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Right after I graduated, I interned with the Arms Control Association. It was terrific.

– George Stephanopolous
Host of ABC's This Week
January 1, 2005
Iraq

Army Report Details Patriot Record in Iraq War

Wade Boese

A new Army report reaffirms earlier Pentagon claims that the Patriot missile defense system destroyed all Iraqi missiles that it engaged during the invasion of Iraq, but does not fully account for why the system failed to target several other Iraqi missiles fired at U.S. forces and Kuwait. The report also describes several operational challenges to the system’s performance that emerged in the buildup to and unfolding of the conflict.

The 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, which is charged with protecting U.S. ground forces from air and missile attacks, recently released its account of “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” As part of that history, the command reports that the Patriot missile defense system, which is designed to destroy short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, scored a perfect nine for nine in intercepting Iraqi missiles. Colonel Charles Anderson, chief of staff of the command, wrote, “The critics concerns over Patriot lethality should be forever silenced.”

Yet Iraq fired at least 23 ballistic and cruise missiles, according to the report, during the three-week span it took U.S. forces to fight their way to Baghdad and topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Of the 14 Iraqi missiles not engaged by Patriots, four were reported as outside the range of any Patriot system and one exploded shortly after launch. No official explanation is given for why the other nine Iraqi missiles were not fired upon, though the report implied that at least three might have been because their trajectories were judged to be non-threatening.

Patriots also did not down any Iraqi cruise missiles, which are powered for their whole flight, can maneuver, and fly at low altitudes. Due to these flight characteristics, a cruise missile can be difficult for radars to track or confused with aircraft.

Although dismissing several Iraqi cruise missile attacks that caused no casualties as ineffective, the report acknowledged, “continued [cruise missile] attacks may have forced us to change our tactics.” The report later added that “the ability of these older cruise missiles to penetrate friendly airspace and reach their targets should serve as a warning…that the emerging cruise missile threat must be addressed.”


The other Iraqi missile that presented a special challenge was the short-range FROG-7 missile. Because of their brief flight times, the missiles must be detected and engaged within roughly 90 seconds, forcing Patriot commanders to make rapid firing decisions. The report recommended that the Army consider putting more senior officers in charge of Patriot batteries in the future to ensure effective decision-making.

Iraq did not launch any Scud missiles, which an earlier version of the Patriot had little success against in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Originally built by the Soviet Union and sold prolifically, Scuds are aging, short-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a several hundred kilogram payload.

The report also pointed out difficulties in getting the Patriot systems up and running. The Iraqis, who waited to fire any missiles at U.S. forces until after the invasion started, might have caught U.S. forces unprepared to use Patriots if they had attacked earlier.

Up until just two days before the U.S. invasion began, Patriot radar systems were regularly malfunctioning due to the harsh environmental conditions. Raytheon, the Patriot manufacturer, sent engineers out to the field to get the systems working properly.

Once hostilities commenced, another problem arose. Due to the enormous amount of electronic equipment involved in the fast-moving battle, there was, in the report’s term, “cluttered cyberspace.” Electronic signals interfered with each other, creating confusion for radars and communication systems. The report said this could have contributed to one Patriot’s mistaken intercept of a U.S. fighter aircraft. Another Patriot destroyed a British jet.

An analysis should be done on battlefield electromagnetic interference and new tactics and techniques should be created to deal with the problem, the report recommended. It further stated that these should be “applicable to the environment in the Korean Theater of Operations.” The United States is currently in a standoff with North Korea over its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and roughly 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. These forces are equipped with Patriots.

Although Patriots are mobile and some moved forward with U.S. troops into Iraq, the report stressed that the system should be better designed to operate “cross-country” or off-road. “Since the armed forces of the United States are now an offensive force (as opposed to the Cold War, defense of Europe orientation) it is imperative that Patriot become more mobile and able to sustain maneuver over time,” the report concluded.

U.S. forces possess three versions of Patriot missiles. The newest is the Patriot Advanced Capability-3, which accounted for two of the nine Iraqi missile kills.

The Army Inspector General is also conducting a study on the Patriot’s performance and U.S. Central Command is investigating the two friendly-fire incidents.

A new Army report reaffirms earlier Pentagon claims that the Patriot missile defense system destroyed all Iraqi missiles that it engaged during the invasion of Iraq...

Deconstructed: Kay's Congressional Testimony

Paul Kerr

Biological Weapons

David Kay, chief U.S. weapons inspector, told Congress that “Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of [biological weapons] agents” and that Iraq concealed relevant “equipment and materials” from UN inspectors in violation of Security Council Resolution 1441. His most prominent piece of evidence, however, was that an Iraqi scientist hid “a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced” in his home; Kay later acknowledged that the vial had been hidden in the scientist’s home since 1993. Kay also said that a “very large body of information has been developed…that confirms” Iraq’s concealment efforts, but he did not elaborate.

Additionally, Kay said the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has “not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile [biological weapons] production effort” and that the group’s investigation into two trailers discovered last spring is so far inconclusive. A May CIA report claimed that the two trailers were for producing biological weapons, apparently vindicating the administration’s prewar claims that Iraq possessed such mobile production units. The Department of State, however, has expressed doubts about the trailers’ purpose.

