Login/Logout

*
*  
“Over the past 50 years, ACA has contributed to bridging diversity, equity, inclusion and that's by ensuring that women of color are elevated in this space.”
– Shalonda Spencer
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation
June 2, 2022
United States

'Section 655' Report Details U.S. Arms Trade

The Defense Department delivered over $19.3 billion in arms and military assistance to 116 countries during fiscal year (FY) 1997, while the State Department approved commercial export licenses that could result in sales of weapons and equipment valued at over $24.7 billion to more than 150 countries and territories. These figures, covering the period from October 1, 1996 to September 30, 1997, were contained in the latest "Section 655" report that the two departments prepare annually for Congress.

Nearly 81 percent of the deliveries, conducted through the Foreign Military Sales program and various grant programs—excess defense articles, emergency drawdowns and international military education and training (IMET)—flowed to the Near East and South Asia ($8.3 billion) and the Far East (almost $7.3 billion). Taiwan ($5.69 billion), Saudi Arabia ($4.69 billion) and Egypt ($1.2 billion) were the leading recipients. Aircraft, including 23 F-15S and 89 F-16 fighters, helicopters and associated spare parts represented over half ($9.8 billion) of the total deliveries.

NATO allies combined for $9.4 billion of the approved licenses, while Japan accounted for $4.6 billion. States have four years to act under the licenses, not all of which result in actual sales.

Taiwan Arms Sale Proposed to Congress

In a move that could complicate Sino-U.S. relations, the Department of Defense notified Congress on August 27 of a proposed $350 million package of arms sales to Taiwan, including 728 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, 131 MK-46 torpedoes and 58 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned the proposed sale, claiming that it violates a 1982 Sino-U.S. joint communique in which Washington promised "gradually to reduce" its sale of arms to Taipei, and that it "infringes on China's sovereignty and damages China's peaceful reunification."

U.S. arms deals with Taiwan have long been a stumbling block to closer relations between Washington and Beijing. In 1992, the U.S. sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters to Taipei prompted China to end its participation in conventional arms talks among the permanent members of the UN Security Council and, according to some analysts, to pursue sales of proliferation concern with Iran and Pakistan.

In fiscal year 1997, Taiwan received $5.69 billion worth of arms and military assistance from the United States, more than any other country. With the August 27 announcement, the Pentagon has proposed $810 million in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan in 1998, nearly 20 percent more than during the same period last year. American policy, as outlined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, is to transfer defense articles and services necessary to maintain Taiwan's "sufficient self-defense capability."

Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must act within 30 calendar days of its August 27 notification if it wishes to block the proposed sale to Taiwan. Congress, however, has never blocked a proposed arms transfer following notice by the Defense Department.

Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Announced

June/July 1998

Reversing his earlier position, President Bill Clinton announced on July 6 that he and President Boris Yeltsin would hold a summit meeting in Russia in early September, even though Moscow has not yet ratified START II. The Clinton administration had sought Russian ratification prior to a summit so that official negotiations could begin on a START III agreement limiting the United States and Russia to 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads each. However, on June 10, the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, postponed consideration of START II until the fall.

Meanwhile, on July 23–24, Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko held an executive session of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (also known as the Gore-Kiriyenko Commission). During their meeting in Moscow, Gore and Kiriyenko announced the completion of two agreements on nuclear security issues, involving the economic diversification of the Russian "nuclear cities" and the management of plutonium no longer required for defense purposes.

Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Announced

U.S. Remains Largest Supplier To a Shrinking Arms Market

Wade Boese

IN 1997, the United States once again led all arms exporters in deliveries and new agreements for conventional weapons in a still-shrinking world arms market, according to an annual Congressional Research Service (CRS) report released July 31. France, however, replaced the United States as the leading signer of new agreements with developing countries.

Worldwide arms sales agreements in 1997 declined to $24.2 billion (all figures in constant 1997 dollars), the lowest amount in the eight years covered by the report, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1990–1997, authored by Richard F. Grimmett. The 1997 total represented less than half the value of the world market at the end of the Cold War in 1990 ($49.7 billion).

At the same time, however, global deliveries rose to $34.6 billion in 1997, an amount second only to the 1990 total of $48.6 billion. The United States delivered $15.2 billion worth of weapons in 1997 (up $6 billion from 1996), more than the United Kingdom ($5.9 billion), France ($4.9 billion), Russia ($2.4 billion) and China ($1 billion) combined. Grimmett attributed the climb in U.S. deliveries to implementing orders placed during and after the Gulf War.

