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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
Fact Sheets & Briefs

Disarming Saddam-A Chronology of Iraq and UN Weapons Inspections From 2002-2003

July 2003

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: July 2003

Prior to the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 in November 2002 giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with its disarmament requirements under previous Security Council resolutions. At issue was Iraq’s failure to provide an adequate accounting of its prohibited weapons programs or to convince UN inspectors that its weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed as Baghdad claimed.

UN weapons inspectors worked in Iraq from November 27, 2002 until March 18, 2003. During that time, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) conducted more than 900 inspections at more than 500 sites. The inspectors did not find that Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons or that it had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.

Although Iraq was cooperative on what inspectors called “process”—allowing inspectors access to suspected weapons sites, for example—it was only marginally cooperative in answering the questions surrounding its weapons programs. Unable to resolve its differences with Security Council members who favored strengthening and continuing weapons inspections, the United States abandoned the inspections process and initiated the invasion of Iraq on March 19.

Following is a summary of the major events of the decision to pursue, then abandon, UN weapons inspections in Iraq.


Skip to: 2002, 2003


2002

January 29, 2002: In his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush labels Iraq a member of an "axis of evil," along with Iran and North Korea. The president's speech is the first of many statements by top U.S. officials on the dangers posed by Iraq. Several of these officials question the ultimate worth of arms inspections and advocate the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as the only way to guarantee that Iraq will not develop weapons of mass destruction in the future.

March 7, 2002: Iraqi officials meet with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Executive Chairman Hans Blix to discuss arms inspections for the first time since 1998. UN officials fail to win the return of inspectors at this meeting or two subsequent ones that occur in May and July.

September 12, 2002: Amid increasing speculation that the United States is preparing to invade Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, Bush delivers a speech to the United Nations calling on the organization to enforce its resolutions on disarming Iraq. Bush strongly implies that if the United Nations does not act, the United States will-a message that U.S. officials make more explicit the following week.

September 16, 2002: Baghdad announces that it will allow arms inspectors to return "without conditions." Iraqi and UN officials meet September 17 to discuss the logistical arrangements for the return of inspectors and announce that final arrangements will be made at a meeting scheduled for the end of the month. The United States contends that there is nothing to talk about and warns that the Iraqis are simply stalling. The Bush administration continues to press the Security Council to approve a new UN resolution calling for Iraq to give weapons inspectors unfettered access and authorizing the use of force if Iraq does not comply.

November 8, 2002: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1441. The resolution declares that Iraq "remains in material breach" of past resolutions and gives Iraq a "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" set out by Security Council resolutions stretching back to the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It also strengthens UNMOVIC's and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) powers to conduct inspections throughout Iraq, specifying that Iraq must allow "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access" to "facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect." UN inspectors are given the authority to prohibit the movement of vehicles and aircraft around sites to be inspected and have the right to interview anyone they choose, without Iraqi officials present, in any location they wish. Additionally, the resolution overrides a 1998 memorandum of understanding between Baghdad and UN Secretary-General Annan that had placed special conditions on inspections of presidential sites to which Iraq had previously denied the inspectors access.

The resolution also warns that Iraq will face "serious consequences" if it fails to comply with its disarmament obligations.

November 13, 2002: Iraq accepts Resolution 1441 in a letter to Annan from Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabr.

November 27, 2002: UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections begin.

December 7, 2002: Iraq submits its declaration "of all aspects of its [weapons of mass destruction] programmes" as required by Resolution 1441. The declaration is supposed to provide information about any prohibited weapons activity since UN inspectors left the country in 1998 and resolve outstanding questions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs that had not been answered by 1998.

The resolution requires the declaration to be "currently accurate, full, and complete," but UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors tell the UN Security Council on December 19 that the declaration contains little new information.

December 19, 2002: Following IAEA and UNMOVIC briefings to the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell states that the Iraqi declaration contains a "pattern of systematic…gaps" that constitute "another material breach" of Iraq's disarmament obligations.

2003

February 5, 2003: Powell briefs the Security Council in an effort to persuade members that Iraq is subverting the inspections process. He publicly presents intelligence for the first time to support Washington's claim that Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction and interfering with inspections. France, China, and Russia are not persuaded and support continued inspections.

February 24, 2003: The United States, United Kingdom, and Spain co-sponsor a new Security Council resolution saying "Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by Resolution 1441."
The same day, Russia and France submit a memorandum stating that military force should be a "last resort" and that force should not yet be used because there is "no evidence" that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. The memorandum also says, however, that "inspections…cannot continue indefinitely. Iraq must disarm." It further adds that Baghdad's cooperation, although improving, is not "yet fully satisfactory."

The memorandum proposes that the inspectors submit a program of work that lists and clearly defines specific disarmament tasks. Such a report is already required under Resolution 1284, which created UNMOVIC in 1999.

The memorandum also suggests "further measures to strengthen inspections," including increasing staff and bolstering technical capabilities. Additionally, it proposes a new timeline mandating regular reporting to the Security Council about inspectors' progress, as well as a progress report to be submitted 120 days after the program of work is adopted.

Neither measure is adopted.

