Price, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Obama

Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and Professor of Mathematical Physics, Universita' degli Studi di Milano

Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office reporting to the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency

Laura Rockwood, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard University

Dr. Randy Rydell, former Senior Political Affairs Officer (retired), UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

Andrew K. Semmel, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation (2003-2007), U.S. Department of State

Thomas E. Shea, Ph.D., Senior Adjunct Fellow, Federation of American Scientists, former International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards official, and former Sector Head of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Jacqueline Shire, former Member of UN Panel of Experts (Iran) established under Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)

Leonard Spector, Executive Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies,* and former Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration

Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies*

Ariane M. Tabatabai, Director of Curriculum, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University

Greg Thielmann, former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State

John Tierney, Executive Director, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, former Member of Congress (1997-2015)

Dr. Ali Vaez, Senior Iran Analyst, International Crisis Group

Frank N. von Hippel, former Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of Science and Global Security

David Wade, Chief of Staff to U.S. Department of State (2013-2015)

Dr. James Walsh, Senior Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program

Anthony Wier, Legislative Secretary for Nuclear Disarmament and Pentagon Spending, Friends Committee on National Legislation

Jon Wolfsthal, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the National Security Council

David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

*institution listed for identification purposes only

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Experts urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the multilateral accord.

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ACA-YPFP NextGen Voices: The Untold Story in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Saga

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What: Short Film "Marshalling Peace" and
NextGen Discussion

When Tuesday, August 29
7:00-8:30pm

Where1619 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20036 

On August 29 - the International Day Against Nuclear Testing - ​NextGen filmmaker Autumn Bordner joins Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) and the Arms Control Association for a​n exclusive​ showing of Marshalling Peace​. Autumn traveled to the Marshall Islands to research the lingering effects of U.S. nuclear testing conducted there during the Cold War. Her short film documents the tiny nation's legal battle against nuclear weapons​-holding superpowers​, and the​ devastating effects of the U.S. nuclear testing program on the Marshallese people.

Autumn and the Association's Executive Director Daryl Kimball will facilitate a discussion on the future of nuclear weapons threats and the ways NextGen leaders can shape today's and tomorrow's nuclear policies. YPFP's Danielle Preskitt (a former Association intern) will moderate.

The Panelists:

Autumn Bordner is a rising second year at Stanford Law School. Prior to matriculating at Stanford, Autumn worked as an environmental consultant at ICF, and as a fellow with the K1 Project, Center for Nuclear Studies, a research institute that she co-founded as an undergraduate at Columbia University. Autumn is also a member of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Youth Group. In this capacity, she is working to advance the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Daryl G. Kimball became the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association in September 2001. The Arms Control Association is a private, non-profit membership organization dedicated to public education and support of effective arms control measures pertaining to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. Find his complete bio here.

                                                                 

Description: 

ACA and Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) are hosting an event featuring a​n exclusive​ showing of Marshalling Peace and a discussion on the future of nuclear weapons threats and the ways NextGen leaders can shape today's and tomorrow's nuclear policies.

Understanding the U.S. Compliance Certification and Why It Matters to the Iran Nuclear Deal

Under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the president must issue a certification to Congress every 90 days that is tied to Iran’s performance under the multilateral nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Failure to issue the certification gives Congress the option to introduce legislation reimposing U.S. sanctions waived or suspended under the JCPOA on an expedited schedule. Since taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump issued certifications, albeit reluctantly, as required by INARA on April 18 and July 17. However, it appears increasingly...

Don’t Abandon the Iran Nuclear Deal


September 2017
By Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director

Although his administration is already struggling with one major nonproliferation challenge—North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities—President Donald Trump soon may initiate steps that could unravel the highly successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, thereby creating a second major nonproliferation crisis.

Blowing up the 2015 agreement between Iran and six world powers and the European Union, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, would be irrational and counterproductive, but it can be prevented.

Senators Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the two top members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attend a hearing on July 29, 2014, on the nuclear talks with Iran. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)If Trump backs out of the accord and tries to reimpose nuclear-related sanctions absent clear evidence of Iranian violations, the United States would be blamed, international support for new sanctions would be soft or non-existent, and Iran could choose to exceed the limits set by the deal.

Members of Congress and parties to the agreement can and should be prepared to head off such an outcome, which could unfold in one of two ways.

First, Trump is clearly pushing his advisers to find a reason to deny certification that Iran is in compliance with the agreement under the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. Under that law, the administration must certify every 90 days that Iran is fully implementing the nuclear deal and that suspension of sanctions is “appropriate and proportionate” to the measures taken by Iran. Failure to issue the certification would open the door for Congress, under expedited procedures, to introduce legislation to reimpose nuclear sanctions on Iran.