As in all previous eight years except 1995, the United States contracted the most worldwide agreements, $5.3 billion in 1997, down from $8.5 billion in 1996. The CRS report excluded U.S. commercial agreements—the United States is the only major supplier with two separate export systems (commercial and government-to-government)—so U.S. totals are underreported. However, according to Grimmett, government-to-government sales make up the "overwhelming portion" of U.S. agreements.

Russia, whose primary arms customers are rivals China and India, also saw the value of its global agreements drop, from $4.4 billion in 1996 to $4.1 billion, while the United Kingdom's agreements fell from $4.9 billion to $1.6 billion. France, however, moved into second place behind the United States as Paris increased its arms deals to $5.1 billion, of which $4.6 billion were with developing nations. In comparison, the U.S. total of arms deals with developing nations fell to an eight-year low of nearly $2.3 billion. China, described as recently becoming more of a major arms purchaser, signed sale agreements worth $1.5 billion in 1997.

Developing nations continued to be the largest buyers of arms in 1997, signing deals valued at nearly $17.2 billion (71 percent of the total) and receiving weapons worth almost $28.6 billion (82 percent of the total). The United Arab Emirates tallied the highest total for 1997 agreements signed (with $3.5 billion), while Saudi Arabia imported $11 billion in weapons.

Regionally, the Near East and Asia combined for 89.9 percent of all agreements signed with developing countries and 92.5 percent of arms received for the period 1994–1997. But states in both regions recently deferred or canceled major arms purchases as a consequence of falling oil prices and the Asian financial crisis. Supplier nations have responded by seeking new markets in Eastern Europe (largely due to NATO expansion) and Latin America, but these nations possess little purchasing power and will not supplant the Near East and Asia as the primary weapons buyers.

In the near future, Grimmett concludes that the combination of developing nations with limited resources to spend on weaponry and the necessity of most supplier nations for cash payment will temper any "significant expansion of the arms trade." Instead, much of the market will be maintaining and upgrading previously supplied equipment.

U.S. Remains Largest Supplier To a Shrinking Arms Market

U.S. Army Destroys Last Non-Essential 'Dumb' Mines

Christopher Fischer and Andrew Howells

ON JUNE 30, the U.S. Army destroyed the last of the U.S.-based stockpile of more than 3.3 million non-self-destructing anti-personnel landmines (APLs), fulfilling President Clinton's May 1996 directive to eliminate all non-essential "dumb" mines by the end of 1999. The final 80 APLs were destroyed during a ceremony at Crane Army Ammunition Activity near Bloomington, Indiana. The elimination of the APLs is a major milestone in the Clinton administration's decision to phase out the use of "dumb" mines and rely on "smart" landmines, which, once deployed, are designed to self-destruct or self-disarm after a predetermined time.

With the exception of Korea, the U.S. military has already destroyed its overseas stockpiles of non-self-destructing mines, and is currently destroying the last of 50,000 APLs that had been deployed around the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba beginning in 1961. The United States plans to retain an estimated 1 million "dumb" mines in South Korea, most of which are stockpiled, in addition to 1,500 APLs for military training purposes. U.S. forces will also maintain an estimated 1 million "mixed" munitions, which combine anti-vehicle and anti-personnel devices, as well as an estimated 9 million "smart" mines. Clinton's May 1996 directive does not apply to the APLs in mixed munitions.

In September 1997, Clinton said the United States would seek to end the use of both "dumb" and "smart" mines outside of Korea by 2003 and worldwide by 2006. The continued need to rely on APLs to protect U.S. military forces in South Korea was cited by the administration as one of the primary reasons the United States would not sign the Ottawa Convention when the treaty opened for signature in December 1997.

The treaty bans the use, stockpiling, production and transfers of all APLs, including the devices now used in U.S. mixed munitions. The convention has been signed by 128 countries and will enter into force six months after the 40th state deposits its instrument of ratification, which could occur this year. The United States currently observes a unilateral moratorium on the transfer and export of APLs.