The ISG also found that:

· Iraqi scientists experimented with “nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents.” For example, they conducted experiments with a substitute for anthrax that would have been “directly applicable” to producing anthrax for weapons.
· Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were “explicitly ordered not to declare” a prison laboratory complex that was possibly used in human testing of biological weapons agents.
· New research was being conducted on biological-weapon applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, and that continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.
· Iraq never declared a “clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus.” The network “was suitable for preserving [biological weapons] expertise, [biological weapons] capable facilities and continuing R&D [research and development]—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming biological weapons production.” The ISG is “still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or…weapons.”

Chemical Weapons

Iraq “did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled chemical weapons program after 1991. Information found to date suggests that Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced—if not entirely destroyed—during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions, and UN inspections.”

Still, the ISG has “developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of chemical weapons production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003.”

Nuclear Weapons

“Iraqi scientists and senior government officials” told the ISG that “Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons” and “assert that Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point,” perhaps “after Iraq was free of sanctions.” In 2000, Iraq “began several small and relatively unsophisticated dual-use research initiatives,” but the ISG has no evidence that the research was applied to weapons production.

The ISG has “not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material” although “Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.” These steps include directing scientists to perform work to “preserve the science base and core skills that would be needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear weapons development.” The ISG “has found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program.”

“Several [Iraqi] scientists—at the direction of senior Iraqi government officials—preserved documents and equipment from their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not reveal” them to the UN. These items would have been “useful” for uranium-enrichment programs, according to Kay.

Delivery Systems

Missiles

Kay’s statement indicates that Iraq was conducting R&D on several different missile projects designed to produce missiles with ranges exceeding the 150 km permitted under Security Council resolutions. Kay told reporters Oct. 2 that the ISG is still trying to determine whether the missiles were intended to carry conventional or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) payloads.

UN weapons inspectors ordered Iraq to destroy its al Samoud missiles, which Iraq declared to the UN in December 2002, in February 2003 because the missiles exceeded the permitted range. Baghdad was in the process of doing so when the invasion began.

Kay cited several Iraqi missile programs:

· Beginning in 1999, Iraq attempted to acquire technology from North Korea for “surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1,300 km…and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300 km.” No such transfers actually occurred.
· “[S]ources” told ISG that, beginning in 2000, Hussein “ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400 km and up to 1,000 km.” These projects appeared to include liquid and solid propellant missiles. Work on the former “had [apparently] progressed to a point to support initial prototype production of some parts and assemblies.” It is unclear as to whether work on the latter had progressed past the design phase.
· “[T]estimony from missile designers” indicates “that Iraq…reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250 km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of [the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission].”
· Kay said Iraq had two cruise missile programs. The first was to increase the range of its HY-2 coastal-defense cruise missile from 100 km to 150-180 km, according to “multiple sources of testimony…corroborated in part by a captured document.” Iraq produced 10 of these missiles, and two were fired during the invasion. The second, aimed at converting the same missile into a land-attack cruise missile with a 1,000 km range, began in 2001, but “Iraq halted engine development and testing and disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design criteria had been met.”

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

According to Iraqi officials, Iraq had several UAV programs. A prototype of one flew well beyond its permitted range during a 2002 test flight. However, Kay said that whether these vehicles were “intended” to deliver WMD “remains an open question.” Iraq had such a program before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and UN inspectors were still investigating the matter as of the March 2003 invasion.

Inspectors' Difficulties

Kay said the ISG has faced difficulties performing its work:

· Iraq engaged in “systematic sanitization of documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts to erase evidence—hard drives destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all traces of use—are ones of deliberate, rather than random, acts.”
· Iraqi officials dispersed “material and documentation related to weapons programs” and may have taken “evidence and…weapons-related materials” to other countries.
· Both ISG personnel and knowledgeable Iraqis are subject to safety threats. For example, Kay stated that ISG facilities and personnel were attacked three times in September alone and told FOX News Sunday Oct. 5 that one scientist was assassinated the same day he spoke to ISG inspectors.
· Iraq undertook extensive concealment efforts, such as co-locating unmarked chemical ordnance with large stocks of conventional munitions.

 

 

David Kay, chief U.S. weapons inspector, told Congress that “Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities...

Effort to Find WMD in Iraq Comes Up Short

Paul Kerr

The U.S.-led effort to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has so far found no evidence that Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons or that it was actively reconstituting its nuclear weapons program at the time coalition forces invaded Iraq this past March. Administration officials insist, however, the search’s results to date justify their decision to go to war.

David Kay, a former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector leading the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), testified before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees Oct. 2 about the group’s progress. (Click here for a deconstruction of Kay's testimony). The ISG is the task force coordinating the search effort. Kay’s testimony revealed that Iraq was pursuing low-level, dual-use biological research and development (R&D) efforts, may have considered plans to produce chemical weapons, had a rudimentary R&D effort in dual-use nuclear technology, and was pursuing several programs to develop missiles that exceeded the range permitted under relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Still, before the war, U.S. officials were more expansive in their claim, saying Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, and possessed prohibited missiles.

Kay cautioned Oct. 2 that the report “does not represent a final reckoning of Iraq’s WMD programs” and that “much remains to be done.” He added that continuing the weapons search is necessary for several reasons: learning lessons to improve the quality of future intelligence; stopping terrorists and Iraqi insurgents from acquiring WMD that may remain in the country; and keeping weapons, information, and expertise from spreading elsewhere. Kay told National Public Radio Oct. 5 that the task force could complete its mission in six to nine months.

Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James R. Clapper Jr., head of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, told reporters Oct. 28 that he personally believes Iraqi officials decided to move prohibited weapons materials to Syria prior to the war. He based his belief on pre-invasion satellite imagery showing a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria.

