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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
United States

National Insecurity Strategy

Daryl G. Kimball

Two years after taking office, the Bush administration has embraced a “new” National Security Strategy that relies heavily on counterproliferation and pre-emptive action to “deter, dissuade, and defeat” adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To a greater extent than ever, the policy sets the United States above and apart from the rules other states are expected to follow.

In the long run, this approach is unsustainable and self-defeating. The strategy minimizes the role of diplomacy and arms control and seeks to maintain and even expand U.S. nuclear capabilities. This combination threatens to erode the credibility of the laws and norms against WMD upon which our security and the security of our allies depend.

The emphasis on pre-emption rests on the belief that diplomacy and nonproliferation cannot halt the weapons programs of outlaw states. Consequently, the Bush team wants to free the United States from entangling treaties and agreements that limit new military capabilities intended to counter emerging threats. To the extent that it does rely on arms control, the Bush policy supports only those treaties that limit the capabilities of other states.

For instance, the National Security Strategy appropriately calls for enhanced compliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) through additional safeguards. However, the administration boldly rejects key U.S. nonproliferation and disarmament commitments under Article VI of the treaty—most notably the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which restricts the development of new nuclear weapons.

Instead, the Bush strategy calls for improving U.S. nuclear warhead capabilities intended for pre-emptive strikes on underground facilities suspected of producing chemical or biological weapons. Congress has just approved funding for new research on a “robust nuclear earth penetrator” warhead. Using nuclear bombs for pre-emptive attacks on such targets is militarily impractical and morally wrong. The very pursuit of such weapons undermines norms against WMD and might prompt other states to follow our lead.

In defense of its NPT credentials, the administration claims that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty helps meet U.S. disarmament commitments. But in contrast to U.S. policy goals prior to 2000, this treaty does not mandate the dismantlement of a single warhead or missile, provide for adequate verification measures, or reduce the readiness posture of U.S. weapons deployed against Russia and other states.

As a result, the United States will retain the flexibility to field at least 4,200 strategic warheads through the next decade. Some Bush officials are calling for reductions of Russia’s nonstrategic warheads, but the strategy document fails to list this or any further U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions as an objective.
The Bush plan does acknowledge the value of continued efforts to assist Russia dismantle and secure its Cold War WMD stockpiles. President Bush’s tepid support for this vital endeavor, however, leaves funding for these vital programs at the mercy of annual congressional wrangling and executive branch infighting.

The Bush strategy correctly identifies biological weapons as a growing danger and professes support for Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) compliance. Unfortunately, the administration has blocked global consensus on a comprehensive verification protocol for the treaty. Instead, the national security plan calls for expanded U.S. biodefense research. Without the investigations the protocol would have authorized, BWC noncompliant states continue to escape scrutiny.

In the case of North Korea, key U.S. objectives—a verifiable freeze of Pyongyang’s missile program and an end to its uranium and plutonium weapons work—are only possible if leaders from Washington and Pyongyang meet. But for now, the administration refuses to negotiate until North Korea verifiably eliminates all nuclear weapons activity. This may be morally satisfying but will not likely produce good results.

In South Asia, the center of an ongoing missile race, the Bush administration has been inconsistent in the application of its own WMD principles. Washington has downplayed the urgent need for further Indian and Pakistani nuclear and missile restraints. Recently, the administration has turned a blind eye toward recent reports of illicit missile transfers to Pakistan from North Korea in exchange for uranium enrichment technology.

Diplomacy and arms control measures obviously cannot address every security threat, but today’s WMD challenges cannot be successfully met without consistent U.S. support for multilateral arms control. If the White House continues to underutilize diplomacy and arms control and to claim special exemptions, it denies the United States and its allies the tools essential for preventing, reducing, and eliminating chemical, biological, and nuclear dangers.

U.S. Funds Released for Shchuch'ye

November 2002

By Christine Kucia

A U.S.-sponsored chemical demilitarization program in Russia received a boost October 23 after President George W. Bush signed the fiscal year 2003 defense appropriations bill, which released funds that had been withheld from fiscal years 2000-2002 “for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility” at Shchuch’ye.

