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"Though we have acheived progress, our work is not over. That is why I support the mission of the Arms Control Association. It is, quite simply, the most effective and important organization working in the field today." 

– Larry Weiler
Former U.S.-Russian arms control negotiator
August 7, 2018
Kelsey Davenport

Myths and Realities: Unraveling the Impact of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran

Between 2006 and 2010, the UN Security Council has passed six resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear program. As Iran negotiates with the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) misconceptions abound about what the UN Security Council resolutions require Iran to do and how the resolutions impact conditions in a final nuclear deal. The Security Council resolutions were never intended to prevent an Iranian nuclear program in the future in compliance with the conditions of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. And the sanctions imposed by the resolutions...

P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Talks Alert, October 10

Negotiators for the P5+1 and Iran will return to the negotiating table in Vienna next week, as talks on a comprehensive nuclear agreement are set to resume Oct. 14-15. A meeting between lead P5+1 negotiator Catherine Ashton and Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif is already on the books, along with a trilateral meeting that will include U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The U.S. negotiating team will also be in Vienna for the talks and a bilateral meeting with Iran on Oct. 14. A spokeswoman for the Iranian foreign ministry said a full round of talks between the P5+1 could take...

Resolution on Israel Fails at IAEA

By Kelsey Davenport

For the second year in a row, a resolution critical of Israel’s nuclear program failed to pass the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last month. 

IAEA member states voted 58-45 against the resolution on Sept. 25.

The nonbinding resolution, referred to as “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities” and sponsored by a group of 17 Arab states, called on Israel to put its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

In 2009 a similar resolution passed the IAEA conference for the first time after being voted down for years. An attempt the next year failed. The Arab states did not put the measure on the agenda in 2011 and 2012, saying they hoped that Israel would be more likely to attend a regional meeting on establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East if it did not feel singled out for condemnation in the region.

The Arab states revived the measure in 2013 after the meeting on the WMD-free zone did not take place as planned in December 2012. 

A commitment to hold the meeting by the end of 2012 was a critical piece of the consensus on the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A meeting subsequently was scheduled for December 2012 in Helsinki, but was postponed when it became clear that not all of the countries in the region were willing to attend the conference. (See ACT, December 2012.)

Israel does not publicly admit to possessing nuclear weapons, but is widely believed to have an arsenal of approximately 80 to 100 warheads. Israel is an IAEA member and has placed some of its nuclear facilities under agency safeguards.

Thomas Countryman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said in a Sept. 25 statement that the United States “regret[ted]” that the resolution was introduced.

He said discussion of the resolution diverted IAEA member states from the “shared priority of strengthening the IAEA, and has diverted the regional states from the critical task of engaging with each other.”

For the second year in a row, a resolution critical of Israel’s nuclear program failed to pass the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last month. 

Australia, India Sign Uranium Deal

By Kelsey Davenport

Australia and India signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in New Delhi last month that will allow India to purchase uranium from Australia.

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the deal Sept. 5 during Abbott’s visit to India. Modi hailed the agreement as a “historical milestone” in the relationship between the two countries. 

A description of the agreement released by Modi’s office said the agreement will “promote cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and that Australia will provide “long-term reliable supplies of uranium” to India. The text of the agreement has not been released.

Abbott said India has an “impeccable” nonproliferation record and that Australia had received commitments from New Delhi that the uranium supplied to India would be used for civilian purposes and not the development of nuclear weapons. 

Australia and India began negotiations on the agreement more than two years ago, after Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard proposed lifting the country’s ban on uranium sales to India in 2011. Australia’s Labor Party voted in favor of the proposal in December 2011. (See ACT, January/February 2012.) 

Australia, one of the world’s largest producers of uranium ore, is a party to the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. Under the treaty, parties are obligated to ensure that nuclear technology and materials are exported only to countries “subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1” of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

India is not a party to the NPT, but negotiated a limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2008. This means that the IAEA has access to some but not all of India’s nuclear facilities. 

India’s safeguards agreement helped pave the way for an exemption from the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 to allow the group’s member states, including Australia, to export uranium and other nuclear goods to India. The rules of the voluntary regime generally prohibit nuclear exports to countries that are outside the NPT. 

In July of this year, India ratified an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, which Australia said was a precondition for any agreement. 