Administration officials insist that Kay’s report justified taking military action because it revealed that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein intended to acquire prohibited weapons and was concealing the means to produce them. President George W. Bush told reporters Oct. 3 that the Kay report proves Iraq “was a threat, a serious danger.”

Secretary of State Colin Powell argued in an Oct. 7 Washington Post op-ed that Iraq’s failure to declare its dual-use equipment and activities to UN weapons inspectors placed it in material breach of its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. He added that Iraq intended to develop WMD despite the presence of inspectors. Vice President Dick Cheney stated in an Oct. 3 speech that Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, “deemed” Iraq’s material breach “to be sufficient cause to go to war.”

However, Resolution 1441 required the Security Council only to “consider” any instances of reported Iraqi noncompliance, rather than providing an automatic authorization for invasion. Moreover, the inspectors reported that prior to the March invasion Iraq was gradually increasing its cooperation with inspectors, although Iraq had not met its requirement to provide the Security Council with a complete declaration of its weapons programs and related activities.

Kay’s findings also challenge the Bush administration’s persistent dismissal of containment and UN weapons inspections as a useful means of checking Hussein’s WMD ambitions. According to an Oct. 27 article in The New Republic, Kay told reporters Oct. 3 that ISG workers have “been struck…by how often [Iraqi scientists] refer to the impact of sanctions” in constraining Iraq’s WMD programs.

 

 

The U.S.-led effort to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has so far found no evidence that Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons or that it was...

Battle Brewing Over Congressional Investigations

As Congress probes the Bush administration’s failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, battle lines are forming over how far the investigations should go. The Republican chairs of both the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence are eager to limit political damage to the White House and have limited their inquiries to examining how the intelligence community carried out its work.

Democrats insist the panels need to look beyond the quality of information that was supplied to President George W. Bush. They also want the investigations to look at whether Bush or his aides intentionally exaggerated claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons capabilities in order to bolster their case for war. “I think the central question here is, frankly: Was there a predetermination to go to war on the part of the administration….Or was there faulty intelligence,” Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.), vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in an appearance Oct. 26 on Meet the Press.

Republicans dispute the idea that Bush intentionally misled the American people. Senate Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) told USA Today and the Washington Post that his inquiry found no evidence that the White House pressured intelligence officials.

Roberts’ assessment was bolstered to some extent by remarks from Carl W. Ford Jr., the State Department’s newly retired intelligence chief. The intelligence community “has to bear the major responsibility for WMD information in Iraq and other intelligence failures,” Ford said in remarks published in the Oct. 29 Los Angeles Times. “We badly underperformed for a number of years,” he
added, “and the information we were giving the policy community was off the mark.”

But at a hearing of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee Oct. 24, Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, said the intelligence committee’s inquiry is “missing half” the issue. Levin is conducting his own inquiry, and Rockefeller has said he will launch an additional committee review to look at the administration’s use of intelligence if the majority refuses to do so.

Both Senate Democrats and Republicans grouse about the administration’s willingness to cooperate with the investigations. On Oct. 29, Roberts and Rockefeller sent a sharply-worded letter to CIA Director George Tenet after he demanded that top CIA officials be given the opportunity to respond to the panel’s preliminary findings. The letter called for the agency to provide the panel with needed information and schedule any interviews within two days. “The committee has been patient,” the senators wrote, “but we need immediate access to this information.”

The battle over the congressional investigations follows news that the Iraq Survey Group has so far failed to find actual weapons in Iraq. The head weapons inspector of that group, David Kay, received a mixed response from Congress when he briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees Oct. 2 on his “interim progress” report. Neither party could be said to be overjoyed, however, particularly after Kay told lawmakers that he needed another six to nine months and more than half-a-billion dollars to complete what many see as a fruitless investigation. The Bush administration is seeking an additional $600 million for Kay to continue his search, part of an $87 billion fiscal 2004 supplemental spending bill to pay for reconstruction costs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To be sure, there were some Republicans who saw bright spots in the report. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, took an entirely different spin from his colleagues. “Basically, I think the news is extremely good,” he stated, contending that Kay’s report actually reaffirms the administration’s decision to go to war. —With Roxane Assaf

 

 

 

 

 

As Congress probes the Bush administration’s failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, battle lines are forming over how far the investigations should go.

Key Hill Panel Faults Intelligence Community for Flawed Iraq Analysis;

Paul Kerr

As the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues without any weapons discoveries and the Bush administration steadily retreats from some of its earlier claims, a key congressional committee has reportedly issued a harsh critique of the intelligence community’s Iraq analysis. The administration has been promising for months that questions surrounding its so far unproven claims about Iraq’s arsenals would be resolved by a report from a CIA task force headed by David Kay, a former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspector. But administration officials have recently cast doubt on whether that report will ever be made public.

“I would not count on [public] reports,” National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told reporters during a press briefing Sept. 22. During a Sept. 28 appearance on FOX News Sunday, Rice said Kay’s “progress report” is “likely not to draw...major conclusions.” She added that the administration “will make known [Kay’s] findings” but did not say if the report would be released to the public.

Bush officials continue to insist that evidence of programs to produce prohibited weapons, as well as weapons themselves, will be found. However, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James Conway said during a Sept. 9 press briefing that Iraqi weapons “were not at the operational level.”

