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“It will take all of us working together – government officials, and diplomats, academic experts, and scientists, activists, and organizers – to come up with new and innovative approaches to strengthen transparency and predictability, reduce risk, and forge the next generation of arms control agreements.”
– Wendy Sherman
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
June 2, 2022
Nuclear Nonproliferation
  • October 10, 2008

    Negotiations with North Korea to shut down its primary nuclear weapons program now stand at the precipice. Unless the United States and its allies can walk North Korea from the edge of fully restarting its bomb-producing efforts, the next president will assume office in the midst of another nuclear proliferation crisis. (Continue)

  • October 6, 2008

    In terms of operational practice as distinct from political rhetoric, institutionalized security policy in the United States is based on two presumptions: that imperial aggression is the principal form of threat and that the countervailing threat of deterrent retaliation is the most decisive method of protection. This formulation was established during the Cold War and has been retained in its aftermath. Because no country can plausibly threaten immediate imperial aggression against U.S. territory, the formulation is now justified as a hedge against the rise of an unnamed peer competitor. For many other countries, however, the United States itself is the most credible potential embodiment of such a threat. (Continue)

  • October 6, 2008
  • October 6, 2008

    In September, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed proliferation sanctions on 25 Iranian entities. Enacted under Executive Order 13382, the sanctions freeze any U.S. assets of the accused and prohibit them from engaging in U.S. financial or commercial activities.

    The sanctions are the latest installment in a series the Treasury Department has imposed during President George W. Bush’s second term on entities allegedly assisting or engaged in the acquisition or sale of unconventional weapons, related materials, or missiles. At the same time, the Department of State, which spearheaded the drive to reinvigorate sanctions during Bush’s first term, has increasingly taken a back seat. The changes parallel a shift in the target of sanctions: over the course of the administration, sanctions have decreased against Chinese entities and increased against Iranian entities. (Continue)

  • October 6, 2008
  • October 6, 2008
  • October 6, 2008

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report Sept. 12 indicating that Libya did not provide a full picture of its past nuclear fuel cycle procurement efforts following its renunciation of nonconventional weapons in December 2003. The omissions, however, did not point to any attempt to maintain a weapons-related capability and were only important for uncovering the timeline of Libya’s contacts with the nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan and other avenues Tripoli pursued to obtain nuclear weapons. (Continue)

  • October 6, 2008
  • October 6, 2008
  • October 6, 2008

    Congress approved legislation Sept. 27 intended to pressure Russia to continue and expand a program that down-blends Russian weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for U.S. nuclear power plants. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced Sept. 8 that President George W. Bush was withdrawing from congressional consideration a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia. (Continue)

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