The additional protocol, which India negotiated with the IAEA in 2009, is a voluntary measure that does not include many of the key provisions included in the IAEA Model Additional Protocol. It does not give the IAEA the authority to inspect undeclared facilities or require India to report on all of its nuclear fuel-cycle research and development. (See ACT, April 2009.) Australia’s Liberal Party opposed lifting the ban on sales to India in 2011 in part because India’s additional protocol does not meet the standards of full-scope safeguards required under the Treaty of Rarotonga.

In addition to mining its own uranium ore, India imports natural uranium from Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Namibia. 

India also is negotiating a nuclear cooperation with Japan. While visiting Japan last month, Modi said on Sept. 1 that he and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed negotiators to “work expeditiously to conclude” a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Modi said the negotiators had made “significant progress” over the past few months. 

India and Japan began negotiating the agreement in 2010. The talks were interrupted by the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, but resumed in May 2013. 

As part of any agreement, Japan has said it wants India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and pledge not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel produced using technology or materials obtained from Tokyo. Reprocessing produces plutonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons.

India will be able to purchase uranium from Australia under a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that the two countries signed last month.

IAEA Reports Delay in Iran Probe

By Kelsey Davenport

Iran provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with access to several nuclear facilities in August, but is behind schedule on turning over information on alleged activities related to nuclear weapons development, according to the agency’s director-general. 

Yukiya Amano told the IAEA Board of Governors on Sept. 15 that Iran expressed a willingness to “accelerate the resolution of all outstanding issues” and has begun discussions with the agency about the two remaining actions of the five that Tehran agreed to complete by Aug. 25. 

Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, said on Sept. 18 that the actions have not been completed “due to their complexity” and because the IAEA allegations are based on invalid information. Najafi said that the IAEA characterization that Iran had “missed the deadline” of Aug. 25 is inaccurate because the agency was aware Iran might not complete the actions by that date. 

On May 21, Tehran pledged to provide the agency with information in five areas of concern to the IAEA. (See ACT, June 2014.) These actions are part of a November 2013 agreement, the Framework for Cooperation, in which Iran and the IAEA committed to “resolve all present and past issues,” including allegations of activities with possible relevance for developing nuclear weapons, or “possible military dimensions,” as the agency refers to them. (See ACT, December 2013.) 

The IAEA laid out its concerns about possible weaponization activities in detail in its November 2011 report to its board, but did not hand over its evidence to Iran. (See ACT, December 2011.) 

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Najafi said Iran denies the allegations of weaponization activities and that there are no “authenticated documents” to back up the IAEA allegations. Nevertheless, Iran will continue to cooperate to clarify the ambiguities, he said. 

The two incomplete actions include providing information on certain kinds of high explosives that could be relevant to nuclear weapons and information on studies “in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.” Neutron transport studies can be relevent to nuclear weapons development. 

Iran has already completed 13 actions by two agreed-on deadlines earlier this year, including providing the IAEA with information on the alleged weaponization issue involving exploding bridge wire detonators. (See ACT, September 2014.) 

Najafi said that the information proved that the detonators were for civilian applications in the oil and gas industry. The IAEA, however, has said that it will not issue an assessment until Iran has furnished information on all the alleged weaponization activities. 

In his Sept. 15 remarks to the board, Amano said the IAEA also had requested that Iran provide the agency with proposals for new practical measures by Sept. 2 to advance the IAEA investigation under the Framework for Cooperation. Amano said that Iran had not proposed any new measures. 

Najafi said that as soon as the remaining two actions are completed, Iran and the IAEA can discuss additional measures. 

In comments to the press Sept. 15, Amano said the IAEA investigation could be completed in about 15 months if Iran cooperated. The aim of the probe is to give the IAEA an understanding of the “whole picture” so that it can issue a factual assessment of the alleged weaponization activities to the IAEA board, Amano said. 

U.S. Reaction

Laura Kennedy, chargé d’affaires at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, said Sept. 18 that the United States is concerned “about the pace of progress in addressing the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.”

She urged Iran to “intensify its engagement” with the IAEA and implement the measures “without delay.” 

Rep. Ed Royce (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), the panel’s ranking member, have drafted a letter to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressing their concern over Iran’s “refusal to fully cooperate” with the IAEA investigation. The draft letter, circulated among House members for signature on Sept. 16, said that the only “reasonable conclusion” to be drawn from Iran’s “stonewalling” of the IAEA investigation is that Iran has “much to hide.” As Arms Control Today went to press, the letter had not been sent.