The Washington Post reported Sept. 28 that Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and ranking member Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.) sent a letter Sept. 25 to CIA Director George Tenet criticizing the intelligence community for lacking the ability to collect new evidence about Iraqi weapons capabilities and relying on “past assessments.” The letter adds that the intelligence community took “the absence of proof” that Iraq had destroyed prohibited weapons as “proof that they continued to exist.” CIA spokesman Bill Harlow called the letter’s findings “premature and wrong,” according to the Post.

Retreating

During the past few months, administration officials have backtracked from their earlier assertions about Iraq’s weapons. Prior to the invasion, officials vigorously asserted that Baghdad possessed weapons of mass destruction. (See ACT, July/August 2003 and September 2003.) In public statements since June, however, officials have stressed that inspectors are certain to find evidence of weapons programs rather than actual weapons.

Two senior administration officials recently corrected claims they made months ago. During a Sept. 10 press conference, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that his March 30 claim that “we know where…[Iraq’s WMD] are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad” was inaccurate and said he should have stated that “our intelligence tells us they’re in that area.”

Similarly, Vice President Dick Cheney told NBC’s Meet the Press Sept. 14 that he misspoke when he said during a March 16 interview that Iraq had “reconstituted nuclear weapons” and that he merely meant to say Iraq had the “capability” to develop such weapons—a claim he had repeated earlier in the show.

The vice president then went on to make a number of questionable charges. For instance, he said an Iraqi scientist came forward with “full designs” for a gas centrifuge “system,” as well as the “key parts” to “build such a system.” That scientist, however, had hidden the parts since 1991 and an IAEA official said the component set was incomplete and the documents appeared to contain errors. (See ACT, September 2003.) Gas centrifuges can be used to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Cheney also asserted that Iraq possessed mobile units to produce biological weapons, citing the discovery of two trailers that, according to the CIA, were designed for this purpose. A Department of State memorandum, however, expresses doubts about whether the trailers were built to produce biological weapons. (See ACT, July/August 2003 and June 2003.)
Moreover, Cheney stated that he had never seen a 2002 report by former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson that calls into question intelligence reports accusing Iraq of trying to acquire uranium in Niger—a key component of the administration’s nuclear weapons charges against Iraq. In a Sept. 16 interview, Wilson argued that he believed the government’s system for getting such information to senior officials would had to have changed significantly in order for Cheney’s account to be true. (See ACT, September 2003.)

As the possibility of finding weapons or significant weapons programs recedes, officials have continued to stress other motives for the Iraq invasion. Secretary of State Colin Powell argued during a Sept. 28 television appearance that Saddam Hussein’s appalling human rights record, along with suspected ties to terrorists and WMD activities, justified the invasion. In a Sept. 5 interview, Richard Haass, the State Department’s recently departed director of policy planning maintained there was “a menu of arguments” for the invasion, including “the feeling that we had to score a geopolitical victory” in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The IAEA Reports


Meanwhile, the IAEA says it had found no evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq by the time it left the country March 18, according to a report summarizing IAEA inspection activities pertaining to Iraq since September 2002 and released during the Sept. 15-19 general conference. However, the report adds that the agency did not have enough time to completely resolve questions over whether Iraq’s capabilities had changed since December 1998, when Iraq stopped cooperating with inspectors.

The report goes on to say that the IAEA would have been able to provide “credible assurance” that Iraq had not revived its nuclear program “within an additional two to three months of continuing verification activities.”

The document also summarizes the agency’s June 7-23 inspection of the Tuwaitha nuclear complex following reports that nuclear material had been looted during the March invasion. (See ACT, July/August 2003). The inspectors estimated that at least 10 kilograms of uranium compounds could have been dispersed but that the materials are not a proliferation concern.

 

 

 

 

As the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues without any weapons discoveries and the Bush administration steadily retreats from some of its earlier claims...

Iraq Inquiry Winds Down; Blair Suffers Political Blow

Daniel Koik

As Lord Hutton prepares to wrap up his investigation into the suicide of arms expert David Kelly, it seems that British Prime Minister Tony Blair will escape legal charges that his government had falsified and exaggerated pre-war intelligence information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yet, Blair is hardly in the clear: the investigation’s revelations about the Blair government’s handling of intelligence and its treatment of Kelly have significantly damaged the Labor leader’s political standing.

The Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded in a Sept. 11 report that, during the preparation of a September 2002 dossier documenting British intelligence analysis of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, the Blair government had not applied political pressure on the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was in charge of drafting the dossier. Referring to a May 29 report by BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan that alleged such pressure and first sparked the controversy, the ISC said, “The dossier was not ‘sexed up’ by Alastair Cambell or anyone else.”

Testifying before the committee, Blair said he took the nation to war because he was concerned that an Iraqi WMD capability would develop “into a nexus between terrorism and WMD.” He noted that “time will tell whether it’s true or not true.”

The committee also criticized some of the claims within the dossier for their lack of clarity and context. In particular, the committee said the dossier should have emphasized that, although it could determine if Iraq had developed biological and chemical capabilities, it did not have firm intelligence of exactly what had been produced and in what quantities. The committee also said that the Blair government had not placed in its proper context a claim that Iraq was prepared to use biological or chemical weapons on 45 minutes’ notice. The panel said that this charge had originally referred merely to battlefield munitions and not any larger strategic capabilities.