In July, Trump said that “if it was up to me, I should have had [Iran] noncompliant 180 days ago.” He said he would be “surprised” if Iran was in compliance at the next certification deadline in mid-October.

Thus far, however, reporting from the U.S. intelligence community, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the other parties to the agreement make it clear that Iran is meeting its many commitments. But given that the certification involves subjective judgments outside the four corners of the nuclear deal, Trump may choose, for political reasons, not to make the certification.

Before enabling any Trump move to undermine the nuclear deal by advancing legislation to reimpose sanctions, Congress must demand to see the evidence behind any allegation of Iranian noncompliance, consider whether the intelligence community concurs, and, if there is a true compliance dispute, call on the White House to use the eight-member body known as the Joint Commission to exhaust all options to resolve the matter quickly.

If Trump cannot produce solid evidence of an Iranian violation, Congress does not have to and should not vote to reimpose nuclear sanctions.

Even if Congress takes the bait, the other parties should continue to abide by their commitments under the agreement. On Aug. 27, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, said if Washington withdraws but the five other parties remain committed, Tehran would remain committed. European entities, which would be subject to secondary U.S. sanctions, can and should take precautions to insulate their commercial and financial dealings from such U.S. penalties.

Second, the United States is pressing the IAEA to demand inspections at sensitive sites in the hope of provoking a refusal that would justify a finding of noncompliance. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley is already insinuating that because the IAEA has not inspected “numerous undeclared sites,” we cannot be sure Iran is not already violating the agreement.

Under the agreement, the IAEA can request access to any site if there is a specific concern about illicit or undeclared materials and activities. If the IAEA requests information or access and remains unsatisfied with Iran’s response, five of the eight members of the Joint Commission can vote on actions to resolve the concern, including authorizing access that Iran would be required to provide.

It is essential that the IAEA continue to be vigilant, and Iran should cooperate fully with all IAEA requests for information and access in a timely manner. But given Trump’s stated opposition to the agreement, the new push by Washington for the agency to seek access to undeclared sites should be treated with special caution.

The Iran nuclear deal is a clear net plus for U.S. and global security. It has dramatically reduced the proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandates unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures to deter and promptly detect any violation. It promises to block Iran’s pathways to development of nuclear weapons for a decade or more. There is no realistic option for scrapping the agreement and negotiating a “better deal.”

The smarter approach would be to continue to implement and vigorously enforce the multilateral nuclear deal and seek to build global support for the widespread adoption of its most innovative verification and nonproliferation measures.


The monthly “Focus” editorials from Arms Control Today are available for reprint on a non-exclusive basis
with permission from the Arms Control Association and link to the original publication online.

 

If Trump cannot produce solid evidence of an Iranian violation, Congress does not have to and should not vote to reimpose nuclear sanctions.

The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, August 2017

Haley Visits Vienna to Discuss Iran Deal Verification Nikki Haley, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, visited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Wednesday and met with the agency’s Director General, Yukiya Amano, to discuss the multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). According to an Aug. 23 press release , Haley and Amano discussed U.S. concerns about “ensuring Iran strictly adheres to its obligations” and does not exploit “ambiguous language” in the agreement. Haley also praised the expertise of the agency and said the...

Nuclear Security Summit at a Glance

August 2017

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: August 2017

The nuclear security summit initiative was announced in an April 2009 speech by U.S. President Barack Obama, in which he pledged to hold a global summit on nuclear security in 2010 as part of an effort to "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.” The broad goal of the summit process is to address the threat of nuclear terrorism by minimizing and securing weapons-usable civilian nuclear materials, enhancing international cooperation to prevent the illicit acquisition of nuclear material by non-state actors such as terrorist groups and smugglers, and taking steps to strengthen the global nuclear security system. The nuclear security summit focus remained on nuclear material in the civil sphere and did not address the security of military nuclear material.

There were four summits in total: in Washington, D.C. in 2010, Seoul, South Korea in 2012, the Hague, Netherlands in 2014 and Washington, D.C. again in 2016.

Each summit produced a consensus communiqué that reaffirmed the broad goals of the summit process and encouraged states to take actions, such as ratifying key treaties or minimizing stockpiles of weapons-usable materials. These voluntary, caveated recommendations were enhanced by individual state-specific commitments made at each summit. These pledges, known as “house gifts,” included actions such as repatriating weapons-usable materials, holding trainings for nuclear security personnel, updating national laws and regulations, and taking steps to combat illicit trafficking. At each subsequent summit, states reported on the progress made toward fulfilling these commitments. All 53 participating states made national pledges at at least one summit.