Royce and Engel said that Iran’s willingness to reveal aspects of its nuclear program, including the alleged weaponization activities, is a “fundamental test” of Iran’s intention to uphold a comprehensive nuclear agreement. 

Separately from the talks with the IAEA, Iran is negotiating with the United States and five other world powers over limits to its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief (see "Little Progress Seen in Iran Talks").

Completed Actions

In its most recent quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA said that one of the five actions was completed before the Aug. 25 deadline, while the other two were completed Aug. 30-31. 

According to the Sept. 5 report, Iran provided the agency with access to a centrifuge assembly workshop Aug. 18-20 and access to a centrifuges research and development center Aug. 30. 

On Aug. 31, Iran and the IAEA agreed on a safeguards approach for the Arak heavy-water reactor. Under that approach, the agency is to have regular access to the partially built reactor and receive updates on design information. Iran halted construction on the reactor in January as part of an interim agreement with the six world powers.

Iran is behind schedule on turning over information to the International Atomic Energy Agency on alleged activities related to nuclear weapons development.

Little Progress Seen in Iran Talks

By Kelsey Davenport

President Barack Obama last month urged Iran to take advantage of a “historic opportunity” to reach a nuclear agreement with the United States and five other world powers, but after a week of talks, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said negotiators made little progress.

In his Sept. 24 speech at the opening of the UN General Assembly session, Obama said it is possible to negotiate an agreement that meets Iran’s energy needs and assures the world that Tehran’s program is entirely peaceful.

Rouhani, speaking to the same body the following day, also used the term “historic opportunity.” But at a Sept. 26 press conference, he said progress had “not been significant” and movement toward an agreement had been “extremely slow.” 

Obama’s and Rouhani’s remarks came a week after the resumption of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the six powers known as the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told reporters on Sept. 26 that there were “no significant advances” during the round of talks. A senior U.S. administration official said in a separate press event the same day that the parties “do not have an understanding on all major issues” and that Iran will need to make some difficult decisions to conclude a comprehensive agreement. 

An interim deal reached by Iran and the P5+1 last November set a target date of July 20 for reaching a comprehensive agreement, but allowed for an extension of the talks if all parties agreed. (See ACT, December 2013.) On July 19, Iran and the P5+1 agreed to extend negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear deal through Nov. 24. (See ACT, September 2014.)

Before the talks resumed on Sept. 18, several of the six countries, including the United States, met bilaterally with Iran to discuss the nuclear negotiations. 

Although Obama and Rouhani did not meet, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met twice to discuss the nuclear talks. 

Kerry and Zarif met again, with Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief and leader of the P5+1 delegation, on Sept. 25 to discuss how to move forward on the remaining issues. 

In addition to the bilateral meetings, a number of plenary sessions and technical meetings took place from Sept. 18 to Sept. 26. 

Ashton had requested that the foreign ministers from all seven countries be available for a ministerial-level meeting if she needed to “consult them collectively” but that proved unnecessary, Ashton spokesman Michael Mann said Sept. 26. 

Talks are expected to resume in mid-October.

Uranium Enrichment

Iran is determined to “enjoy its full nuclear rights under international law,” including uranium enrichment, and is committed to a deal that “removes concerns” from both sides, Rouhani said in his address to the General Assembly.

Determining the future size and scope of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is one of the most significant obstacles that negotiations must resolve before the Nov. 24 deadline. 

The P5+1 wants to reduce Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity and put limits on other elements of its program, including the stockpiles of enriched material and the types of new centrifuges that Iran is developing. These limits would increase the amount of time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to provide enough weapons-grade material for one bomb. In such material, more than 90 percent of the material is uranium-235. Iran currently is enriching uranium to less than 5 percent U-235. 

Iran says it needs to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity to provide fuel for nuclear power reactors it plans to build. 

At an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Sept. 17, Zarif said Iran does not need to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity in the near term. Russia provides fuel for Iran’s sole nuclear power plant, Bushehr, under a contract that lasts until 2021. 

To produce the fuel for Bushehr domestically, Iran would need a tenfold increase in its uranium-enrichment capacity. But Zarif said Iran “does not need all these centrifuges tomorrow” or in a year’s time. Iran has time to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and therefore “establish the type of confidence that is required” by the international community before Tehran can expand its uranium-enrichment capacity, Zarif said. 