The 45-minute claim has been at the center of the intelligence controversy. In his May BBC report, Gilligan had cited an unnamed senior intelligence official “in charge of drawing up that dossier,” later acknowledged to be Kelly. Gilligan said the official asserted that the claim had been added over the criticisms of the intelligence community at the insistence of Downing Street. In June, Gilligan wrote in the Sunday Mail that, according to his source, Blair communications director Alastair Cambell had given the order.

Government officials have continued to deny that there was any government pressure over that or any other claim made in the dossier. (See ACT, September 2003.)

In his second appearance before the Hutton Inquiry, Campbell again said that he had only been involved with the creation of the dossiers in a “presentational” role and that he had not had any say in the substance of the report.

Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 Secret Intelligence Service, made a rare public appearance to testify before the inquiry that he had personally followed the creation of the dossier throughout its creation and that he was satisfied with the process. Dearlove said that he had considered the 45-minute claim to be “well-sourced.” He was “bemused” by the accusation that good intelligence could not come from a single source, saying that many reports produced by MI6 are single-source yet are still considered to be reliable. Dearlove did say, however, that “in hindsight” it should have been made clearer that the claim referred to short-range battlefield weapons.

To be sure, John Scarlett, the head of the JIC, admitted that he had revised the dossier after receiving an e-mail from Blair’s chief of staff Jonathan Powell, removing a reference stating that Saddam would only use biological or chemical weapons when “under threat.” Powell’s e-mail asked Scarlett to redraft the statement, because it would have supported arguments that Hussein would only be a threat if attacked.

But in his testimony, Scarlett argued that the e-mail only made him re-examine the statement and that removing the explicit phrase was justified given recent intelligence that placed Iraqi WMD and its importance in the context of Hussein’s “perception of his regional position, his plans to acquire and maintain regional influence and, as one report, and maybe more, put it: dominate his neighbors.” Given this interpretation, he said that removing the phrase permitted him to act within his instruction from the JIC to keep the dossier in line with the most recent intelligence.

Kelly was found dead July 18 after becoming caught up in a conflict between the Blair government and the BBC over Gilligan’s accusations. The government has faced strong criticism over the way Kelly’s name was revealed to the public. Representatives of the Kelly family have accused the government of using Kelly as “a pawn in their political battle with the BBC.”

Blair has seen his popularity plummet as a result of the crisis and late September polls in the Guardian show that 61 percent of British voters are unhappy with the job he is doing as prime minister and that only 38 percent now believe the war in Iraq was justified.

Facing even greater political trouble is Secretary of Defense Geoff Hoon. Hoon already faced substantial public criticism for his role in revealing Kelly’s identity as Gilligan’s source. But the ISC report also disclosed that Hoon had failed to disclose that two aides had submitted written concerns about the dossier to him prior to its publication. The ISC characterized this failure as “unhelpful and potentially misleading,” leading Conservative leader Ian Duncan Smith to call for Hoon’s resignation. Hoon said that he regretted any “misunderstanding,” but a September 5 poll in the Sunday mail showed that 62 percent of the British public backed Smith’s call for Hoon’s resignation.

The Hutton Inquiry and the ISC are two of the three committees that have investigated the British governments handling of Iraqi intelligence. The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee also concluded in July that Blair and his advisers did not interfere in the creation of dossiers.

 

 

 

As Lord Hutton prepares to wrap up his investigation into the suicide of arms expert David Kelly, it seems that British Prime Minister Tony Blair will escape...

Putting the Kay Report on Iraqi WMD in Perspective: Experts and Resources From the Arms Control Association

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: September 25, 2003

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball: (202) 463-8270 x107;
Paul Kerr, Research Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102


(Washington, D.C.): News reports today suggest that a much anticipated report by the Bush administration's top Iraqi weapons inspector David Kay will not offer conclusive evidence supporting the administration's pre-war claims that Iraq had accumulated extensive stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons or revived its pursuit of nuclear weapons. If true, it's ever clearer that Iraq did not pose the urgent threat that the administration charged.

"The Bush administration should be forthright about the Kay report, publish its findings, and explain to Congress and the American people why it used discredited and disputed claims about the Iraqi WMD threat to make its case for war," recommended ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball today.

Outside arms control experts argued before the March invasion of Iraq that the international arms inspection and disarmament process initiated after the 1991 Persian Gulf War had successfully led to the dismantlement of the bulk of Iraq's illicit weapons programs. They further contended that the return of UN arms inspectors to Iraq last November would constrain Saddam Hussein from developing or hiding militarily significant quantities of weapons and urged greater Iraqi cooperation in resolving outstanding concerns.

The work of the UN weapons inspectors between November 2002 and March 2003 substantiated these claims. They did not unearth any evidence proving Iraq had resumed major weapons activities, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. But the Bush administration belittled and dismissed these reports and disparaged the arms inspection process as ineffective, arguing that the arms inspectors could not account for some weapons and materials that Iraq had prior to 1991. Yet, the lead UN arms inspector, Hans Blix, cautioned that one should not equate "not accounted-for with existing." Blix now says that as more time passes without dramatic weapons discoveries, it is increasingly plausible that Iraq may have destroyed its illegal weapons during the 1990's.

Blix's view is shared by former UN weapons inspector Frank Ronald Cleminson, who wrote an article on the Iraqi weapons search in the September 2003 Arms Control Today. Cleminson's article can be accessed on the ACA Web site's Iraq resource page, <http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iraq/>, along with other information on Iraq, including a July 9 press conference with former State Department intelligence official Greg Thielmann charging that the administration exaggerated the case for war, <http://www.armscontrol.org/events/iraq_july03.asp>.