In September 1997, the Clinton administration announced that it is the goal of the United States to sign the Ottawa Treaty by 2006 if the Department of Defense can develop alternatives to APLs. The U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC), located at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey, awarded 12 contracts in January 1998 for the development and production of APL alternatives. ARDEC is expected to select two or three contractors for further development work. The Pentagon is considering both lethal and non-lethal alternatives, including acoustic, seismic and infrared remote sensing mechanisms.

U.S. Army Destroys Last Non-Essential 'Dumb' Mines

U.S. 1997 Data for the UN Conventional Arms Register

The UN Register of Conventional Arms, established by the UN secretary-general in January 1992, calls on member-states to provide voluntary submissions on their arms exports and imports, military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies during the previous calendar year as a means to promote transparency in armaments. States are requested to provide information on seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

U.S. data, submitted on May 29, reveal that Washington exported 4,759 weapons to 27 states (and Taiwan) in 1997, more than doubling the total of 2,342 items in 1996. Middle Eastern states, including Egypt, received 2,359 of the weapons, easily outdistancing Asian nations (1,377) as the largest importers of U.S. arms.

Missiles and missile launchers accounted for 64.5 percent of all exported items, with Israel receiving nearly half of these. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan also accepted large shipments of missiles and missile launchers.

For the first time since the UN register became operational, the United States included information on the type of equipment exported, but not the specific model. For example, Washington notified delivery of 16 F-16 fighter jets to Greece, but did not include whether the planes were A/B or C/D models.

U.S. holdings and procurements (see second table) show a drop compared to figures reported last year, listed in parentheses.

—For more information contact Wade Boese.

 


Region/Country Battle Tanks ACVs Large Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack Helicopters Warships Missiles & Launchers TOTAL
Africa 519
Morocco     60         60
Egypt   437     6   16 459
Asia 1,377
Japan     14       449 463
Malaysia       8     20 28
Pakistan       2       2
South Korea   3   12     344 359
Singapore             4 4
Taiwan 30     60 9   248 347
Thailand 101 63   10       174
Europe 931
Austria     42         42
Bosnia-Herzegovina     126         126
Denmark       4     44 48
Finland       13       13
Germany             36 36
Greece       19     270 289
Norway     6 1     66 73
Spain       1       1
Switzerland       19       19
Turkey   189   26     69 284
Latin America 30
Argentina       14       14
Brazil   14           14
Mexico           2   2
Middle East 1,900
Bahrain     49   10   4 63
Israel     16       1,502 1,518
Jordan 38   18         56
Lebanon   88           88
Saudi Arabia   159   16       175
Other Regions 2
Australia     2         2
TOTAL 169 953 333 205 25 2 3,072 4,759

Sources: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Arms Control Association.

...

U.S. Military Holdings and Procurement Through National Production
Category Military Holdings

1997 (1996)

Procurement

1997 (1996)

I. Battle Tanks 8,971 (9,976) 0 (0)
II. Armored Combat Vehicles 22,747 (22,731) 0 (0)
III. Large-Caliber Artillery Systems 9,879 (9,711) 117 (460)
IV. Combat Aircraft 3,919 (4,014) 21 (23)
V. Attack Helicopters 2,816 (2,717) 7 (20)
VI.Warships 347 (351) 5 (11)
VII. Missiles and Missile Launchers 121,666 (123,731) 1,231 (1,816)

Sino-U.S. Summit Yields Modest Advances in Arms Control Agenda

Howard Diamond

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON traveled to China for a state visit June 25 to July 3 that produced several modest achievements in arms control and non-proliferation. At a joint press conference on June 27, Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced the two sides had reached agreements on the detargeting of strategic nuclear weapons, a Chinese commitment to "actively study joining" the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Beijing's announcement of additional controls on chemical precursors, and a new arrangement for end-use verification of U.S. high-technology exports to China.

Clinton said the detargeting agreement "would completely eliminate" the prospect of an accidental nuclear launch, show "mutual confidence and trust," and would be "a helpful counterweight" to the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. Critics of such detargeting agreements have argued that the arrangements are not verifiable and are largely symbolic because the missiles can be retargeted in a matter of minutes. China had previously resisted the U.S. detargeting proposal, insisting it should be linked to the United States adopting a "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons. When asked if the United States had made any concessions to get the detargeting agreement, Clinton said, "[W]e have not changed our position [on no first use], nor are we prepared to do so on that."