Congress requires that the president certify Russian compliance with certain conditions, such as abiding by arms control treaties, in order to provide funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, which include nuclear, biological, and chemical nonproliferation and disarmament projects.

In fiscal year 2000, President Clinton certified Russian compliance, but Congress denied funding for Shchuch’ye. In addition to the usual CTR certification requirements, some Republicans who questioned Russia’s commitment to destroying its chemical weapons stockpile denied funding again and inserted a provision into the fiscal year 2001 defense authorization bill imposing additional conditions on funds for the chemical demilitarization program. Among the requirements, the secretary of defense must certify that Russia has declared its entire chemical weapons stockpile and that Moscow is committed to allocating at least $25 million per year for Shchuch’ye’s construction and operation.

The Pentagon has been unable to certify these conditions and has therefore been prevented from spending money on Shchuch’ye that was allocated after the legislation was passed. The 2003 appropriations bill provides the president with the authority to waive the certification requirements, allowing the Defense Department to spend the backlogged funds and money to make up the 2000-2001 gap.

President Bush had asked Congress to grant him the authority to waive the conditions and allow the Shchuch’ye project to proceed. The House and Senate finally agreed to grant a one-year waiver authority as part of the appropriations bill in order to release the money withheld from fiscal years 2000-2002.

The congressional requirements and the Pentagon’s decision not to certify Russia’s compliance, however, might still prevent expenditure of funds allocated for fiscal year 2003. Waiver authority for 2003 funds was not in the appropriations bill. Although the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill could grant the president waiver authority for the general CTR program and the chemical destruction project, Congress has not yet completed it.

Before Congress passed the appropriations bill, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), a key proponent of the CTR program in Congress, accused his colleagues in July of dangerous foot-dragging on the waiver issue. He declared, “It has been more than five years since the U.S. and Russia, each, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention but no Russian chemical weapons are being destroyed…. Almost two million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively small and discrete shells [are] awaiting elimination at Shchuch’ye.” Lugar urged Congress to grant the president permanent waiver authority.

U.S. Funds Released for Shchuch'ye

U.S. Releases Information On Cold War Chem-Bio Tests

November 2002

By Kerry Boyd

The Defense Department released new information October 9 regarding 27 chemical and biological weapons tests conducted between 1962 and 1973, revealing for the first time that it had used live chemical and biological agents in some land-based experiments and that civilians had been exposed to some simulated agents during the tests.

The Defense Department documents include information on land-based tests conducted in Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Utah, Canada, and the United Kingdom. They also contain information on sea-based tests that were part of Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense. Of the new documents, 16 describe the use of live chemical or biological agents in tests, and 12 describe tests involving simulants, ostensibly nonharmful materials that behave in a manner similar to real agents.

The new disclosures are part of an ongoing effort to declassify information on 134 chemical and biological tests planned by the Defense Department during the Cold War. The U.S. government never conducted 62 of the 134 planned tests, and it has now released information on 37 tests, including previously released reports regarding tests conducted on U.S. ships during the Cold War.

Defense officials continue to investigate the remaining tests, although William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said in a press briefing October 9 that preliminary findings suggest most of the other planned tests never occurred. The department began investigating the tests in September 2000 at the request of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

“The purpose of these operational tests was to test equipment, procedures, military tactics, et cetera, and to learn more about biological and chemical agents. The tests were not conducted to evaluate the effects of dangerous agents on people,” Winkenwerder said. He added that “things were learned at that time that would have been useful” to offensive use of chemical or biological agents.

Winkenwerder said he was “highly confident that civilians were not exposed to live chemical or pathogenic biologic agents.” Civilians in Hawaii, Alaska, Florida, and Puerto Rico, however, might have been exposed to biological and chemical simulants—particularly civilians in Hawaii, officials said. The simulants used were considered harmless at the time of the tests, but scientists have since discovered some of the simulants pose a potential health risk to people with weak immune systems, Winkenwerder added.

Approximately 5,000 service members were involved in the sea-based tests and another 500 in the land-based tests, Winkenwerder estimated.