Also available on the ACA Web site:
· An extensive June 16 Arms Control Today interview with Hans Blix;
· A comparison of the Bush administration's claims about Iraq's nuclear program with U.S. intelligence and UN weapons inspectors' assessments;
· A chronology of Bush administration statements on Iraqi efforts to import uranium from Niger; and
· Reports on the record of arms inspectors in Iraq.

Media interviews with Cleminson, Thielmann, and Jonathan Tucker, a chemical and biological weapons expert who participated in the UN arms inspections process, can be arranged through the Arms Control Association.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies to address security threats posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as conventional arms.

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Bush's Claims About Iraq's Nuclear Program

Paul Kerr

Vice President Dick Cheney stated three days before U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq this past March that Iraq “has reconstituted nuclear weapons.” At the time, however, intelligence and other U.S. officials already disagreed about the evidence behind his statement, and events over the last few months have deepened doubts among the general public and members of Congress.

The international community discovered after Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War that Iraq had a much more advanced nuclear weapons program than either the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had suspected. The IAEA was charged with undertaking inspections to ensure that Iraq complied with disarmament requirements mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 687, but the United Nations withdrew the inspectors in December 1998 after Iraq stopped cooperating with them. The agency, however, reported in 1999 that, based on the inspectors’ work until that time, there was “no indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material, or that Iraq has retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material.”

The IAEA also cautioned that this statement was “not the same as a statement of [the weapons] ‘non-existence.’” A 2001 Department of Defense report added that Iraq “still retains sufficient skilled and experienced scientists and engineers as well as weapons design information that could allow it to restart a weapons program.”

The absence of inspectors, combined with the remaining uncertainty regarding Iraq’s nuclear program, created concern that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 in November 2002, requiring Iraq to comply fully with its disarmament requirements under relevant Security Council resolutions. Inspections resumed later that month. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the Security Council March 7 that the inspectors had “found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.”

The administration’s contention that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program has several components. President George W. Bush cited three pieces of evidence in an October 7, 2002, speech that “Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program”: meetings between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Iraqi nuclear weapons scientists, Iraq’s reconstruction of buildings at sites where its nuclear weapons facilities had previously been located, and Iraq’s attempts to obtain components for gas centrifuges that can be used to enrich uranium for use as fissile material in nuclear weapons.

The State Department issued a fact sheet December 19 asserting that Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium from Niger. Bush and other administration officials repeated the claim several times after that.

On February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a presentation about U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to the Security Council. His presentation only mentioned efforts to acquire centrifuge components and Hussein’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists.

An October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) cites all of these factors in its judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The NIE states that “most agencies” agreed but includes an alternative view from the State Department’s Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) stating that “available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities” but that the evidence is “inadequate” to support the claim that “Iraq is currently pursuing…an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.”

The following chart looks at the administration’s public claims about Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program.

NUCLEAR CLAIMS

 

Uranium Imports
Bush Administration Claim

The Bush administration claimed that Iraq was attempting to acquire uranium from Niger.

Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium were considered an important step in its suspected nuclear weapons program because Baghdad’s lack of fissile material was one of the most serious constraints on its ability to produce nuclear weapons. Even if Iraq had acquired lightly processed uranium ore from Africa, however, it would still have needed to enrich it to obtain weapons-grade uranium.

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said in an August 11 statement that claims regarding uranium importation were not central to the National Intelligence Estimate’s judgments about Iraq’s nuclear program because “Iraq already had significant quantities of uranium.” Iraq had more than two tons of low-enriched uranium under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The Controversy

Intelligence officials expressed reservations about this claim several times. Tenet told National Security Council staff and White House speechwriters not to include a line about Iraq’s attempts to import uranium from Africa in a speech Bush gave October 7, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said July 22. Additionally, Tenet said July 11 that the CIA expressed “reservations” about the claim to British intelligence in September 2002, and INR characterized claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa as “highly dubious,” according to the October NIE.

The CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger in February 2002 to investigate reports about Iraq’s attempts to acquire uranium. Wilson wrote in The New York Times July 6 that “it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had taken place” because Niger’s uranium industry is closely regulated by its government and is controlled by a consortium of foreign companies monitored by the IAEA.

Tenet said July 11 that Wilson also reported to the CIA that a former Nigerien official described a businessman’s attempt to arrange a meeting between the former official and an Iraqi delegation as “an attempt to discuss uranium sales,” but Wilson told Arms Control Today August 18 that the official mentioned uranium as an afterthought.

ElBaradei told the UN Security Council in March that U.S.-supplied documents ostensibly supporting this claim were forged.

Nigerien Prime Minister Hama Amadou denied in an interview with the London Sunday Telegraph that Niger ever discussed uranium with Iraq, according to a July 27 article.

Centrifuges
Bush Administration Claim The October NIE claimed that Iraq was attempting to obtain aluminum tubes and magnets for use in a gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program.
The Controversy
Aluminum Tubes

An IAEA investigation concluded that “[t]here is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in question,” ElBaradei told the Security Council March 7. He added that “field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these…tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets.” According to the October NIE, both INR and Department of Energy (DOE) centrifuge experts concluded that the tubes were most likely for rockets, although three other intelligence agencies concluded they were for use in centrifuges.

Tenet said August 11 that U.S. military intelligence experts concluded that the tubes were “poor choices for rocket motor bodies,” but Greg Thielmann, former director of INR’s Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs Office, argued in a July 9 press conference that the DOE experts were the most knowledgeable about the subject.