The P5+1 has said it wants limits to Iran’s program for a period of at least 10 years. Zarif said that if Iran cannot establish international confidence in its nuclear program in five years, then “a deal is meaningless.” 

New Proposal Reported

On Sept. 19, The New York Times reported that the P5+1 had proposed disconnecting Iranian centrifuges that are installed but not currently enriching uranium. 

Typically, 174 single centrifuges are connected with pipes to form a cascade for enriching uranium more efficiently.

Iran currently has about 10,200 first-generation, or IR-1, centrifuges producing uranium enriched to less than 5 percent, which is suitable for nuclear power plants. About 8,000 additional first-generation centrifuges and 1,008 second-generation centrifuges are installed but not operating. 

According to the Sept. 19 article, the P5+1 proposed that, as part of a deal, Iran remove the pipes that connect the centrifuges. This would prevent Iran from quickly beginning enrichment using the machines, but does not require removing the centrifuges, which Iran says it will not do. 

A Western official familiar with the talks said that disconnecting the pipes is only “one element of a larger proposal” to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity. In a Sept. 24 interview, he said that “other factors are being considered and discussed.” 

Those comments are consistent with remarks made by a senior Obama administration official in speaking more broadly about the potential deal at a Sept. 18 press briefing. The official said that there are “many components” to a deal that ensures that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful. The official said that the elements must “come together in a way that gives us and the international community confidence that the program is exclusively peaceful and Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon.”

A spokeswoman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry said on Sept. 23 that Iran had not accepted or rejected the idea of disconnecting the pipes. 

Members of Congress expressed concern about the prospect of disconnecting the pipes between centrifuges. 

In a Sept. 19 letter to Kerry, 31 Republican senators, led by Sen. Mark Kirk (Ill.), asked the administration if it was willing to accept anything less than complete dismantlement of Iran’s enrichment program and the partially built Arak heavy-water reactor. The reactor, which Iran says is designed to produce isotopes for medical purposes, would produce plutonium that is particularly suitable for nuclear weapons once it is separated from the spent fuel. 

Negotiators have said that before the decision in July to extend the talks, they made progress on agreeing to decrease the plutonium output of the reactor.

President Barack Obama urged Iran to reach a nuclear deal with the United States and five other world powers during his address to the UN General Assembly last month, but negotiators made little progress over a week of talks.

Senators Push Nonproliferation Budget

Kelsey Davenport

Twenty-six senators sent a letter to the Obama administration requesting increased funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs in the fiscal year 2016 budget for the Energy Department.

The signatories of the Aug. 13 letter, led by Sens. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), urged Shaun Donovan, director of the Office of Management and Budget, to “seek increased funding for vital nuclear material security and nonproliferation programs.”

The letter noted that the administration “proposed cuts to these programs over the last several years.”

The Obama administration’s budget for fiscal year 2015 would cut the Energy Department’s nonproliferation programs by $399 million from the fiscal year 2014 appropriation. Fiscal year 2014 ends Sept. 30.

It is “not the time to pull back on nonproliferation,” the letter said, noting that recent terrorist actions serve as a reminder of the importance of “ensuing that terrorist groups and rogue states” do not obtain nuclear weapons and materials.

The Senate Appropriations energy and water subcommittee, chaired by Feinstein, increased funding for nonproliferation activities to nearly $2.0 billion, $423 million above the president’s request for fiscal year 2015. The subcommittee released its bill and draft report July 24, but no further action has been taken on the bill.

The increases include an additional $136 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and $50 million for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program.

The letter said the GTRI played an important role in eliminating nuclear materials from 13 countries since 2009 and that “significant work remains” to secure nuclear material at “hundreds of sites spread across 30 countries.”

The senators urged the administration to work with the Senate to “ensure that critical nuclear material security” programs have the necessary resources. The letter urged the administration, in next year’s budget request, to build on the funding levels that the appropriations subcommittee approved for fiscal year 2015.

In addition to Feinstein and Merkley, the signers of the letter included 20 Democrats, Republican Sens. Lamar Alexander (Tenn.) and Lindsey Graham (S.C.), and independents Bernie Sanders (Vt.) and Angus King (Maine).

Twenty-six senators sent a letter to the Obama administration requesting increased funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs in the fiscal year 2016 budget for the Energy Department.