Beginning at the 2012 summit in Seoul, groups of countries offered multinational commitments, known as “gift baskets” that targeted key areas of nuclear security. In 2012, 13 joint statements were offered. That number increased to 14 in 2014, with some gift baskets building off of 2012 statements and others targeting new areas. In 2016, states produced 21 gift baskets.

Of the 53 countries to participate in the 2012 summit, 48 participated in at least one joint statement in 2012.

At the last summit in 2016, countries agreed to five action plans for international organizations to take forward the work of the summits beyond their conclusion. 

Nuclear Security Summits Quick Links
Washington, 2010 Seoul, 2012Hague, 2014 Washington, 2016

 

Washington 2010

The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C. from April 12-13, 2010. Forty-seven national delegations as well as the heads of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union attended. With 38 of the 47 participating countries represented at the head of state or head of government level, the gathering was the largest of its kind hosted by a U.S. President since 1945.

The summit produced the first of four communiqués, the summit’s only work plan, and the first national commitments or house gifts.

Communiqué 

  • Recognizes that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium require special precautions and encourages the conversion of reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and minimization of use of HEU, where feasible.
  • Reaffirms the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise to carry out its activities.
  • Recognizes the continuing role of nuclear industry in nuclear security.
  • Supports the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security.

Washington Work Plan 

The Work Plan lays out the specific steps for realizing the goals of the Communiqué, including ratification and implementation of international treaties; support for Security Council Resolution 1540; conversion of civilian facilities from HEU to non-weapons-useable materials; research on new nuclear fuels; detection methods and forensic technologies; development of corporate and institutional cultures that prioritize nuclear security; education and training; and joint exercises among law enforcement and customs officials to enhance nuclear detection opportunities.

Selected National Commitments (House Gifts)

Thirty countries announced 67 specific measures they planned to implement to support the goals of the summit. Prior to the 2012 Seoul summit, approximately 80 percent of these commitments were completed. For an accounting of the implementation of the 2010 national commitments, see: The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments, March 2012.

Some of the national commitments include:

  1. Belgium, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom will convert a HEU research reactor to LEU.
  2. Canada will return a large amount of spent HEU fuel from their medical isotope production reactor to the United States and fund HEU removals from Mexico and Vietnam.
  3. Kazakhstan, Mexico and Ukraine will eliminate remaining HEU. Ukraine committed to eliminate half of its HEU by the year’s end.
  4. Norway will contribute $3.3 million over the next four years to the IAEA nuclear security fund.
  5. Russia committed to sign the Plutonium Disposition protocol to  end plutonium production and to contribute to IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.

See a full list of national commitments here.

  Seoul 2012

From March 26-27, 2012, 53 heads of state along with representatives from the UN, IAEA, EU and INTERPOL gathered for the second nuclear security summit in Seoul, South Korea. Participating countries included the 47 countries that attended the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit plus Azerbaijan, Denmark, Gabon, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania.

The scope of the 2012 agenda was expanded to include discussions on the security of radiological sources and the interface between nuclear security and safety, a concern highlighted by the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan.

In additional to the consensus communiqué and national commitments, or house gifts, states also introduced joint proposals, or gift baskets for the first time in 2012. All states also submitted voluntary progress reports on their national commitments from 2010.

Communiqué 

  • Reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, including through the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); reiterates broader participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; continued support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1977.
  • Encourages States to minimize the use of HEU, where feasible, and to convert reactors from HEU to LEU fuel; urges states to secure nuclear materials and radioactive materials through proper transportation, accounting, consolidation and storage practices; emphasizes the need to develop national capabilities to combat illicit nuclear trafficking through utilizing nuclear forensics, investing in the promotion of a strong nuclear security culture, and preventing non-state actors from obtaining sensitive information.
  • Encourages efforts to control radioactive material, including through IAEA measures such as the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Expert of Radioactive Sources.
  • Urges states in a position to do so to accelerate their domestic approval of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, seeking to bring the Amendment into force by 2014
  • Encourages states in a position to do so, by the end of 2013, to announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimize the use of HEU.