March 7, 2003: UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix tells the Security Council that Iraq's cooperation with the inspectors in providing information about past weapons activities has improved, although Baghdad has not yet complied with its disarmament obligations. UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors had stated during briefings to the Security Council on January 27 and February 14 that Iraq was gradually increasing its cooperation with the United Nations. Yet, both deemed the cooperation insufficient.

The United States, United Kingdom, and Spain co-sponsor another resolution stating that Iraq "will have failed" to comply with Resolution 1441 unless Baghdad cooperates with its disarmament obligations by March 17. The draft resolution implies that the council members would take military action if Iraq failed to meet the deadline.

March 17, 2003: After U.S.-led diplomatic efforts to build support for the new resolution fail, the United States decides not to seek a vote on it-a reversal of Bush's March 6 statement that the United States would push for a Security Council vote on the resolution, regardless of whether it was expected to pass.

Annan announces that UN weapons inspectors will be withdrawn from the country.

Bush announces that Hussein and his sons have 48 hours to leave Iraq or the United States will initiate military action.

March 18, 2003: UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors leave Iraq.

March 19, 2003: The United States commences military action. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland provide troops to the U.S.-led invasion.

May 1, 2003: Bush declares an end to "major combat operations." U.S. forces had not discovered any Iraqi weapons of mass destruction since entering the country.

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START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance

March 2019

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2019 

START II's ratification process began after U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement on January 3, 1993. The United States ratified the original START II agreement in January 1996, but never ratified a 1997 protocol extending the treaty's implementation deadline or the concurrently negotiated ABM Treaty succession, demarcation, and confidence-building agreements.[1] On May 4, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the resolution of ratification for START II, its extension protocol, and the 1997 ABM-related agreements. Russia's ratification legislation made the exchange of START II's instruments of ratification (required to bring it into force) contingent on U.S. approval of the extension protocol and the ABM agreements; Congress never voted to ratify the entire package.

Russia announced on June 14, 2002, that it would no longer be bound by its Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II commitments, ending almost a decade of U.S.-Russian efforts to bring the 1993 treaty into force. Moscow's statement came a day after the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a few weeks after the two countries concluded a new nuclear arms accord (SORT) on May 24. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which requires the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece by December 31, 2012, effectively superseded START II's requirement for each country to deploy no more than 3,000-3,500 warheads by December 2007. Yet other key START II provisions, such as the prohibition against deploying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), were not addressed in the SORT agreement.

Basic Terms[2]:

  • Deployment of no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy (long-range) bombers by December 31, 2007.
  • "Deactivation" of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination under the treaty by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles (warheads), or taking other jointly-agreed steps, by December 31, 2003.[3]

Additional Limits:

  • No multiple warheads (MIRVs) on ICBMs.
  • All SS-18 "heavy" Russian ICBMs must be destroyed.
  • No more than 1,700 to 1,750 warheads may be deployed on SLBMs.
  • Reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, as well as de-MIRVing ICBMs by "downloading" (permanently removing) warheads from missiles.

NOTES

1. The START II extension protocol shifted the deadline for completion of START II reductions from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. The succession agreement formalized the former Soviet republics' status as parties to the 1972 ABM Treaty. The demarcation agreements clarified the demarcation line between strategic and theater ballistic missile (TBM) defenses. On September 26, 1997, the extension protocol was signed by the United States and Russia and the ABM-related agreements were signed by the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

2. START I definitions, limits, procedures, and counting rules applied to START II, except where explicitly modified. Unlike START I, which substantially undercounts weapons deployed on bombers, the number of weapons counted for bombers would be the number they are actually equipped to carry. Provided they were never equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, up to 100 heavy bombers could be "reoriented" to conventional roles without physical conversion, which would not count against the overall limits. The reoriented bombers could be returned to a nuclear role, but thereafter could not be reoriented and exempted from limits.

3. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov codified the deactivation agreement through an exchange of letters in September 1997. Primakov's letter also contained a unilateral declaration that Russia expected START III would be "achieved" and would enter into force "well in advance" of the START II deactivation deadline.

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The 1997 START II/ABM Package at a Glance

March 2019

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: March 2019

In September 1997, representatives from the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine signed a package of agreements in New York designed to enhance the prospects for Russian ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and to clarify issues pertaining to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Efforts to bring the package into force have been terminated, however, following the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between Moscow and Washington in May 2002, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, and Russia's subsequent announcement that it would no longer be bound by its START II commitments.

The package consisted of the START II extension protocol and associated agreements, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on ABM Treaty succession, the first and second agreed-upon statements on ABM-theater missile defense (TMD) demarcation, a confidence-building measures agreement related to TMD systems, and an agreement updating the regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission, a body composed of treaty party representatives that discusses implementing issues.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin transmitted these agreements to the Duma in April 1998. The Clinton administration stated that it would submit the START II documents, MOU on Succession, and both demarcation agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent on ratification after Russia ratified START II. The Senate failed to do so after Russia approved START II and the 1997 agreements in early 2000.