Prior to Clinton's visit, China had also rejected a U.S. proposal made in March to exchange Beijing's full membership in the MTCR and a cutoff of all missile cooperation with Iran for additional opportunities to launch U.S. satellites. Jiang's announcement that China will "actively study joining" the missile export regime may signal a shift in Beijing's position. But according to Bates Gill, a China specialist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, while the new Chinese position "tends to suggest a favorable conclusion… there's a greater degree of disagreement in China than meets the eye. We shouldn't be too optimistic about China joining the MTCR."

Beijing's current policy on missile exports is ambiguous. At a June 27 press conference, national security advisor Samuel R. Berger said, "The Chinese in the past have said unilaterally that they would adhere to the MTCR guidelines. That is a kind of a general commitment and it doesn't necessarily include all of the technology and components that are part of the annex of the MTCR." A semi-annual CIA report to Congress published after the summit noted that "During 1997, Chinese entities provided a variety of missile-related items and assistance to countries of proliferation concern."

The Clinton administration imposed MTCR-related sanctions on China in August 1993 for selling M-11 missile components to Pakistan. But in October 1994, Beijing pledged to abide by the "guidelines and parameters" of the MTCR so the sanctions could be lifted. Subsequently, U.S. officials have acknowledged that China has stopped selling whole ground-to-ground missiles and major sub-systems (so-called Category I items), but has continued to sell missile components and technology (so-called Category II items), notably to Pakistan and Iran.

During the summit, however, Beijing offered an additional pledge on missile exports. In the Sino-U.S. joint statement on South Asia, the United States and China pledged to "prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons."

Prior to the summit, many observers predicted that Clinton's visit would not result in significant progress in arms control because China had already offered several concessions before and during the last Sino-U.S. summit in Washington in October 1997. At that summit, Clinton announced that improvements in China's nuclear non-proliferation policies and practices, together with its written pledge to end all cooperation with Iran's civil nuclear program, would allow him to put into effect the never-implemented 1985 Sino-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. Chinese officials promised the administration that they would supplement the nuclear export guidelines they promulgated in August 1997 with new additional regulations covering dual-use nuclear items. On June 17, China's official English-language news agency, Xinhua, published the promised regulations.

Sino-U.S. Summit Yields Modest Advances in Arms Control Agenda

The 1996 ICJ Opinion and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

June/July 1998

To the Editor:

In "Dismantling the Concept of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'" (April 1998), Wolfgang Panofsky makes the following inaccurate statements regarding the legality of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the July 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on this question. (See ACT, July 1996.)

1. "[P]ossession and some uses of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon states remain legal…."

The ICJ ruled that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons was generally illegal, but could not determine whether there would be an exception to this general finding in the extreme circumstance of self-defense, when the very survival of a state was at stake. Some commentators have erroneously assumed that this indecision over the exceptional circumstance is the same as a declaration of legality in such circumstance. The court, however, clearly refuted this when it did not support the view of certain nuclear-weapon states that the use of "clean," low-yield tactical nuclear weapons accurately targeted on military targets would be legal in such extreme circumstance. (ICJ Opinion, paragraph 94).

Then-ICJ President Mohammed Bedjaoui said the court's inability to determine absolute illegality in the extreme circumstance "can in no manner be interpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons." Bedjaoui noted that this opinion differed considerably from the often cited Lotus case, which held that what was not expressly prohibited by international law was therefore permitted. "The Court, in this opinion is showing much more circumspection than its predecessor in the Lotus case in asserting today that what is not expressly prohibited by international law is not therefore authorized," he said.

2. "[T]he ICJ ruled (11-3) that [existing] specific injunctions [against the threat or use of nuclear weapons] did not constitute 'comprehensive and universal prohibition' of the threat or use of nuclear weapons."

Mr. Panofsky here reverses the order of the ICJ findings, thus changing their meaning. The court declared firstly that there was no comprehensive and universal prohibition on the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons as such, but then followed this by concluding (unanimously) that specific laws of peace and war, including Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, apply to nuclear weapons, and that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would thus be generally illegal.

3. "However, neither the nuclear-weapon states nor the 'threshold' states have formally accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ in this matter."

Mr. Panofsky confuses contentious cases (disputes between states, for example), in which acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction is necessary, with advisory opinions, in which acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction by states is not necessary. The July 1996 ruling was an advisory opinion, not a contentious case. Even so, Britain, a nuclear-weapon state, and India, a "threshold" state, have accepted jurisdiction of the ICJ in contentious cases.