Selected Accomplishments

  1. Algeria, Argentina, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam joined the GINCT.
  2. Czech Republic, Mexico, Vietnam converted their research reactors using HEU fuel to LEU fuel.
  3. Ukraine completed the removal of all HEU stockpiles.
  4. Kazakhstan secured spent nuclear fuel, which contained enough HEU and plutonium to make several hundred nuclear weapons by moving them to a new long-term storage facility.
  5. Russia and the United States down-blended HEU equivalent to around 3,000 nuclear weapons to LEU. 

Selected National Commitments (House Gifts)

  1. Armenia, Brazil, Canada, France, Georgia, Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Vietnam committed to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM.
  2. Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria will establish nuclear security support centers.
  3. Italy will repatriate excess HEU and plutonium to the U.S. by the 2014 summit.
  4. Pakistan will open Nuclear Security Training Centers to act as a regional and international hub and deploy Special Nuclear Material Portals on key exit and entry points to counter the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.
  5. Singapore committed to establish a national nuclear forensics laboratory by 2013.

Joint Commitments (Gift Baskets)

  1. Kazakhstan, Russia and the United States committed to continue to cooperate to secure the former Semipalatinsk test site.
  2. Indonesia and 17 others agreed to draw up a National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security to help states align domestic laws with international treaties and regulations that address nuclear security. 
  3. Twenty-three states collaborated to develop International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSCs) to develop highly trained nuclear security personnel, and provide technical and scientific support for nuclear security technical systems and to detect nuclear security events. 
  4. France, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to hold working group meetings, the first one in 2013, to address nuclear transport security issues. 
  5. Chile, Nigeria, Morocco, Poland, Republic of Korea, Thailand and the United States hosted regional outreach meetings to discuss nuclear security challenges and promote the continuation of outreach efforts. 
  6. Russia and the United States explained the contributions of the GICNT to nuclear security, including through the creation of the Nuclear Detection Working Group, chaired by the Netherlands. 
  7. Canada, Mexico and the United States announced a collaborative effort to convert Mexico’s research reactor from HEU to LEU. 
  8. Belgium, France, the Republic of Korea and the United States declared a joint project to use high-density LEU fuel production technology to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU. 
  9. Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands reaffirmed their commitment to convert “production industries to non-HEU-based processes by 2015, subject to regulatory approvals” and the United States agreed to supply those countries with HEU target material for the “uninterrupted production of medical isotopes... while achieving the goal of HEU minimalization.”
  10. Nineteen states pledged to build national capacities to counter nuclear smuggling, to pass new laws against nuclear smuggling by the 2014 summit, to share information on nuclear smuggling with partner countries and to make resources available for counter smuggling projects. 
  11. Germany and 24 other states described the threat posed by radioactive material and encouraged states to ratify or accede to the ICSANT and establish national registers of high-activity radioactive sources. 
  12. Thirty-one states committed to enhance nuclear information security, including by conducting national assurance exercises, and developing government processes to control the export of nuclear information. 
  13. France, the United States and the United Kingdom committed to“strengthen worldwide preparedness to contend with the threat of nuclear terrorism.” 

For a report on progress on these commitments, see: The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report, July 2013.

The Hague 2014

On March 24-25, 2014, all 53 countries and four international organizations who met in 2012 reconvened for the third nuclear security summit in the Hague, Netherlands.

The Netherlands laid out several goals for the summit, including; reducing stockpiles of nuclear materials, improving the security of nuclear and radioactive sources, increasing coordination with the nuclear industry, and improving international cooperation.

Leaders also participated in a scenario-based policy exercise, during which they had the opportunity to think through responses to a radioactive device, and held a discussion on the future of the summit process.

Communiqué 

  • Identifies a range of voluntary measures States may consider taking to show that they have established effective security of their nuclear materials and facilities while protecting sensitive information. Such measures include exchanging good practices, inviting IAEA review and advisory services and following through on recommendations, further developing training of personnel involved in nuclear security.
  • Supports a more intensive dialogue between operators and government bodies, including the national regulator, which should be functionally independent, with a view to improving nuclear security regulations and regulatory effectiveness.
  • Encourages states to take effective risk mitigation measures to ensure that the systems and networks of nuclear facilities are appropriately secured from cyber attack.

Selected Accomplishments

  1. Belgium, Canada, and France completed steps necessary to ratify the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM.
  2. Germany hosted the Wiesabaden Conference in 2012 and 2013 to strengthen the partnership between government and industry. In 2013, the conference focused on UNSCR 1540 implementation.
  3. Italy returned 20 kilograms of HEU and plutonium in coordination with the IAEA and the United Kingdom. 
  4. The United Arab Emirates signed an Integrated master Working Plan with the IAEA to enhance the partnership between the IAEA and the UAE.
  5. The United States and Russia successfully completed the HEU Purchase Agreement under which 500 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU- the equivalent for approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads - was converted into LEU and used in U.S. power reactors to produce 10 percent of all U.S. electricity during the past 15 years.