Congress Questions Policy on N. Korea

Kelsey Davenport

Members of Congress questioned the Obama administration’s policy toward negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program at a July 30 hearing and expressed concern about Pyongyang’s growing nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, said the administration’s “so-called strategic patience policy is crumbling to pieces” and that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program “continues unfettered.”

As described by U.S. officials, the strategic patience policy seeks to hobble North Korean nuclear and missile programs through U.S. and international efforts to prevent the import and export of proliferation-sensitive materials and restart negotiations after Pyongyang demonstrates its commitment to dismantling its nuclear weapons program. For more than a decade, North Korea has had intermittent talks with the United States and its four negotiating partners—China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea—in the so-called six-party talks.

Glyn Davies, special representative for North Korea policy at the State Department, defended the administration’s approach at the hearing, saying that because North Korea “increasingly rejects meaningful negotiations,” the United States is looking for meaningful actions by North Korea before restarting talks. Davies said these actions could include steps by North Korea such as freezing its nuclear program and inviting inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency back into the country.

Davies said it might take continued diplomatic overtures combined with “the patient application of increasing amounts of pressure” to make North Korea realize its current path is “leading [it] nowhere.”

Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) said that “both carrots and sticks” are necessary to change North Korea’s behavior. He said the United States should discuss a nonaggression pact with North Korea and work with China to stem the “enormous subsidies” that Beijing sends to Pyongyang.

Davies said that negotiations with North Korea are a “multilateral task” and the United States is making progress working with countries in the region, including China, to push North Korea to take steps toward denuclearization in order to resume negotiations. Washington is also unilaterally tightening sanctions that “increase the cost” of North Korea’s illicit activities, he said.

North Korea committed to denuclearization in a 2005 joint statement with the other members of the six-party talks, but more recently, Pyongyang has said that it wants negotiations on its nuclear program to resume without any preconditions. (See ACT, November 2013.)

Those talks began in 2003 with the goal of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. The multilateral negotiations were held intermittently until North Korea announced in April 2009 that it would no longer participate.

Washington has also negotiated bilaterally with North Korea in the past.

Pyongyang is believed to possess the nuclear material for approximately four to eight nuclear weapons and is working to increase its stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear material. (See ACT, January/February 2014.)

At a July 30 hearing, members of Congress questioned the Obama administration’s policy toward negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program.

Profile: State Dept. Targets ‘Generation Prague’

Kelsey Davenport

Since 2010, the State Department has hosted an annual conference on arms control and disarmament to support President Barack Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons, with students and young professionals in the field as its principal target audience.

In interviews, participants in the conferences praised the meetings while suggesting ways to strengthen the effort.

The State Department uses the term “Generation Prague” to refer to the conferences and the next generation of professionals working in arms control. The term is an allusion to Obama’s speech outlining nuclear policy in Prague on April 5, 2009.

The State Department created the Generation Prague concept in 2010 to provide a “forum and framework for collaboration” with young professionals, students, and foreign governments that were energized by the Prague speech, Erin Harbaugh, outreach officer for the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 25 e-mail.

Now in its fifth year, Generation Prague is an event for “educating and empowering the next generation,” Alexandra Bell, director for strategic outreach in the Office of the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, said in the same e-mail.

Young people view nuclear weapons “through a completely different lens” in comparison to other generations because many were born after the Cold War, Bell said. The conferences give emerging leaders an opportunity to discuss nuclear policies that will fit in a more interconnected world, she said.

Making Disarmament ‘Relatable’

Participants at the conference said they benefited from the experience. For Brenna Gautam, a senior at the University of Notre Dame who attended the conference while working as an intern in Washington, the gathering presented “a more relatable image of the issue of disarmament and arms control.” Gautam, a co-founder of her university’s Global Zero chapter, said in an Aug. 20 e-mail that this is important because she feels that nuclear disarmament is “not a very personal issue” for her generation.

Erin Corcoran, a recent college graduate with an interest in the field, said in an Aug. 21 e-mail that, for young professionals to continue making progress in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, it is important to learn about the gravity of the threat posed by these weapons from “predecessors who lived and worked through the Cold War.”

Officials also say they benefit from the conferences. An Energy Department official said in a July 28 interview that the students and young professionals at Generation Prague have “challenged and broadened his thinking.” He said experts need to be reminded that youth “view the value of nuclear weapons differently” because the weapons do not have the same deterrent value today as they did during the Cold War.