Known Land-Based Live* Biological and Chemical Tests Conducted During the Cold War
Location
Test Name
Date(s)
Live Agents(s)
Alaska
Whistle Down
Dec 1962-Feb 1963
Sarin, VX
Alaska
Elk Hunt, Phase I
July-Aug 1964
VX
Alaska
Elk Hunt, Phase II
Oct-Dec 1964, June-July 1965
VX
Alaska
Devil Hole, Phase I
Summer 1965
Sarin
Alaska
Sun Down
Feb, Apr 1966
Sarin
Alaska
Swamp Oak
Mar-Apr 1966
Sarin
Alaska
Devil Hole, Phase II
July-Aug 1966
VX
Alaska
Red Cloud
Nov 1966-Feb 1967
Francisella tularensis
Alaska
Watch Dog
Summer 1967
Francisella tularensis
Alaska
Dew Point
June-July 1967
Sarin
Canada
Rapid Tan, Phase II
May-June 1968
Soman, VX, Tabun
Florida
DTC Test 69-75
Oct-Dec 1968
Puccinia graminis var. tritici
Hawaii
Tall Timber
May 1966
Ester of benzilic acid
Hawaii
Pine Ridge
May-June 1966
Sarin, Ester of benzilic acid
Hawaii
Green Mist
Mar-Apr 1967
Sarin
Maryland
DTC Test 69-12
Spring 1969
Sarin, VX, Tabun, Soman
U.K.
Rapid Tan, Phase I
July-Aug 1967
Sarin, VX, Tabun, Soman
U.K.
Rapid Tan, Phase III
Aug-Sep 1968
Sarin, VX, Tabun, Soman
Utah
DTC 68-53
Apr-Dec 1969
CS Riot Control

Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of Defense press releases and fact sheets.

*"Live" agents are chemical and biological substances capable of injuring or killing humans or crops.

 

U.S. Releases Information On Cold War Chem-Bio Tests

U.S. Begins Trimming Nuclear Forces

November 2002

By Christine Kucia

The United States has begun dismantling its Peacekeeper ICBM force and converting two Trident nuclear submarines to carry conventional weapons in the first move toward reducing its deployed strategic warheads to the 1,700-2,200 limit established by the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty.

On October 1, crews at F. E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming began dismantling the first of 50 Peacekeeper missiles, each capable of delivering 10 independently targetable warheads at variable yields, according to Jenna McMullin, spokeswoman with Air Force Space Command. One-third of the force will be retired in each year of the three-year dismantlement program at a total estimated cost of $400-500 million. The deactivation and dismantlement of each missile will take about 17 days, McMullin noted. Warheads removed from the Peacekeepers will be stored, and some are slated to replace older warheads on Minuteman III missiles.

Meanwhile, the USS Ohio ceased its nuclear role on September 30 upon its return to Bangor Naval Submarine Base in Washington, The Seattle Times reported October 1. The Ohio will head to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for a two-year conversion program slated to begin in October 2003, according to U.S. Navy spokeswoman Elissa Smith. The submarine is the first of four that will be refitted to carry as many as 154 conventional Tomahawk or Tactical Tomahawk land-attack missiles, bringing the U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet down to 14 boats. The newly fitted submarines are scheduled to become operational in 2007 at a total estimated conversion cost of $3.4 billion.

The reductions in land-based and submarine-launched nuclear forces come after the Bush administration outlined its strategic plans in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. By 2007, according to the review, the United States will reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads in its arsenal from around 5,900 to 3,800 by eliminating the Peacekeeper ICBM platform and converting the four Tridents, along with downloading some warheads from other ICBMs and bombers. (See ACT, January/February 2002.)

It is unclear which warheads the United States will subsequently remove from operational deployment to meet the 2,200-warhead limit by the strategic reductions treaty’s 2012 deadline, but after the modifications to the U.S. force structure currently underway, there are no plans to dismantle further delivery vehicles. According to leaked portions of the nuclear posture review, after 2007 “no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service.”

A September 24 Congressional Budget Office report on the financial implications of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty concluded that retiring delivery platforms and warheads would save more money than removing and storing warheads and keeping many delivery platforms, as the Bush administration plans. “Removing or retiring delivery platforms…offers the potential for significant savings”—around $5.1 billion in savings by 2012, according to the report. Simply removing and storing warheads while retaining the delivery platforms, however, will cost an estimated $105 million in the next decade, the report says.