START II Protocol and Associated Agreements

  • START II Protocol: Extended the time period for the completion of START II reductions from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007.
  • Albright-Primakov letters on early deactivation: Upon START II's entry into force, the United States and Russia would deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination under the treaty (e.g. SS-18, SS-24, and MX missiles) by December 31, 2003 by "removing their nuclear re-entry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps." Primakov's letter also contained a unilateral statement: "Taking into account the supreme national interests of the county, the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance of the above deactivation deadline the START III Treaty will be achieved and enter into force." Albright's letter took note of Russia's position.
  • Joint Agreed Statement: Allowed the United States to "download" (remove warheads from) Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under START II any time before December 31, 2007, the deadline for all START II-mandated reductions. Previously, the United States was required to download its Minuteman IIIs by December 5, 2001, seven years after START I's entry into force.

MOU on Succession to the ABM Treaty

  • Designated the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as the parties of the ABM Treaty. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would assume the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the treaty. Thus they collectively would be limited to ABM deployment at a single site and a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges.
  • Broadened the ABM Treaty's membership because a number of ABM-related facilities, required to operate Russia's ABM system, were located outside Russian territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also regarded ABM Treaty membership as a key element of their independent status. The United States viewed the MOU as important because it recognized the ex-Soviet states as bound by the treaty.
  • Although the Clinton administration argued that the ABM Treaty was in force because the power to determine succession lies within the executive branch, it agreed in May 1997 to submit the MOU to the Senate for approval in connection with the ratification of an unrelated agreement associated with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. However, the MOU was never submitted.

First Agreed Statement on Demarcation

  • Permitted the deployment of "lower-velocity" theater missile defense (TMD) systems (those with interceptor velocities of 3 kilometers per second or less) provided that they would not be tested against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers.
  • Enabled the United States to deploy the Army's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, as well as the Navy's Area Defense system. Previously, the United States had reviewed these systems and declared them to be treaty-compliant.

Second Agreed Statement on Demarcation

  • Prohibited the parties from testing "higher-velocity" TMD systems (those with interceptor velocities above 3 kilometers per second) against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers.
  • Prohibited the development, testing or deployment of space-based TMD interceptor missiles, or space-based components based on other physical principles (such as lasers) which could be capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.
  • Allowed each side to determine its own compliance with respect to higher-velocity TMD systems. The United States had determined that the Navy's Theater-Wide Defense (NTWD) system was compliant with ABM Treaty requirements.

Confidence-Building Measures Agreement (CBMA)

  • Ninety days after entry into force, the parties would conduct an initial exchange of information about TMD systems and components covered by the CBMA: U.S. THAAD and NTWD systems, as well as the Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian SA-12 systems. (Kazakhstan does not possess the SA-12.). This information would be updated annually.
  • Prior to testing, parties would notify one another of the test ranges that would be used to test a system governed under the CBMA. Ten days' advance notification was required prior to a TMD system test using ballistic missile targets.

Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

  • The United States and Soviet Union established operating regulations for the SCC in 1973. These regulations were revised after Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to assume the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the ABM Treaty.
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Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002

January 2003

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: January 2003

During 2002, the Pentagon notified Congress of an estimated $15.534 billion in proposed, government-to-government, conventional arms transfer agreements with 29 countries, including Taiwan. The Pentagon also offered NATO up to $1.1 billion in military deals.

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as "major defense equipment" which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.1 However, if the proposed sales involve NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.2 Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never blocked a sale once formally notified.

Kuwait topped the list of all potential recipients with requests for $2.29 billion in weaponry, including 16 AH-64D Apache Longbow combat helicopters and 80 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs). Kuwait finalized a deal for the helicopters in September 2002.

The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Taiwan ranked second and third respectively in possible arms buys. U.A.E. requests totaled $2.14 billion for the upgrade of 30 Apache helicopters and the purchase of five E-2C Hawkeye early-warning aircraft and 237 Sea Sparrow ship-to-air missiles. Taiwan sought $1.52 billion in potential deals, including four Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers and hundreds of anti-armor and anti-aircraft missiles. The United States publicly authorized selling the destroyers to Taiwan in April 2001.

Other major weapons sales proposed by the Pentagon in 2002 were 18 F/A-18F fighter jets to Malaysia, 30 F-16A/B or 24 F-16C/D combat aircraft to Austria, and 12 F-16C/D aircraft to Brazil. By the end of 2002, Malaysia and Austria still had not decided whether they would purchase the American fighters, while Brazil announced in early January 2003 that it would postpone any fighter buy for at least a year.

During 2001, the Pentagon notified Congress of $18.88 billion in possible agreements.

The Top Five Recipients of Proposed FMS Deals
From January 1 to December 31, 2002:

Country
Total Value
Weapons/Services
Kuwait
$2.289 billion
Aerostat balloon/radar system and other radars.

80 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs).

16 AH-64D Apache Longbow combat helicopters with spare engines and armaments, including 96 Longbow Hellfire AGM-114L3 and 288 Hellfire AGM-114K3 missiles.

U.A.E.
$2.145 billion
Five refurbished E-2C Hawkeye 2000 early-warning aircraft with radars.

Upgrade of 30 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters to the AH-64D version. 32 AN/APG-78 AH-64D Longbow Fire Control Radars, 32 spare engines, 32 night vision sensors, 240 AGM-114L3 Hellfire missiles, 49 AGM-114M3 Hellfire blast fragmentation anti-armor missiles, and 90 299 Hellfire missile launchers.