One of the young professionals he mentioned was Kingston Reif, who participated in a 2011 panel and is now the director of nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Reif said in an Aug. 20 e-mail that he was motivated to participate because nuclear threat reduction is the responsibility not only of previous generations, “but our generation and future generations as well.”

Although the conferences bring in high-level officials such as Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, Bell said the State Department has also worked to bring in experts from the “policy trenches” to ensure that the “audience gets an idea of how policy is working from top to bottom.”

Shane Mason said he appreciated the opportunity to meet experts who have been in the field for five to 10 years and support high-level officials. Mason, a research associate at the Stimson Center, said in an Aug. 20 e-mail that these experts provide “practical insights” about finding jobs and developing the necessary skills for the field.

Increasing Participation

Mason said that barriers to careers, particularly at the State Department, “seem pretty insurmountable at times.” Although he acknowledged that budget constraints make hiring difficult, Mason said that young people will not stay in the field if they cannot find jobs.

Bell said a “key driver” for reaching out to young people is demographics, as many experts who “built the arms control and nonproliferation regimes” are reaching retirement age. The State Department “wants to recruit their replacements” and is looking for new ways to hire the next generation of leaders, she said.

Despite the difficulties finding jobs, the number of young people involved in nuclear issues at the global level apparently is growing. Meena Singelee, who has tracked participation by young experts attending conferences that are part of the review process for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said the numbers have “gradually increased” since 2010, due in part to “renewed momentum” on disarmament issues and “new priorities” in areas such as nuclear security.

Singelee, executive director of the International Network Emerging Nuclear Specialists, said there remains a “lack of significant participation by young experts from developing countries,” she said.

The State Department is looking to expand Generation Prague to reach international audiences. Bell noted that the State Department has paired with international partners such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and representatives from countries including Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Harbaugh said that the State Department sees Generation Prague as “one part of a larger push to engage global youth” and welcomes collaborators.

Moving Forward

Several participants agreed that the conferences could accomplish more. Corcoran said that small-group discussions at future conferences might be useful so that there would be more opportunities to “directly engage” with some of the experts.

Reif suggested that the State Department work with universities on events that bring officials to campuses to “demonstrate that nuclear weapons are not just a problem of the past.”

Gautam agreed and suggested that the State Department work with pre-existing clubs on college campuses that are dedicated to arms control issues. She said a stronger online presence could be helpful in reaching out to students who cannot attend events such as the annual conference in Washington. Streaming the conference live would be a good step, she said.

Harbaugh said that the State Department wants to partner with universities and nongovernmental organizations to “offer more opportunities through the year, in and out of Washington.”

She said plans are already underway for next year’s conference and that organizers hope to make it more “interactive.”

For the past five years, the State Department has hosted an annual conference on arms control and disarmament to heighten interest in the issue among students and young professionals.

Iran, P5+1 Extend Nuclear Talks

Kelsey Davenport

Iran and six-country group known as the P5+1 agreed in July to extend negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program through Nov. 24, a step officials said they hope will give the parties enough time to find solutions to the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement.

The negotiators originally aimed to conclude a comprehensive agreement by July 20, which marked the end of the implementation of a six-month interim agreement. But the interim accord, which the parties reached last Nov. 24, allows for the initial six-month time period to be extended if all parties agree. (See ACT, December 2013.)

In a joint statement announcing the extension in Vienna on July 19, Iranian Foreign Minister and lead nuclear negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif and Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief and lead negotiator for the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), said they had made “tangible progress” in some areas but that “significant gaps on core issues” will require “more time and effort” to reach an agreement.

The statement did not give an exact date for the resumption of negotiations, but said that the parties would reconvene “in the coming weeks in different formats.”

On Aug. 7, U.S. officials, led by Wendy Sherman, the lead U.S. negotiator and undersecretary of state for political affairs, met with Iranian officials in Geneva to discuss the nuclear negotiations.

A European diplomat familiar with the talks told Arms Control Today in an Aug. 14 e-mail that negotiators would likely meet before the UN General Assembly convenes Sept. 16. A ministerial-level meeting during the General Assembly is probable, he said.

He said both sides “remained entrenched” on the issue of Iran’s uranium-enrichment program. A comprehensive agreement is unlikely unless both sides are willing to move away from “extreme positions” on what uranium-enrichment capacity Iran needs in the years to come, he said.