U.S. Begins Trimming Nuclear Forces

No Movement on Strategic Reductions Treaty

Despite support from the White House, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and key Republican senators, the Senate did not act on a resolution of ratification for the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty before Congress recessed October 17. It remains to be seen whether the Senate will vote on a resolution when it reconvenes for the lame-duck session expected to begin November 12.

During an October 9 hearing, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-DE) emphasized his intention to move the treaty through the Senate. “I know of no outright opposition to that treaty,” he said, adding that “it would be my intention to bring it up in the lame-duck session to get it finished.” Leading Republican Senators Jesse Helms (NC), John Warner (VA), and Richard Lugar (IN) sent a letter October 10 to Biden in support of the treaty and urged him to “finish the job before we recess the 107th Congress.”

It is unclear what is causing the delay, but wrangling over whether to add conditions to the treaty will certainly be an issue for the Senate. In addition to the joint October 10 letter, Warner wrote the Foreign Relations Committee October 21 urging that the treaty “proceed through Senate consideration unencumbered by reservations, understandings or declarations.”

But, in an October 7 report to Biden, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) cast doubt on whether the treaty should go forward without careful examination of its weak points. Calling the new strategic reductions agreement “an unusual treaty,” Levin suggested adding conditions, such as providing for Senate consultation prior to U.S. withdrawal from the treaty; encouraging the elimination of both delivery platforms and warheads; pursuing an information exchange agreement with Russia on warhead and fissile material stockpiles and associated security measures; and reporting annually on the progress made toward the treaty’s reduction goals.

Reaffirming the difficult path facing the treaty in the Senate, a U.S. official indicated that “the chances of ratification of the treaty are very slim for this year.”


North Korea Extends Missile-Test Moratorium; U.S. to Send Kelly

October 2002

By Paul Kerr

North Korea announced September 17 that it would indefinitely extend its moratorium on testing long-range missiles. Subsequently, the United States said September 26 that it would send an interagency delegation led by James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian-Pacific affairs, to Pyongyang October 3-5.

The North Korean pledge was part of the North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration signed during a September 17 summit between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. According to the declaration, North Korea “expressed its will to extend its moratorium on missile tests beyond 2003.”

The country originally announced a halt to testing long-range missiles in September 1999, saying it would adhere to the moratorium as long as dialogue continued with the United States. The prospects for reaching an agreement to permanently halt North Korea’s missile program brightened when then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with Kim in October 2000. At that meeting, Kim promised not to test further the Taepo Dong-1 missile, which it had test-fired over Japan in August 1998 to considerable international alarm.

The Clinton administration subsequently came “tantalizing close” to a deal to eliminate North Korea’s medium- and long-range missiles and end its missile exports, according to Wendy Sherman, a Clinton adviser on North Korea policy. But an agreement was never reached, and after the Bush administration suspended negotiations in March 2001 pending a policy review, North Korea stated that it could not maintain the moratorium “indefinitely.” During a May 2001 meeting with a European Union delegation, however, Kim said North Korea would extend the moratorium until 2003.

A portion of the Japan-North Korea declaration also references nuclear weapons, saying only that the two countries “affirmed the pledge to observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.” Whether this statement simply affirms a commitment to existing agreements or signals support for additional arms control measures is unclear.

The most relevant nuclear agreement is the Agreed Framework concluded in 1994 between North Korea and the United States. This agreement defused the crisis over Pyongyang’s diversion of plutonium from its graphite reactors as part of a secret nuclear weapons program—a violation of its nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments. Washington agreed to construct two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors in North Korea in exchange for a freeze on the country’s nuclear weapons program and eventual dismantlement of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities.

The United States recently expressed support for the deal when Jack Pritchard, State Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, attended the August 7 ceremony to mark the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first reactor to be supplied under the Agreed Framework.

Diplomatic Progress

Meanwhile, after months of discussing whether to send a U.S. envoy to North Korea, the United States has decided to send Kelly, who will be the highest level official to visit the country since President George W. Bush took office. A September 26 White House statement said that Kelly would “explain U.S. policy and seek progress on a range of issues of long-standing concern to the United States and the international community.”