Selected National Commitments (House Gifts)

  1. Belgium, Italy and Japan made commitments to remove excess HEU and plutonium.
  2. Denmark committed an additional 8 million Danish Krona (about $1.3 million) to the IAEA.
  3. Finland committed to host the next plenary meeting of the GICNT.
  4. Hungary will host an event of the GICNT on nuclear forensics libraries in the fall of 2014 in Budapest.
  5. Poland committed to eliminate the last of its HEU from its territory by 2016.

Joint Statements (Gift Baskets)

The gift baskets from the 2014 summit built on several of the subjects from the 2012 summit. The new gift baskets to the 2014 summit are listed below.

  1. Twelve states marked the elimination of HEU from their borders. 
  2. The Netherlands headed a new gift basket on nuclear forensics, including a platform for sharing best practices in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident. 
  3. Thirty-two states reiterated their support for the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540 and agreed to consider hosting regional capacity building events to support UNSCR 1540. 
  4. Thirteen states agreed to participate in a workshop by the next nuclear security summit to detect and remove nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control from the global supply chain. 
  5. The United States, South Korea, and the Netherlands led a joint statement supported by 32 additional states that committed participants to meet the intent of IAEA recommendations for nuclear security and take further steps to provide assurance of sound nuclear security practices. 

For more information on these commitments see: The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of Joint Statements, March 2014.

For a report on progress on these commitments see: The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report on Joint Statements, March 2015.

Washington 2016

The fourth and final summit took place in Washington, D.C. from March 31-April 1, 2016. Of the 53 states and four international organizations that attended the 2012 and 2014 summits, all attended except Russia.

For more information, see The Nuclear Security Summit: Accomplishments of the Process, March 2016. 

Communiqué 

  • Welcomes the imminent entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and Facilities and encourage further ratifications.
  • Seeks to maintain the international network of officials and government experts who have supported the Summit process and to incorporate the broader community of States, as well as encourage the continued engagement of relevant partners in nuclear industry and civil society.
  • Resolves to implement the attached Action Plans, in support of the international organizations and initiatives to which we respectively belong (the United Nations, the IAEA, INTERPOL, the GICNT, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction), to be carried out on a voluntary basis and consistent with national laws and respective international obligations.

Selected Accomplishments

  1. The 2005 amendment to the CPPNM received the necessary ratifications to enter into force. 
  2. China converted a research reactor from HEU to LEU in March 2016.
  3. Egypt held training courses on the security of research reactors and associated facilities.
  4. Georgia:  With the support of the IAEA, adopted an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan through 2019.
  5. New Zealand enacted the Radiation Safety Act (2016) to better address the safety of nuclear and radioactive material. 

Selected National Commitments (House Gifts)

  1. Argentina committed to eliminate its HEU, making Latin America and the Caribbean the first regional HEU-free region.
  2. Egypt committed $10 million to establish a nuclear counterterrorism center at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna.
  3. Lithuania committed to welcome the IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service Mission (IPPAS) in 2017.
  4. Morocco agreed to establish the “Moroccan Agency for Safety and Security in Nuclear and Radiological Fields.”
  5. South Africa committed to finalize the establishment of a nuclear forensics facility. 

Joint Statements (Gift Baskets)

Gift Baskets continued to build on proposals from previous years. For a complete list of 2016 Gift Baskets, see here. Proposals unique to 2016 are listed below.

  1. Seventeen states developed a “Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report” as a suggested reporting template. 
  2. Twenty-nine states agreed to participate in two workshops on cyber security in 2016. 
  3. Twenty-seven states agreed to establish national measure to mitigate insider threats in nuclear and radiological security programs. 
  4. Eighteen states noted the progress on towards establishing an IAEA LEU Bank with Kazakhstan and looked forward to its full-scale implementation.
  5. Twenty-three states committed to improve national detection practices to combat the trafficking of nuclear materials. 
  6. Forty states agreed to establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group and to designate an official to participate in the contact group in order to sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. 

Action plans

The final nuclear security summit established five action plans for international organizations to take forward the work of the summits.

  1. United Nations Action Plan 
  2. IAEA Action Plan 
  3. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Action Plan 
  4. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Action Plan 
  5. Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Action Plan 
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