Magnets

ElBaradei told the Security Council March 7 that there was “no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.”


Administration officials have also cited an Iraqi scientist’s June 2003 handover of blueprints and components for gas centrifuges that he had hidden on his property as evidence that Iraq had a centrifuge program. The scientist, however, had hidden those components since 1991 and IAEA Iraq Action Team Leader Jacques Baute said the component set is incomplete and the documents appear to contain errors, according to a July 15 Associated Press article.

Scientists/Personnel
Bush Administration Claim The administration claimed that Hussein was meeting with top nuclear weapons experts and that Iraq maintained the scientific know-how to produce nuclear weapons.
The Controversy Thielmann said that “there was no solid evidence that indicated Iraq’s top nuclear scientists were rejuvenating Iraq’s nuclear weapons program,” according to a June 20 Associated Press article. IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming added that Iraqi nuclear personnel were “aging…[and] weren’t working collectively.”
Infrastructure
Bush Administration Claim Bush said October 7 that Iraq was reconstructing buildings at sites where its nuclear weapons facilities had previously been located.
The Controversy ElBaradei reported March 7 that “[t]here is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.”

 

 

Controversy Grows Surrounding Prewar Intel

Paul Kerr

FUELED BY A White House admission that discredited intelligence was used in President George W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, the Bush administration’s prewar claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have come under increasingly intense scrutiny. As the search for proscribed weapons continues without any actual weapons being found, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Bush administration officials’ unequivocal claims that Iraq possessed militarily significant quantities of weapons of mass destruction were likely flawed and, in some cases, did not accurately reflect the more ambiguous judgments of the intelligence community.

The dispute has gained political traction as U.S. casualties in Iraq continue. Members of Congress and the public have questioned both the veracity of U.S. claims about Iraq and the magnitude of the Iraqi threat at the time of the U.S.-led coalition forces’ March 19 invasion. The controversy has harmed British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s political standing and coincided with a decline in the U.S. public’s confidence about operations in Iraq. Bush could face a new round of questions this fall, with the House and Senate intelligence committees continuing their investigations into intelligence matters when Congress returns from its summer recess.

The controversy has centered around two claims Bush made in the State of the Union speech about Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program. The first was that “the British government has learned that [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa,” a reference to a claim that appeared in a September 2002 British report about Iraqi weapons capabilities. The second was that Hussein “has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production” when used in centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

The claims were not limited to the State of the Union address. Bush asserted two days before the invasion that “[i]ntelligence…leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised,” but recent revelations regarding U.S. intelligence on Iraq have raised doubts about that statement. Additionally, UN weapons inspectors—who had been working in Iraq since late November 2002—reported less than two weeks before the invasion that they had found no evidence Iraq had active programs to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

Much of the supporting evidence for the claim about Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium in Africa was known to be weak at the time of Bush’s speech, and UN inspectors further undermined it shortly after, particularly when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in March that documents supporting the claim were forged. Additionally, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in October 2002, which is said to be the basis for the claims in the speech, contains a dissent by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) that characterizes “claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa” as “highly dubious.”

These facts have raised questions about the process for clearing the information in Bush’s speech. Bush first tried to pin the blame on the CIA, claiming July 14 that the speech was “cleared by the CIA.” Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet stated July 11 that his agency cleared the speech but should not have allowed the language to appear in the final draft.

Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, however, acknowledged July 22 that the CIA had previously warned him that the information might be inaccurate, and White House speechwriters subsequently removed the information from an October 7, 2002, presidential speech. Hadley said he should have removed it from the State of the Union address but that he had forgotten the CIA warnings.

Hadley also said National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was informed about the CIA’s warnings, but Rice claimed July 30 that she did not remember seeing them. A senior administration official said July 18 that Rice did not read the INR dissents in the NIE.

Although Rice said July 13 that the uranium line should not have been included in the State of the Union address, she claimed that the statement was still accurate because it referred to British intelligence that originates from sources that have not yet been discredited. Washington does not have access to that information, she added. Blair said July 17 that his government continues to stand by the intelligence, but Tenet stated that the CIA “expressed reservations” to British officials about the uranium information before the United Kingdom published its September 2002 report.

Bush’s second claim was that Hussein tried to buy specialized aluminum tubes that could be used for producing material for nuclear weapons. The October 2002 NIE states that Iraq was attempting to obtain such tubes for use as rotors in a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility but notes that part of the intelligence community disagreed on this point. Uranium enrichment has civilian uses, but it also can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the UN Security Council in March that IAEA experts concluded that it was “unlikely” Iraq was procuring the tubes for centrifuges.

Bush administration officials also continue to argue that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons at the time of the U.S.-led invasion. Although U.S. pre-inspections intelligence is more consistent with administration statements that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it still contains qualifiers that were not reflected in the administration’s public statements. (See ACT, July/August 2003.)

Shifting Rationale for War


Meanwhile, administration officials have downplayed the importance of the intelligence controversy, arguing that evidence of Hussein’s malicious motivations and his residual capability to develop and use weapons of mass destruction, along with uncertainty surrounding Iraq’s suspected weapons programs, provided sufficient basis for determining that Iraq was a threat. This level of certainty satisfied the White House because the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States made the administration less tolerant of perceived risks of catastrophic terrorism, according to officials’ statements.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained this argument to the Senate Armed Services Committee July 9, stating that the U.S.-led coalition did not invade Iraq “because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11.”