According to a State Department official interviewed September 26, those issues include weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, human rights, humanitarian issues, and missile production and proliferation. This is consistent with the Bush policy of linking progress on missiles to other issues. Kelly will visit Seoul and Tokyo prior to the Pyongyang meeting to consult and coordinate with U.S. allies, the State Department official said.

Koizumi’s visit to North Korea—the first by a Japanese prime minister—suggests some positive signs for security in Northeast Asia. Kim and Koizumi committed “to observe international law and refrain from threatening mutual security” and agreed to meet again in October to discuss normalizing diplomatic relations. The two sides also agreed to discuss future economic cooperation initiatives, with the “understanding” that Japan will “render economic cooperation” to North Korea.

The meeting also made important progress toward resolving several other controversial bilateral issues. North Korea apologized for the kidnapping of a number of Japanese citizens over the past 25 years—a major source of friction between the two countries—and agreed to take measures to prevent future abductions. Japan apologized for its treatment of the Korean people during its colonial rule from 1910-1945.

Koizumi expressed cautious optimism about the meeting’s outcome in a September 17 press conference, stating “as long as the principles and spirit of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration are sincerely abided by, relations between Japan and North Korea will begin to make great strides from hostile relations to cooperative relations.” He also quoted Kim as saying that “the doors are always open for dialogue” with the United States.

North Korea also praised the meeting’s outcome, calling the summit “a landmark event which paved the way for putting an end to the abnormal relations” between North Korea and Japan, the state-run Korean

North Korea Extends Missile-Test Moratorium; U.S. to Send Kelly

U.S. Attempts to Sink BWC Review Conference

October 2002

By Kerry Boyd

The United States is demanding that the upcoming Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) review conference make no decisions beyond agreeing to hold another conference in 2006, generating anger among many BWC states-parties.

In talking points distributed to Western allies in early September, the United States called for a “very short” conference, which is scheduled to begin November 11 in Geneva. In meetings with other delegations, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker originally proposed a 10-minute meeting. The United States, however, took a slightly more flexible stance after allies and arms control experts indicated that was nearly impossible, a State Department official said September 25.
According to the talking points, if the member states attempt to address any issue beyond scheduling another conference in 2006, the United States will publicly list countries it believes are covertly developing biological weapons. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said in an August 26 speech in Tokyo that Iran, Libya, Syria, and North Korea are seeking biological weapons and that Cuba has “at least a limited” biological warfare research and development program. He said there are other states with covert programs that the United States has not yet named.

The United States has called for a minimal conference out of concern that the meeting will turn into a “train wreck” if countries attempt to address issues beyond agreeing to meet in 2006, the State Department official said.

The United States came under international criticism last year when it said it would not support a proposed legally binding protocol to strengthen the BWC or any efforts to revise the protocol. (See ACT, September 2001.) The BWC lacks any mechanism to verify member states’ compliance, and countries spent more than six years negotiating the draft protocol through an international body known as the Ad Hoc Group to provide such a tool. The United States opposes the protocol out of concerns that proposed mechanisms and inspections might pose a threat to the U.S. biotech industry and biodefense efforts while doing nothing to catch BWC violators. Bolton also said that, despite their success in limiting other weapons, “traditional arms control measures…are not workable for biological weapons.”

In addition to opposing the protocol, the United States created an uproar at the 2001 review conference when it called for an end to the Ad Hoc Group’s mandate to negotiate a legally binding protocol. The conference, at which it had been hoped the protocol would be approved, was suspended for one year with no action taken. (See ACT, January/February 2002.)

The Bush administration continues to call for an end to the Ad Hoc Group, and the U.S. talking points threatened that if the November conference lasts too long the United States would explicitly demand the group’s end. If states-parties meet the U.S. demand for a brief meeting, then the United States would not press the issue at the conference.

The United States offered a package of measures to strengthen efforts to curb biological weapons proliferation at last year’s review conference, but the proposal did not include any legally binding measures. Since then, the United States appears to have moved away from its own proposals and any attempts to strengthen the BWC through states-parties meetings. The United States has told allies that it does not want to hold other meetings to discuss strengthening the treaty before a 2006 review conference.

