Kingston Reif | Arms Control Association

New Cruise Missiles to Cost $11 Billion

September 2016

UPDATED: September 2, 2016

UPDATED: December 12, 2016

An updated U.S. Air Force estimate, approved by the Pentagon’s top acquisition official in July, puts the cost to design and build a fleet of new nuclear-capable cruise missiles at $10.8 billion, a source familiar with the program told Arms Control Today.

The service prepared the estimate, which is in fiscal year 2016 constant dollars, in the spring in preparation for the program’s milestone A decision, a key early benchmark in the acquisition process for the weapon, according to the source.

(UPDATE: Since the publication of this article, Arms Control Today has learned that this acquisition estimate is in "then-year dollars," which includes inflationary increases expected over the life of the program, not constant dollars as previously reported.)

An unarmed AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile maneuvers over the Utah Test and Training Range en route to its target September 22, 2014, during a simulated combat mission. [Photo credit: Staff Sgt. Roidan Carlson/U.S. Air Force] Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, approved that decision on July 29, the Air Force said later that day. The service declined requests from Arms Control Today to provide information on new program cost estimates.

An early draft estimate prepared by the Air Force in fiscal year 2015 projected the price to acquire the missile fleet at $8.3 billion.

The service also announced on July 29 that it had begun soliciting proposals from the defense industry to design the new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), known as the long-range standoff weapon, and a new fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

These programs are part of the Defense Department’s plan to modernize and replace elements of the U.S. nuclear triad, which department officials anticipate will cost $350-450 billion over the next 20 years and will put severe pressure on the overall military budget unless Congress provides additional funding. (See ACT, May 2016.)

The Air Force’s current ALCM is the AGM-86B, up to 20 of which can be carried by a B-52H bomber. Current Air Force plans call for the procurement of about 1,000 new nuclear-capable missiles to replace the current missile, which has been operational since 1986. (See ACT, June 2015.)

The Air Force intends to award contracts to one or two companies for the long-range standoff weapon program in the summer of 2017, according to the service press release announcing the solicitation. The contractors will spend the next four and a half years completing a preliminary design, which will be followed by the selection of a sole contractor to further develop and produce the missiles. The first new missile is slated to be produced in 2026.

As the Pentagon proceeds with its plans to replace the AGM-86B, the semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is pursuing a life extension program for its warhead. The NNSA estimates that the cost of the program will be between $7.4-9.9 billion in “then-year dollars,” which includes inflationary increases expected over the life of the program. The first refurnished warhead is scheduled for production in 2025.

Pentagon Debates New ICBM Cost

The Air Force also plans to award up to two contracts in the summer of 2017 to design the replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM system, known as the ground-based strategic deterrent.

But Bloomberg News reported on Aug. 18 that Kendall has yet to approve the milestone A decision for the program due to a gap of billions of dollars between the cost estimate prepared by the Air Force and an independent estimate prepared by the Pentagon’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, which provides the Defense Department with detailed analysis of the costs of major acquisition programs.

(UPDATE: The Air Force announced in a Sept. 1 press release that the Defense Department approved the milestone A decision for the ground based strategic deterrent on Aug. 23.)

In an Aug. 10 press conference at the Pentagon, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said the program “is not on hold” but that the department still needs to “get on the same page” regarding how to estimate the cost of the new missile system.

An early estimate prepared by the Air Force in February 2015 projected the cost to acquire 642 missiles and rebuild the existing Minuteman III infrastructure, including command and control systems, at $62.3 billion over the next 30 years in then-year dollars. (See ACT, July/August 2015.)

In 2014 the Air Force projected the total life-cycle cost of the ground-based strategic deterrent at $159 billion (in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars) between fiscal years 2016 and 2075. (See ACT, April 2016.)

Navy Names New Sub Program

On July 28, U.S. Naval Institute News reported that the first submarine in the Navy’s Ohio-class replacement program will be called the Columbia and that the program will now be called the Columbia-class program.

The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Alabama returns to Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, Washington, on May 14, following a patrol mission. The Navy plans to replace its 14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 new Columbia-class subs. [Photo credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Amanda R. Gray/U.S. Navy] The Navy plans to replace its fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines with 12 new subs. In 2014 the service estimated that the 12 planned boats, which are slated to be purchased between 2021 and 2035, will cost approximately $140 billion (in then-year dollars) to develop and build.

According to an informed source, the Navy in December 2010 projected the total life-cycle cost of the Columbia-class program to be $342 billion in then-year dollars through the 2080s. The source said the Navy prepared a second life-cycle estimate in 2014 that put the cost at $282 billion. The reduction in the life-cycle cost is attributable to such factors as a reduction in the average cost to buy the submarines, updated operations and maintenance costs, and revised inflation assumptions, according to the source.

In a May 27 email to Arms Control Today, Lt. Kara Yingling, a Navy spokesperson, did not confirm the life-cycle estimates, but said the service is preparing updated cost estimates in preparation for the Columbia-class program’s milestone B acquisition decision, which is considered the formal start of a Pentagon acquisition program. That decision is scheduled to take place later this year, she said.

The Pentagon has raised the estimated cost for the new missiles slated to be produced in 2026.