Although critics have argued that inspections should have been given more time to succeed, the administration contended that this course was futile because Iraq was deceiving inspectors and refused to cooperate fully with them.

UN inspectors, however, also reported that they saw no evidence that Iraqi agents had infiltrated the organization or were moving prohibited weapons materials to avoid detection. They told the Security Council in March that Iraqi cooperation with the inspectors was increasing, albeit marginally. (See ACT, April 2003.)

In addition, intelligence reports had suggested that inspections could contain Iraq’s nuclear programs. For example, the October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq could obtain a nuclear weapon “if left unchecked”; a 2001 Defense Department report states, “From April 1991 to December 1998, Iraqi nuclear aspirations were held in check by...[UN] inspections and monitoring.”

Search, Hearings Continue

In Iraq, forces of the U.S.-led coalition continue to search for evidence of prohibited weapons but have yet to reveal any significant finds. David Kay, special adviser for strategy to the CIA on the weapons search, stated July 31 that the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)—the organization formed to ferret out Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—was making “progress.” He said the ISG would probably have a “substantial body of evidence before six months” during a July 15 interview on NBC’s “Nightly News.”

However, a July congressional delegation, led by Porter Goss (R-FL), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and Jane Harman (D-CA), the committee’s ranking member, reported July 15 that the “evidence emerging on Iraq’ s WMD programs does not point to the existence of large stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.” In recent weeks, discussion of the Iraqi threat has emphasized Iraq’s weapons programs rather than actual weapons, although administration officials continue to assert that forces will find functional chemical and biological weapons.

The intelligence committees plan to continue their investigations into the matter, but no specific hearings have been scheduled, and it is not known whether government officials will testify in open hearings.

 

Iraq's WMD: Myth and Reality

Daryl G. Kimball

The 2003 “pre-emptive” war against Iraq has been lauded by its proponents as a new model to address growing dangers posed by “rogue” states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To this day, senior U.S. officials such as Undersecretary of State John Bolton insist that the war was necessary because “the international regime that tried to enforce restrictions on Iraq obviously didn’t succeed.” Or did it?

A far different story has emerged than the one told by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair. Although Iraq clearly failed to fully comply with UN disarmament mandates, by March 2003 it was apparent from the work of the UN inspectors that Iraq did not retain weapons of mass destruction that could pose an urgent threat. Years of intrusive UN inspections had dismantled the bulk of Iraq’s unconventional arsenal and effectively contained what remained of its WMD capabilities.

Meanwhile, U.S. and British intelligence did not uncover reliable, new information about Iraqi WMD activity to justify the abandonment of inspections. Nevertheless, senior U.S. and British leaders systematically misrepresented earlier national intelligence assessments in order to exaggerate the Iraqi threat and cast doubt on the utility of inspections. Over the last few weeks, each of their key charges has been discredited.

An ongoing public inquiry in the United Kingdom has shown that the September 2003 British claim that Iraq could “deploy some WMD within 45 minutes” was based on questionable single-source intelligence and was included over the objections of some British intelligence analysts. To date, no chemical or biological weapons have been uncovered.

In Washington, a similar pattern of deception occurred. National Security Council officials repeatedly ignored high-level CIA and State Department objections to the charge that Iraq was seeking processed uranium for weapons from Africa. As a result, the discredited uranium allegation was not only repeated in Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union address but in numerous other prewar statements and op-eds by top officials.

Another contested U.S. claim was that Iraq sought high-strength aluminum tubes for enriching uranium. In a classified October 2002 intelligence estimate, however, State and Energy Department intelligence agencies dismissed that interpretation as “highly dubious.” Nevertheless, Bush and his cabinet repeated the claim without qualification. When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigated the claim and found that the tubes probably were for rockets, U.S. officials questioned the IAEA’s credibility.

The administration also charged that Iraq had unmanned aircraft “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent” and could be used to carry out attacks on U.S. cities. The Air Force intelligence office, however, disagreed, saying that the small aircraft were for reconnaissance. Fresh evidence from Iraq now supports the Air Force assessment.

Another major U.S. charge was that Iraq had mobile facilities to produce biological weapons agents. In April and May, the United States discovered two mobile labs, and claimed they were used for bioweapons agent production. But the Defense Intelligence Agency now indicates the trailers were used to produce hydrogen for weather balloons.

A defensive White House might be hoping that the U.S. Iraq Survey Group will discover new proof of prewar WMD programs. Such findings would not alter the fact that the administration’s most dramatic claims about unconventional Iraqi weapons were wrong. The key question before the war was not whether Iraq had WMD programs in the past. Rather, did Iraq have active programs or weapons posing an imminent threat?

Taken together, the evidence shows that after a decade of inspections and sanctions, Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was dormant. Its chemical and biological weapons programs, while illegal and potentially dangerous, were probably geared to support rapid production capabilities rather than maintaining active stockpiles.

Intelligence is meant to inform government decision-making, not to be invoked or discarded selectively to justify predetermined political decisions. The conduct of the Bush and Blair administrations on Iraq has severely damaged the credibility of their governments, their intelligence assessments, and their leadership on other global issues.

The Iraq episode underscores the fact that international weapons monitoring and inspections are vital to augment limited national intelligence capabilities and provide an objective, factual basis for collective international enforcement of the nonproliferation regime. As the United States faces the next round of WMD proliferation challenges, it cannot afford to abandon its first and best line of defense against global WMD dangers: intrusive inspections and the arms control rules and institutions that make them possible.

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