Despite rejecting the draft protocol and any meetings within the next four years, the Bush administration fully supports the BWC, the State Department official said. The treaty remains “a bedrock of our efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction,” the U.S. talking points say.

The Bush administration has decided, however, that the best way to combat the biological weapons threat is through other forums. Using opportunities beyond the BWC regime avoids the potential that rogue states developing biological weapons programs, some of which are party to the treaty, could scuttle the efforts, the State Department official said.

Other mechanisms the United States is using to combat biological weapons include the Australia Group, 33 countries that coordinate export control policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons proliferation. Bolton also cited new U.S. laws designed to strengthen the country’s ability to defend against biological weapons attacks, multilateral commitments to prevent proliferation in the former Soviet Union, and World Health Organization and NATO efforts to prevent and respond to biological attacks.

The United States has been explaining its position to European states, Japan, South Korea, and other allies. U.S. officials have also discussed the issue with other countries, but the U.S. emphasis is on working with its Western allies, according to the State Department official.

Most of its allies are very unhappy with the U.S. position, according to a Western European official. There might be some room for compromise if countries can agree to hold meetings before a 2006 review conference, such as deciding to meet again in 2003, the official said. There are alternatives that countries could discuss, such as those the United Kingdom put forward in a green paper in June, which included a new international convention to criminalize individual actions to develop, produce, or use biological weapons. However, the prognosis for continuing work is not good, the official said.

Meanwhile, experts from the U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries and analysts from the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington-based policy organization, issued a report in September agreeing with the U.S. decision to reject the draft protocol to the BWC but criticizing the U.S. alternative proposals. “The industry group was genuinely puzzled that their government would advance such tepid proposals after the bioterrorist attacks of 2001 and in view of the continuing efforts of national and subnational actors to acquire biowarfare capabilities,” the report says. The group called for international standards, such as a criminalization treaty.

 

U.S. Attempts to Sink BWC Review Conference

Nuclear Test Readiness at Risk, DOE Reports

October 2002

By Christine Kucia

The Energy Department’s ability to resume full-scale nuclear testing within 36 months is at risk due to the loss of experienced employees, dismantled facilities, and unusable equipment, according to a report by the department’s Office of Inspector General (IG). The department is required to be able to conduct a nuclear test within three years of receiving an order from the president to resume testing.

The report, released September 9, harshly criticized the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management of the test readiness program, noting a significant lack of planning to fill key roles and update equipment. The audit asserted that NNSA “did not have a comprehensive plan or methodology in place to address its most significant test-related concerns.”

Lack of personnel with testing experience was a chief problem listed in the report, which cited a 50 percent loss of such employees in the past five years. Physical assets, such as computer equipment and diagnostic tools used during testing, are in disrepair or obsolete. In addition, computer modeling to determine the site’s readiness has not been updated to reflect changes in personnel, facilities, and safety requirements over the last 10 years.

In an accompanying memorandum addressing the report’s findings, NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Everet H. Beckner defended the agency, saying, “NNSA is confident that the weapons complex could resume testing on a time scale appropriate” to deal with any potential problem. Other Energy Department management comments noted that the audit focused only on the Nevada Test Site’s preparedness when it is the national weapons laboratories that have the greatest technical capabilities to conduct nuclear tests.

The IG report was issued as Congress contemplates reducing the time required to resume nuclear testing as part of the FY 2003 defense authorization and appropriations bills. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives approved $15 million to enhance test readiness, but only the House authorization bill calls for the ability to resume underground nuclear weapons testing within 12 months.

Given the current state of the test site’s facilities and annual funding level of $10 million, it would be “an ever greater challenge to meet a smaller window” of test readiness time, according to an Energy official familiar with the report.

The audit was conducted from September 2001 to July 2002 and involved interviews with over 70 current and former employees, visits to the Nevada Test Site and the North Las Vegas Facility, and reviews of policies and procedures.

