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“The Arms Control Association and all of the staff I've worked with over the years … have this ability to speak truth to power in a wide variety of venues.”
– Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
June 2, 2022
Daryl Kimball

No Ordinary NPT Review Conference

June 2022
By Daryl G. Kimball

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, waged under the threat of nuclear weapons use, has delivered a shocking reminder of an existential danger that did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Putin’s aggression increases the potential for a NATO-Russian conflict that could quickly escalate, lead to the use of nuclear weapons, and spiral into a global nuclear catastrophe. Although leaders in Washington and Moscow understand that a nuclear war cannot be won, their respective nuclear deterrence policies and the ongoing fighting make it more likely that a nuclear war could be fought.

United Nations Headquarters. (UN Photo/Joao Araujo Pinto)Putin’s decision to discard diplomacy and invade Ukraine puts the 77-year taboo against nuclear weapons use to the test. It also has derailed the strategic stability and arms control dialogue between Washington and Moscow, made a mockery of the repeated security assurances that nuclear-armed states will not attack non-nuclear states, and created a major challenge for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

But the international community’s pushback against Russia’s nuclear bullying has been far too tepid.

The next global debate about nuclear weapons will take place in August at the 10th NPT Review Conference. In the face of the growing danger of nuclear war, this is a critical opportunity for the treaty’s 191 states-parties to reinforce the norms against nuclear weapons, to strongly condemn any threat of nuclear weapons use, and to intensify the pressure for action to fulfill the treaty’s Article VI provision “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

Responsible nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states cannot afford simply to muddle through the month-long meeting. Russia’s violent assault on Ukraine is a clarion call for responsible NPT states to rally around a meaningful nuclear risk and disarmament action plan. Even if a consensus final document is not attainable due to tensions over the war, a supermajority of states should seek to chart the path forward through a joint declaration.

Putin’s war has derailed for now U.S.-Russian talks on further cuts in their bloated strategic arsenals and new agreements to limit short- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, but the United States and Russia, as well as other NPT states-parties, are still bound by their disarmament obligations. The last remaining U.S.-Russian arms reduction agreement, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), expires in early 2026. Without commonsense arms control guardrails, the dangers of unconstrained global nuclear arms racing will only grow.

U.S. President Joe Biden should direct his team to embrace a bold, specific NPT action plan, which, more than any rhetoric from U.S. diplomats, would show that his administration wants to be on the right side of history rather than resisting the overdue action that is needed to reduce nuclear dangers.

Other states cannot afford to wait for the United States to lead or allow the other NPT nuclear-weapon states (China, France, and the United Kingdom) to escape accountability. Robust, constructive leadership from other NPT states-parties, such as Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, South Africa, and Sweden, will be needed. Leaders of the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons and the Non-Aligned Movement also have crucial roles to play. Their previous statements and working papers suggest these states share common positions that would allow them to advance a common nuclear risk and disarmament action agenda that:

  • calls on the United States and Russia to resume their strategic stability dialogue, begin negotiations on New START follow-on agreements, and issue unilateral reciprocal commitments to respect the central limits of New START after 2026;
  • calls on all NPT nuclear-armed states to freeze their nuclear stockpiles and engage in disarmament negotiations;
  • endorses a moratorium on intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the deployment of new short-range nuclear weapons;
  • calls for all states to respect the de facto global moratorium on nuclear testing and to negotiate on-site confidence-building measures pending the entry into force of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
  • reaffirms that any use of nuclear weapons would produce catastrophic humanitarian consequences and that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” nor should any state threaten the use of nuclear weapons;
  • urges all states to phase out “launch under attack” postures and refrain from offensive cyberattacks on nuclear command, control, and communication systems; and
  • calls for the start of negotiations on legally binding security guarantees to prevent unprovoked attacks by nuclear-weapon states against non-nuclear-weapon states.