Iranian officials have opposed any cuts to the current capacity, which is about 10,200 operating first-generation centrifuges, and want to build up a program that will allow them to provide enriched-uranium fuel for domestic nuclear power reactors Tehran says it plans to build. Iran currently has one nuclear power reactor, Bushehr, and has a contract with Russia for the reactor’s fuel through 2021.

The P5+1 wants to cut Iran’s current capacity and maintain strict limits on uranium enrichment for a number of years.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who joined negotiators July 13-15 in Vienna, said in a statement after the extension announcement that, despite the gaps, there is a “path forward.”

Both sides committed to continue implementation of the measures from the six-month interim agreement and agreed to take several additional steps before Nov. 24. For example, Iran agreed to convert 25 kilograms of 20 percent-enriched uranium powder into fuel assemblies for its Tehran Research Reactor.

During the term of the interim agreement, Iran neutralized its stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium gas by diluting half to reactor-grade enrichment levels of less than 5 percent and converting the other half to powder form for fuel assemblies. Kerry said that implementation of the interim agreement was a “clear success” and rolled back parts of Iran’s nuclear program for the first time in a decade.

The stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium in gas form was a particular concern to the P5+1 because uranium enriched to this level is more easily enriched further to weapons grade.

The P5+1 committed to allow Iran to transfer $2.8 billion of its funds locked up in overseas accounts back into the country over the course of the four-month extension. U.S. sanctions have prohibited foreign banks from transferring payments for Iranian exports such as oil to Iranian banks. (See ACT, July/August 2012.)

IAEA-Iran Cooperation

Meanwhile, Yukiya Amano, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), visited Tehran on Aug. 17 to discuss how to “strengthen cooperation and dialogue” between the agency and Iran, according to an Aug. 15 IAEA press release.

During his one-day visit, Amano met with President Hassan Rouhani, Zarif, and Ali Akbar Salehi, chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

In comments to the press during his visit, Amano said he discussed with Iranian officials how to “move ahead with existing practical measures.”

He was referring to a May 21 joint announcement in which Tehran pledged to provide the agency with information in five areas of concern to the IAEA by Aug. 25. (See ACT, June 2014.) Amano said implementation of these measures had begun and he expected further progress to be made over the next week.

These actions are part of a November agreement, the Framework for Cooperation, in which Iran and the IAEA committed to “resolve all present and past issues.” (See ACT, December 2013.) The IAEA laid out its concerns, including allegations of activities with possible relevance for developing nuclear weapons, in detail in its November 2011 report to the agency’s Board of Governors. (See ACT, December 2011.)

As one of the May actions, Tehran was to provide the IAEA with information addressing allegations that Iran conducted experiments with certain kinds of high explosives that could be relevant to nuclear weapons. Iran also said it would provide information on studies “in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials,” another area with direct connections to nuclear weapons development.

Detonators

Under one provision of the November framework agreement, Iran provided the IAEA with information by May on its past work on exploding bridge wire detonators, which is one of the activities relevant to developing nuclear weapons. Iran maintained in its communications to the agency that the detonators were developed for use in the oil and gas industry. (See ACT, June 2014.)

Amano said the IAEA “followed up” on issues related to the information Iran provided on the exploding bridge wire detonators during his visit. Salehi told reporters on Aug. 17 that Iran “responded to all of the questions” Amano asked about the detonators and said he hoped Amano would “wrap up” this topic. Salehi said future steps would be easier if the topic were closed.

Amano, however, said that to assess Iran’s need for the detonators, the agency will need to consider “all past outstanding issues” and assess them as an entire system.

Amano said he and Iranian officials also discussed new measures that Iran is to take “in the near future” to address the agency’s unresolved concerns about Tehran’s nuclear program.

Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, who was in Tehran during Amano’s visit, said on Aug. 18 that Iran is trying to resolve its problems with the agency while protecting Iran’s “principles, interests, and national security.” He said he hoped this cooperation would continue but that some IAEA requests are “irrational” and unacceptable to Iran.

Iran has provided the IAEA with information to address 13 areas of concern since the November agreement. After the August talks, Amano said he was glad to hear “from the highest levels [of the Iranian government] a firm commitment to implementation” of the November agreement.

Amano said that the IAEA remains committed to “resolve all past and present issues.”

 


 

Kelsey Davenport’s reporting from Vienna was supported by a grant from the Heinrich Böll Foundation North America.

Iran and six world powers agreed to a four-month extension for negotiations on a comprehensive deal addressing Iran’s nuclear program.

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