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Group Seeks Nuclear Ban Negotiations

September 2016

Kingston Reif

A supermajority of the non-nuclear-weapon states that participated in a working group on nuclear disarmament in Geneva this year called on the UN General Assembly to convene a conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding agreement that prohibits nuclear weapons.

The final outcome of the open-ended working group, a forum in which all UN members can participate, sets the stage for what many diplomats believe will be a highly contentious debate on a resolution to mandate the start of formal talks on such a treaty at the UN General Assembly First Committee in New York this fall.

A view of the dais during a session of the Open Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament, Palais des Nations on May 15, 2013. [Photo credit: Violaine Martin/UN Office at Geneva] On Aug. 19, by a vote of 68 to 22 with 13 abstentions, countries approved the final report of the working group. Many countries had expected the final report to pass by consensus, as the most contentious paragraphs underwent multiple revisions in an attempt to reconcile differing views. But the Australian delegation announced that it could not support the final report and called for a vote. An Australian Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman told The Guardian that Australia sought the vote as “the most effective way to register our opposition to a recommendation to start negotiations on a ban treaty.”

The final report reflected the different opinions on how to advance nuclear disarmament by noting that more than 100 countries, not all of which were present for the final vote, supported the recommendation to begin negotiations on a ban treaty, while a smaller group, most of them close U.S. allies, opposed the recommendation. (See ACT, June 2016.)

Although none of the nine nuclear-armed states attended the working group meetings, countries that rely on U.S. nuclear weapons for their protection did participate. (See ACT, March 2016.) The final report noted that these so-called umbrella states backed “the pursuit of practical steps consisting of parallel and simultaneous effective legal and non-legal measures to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” such as achieving entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and commencing negotiations on further nuclear weapons reductions below the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels.

A supermajority of the non-nuclear-weapon states that participated in a working group on nuclear disarmament in Geneva this year called on the UN General Assembly to convene a conference in 2017...

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NATO Highlights Role of Nuclear Weapons

September 2016

By Kingston Reif

Leaders of the 28 member countries of NATO strongly criticized Russian nuclear behavior and reaffirmed the security role played by U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe at their July 8-9 summit meeting in Warsaw, Poland. The sections of the alliance statement, or communiqué, devoted to nuclear weapons are nearly three times as long as those issued at the 2014 summit in the United Kingdom. (See ACT, October 2014.)

In Warsaw, NATO leaders characterized as “destabilizing” Russia’s “irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military concept and underlying posture.” Alliance officials have expressed concern over the past two years about Russian actions such as more nuclear bomber flights close to the borders of alliance members, more nuclear exercises, and nuclear threats directed at NATO members. (See ACT, November 2015.)

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addresses press following the meeting on Afghanistan with Resolute Support Operational Partner Nations at the level of heads of state and government in Warsaw on July 6, 2016.[Photo credit: NATO]

The communiqué explicitly states that NATO’s deterrence posture “relies, in part, on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by allies concerned.” This language is a significant departure from the 2014 communiqué and the alliance’s 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review report, neither of which explicitly referred to the need for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

In addition, NATO countries stated in Warsaw that “[a]ny employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict” and warned that “NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable.” The 2014 communiqué did not include these declarations.

Alliance members reiterated their desire to reduce the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy. But the communiqué expressed “regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament are not favorable today.” The United States is thought to deploy approximately 200 tactical B61 gravity bombs in Europe in support of NATO.

Despite speculation ahead of the Warsaw meeting that the alliance might make changes to NATO’s nuclear posture, such as increasing the readiness level of alliance nuclear forces, there is nothing specific in the communiqué about readiness. (See ACT, January/February 2016.)

The alliance also announced in Warsaw that its missile defense system had achieved an “initial operational capability.” The communiqué said the activation of the missile defense site in Romania in May and the transfer of the command and control of the site to NATO is “a new milestone” in the development of NATO’s missile defense plan that “offers a stronger capability to defend” NATO members in southern Europe. (See ACT, June 2016.) Russian President Vladimir Putin asserts that the missile defense system threatens his country, despite U.S. assurances to the contrary.

Leaders of the 28 member countries of NATO strongly criticized Russian nuclear behavior and reaffirmed the security role played by U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe...

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Rethink Oldthink on No First Use

Authored by Kingston Reif, Daryl G. Kimball on August 29, 2016

This op-ed originally appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. For the second time during his presidency, President Barack Obama and his top advisors are re-evaluating whether to adjust the declared role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy to meet the evolving global strategic environment and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association on June 6, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes announced that the administration “will continue to review whether there are additional steps...

This is how the president orders nuclear war

News Source / Outlet:

Washington Examiner

News Link:

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/theres-no-button-how-the-president-orders-nucl...

Submitted by Kingston Reif on Tue, 2016-08-16 11:29

News Date:

August 16, 2016 -04:00

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Trump, Clinton and Our Nuclear Wake-Up Call

Authored by Kingston Reif on August 13, 2016

This op-ed originally appeared in CNN. Kingston Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association. You can follow him on Twitter at @KingstonAReif . The opinions expressed in this commentary are his. (CNN) The possibility of Donald Trump winning the presidential election this November has renewed media and public interest in one of the most important responsibilities of the president: commanding America's massive nuclear arsenal and averting nuclear war. Yet what has been lost in the angst that Mr. Trump might soon have the authority to launch...