Nuclear Test Readiness at Risk, DOE Reports

Landmine Treaty Members Meet

Representatives of more than 100 countries that have ratified or signed the Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) met September 16-20 in Geneva. The United States, which has not signed the treaty, did not officially participate in the conference, although it attended public portions of the meeting.

During this annual meeting, the fourth since the accord entered into force March 1, 1999, states-parties took stock of the treaty’s implementation as the four-year deadline for destroying all APL stockpiles draws nearer for countries that became states-parties in 1999. To date, 34 states-parties have fulfilled their stockpile destruction commitments, bringing the total number of states-parties that do not have APL stockpiles to 88. Another 22 are currently working toward their destruction commitments.

In addition to living up to their own obligations, meeting participants identified their other major objective as persuading as many countries to adhere to the treaty as possible. Ottawa members also explicitly urged nonstate actors for the first time to stop using landmines. German Ambassador Volker Heinsberg noted September 17 that of an estimated 230 million APLs worldwide about 90 percent are being used or stockpiled by governments and irregular forces outside the treaty.

Currently, 145 countries are states-parties or signatories to the accord, but some key countries have shied away, including the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and several countries in the Near East.

The United States ended its role in negotiating the treaty in 1997 when countries rejected Washington’s proposals for exempting U.S. APLs deployed on the Korean Peninsula and permitting the use of some mixed U.S. mine systems with both APL and anti-vehicle capabilities. But the Clinton administration announced the following year that it would join the treaty by 2006 if the United States could identify and field “suitable alternatives” to its mines outlawed by the treaty.

The Bush administration, however, initiated a review of U.S. landmine policy after taking office and has yet to finish it. A U.S. government official interviewed September 24 said the review is nearly complete, and findings could be announced imminently.

The next annual meeting of Ottawa Convention states-parties is scheduled to take place September 15-19, 2003, in Bangkok.

Representatives of more than 100 countries that have ratified or signed the Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines...

GAO Reports on U.S. Arms Export Discrepancies

October 2002

By Wade Boese

U.S. processes for controlling arms exports have failed to properly review and account for weapons and technology transfers, according to two reports the General Accounting Office (GAO) released September 20.

One report by the GAO, a nonpartisan government agency tasked with carrying out studies for Congress, faulted the Commerce Department for not seeking advice from the State Department frequently enough and for wrongly deciding that it, and not the State Department, should approve certain proposed exports.

In the U.S. export system, the State Department approves commercial exports of weapons and other purely military items, while the Commerce Department oversees exports of dual-use goods that have both military and civilian applications. Companies conducting defense-related trade are responsible for determining which channel to use.

Between fiscal years 1998 and 2001, companies requested more than 12,400 export classifications from Commerce, meaning they asked for a determination as to what regulations applied to the proposed export. Of those requests, Commerce only referred 40 to the State and Defense Departments for their input on what controls should apply. GAO felt that at least another 253 should have been referred based on criteria set out by Commerce, and it noted that State and Defense Department officials believe that Commerce should be referring “most, if not all,” such requests to them. Commerce disputed this contention.

GAO also reported “several instances” in which Commerce misclassified proposed exports as being under its jurisdiction when they should have been licensed through State. Because Commerce generally has a more lax review process than the State Department, GAO warned that items misclassified could be exported without the proper U.S. government scrutiny.

In another report, GAO concluded that the Defense Department does not have a modern and accurate system for tracking emergency or specially authorized U.S. arms exports.

By law, the president can order the Pentagon to supply arms abroad without going through the normal export process. Since fiscal year 1963, the president has authorized “drawdowns” exceeding $3.3 billion to more than 55 countries and organizations for peacekeeping activities, combating drugs, and military and nonmilitary emergencies worldwide.

In reviewing data for fiscal years 1993-2001, GAO found that the president authorized $1.8 billion in drawdowns, and the U.S. military services collectively reported $724 million in actual transfers. But the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is charged with tracking drawdowns, only had data showing $300 million in exports.

GAO attributed DSCA’s poor accounting to its use of an antiquated information system designed in the 1960s and irregular reporting by the services. DSCA agreed with GAO’s recommendation for it to improve its data collection and pursue more regular updates from the armed services.

GAO Reports on U.S. Arms Export Discrepancies

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