237 Sea Sparrow ship-to-air missiles.

Taiwan
$1.521 billion
290 TOW-2B anti-tank missiles with spare and repair parts.

Four Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers, 248 SM-2 Block IIIA Standard ship-to-air missiles, 32 RGM-84L Block II Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

48 rebuilt Standard Assault Amphibious Personnel Vehicles, four Assault Amphibious Command Vehicles, and two Assault Amphibious Recovery Vehicles.

Maintenance and spare parts for military aircraft and missiles.

182 AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

449 AGM-114M3 Hellfire blast fragmentation anti-armor missiles.

Three AN/MPN-14(SS) radar sets with spare and repair parts.

Malaysia
$1.483 billion
18 F/A-18F Super Hornet combat aircraft with 39 engines, radars, and other electronic support packages.
South Korea
$1.266 billion
Nine excess P-3B Orion long-range maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft with spare engines and parts.

Three AEGIS shipboard combat systems and associated equipment and services.


NOTES:

1 .The State Department is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of "major defense equipment" that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as "significant military equipment." As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data and it is often incomplete and less precise than the data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F. "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994-2001," Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, p. 15). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State Department and Defense Department for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002.

Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of State, and Arms Control Association

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The START III Framework at a Glance

January 2003

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: January 2003

After the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), it seemed unlikely that a START III agreement would be negotiated. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed SORT on May 24, 2002. The treaty calls for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads, effectively matching the limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads proposed for START III.1 SORT does not, however, address strategic nuclear warhead destruction or tactical nuclear weapons limits, both ground-breaking arms control measures that were suggested for inclusion in START III. Negotiations on START III were ultimately not successful and the treaty was never signed.

START III's Origins:

  • During their March 1997 summit meeting in Helsinki, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their commitment to begin formal negotiations on START III as soon as Russia ratified START II.

Basic Elements:

  • By December 31, 2007, coterminous with START II, the United States and Russia would each deploy no more than 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. Russian officials stated that they were willing to consider negotiated levels as low as 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads within the context of a START III agreement.
  • The United States and Russia would negotiate measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, as well as other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions.
  • The United States and Russia would resolve issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.2

Other Issues:

  • The United States and Russia agreed that in the context of START III negotiations, their experts would explore (as separate issues) possible measures related to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, including appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.
  • The United States and Russia would also consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

NOTES

1. The Bush administration maintained that SORT specifies limits on "operationally deployed" strategic nuclear forces, a term that does not include warheads on bombers and submarines under refurbishment. Since those warheads were included under START counting rules, the ceiling specified in SORT and that proposed for START III were similar.

2. START I, which entered into force December 1994, runs for 15 years, but the treaty specifies that it can be extended for successive five-year periods if it has not been superseded by another arms control agreement. If it entered into force, START II would have remained in force as long as START I is in force.

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Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001

January 2002

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: January 2002

During 2001, the Pentagon notified Congress of an estimated $18.884 billion in proposed, government-to-government, conventional arms transfer agreements with 22 countries.

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of any proposed sale of "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as "major defense equipment" which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million 1 Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never blocked a sale once formally notified.

Possible Pentagon arms sales to South Korea totaled $6.213 billion, approximately one-third the value of all the proposed deals in 2001. Of that amount, $1.615 billion is for weapons and other sub-systems related to Seoul's previously announced possible buy of at least 40 U.S. F-15K fighter aircraft, which South Korea has currently postponed because it claims all the offers it received are too expensive. Another $4 billion would go toward a possible buy of 36 attack helicopters, for which two U.S. companies are competing. (Boeing is offering the AH-64D Apache at $2.4 billion and Bell Helicopter Textron is offering the AH-1Z Super Cobra at $1.6 billion.)

Ranking second in possible deals, Poland is considering a $4.3 billion buy of 60 F-16 fighter aircraft. Poland may make a final decision on its fighter aircraft purchase during 2002. Other countries are also considering possible combat aircraft buys from the United States. Austria is weighing its options, including U.S. F-16s, for a purchase of 30 fighters, while Chile and Oman have moved closer toward finalizing their proposed F-16 fighter buys.

Aside from these major potential deals, the proposed FMS sales are largely upgrades, armaments, or support equipment for past and pending sales of U.S. weapon systems. During 2000, the Pentagon notified Congress of possible agreements totaling at least $11.6 billion.2

The Top Five Recipients of Proposed FMS Deals
From January 1 to December 31, 2001:

Country
Total Value
Weapons/Services
South Korea
$6.213 billion

Munitions, sub-systems, and related equipment for possible sale of F-15K aircraft, including 105 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles and 157 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs)

45 AGM-84-H Standoff Land Attack Missiles-Expanded Response missile systems, 1 ATM-84-H Exercise Missile and related equipment for use on F-15K aircraft.

Cooperative Logistics Supply Support agreement for radar and missiles.

Three MK-41 Vertical Launch Systems for South Korean destroyers.