Finally, Mr. Panofsky makes no mention of the most important decision of the ICJ, which was adopted unanimously and does impact on possession of nuclear weapons: "There exists an obligation [in international law] to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." By refusing to implement this obligation, the nuclear-weapon states are setting a bad example of non-compliance with international law, which will continue to stimulate other states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

Alyn Ware
Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

 

The author responds

The references in my article were intended to document that the ICJ's advisory opinion did not establish a broad international norm prohibiting nuclear weapons, comparable to the norms established by the international conventions on chemical and biological weapons.

With regard to my first statement, Mr. Ware does not challenge it as it applies to "possession," and agrees that in respect to "uses" the ICJ could not determine whether there would be an exception (to illegality) in the extreme circumstance of self-defense, when the very survival of a state is at stake. As a layman, this signals to me that the court agrees that possession and some uses of nuclear weapons remain legal. Mr. Ware's formulation is not in conflict with my statement.

On the second point, I stated that the specific injunctions in certain international treaties against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons "did not constitute a comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat of use of nuclear weapons." Mr. Ware agrees with my citation of the ICJ opinion, but then proceeds to list a series of specific laws of war under which use of nuclear weapons would be illegal. To a layperson, our differences seem to be analogous to the distinction between a glass being half empty or half full.

My third statement—that the nuclear-weapon states had not "formally accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ" on the issue of nuclear weapons policy—is correct. In fact, the United States, Britain and France opposed the ICJ taking jurisdiction in this matter, arguing that the case was not appropriate for an advisory opinion.

Finally, Mr. Ware accuses me of a sin of omission by not explicitly citing the portion of the ICJ advisory opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith steps leading to nuclear disarmament. Indeed, that obligation is codified in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was reaffirmed during the treaty's indefinite extension in 1995. Thus, this part of the ICJ opinion is hardly novel. Needless to say, I fully share the concern that the pace of nuclear disarmament is woefully slow.

I suggest that little good is served to signal differences in opinion when, in fact, such differences are insignificant and a common goal is shared. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky

The 1996 ICJ Opinion and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

U.S. Pledges to Sign APL Ban; Lists Conditions to Be Met First

May 1998

By Erik J. Leklem

In a May 15 letter to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Clinton administration pledged that the United States would sign the Ottawa landmine convention by 2006 if "suitable alternatives" to anti-personnel landmines (APLs) and so-called mixed anti-vehicle systems can be developed. The treaty, signed last December, bans the stockpiling, development and use of anti-personnel landmines and has been signed by 126 countries as of May 31, but has not been signed by the United States, China, Russia or a number of other landmine possessors.

The letter to Leahy, signed by National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, signals a politically significant shift in the administration's position and increases the pressure on the Department of Defense to develop alternatives to APLs, as called for by President Clinton last year. Moreover, the administration for the first time has pledged to search "aggressively" for alternatives to mixed munitions (which combine anti-vehicle components with anti-personnel munitions) that the United States currently stockpiles and unsuccessfully sought to exempt during the treaty's negotiation. The announcement "is a major step toward the international ban," said Leahy in a May 22 statement. "I am greatly encouraged by this decision because I believe there is no longer any doubt that we will sign…the only question is whether we get there before 2006."

When Clinton announced in September 1997 that the United States would not sign the Ottawa Convention, the president cited the need "to preserve the anti-tank mines we rely upon to slow down an enemy's armored offensive in a battle situation." Clinton also spoke of the need for "an adequate transition period to phase out anti-personnel mines," a prerequisite to signature that remains U.S. policy.

Berger's letter was the result, in part, of a several-month review of landmine policy reportedly codified in a recently completed presidential decision directive, although administration statements since last year have heralded a move toward an eventual U.S. signature of the Ottawa Convention.

The pledge to sign the treaty is related to the administration's ongoing effort to seek a repeal or waiver of a one-year moratorium on the U.S. use of APLs set to begin in February 1999. (See ACT, May/June 1996.) Leahy agreed to support a repeal of the moratorium in exchange for a pledge by the administration to eventually sign the convention. "I agreed to this because the real issue is not whether we stop using landmines for a year, but whether we are committed to signing the treaty," Leahy said in his statement.