At this time of heightened nuclear danger, responsible NPT states must act with urgency to reinforce norms against nuclear weapons, push back against Russia’s nuclear bullying, and strengthen their commitment to reverse the arms race, avoid nuclear war, and eliminate nuclear weapons.

At this time of heightened nuclear danger, responsible NPT states must act with urgency to reinforce norms against nuclear weapons, push back against Russia’s nuclear bullying, and strengthen their commitment to reverse the arms race, avoid nuclear war, and eliminate nuclear weapons.

Space Security Working Group Meets


June 2022
By Daryl G. Kimball

The first meeting of the working group on reducing space threats was held May 9–13 in Geneva. The forum was mandated by a UN General Assembly resolution approved in December to promote “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors” in space. (See ACT, December 2021.) Earlier this year, Russia raised procedural objections that delayed the scheduling of the meeting, but Russia participated in this session.

Members of the space security working group launched their first meeting in May at UN headquarters in Geneva.  (Photo courtesy of the UN)The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in space, but there are no restrictions on other types of weapons in that domain. Efforts to launch talks that might produce new understandings on maintaining the peaceful use of space have been stymied for years. The working group discussions reflected ongoing differences in emphasis and approaches to the issue, but also showed there is growing pressure for tangible results.

“We are trying to have a positive momentum in this process…because it is in everybody’s interest, and so far, we have achieved that. We see that there is big engagement and interest in moving things forward,” Hellmut Lagos of Chile, chair of the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, said on May 13.

In April, the United States announced it would “not…conduct destructive, direct-ascent [anti-satellite (ASAT)] missile testing, and that [it] seeks to establish this as a new international norm for responsible behavior in space.” The initiative has received support from other states.

On May 9, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva issued a statement pledging that Canada would join the ASAT ban. “For 40 years [Canada] has advocated for a halt to [ASAT] tests. Today we joined the U.S. pledge not to conduct destructive ASAT missile testing. We encourage all states to join so that together we can make this a global norm,” the Canadian statement said.

To date, Russia, China, the United States, and India have demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites with ground- or air-launched missiles, which produce dangerous space debris that can threaten orbiting satellites and represent counterspace activities that threaten international stability and security. Russia and China have long advocated for a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, which would focus on barring weapons in space, while other states have sought approaches that prevent actions that harm objects in space from any source.

In a statement on behalf of his government, Aidan Liddle, UK ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, said on May 9 that the United Kingdom “believes that framing this problem in terms of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors—that is, on the actions, activities or omissions of states rather than the capabilities themselves, many of which are dual purpose or hard to effectively verify—is more likely to lead to solutions.”

Referring to Russia and China, Liddle added that “[w]e recognize that many delegations want those solutions to be enshrined in a legally binding treaty. We hope that this will be possible. History has shown that successful legal instruments are usually the result of an iterative process, such as this one. So, the responsible behaviors approach is not a prescription for moving slowly but a way to get the journey started.”

The working group will meet again in September with a focus on “current and future threats by states to space systems, and actions, activities and omissions that could be considered irresponsible.” In 2023 the working group will begin preparing its recommendations to the UN General Assembly.

The forum was mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote “responsible behaviors” in space.

Fifty Years Ago, the First Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements Were Concluded

Fifty years ago, on May 26, 1972, the first bilateral nuclear arms control agreements were struck: the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The breakthrough agreements, which began the process of slowing the nuclear arms race, followed the entry into force of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970. The U.S.-Soviet agreements were the product of intensive negotiations that began in 1969. The chief American negotiator was Gerard Smith, who had been appointed the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by then-president Richard...

Growing Nuclear Danger Represents A Call to Action

Inside the Arms Control Association May 2022 Over the long course of the nuclear age, millions of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful action to reduce and eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Civil society pressure in the United States has informed, influenced, and catalyzed action by successive presidential administrations to conclude agreements to slash nuclear stockpiles, halt nuclear testing, and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Since 1972, the Arms Control Association has been in the middle of these efforts. Fifty years ago this week, the first of many...

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