36 AH-1Z Super Cobra or AH-64D Apache attack helicopters with weapons and support equipment.

Poland
$4.3 billion
44 F-16C/D fighter aircraft, 12 F-16A fighter aircraft, and 4 F-16B fighter aircraft, plus weapons, training, and support.
Austria
$1.739 billion
30 F-16C/D fighter aircraft, 3 spare F-16C/D engines, 4 AIM-120C AMRAAMs, 9 AIM-120C AMRAAM Air Vehicle Instrumented missiles, 20 AIM-9M-8/9 Sidewinder missiles, 15 AIM-9M-8/9 Sidewinder practice/training missiles, plus additional equipment, training and support.
Oman
$1.120 billion
12 F-16C/D fighter aircraft with engine and radar, 50 AIM-120C AMRAAMs, 10 AMRAAM training missiles, 100 AIM-9M-8/9 Sidewinder missiles, 10 Sidewinder training missiles, 80 AGM-65D/G Maverick missiles, plus additional equipment.
Egypt
$1.119 billion

201 M109A2/A3 155mm self-propelled howitzers, with spare parts.

240 wheeled bulldozers with spare parts, training, and support.

26 Extended Range-Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (ER-MLRS), 485 ER-MLRS rocket pods, 22 reduced range practice rocket pods with related software, equipment training, and support.

100 M1A1 Abrams tank kits and additional munitions, training, and support.

 

 

 

Assisted by Andy Diamond


NOTES:

1.The State Department is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of "major defense equipment" that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as "significant military equipment." As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data and it is often incomplete and less precise than the data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000, Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, p. 15). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State Department and Defense Department for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses, and there is no current reporting requirement for actual deliveries after the initial license wins approval. However, beginning in fiscal year 2001, U.S. exporters are required to report on actual commercial transfers within 15 days of shipment. The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. A proposed German buy of HARM missiles was estimated at $50 million or $250 million depending on whether Germany acquires the B or C model. In addition, no value or quantity was declared for Australia's possible purchase of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, but notifications are required for sales equaling or exceeding $14 million. For the purpose of this fact sheet, the minimum values of $50 million for the proposed German missile buy and $14 million for the possible Australian acquisition were assumed in calculating the total value of proposed U.S. FMS sales during the period.

Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of State, and Arms Control Association

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Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000

January 2001

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: January 2001

From January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000, the Pentagon reported to Congress proposed government-to-government conventional arms transfer agreements with 25 countries worth a minimum of $11.6 billion.1

Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of any proposed sale of "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as "major defense equipment" that total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.2 Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) to block a sale by voting a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never exercised this authority. The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions.

The 2000 total is significantly less than the $20.78 billion in arms sales to 19 countries proposed in 1999, but that figure was bolstered by several countries seeking advanced aircraft, as well as a possible $4.2 billion deal with South Korea for advanced versions of the Patriot anti-missile system.

Saudi Arabia led all prospective buyers in 2000 with $3.18 billion in requested arms, and Taiwan ranked second with proposed buys totaling $1.87 billion. Together, the top five prospective weapons buyers—Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Israel ($1.6 billion), Egypt ($1.17 billion), and Italy ($915 million)—accounted for 75 percent of the value of the proposed arms deals. The Near East led all regions in prospective buys, totaling approximately $6.2 billion in possible deals. This total does not include the United Arab Emirates' estimated $6.4 billion contract signed on March 5, 2000 with Lockheed Martin for 80 F-16C/D fighter aircraft, which was concluded as a commercial deal between the company and the foreign government and not as a sale by the U.S. government through the Pentagon. Seven countries in the Asia-Pacific region accounted for $2.8 billion of the proposed sales, while a dozen European countries sought weapons valued at $2.6 billion.

 

The Top 3 Recipients of Proposed Arms Deals
From January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000

Country
Total Value
Weapons/Services
Saudi Arabia
$3.18 billion

500 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles.

Continuation of contractor maintenance and training technical services, spare and repair parts, support equipment, modification facilities, and labor to accomplish programmed depot maintenance on the F-15 aircraft.

Continuation of U.S. Air Force and contractor technical services, spare and repair parts, support equipment and simulators in support of the Royal Saudi Air Force F-15 aircraft.

Continuation of U.S. supported effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard to include, among other items, 1,827 TOW 2A missiles, advanced tactical communication systems, and 132 Light Armored Vehicles.

Taiwan
$1.87 billion

Items needed for conversion of the TPS-43F air surveillance radar to the TPS-75V configuration.

162 HAWK Intercept Aerial guided missiles.

48 AN/ALQ-184 electronic countermeasures pods.

39 sets of Pathfinder/Sharpshooter (Lantirn derivatives) pods.

146 M109A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 79 M2 machine guns, six M88A2 recovery vehicles, 160 AN/PVS-7B Night Vision Goggles, and advanced tactical communication systems.

200 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles and 292 LAU-129 missile launchers.

71 RGM-84L Harpoon missiles, six Harpoon training missiles, and 10 Harpoon Shipboard Launcher Command Launch Control Sets.

Follow-on phase of the Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment communication system.

Israel
$1.62 billion

Services for construction of two infantry training bases and a storage and logistics base for a reserve armored division.