In his letter, Berger restated the administration's commitment "to end the use of all APLs outside Korea by 2003, including those that self-destruct," and "to aggressively pursue the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006, including those that self-destruct." Critics contend that the search for alternatives is not proceeding quickly enough. Leahy will reportedly propose an amendment to the 1998 defense authorization bill seeking funding to promote the search for alternatives to self-destruct APLs and mixed munitions.

U.S. Pledges to Sign APL Ban; Lists Conditions to Be Met First

UAE to Purchase 80 F-16C/Ds, Arms in Deal Worth $7 Billion

May 1998

By Wade Boese

On May 25, representing one of the largest and most expensive sales of U.S. fighter aircraft this decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced on May 12 that it will purchase 80 F-16C/D fighters, including weapons and support systems, worth an estimated $7 billion. The aircraft will be equipped with more advanced features than the F-16s currently flown by the U.S. Air Force and the UAE, as part of the package, will also receive the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).

A U.S. government official described the UAE F-16, which will be built with a new Block 60 platform, as "comparable to or superior to" U.S. F-16s, which are based on the Block 50 and 40 platforms. Aside from being equipped with additional fuel tanks above the wings, which could extend range by almost 30 percent, the UAE aircraft will also feature an improved mission computer, new cockpit displays, a larger engine and a more advanced radar, the development of which will be paid for by the UAE.

While acknowledging that the UAE F-16s will have newer technology than U.S. models, a U.S. Air Force official said there are currently no plans to upgrade U.S. F-16s to match the Block 60 version because of fiscal constraints. The official stressed the importance of tactics and training on aircraft performance and noted that the Air Force expects its new F-22 fighter to be operational in 2004, shortly after the UAE starts receiving its fighters in 2002. The Air Force is now expected to receive its last delivery of F-16 aircraft in 2001.

Inclusion of the AMRAAMs, an advanced beyond-visual-range missile, proved central to the deal as the UAE insisted that it would not purchase F-16s without AMRAAMs, while the United States conditioned approval of the missiles for the UAE on its selection of the F-16 fighter. In the Middle East, only Israel previously had been approved to purchase the AMRAAM, but with the UAE deal, other Arab states may press for the missile.

The UAE, which has sought advanced fighters since the 1991 Gulf War, signed an agreement in December 1997 with Dassault Aviation of France for 30 new Mirage 2000 9 fighters and the upgrading of 33 older Mirage fighters for approximately $3.2 billion. By purchasing both U.S. and French fighters, the UAE intends to strengthen ties with both states, while avoiding dependence on any one supplier for arms. Kuwait made a similar decision earlier this year when it purchased artillery systems from both the United States and China.

The UAE will be the 20th country to operate the F-16 aircraft, of which more than 3,700 have been delivered, including 2,200 to the United States. Lockheed Martin, manufacturer of the F-16, anticipates continued production and export of the aircraft until 2010 and beyond. A Lockheed Martin official said that other countries have expressed interest in the Block 60 platform and that the company plans to offer the Block 60 capabilities to other buyers.

A White House press release touted the UAE sale as a jobs issue, claiming the deal would create 15,000 new jobs in Texas and nearly 30,000 nationwide. The Clinton administration's conventional arms export policy, outlined in a February 1995 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 34), holds as one of its criteria for arms exports the impact a sale would have on U.S. arms manufacturers. Lockheed Martin estimated that the UAE sale would create about 3,500 jobs at its Tactical Aircraft Systems plant in Fort Worth, Texas.

Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, all sales (direct commercial, Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales or hybrids of the two) of "major defense equipment," as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, worth $14 million or more must be notified to Congress. If Congress votes a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand), the sale cannot go forward.

While a congressional staffer noted that there is no real opposition to the sale, Congress is interested in maintaining its role in the deal considering the sophistication of the aircraft and the unusual nature of the notification. Rather than submitting a signed contract for notification, a very detailed letter of intent will be notified to Congress. The staffer said that Congress will consider requiring a renotification once the contract is signed or an assurance that if there is an upgrade in the equipment is contained in the letter of intent, Congress would be notified before delivery of the fighters.

Lockheed Martin and the UAE want to sign the contract before the end of this year. Both Lockheed Martin and U.S. government officials declined to discuss the value or details of offset arrangements accompanying the sale.

UAE to Purchase 80 F-16C/Ds, Arms in Deal Worth $7 Billion

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - United States