41 AGM-142D air-to-ground missiles with data links.

241,000 M107 high explosive 155mm projectiles and publications.

57 AIM-120B Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles.

14 non-MDE Beech King Air B2000CT/T fixed wing aircraft.

JP-8 aviation jet fuel.

8 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, 10 AN/APG-78 AH-64D Longbow Fire Control Radar and configuration of 70 M272 Hellfire missile launchers to M299 version.

35 UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters.

Assisted by Jonathan Weiss


This register does not necessarily reflect finalized transactions and therefore is most useful in demonstrating trends in the type of weapons systems the United States is willing to sell, to whom it will sell, and the costs involved.

 

NOTES:

1. The proposed German buy of HARM missiles could total $50 million or $250 million depending on whether Germany acquires the B or C model. In addition, no value or quantity was declared for Australia's possible purchase of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, but notifications are required for sales equaling or exceeding $14 million. For the purpose of this fact sheet, the minimum values of $50 million for the proposed German missile buy and $14 million for the possible Australian acquisition were assumed in calculating the total value of proposed U.S. FMS sales during the period.

2. The president is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales of "major defense equipment" that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as "significant military equipment." Like FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand).

Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, ACA

Conventional Arms Issues

Country Resources:

Fact Sheet Categories:

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements Reported to Congress from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999

January 2000

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: January 2000

From January 1 to December 31, 1999, the Pentagon reported to Congress $20.78 billion in proposed government-to-government conventional arms transfer agreements with nineteen countries. Proposed sales of advanced fighters to Egypt, Greece, Israel, Norway and South Korea, as well as a possible $4.2 billion sale of 14 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile systems to Seoul, resulted in a substantial increase in the value of proposed sales from 1998, which totaled $12.1 billion. While the Middle East topped all regions in 1998 with sixty percent of proposed arms deals, it ranked third in 1999 behind Europe and Asia-Pacific. Seven European countries, led by Greece, sought arms worth nearly $7.8 billion. South Korea accounted for more than $5.4 billion of the Asia-Pacific region’s $7.49 billion in possible arms buys. Israel and Egypt requested more than 96 percent of the Middle East’s $5.2 billion total.

Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of any proposed sale of "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as "major defense equipment" that total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.1 Once notified, Congress has thirty calendar days (fifteen in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions.

The Top 5 Recipients of Arms Deals Reported to Congress in 1999:

Country
Total Value
Weapons/Services
South Korea
$5.46 billion

Sale of aircraft spare parts under a Cooperative Logistics Supply

64 MK44 Guided Missile Round Pack with tactical MK 116 Block I Rolling Airframe Missiles.

29 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems with fire control panels, 281 MLRS extended range rocket pods, 120 reduced range rocket pods, one MLRS fire control proficiency trainer, 111 M39 Army Tactical Missile Systems Block 1 guided missile and launching assemblies, training and test devices, trucks, and support services.

20 F-16C/D aircraft component kits, spare and repair parts.

14 Patriot Advance Capability-3 fire units consisting of: 14 AN/MPQ-53 radar sets, 14 AN/MSQ-104 engagement control stations, 76 M091 launching stations, 31 OA-9054 (V) 41G antenna mast groups, 14 electric power plants with dual 150kw generators; 616 MIM-104D missiles, 333 SINCGARS and associated equipment.

Greece
$3.46 billion

Patriot missile system support equipment.

Four AH-64A Apache attack helicopters.

358 M26A1 Extended Range Rocket pods with M77 grenades for the Multiple Launch Rocket System.70 F-16C/D Block 50+ aircraft.

Israel
$2.68 billion

50 F-16C/D aircraft, 50 AN/APG-68(V)X radars and 30 LANTIRN navigation and targeting pods.

42 AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles.

518 M984A1/M985 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks.

Remanufacture of 24 AH-64A Apache helicopters to AH-64D model helicopters, 12 AN/APG-78 AH-64D Longbow Fire Control Radars, 12 APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometers, 56 T-700-GE-701C engines, 24 Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 480 AGM-114L3 HELLFIRE II laser guided missiles.

700 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) tail kits, MK-84 inert bombs, testing and spare and repair parts.

Norway
$2.6 billion
30 F-16 Block 60 or F-16 Block 50+ aircraft.
Egypt
$2.35 billion

24 F-16C/D Block 40 aircraft, 28 engines, and 24 AN/APG-68 radars.

Upgrade of five E-2C Update Group II Mission Suite retrofit kits for existing E-2C aircraft.

Six AN/TPQ-36(V)7 FIREFINDER radar sets, 16 AN/VRC-90E SINCGAR radio systems, six commercial M1097A2 HMMWV trucks.

Two UH-60L VIP Blackhawk utility helicopters and two spare engines.

A co-production program for 100 M1A1 Abrams tanks.

Two Gulfstream IV-SP aircraft including four Rolls Royce engines.

239 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles.

Modification/upgrade of five AN/TPS-59(V)2 radar systems to the AN/TPS-59(V)3 configuration.

 


The Arms Control Association maintains a register of all U.S. FMS sales notified to Congress by the Pentagon since January 1990. The register does not necessarily reflect finalized transactions, and therefore is most useful in demonstrating trends in the types of weapon systems the United States is willing to sell, to whom it will sell, and the values involved.

NOTE:

1. Commercial sales of "major defense equipment" that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million and any items defined as "significant military equipment." As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval. [Back to text]

Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, ACA

Conventional Arms Issues

Country Resources:

Fact Sheet Categories:

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements Notified to Congress from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998

January 1999

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: January 1999

From January 1 to December 31, 1998, the Pentagon reported to Congress $12.115 billion of proposed government-to-government conventional arms transfer agreements with seventeen countries. Sixty percent ($7.32 billion) of the proposed sales are to states in the Middle East. This total does not include the announced purchase of 80 F-16C/D fighters by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on May 12 in a direct commercial sale valued at $5 billion. In 1997, the Pentagon notified Congress of $10.618 billion in proposed sales to eighteen countries.

Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of any proposed sale of : "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as "major defense equipment" that total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.1 Once notified, Congress has thirty calendar days (fifteen in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand) to block a sale by voting a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never exercised this authority. The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions.

Top 10 Recipients of Arms Deals Notified to Congress from January 1 to December 31, 1998

Country
Total Value
Weapons/Services
Israel
$2.627 billion

64 AIM-120B Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) and three test missiles.

Patriot missile system equipment including three AN/MPQ-53 radar sets, three AN/MSQ-104 engagement control stations, three M983 tractors and nine M931A2 trucks.

16 HARPOON missiles with containers and spare and repair parts.

60 F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters or 30 F-15I fighters.
United Arab Emirates
$2 billion
In support of the direct commercial sale of 80 F-16C/D fighters: 491 AIM-120B AMRAAMs, 267 AIM-9M ½ SIDEWINDER missiles and 80 SIDEWINDER training missiles, 163 AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) missiles, 1,163 AGM-65D/G MAVERICK missiles and 20 training missiles, 52 AGM-84 HARPOON missiles, 2,252 MK-82 and 1,231 MK-84 general purpose bombs, 462 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II and 606 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III laser guided bomb kits and other assorted bombs and munitions.
Greece
$1.602 billion

160 AGM-114KBF HELLFIRE II missiles, 88 AGM-114K1 HELLFIRE II missiles, publications and logistic support.

1,322 STINGER-RMP Block 1 International missiles including 1,286 complete missile rounds without grip stocks, 36 lot acceptance missiles and 188 gripstock control group guided missile launchers.

200 AGM-65G MAVERICK missiles, 200 GBU-24 A/B bomb kits and missile launchers.

18 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 146 MLRS extended range rocket pods, 81 Army Tactical Missile System guided missiles, 11 M577 command post carriers, 162 M26 rockets, 94 SINCGARS radio systems, 60 AN/PVS-7B night vision goggles, 4 M984A1 and 24 M985 heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks.

6 new production E-2C Airborne Early Warning and Control mission systems as part of a purchase of either E-2C or C-130J airframe.

Lease/sale arrangement of 4 KIDD class guided missile destroyers, 62,000 20mm cartridges, 4,800 5"/54 projectiles, 64 anti-submarine rockets, 320 MK 36 Rapid Bloom Offboard Chaff, 32 HARPOON missiles, 48 MK 46 MOD 5 torpedoes and other related ammunition.

Taiwan
$1.296 billion

Three KNOX class frigates, weapons and ammunition to include one MK 15 PHALANX Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), one AN/SWG-1A HARPOON launcher, two sets of MK 36 MOD 5 Super Rapid Bloom Offboard Countermeasures decoy launching system, 1,581 rounds of 5 inch ammunition and 30,000 rounds of 20mm tungsten cartridges for CIWS.

PATHFINDER/SHARPSHOOTER navigation and targeting pods for F-16A/B fighters.

61 Dual Mount STINGER launchers and 728 STINGER RMP missile rounds and 132 AN/VRC-91 export version radios.

58 HARPOON missiles and eight training missiles.

131 MK-46 MOD 5S torpedoes and spare parts.

Nine CH-47D Chinook helicopters with three spare engines.

Egypt
$1.138 billion

Two FFG-7 PERRY class frigates, two currently leased FF 1052 KNOX class frigates.

42 HARPOON missiles and containers and upgrade modification kits for 20 SM-1 STANDARD missiles.

1,058 STINGER RMP Type III missiles less reprogrammable modules, 48 lot acceptance missiles, 50 completer AVENGER Systems, launch pods integrated on High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, 50 AVENGER turrets, M3P machine guns and 50 STANDARD Vehicle Mounted Launchers.

F-16 Depot Level Maintenance Program.

Upgrade of six CH-47C Chinook helicopters to newer configuration and upgrade of 40 ALQ-131 Block I to Block II pods.

Saudi Arabia
$946 million

Upgrade of 1,500 AIM-9L missiles to 9M configuration and five sets of PATHFINDER/SHARPSHOOTER navigation and targeting pods.

Services for the continuation of the U.S. supported modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.

Singapore $758 million Services related to pilot proficiency training and logistics support to include aircraft modifications and support equipment.

8 AH-64D Apache helicopters, 216 HELLFIRE II laser guided missiles, 9,120 Hydra-70 rockets and other support equipment.

Kuwait
$609 million

2 fully equipped Paladin artillery battalions to include 48 M109A6 self-propelled howitzers, 152 M2 machine guns, 18 M88A2 recovery vehicles 24 M113A3 battalion reconnaissance vehicles, 64 M9992A2 field artillery ammunition support vehicles and 261 SINCGARS radio systems.

1,057 SINCGARS radio systems.

South Korea
$273 million

12 MK 14 Weapon Direction Systems and 12 OT-134 Continuous Wave Illumination Transmitters.

112 MLRS extended range rocket pods with spare and repair parts.

500 TOW 2A missiles and 8 lot acceptance missiles.

Turkey
$248 million

30 HARPOON missiles and spare and repair parts

3 FFG-7 PERRY class frigates and 8 currently leased FF 1052 KNOX class frigates and 20,000 rounds of 20mm cartridges.


The Arms Control Association maintains a register of all U.S. FMS sales notified to Congress by the Pentagon since January 1990. The register does not necessarily reflect finalized transactions, and therefore is most useful in demonstrating trends in the type of weapon systems the United States is willing to sell, to whom it will sell, and the values involved.

NOTE

1. The President is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales of "major defense equipment" that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million and any items defined as "significant military equipment." As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within thirty calendar days of notification (fifteen in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data and it is often incomplete and less precise than the data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1989-1996, Washington DC: The Library of Congress, p. 13). The annual "Section 655" report, prepared by the State Department and Defense Department for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses and their is no reporting requirement for actual deliveries after the initial license wins approval. During fiscal year 1997, the State Department approved commercial licenses that could result in over $24.7 billion in possible sales to more than 150 countries and territories. The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement and reporting. [Back to text]

Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, ACA

Conventional Arms Issues

Country Resources:

Fact Sheet Categories:

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997

January 1998

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: January 1998

The Pentagon notified Congress in 1997 of an estimated $10.617 billion in proposed, government-to-government, conventional arms transfer agreements with 18 countries, including Taiwan.

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of any proposed sale of "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as "major defense equipment" which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.1 Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never blocked a sale once formally notified.

Three countries accounted for just over 60 percent of the total value of the proposed deals. Asking for the purchase of four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) aircraft worth $3 billion, South Korea led all possible buyers with $3.8 billion in total weapons requests. Saudi Arabia ranked second with $1.4 billion in possible arms deals and Taiwan trailed with $1.2 billion in potential weapons buys.

Other notable arms deals offered by the Pentagon include 16 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters to Kuwait, 20 F-16A/B fighter aircraft to Bahrain, 15 UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters to Israel, 21 AH-1W Super Cobra combat helicopters to Taiwan, and 107 excess M-60A3 tanks to Thailand.

If all the proposed deals are finalized the top regional destination would be Asia. The five Asian countries-Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand-requested nearly $6 billion in weapons. In comparison, Near Eastern arms buyers sought about $3.5 billion in arms and European countries tallied $1.1 billion in possible purchases.

The Top Five Recipients of Proposed FMS Deals From January 1 to December 31, 1997:

Country
Total Value
Weapons/Services
South Korea
$3.801 billion

Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement to provide spare
parts for military aircraft.

Three MK-41 Vertical Launch Systems.

One MK-41 Vertical Launch System.

159 AIM-120B Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles.

200 Stinger RMP anti-aircraft missiles and associated equipment.

Four E-767 Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) aircraft.

1,065 Stinger RMP anti-aircraft missiles.

Saudi Arabia
$1.428 billion

Communications equipment, including 465 AN/VRC-90, 355 AN/VRC-92, and 404 AN/VRC-119 radios.

Support for continued modernization of Saudi Arabian National Guard,
including 130 90mm turret weapon systems for integration into light
armored vehicles.

Contractor support services in support of five E-3 Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) aircraft, seven KE-3 aerial refueling tankers, and one KE-3 Tactical Air Surveillance aircraft.

Taiwan
$1.246 billion

F-16 pilot training.

Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement to provide spare
parts for military aircraft.

13 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed scout helicopters with 13 engines, 13 Hellfire missile launchers, Hydra-70 rockets, and spare and repair parts.

21 AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters with spare and repair parts.

1,786 TOW-2A anti-armor guided missiles, 114 TOW launchers, and
100 M1045A2 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle trucks.

54 RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles with containers and spare and repair parts.

Kuwait
$800 million
16 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, 384 Hellfire missiles, and 10,917 Hydra-70 rockets.
Egypt
$529 million

Co-production of 50 M88A2 recovery vehicle kits, 53 M2 machine guns, and 100 AN/PVS-7B night vision goggles.

Four CH-47D Chinook helicopters with engines and spare and repair parts.

32 AGM-84G Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

84 MK-46 torpedoes with containers.

Medical equipment, medical furnishings, training and other related elements of logistics to support a 650 bed International Medical Center in Egypt.

 


NOTE:
1. The State Department is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of "major defense equipment" that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as "significant military equipment." As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). Potential weapons buyers have four years to act under authorized commercial licenses. The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of State, and Arms Control Association

Conventional Arms Issues

Country Resources:

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