Login/Logout

*
*  

"I find hope in the work of long-established groups such as the Arms Control Association...[and] I find hope in younger anti-nuclear activists and the movement around the world to formally ban the bomb."

– Vincent Intondi
Professor of History, Montgomery College
July 1, 2020
EU / NATO

Parties Complete Weapons Reductions Under Balkan Arms Control Accord

THE FORMER warring parties in the Balkans conflict have eliminated nearly 6,600 heavy weapons from their active forces to meet final reduction requirements under the June 1996 Agreement on Sub Regional Arms Control. Although an official assessment of the 16 month reduction period, which ended October 31, will not be announced until November 21, the State Department has called the process a "near total success."

Modeled after the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the agreement, a key goal of the 1995 Dayton peace accord, establishes numerical ceilings on tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, attack helicopters and artillery that the parties could possess. Unlike the CFE Treaty, which imposed equal limits on two blocs of states, the sub regional agreement allocated ceilings according to each party's population on a ratio of 5:2:2 among Serbia (which forms the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia along with Montenegro), Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia's limits were further divided on a ratio of 2:1 between two entities—the Muslim Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. (Because the actual weapons holdings for the parties were never officially released, estimated reduction requirements are derived from non governmental estimates.) (See table below)

Balkan Arms Ceilings (1995 Estimates1/Agreement Ceiling)
Country or Entity Combat
Aircraft
Attack
Helicopters
Battle
Tanks
ACVs Artillery2
Serbia 280/155 110/53 1,300/1,025 1,000/850 4,000/3,750
Croatia 20/62 30/21 400/410 300/340 1,700/1500
Bosnia and Herzegovina --- /62 --- /21 --- /410 --- /340 --- /1,500
  • Muslim-Croat
0/41 12/14 135/273 80/227 1,500/1,000
  • Bosnian Serbs
40/21 30/7 330/137 400/113 1,600/500

SOURCES: Agreement on sub-Regional Arms Control; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995/96; and other sources.
NOTES: 1. Declared holdings were not made public. 2. Artillery pieces are all those with diameters of 75 millimeters or greater, including mortars.


While the ceilings for Serbia and Croatia corresponded closely with their actual holdings, thereby obligating them to make minimal reductions, the Bosnian Serbs have reduced their holdings in all five categories of "agreement limited armaments" (ALA) by more than half and in the case of artillery by two thirds, from 1,600 pieces to 500. Because the Muslim Croat federation's holdings were substantially less than its ceilings (except in artillery, which had to be reduced by 500 pieces), the federation will be able to more than double its numbers of tanks, ACVs and combat aircraft. The reductions comprised over 700 tanks, 80 ACVs, 60 combat aircraft and more than 5,700 pieces of artillery. According to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and State Department officials, the parties destroyed an overwhelming portion of their items; some weapons were exported, converted to non military purposes or placed on static display.

Originally, allegations of under reporting, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, threatened to undermine the agreement, but throughout the implementation period all parties voluntarily increased their reduction responsibilities. The parties, which completed 185 inspections during the reduction process, are expected to conduct more than 50 inspections between November 1 and March 1 to verify compliance with the new ceilings. After this validation period, the parties will be obligated to accept an annual quota of inspections equaling 15 percent of their "objects of inspection" (any formation, unit, storage and reduction site with ALA) for the unlimited duration of the agreement.

 

'Train and Equip'

Occurring simultaneously with the arms reduction process, the controversial U.S. led "train and equip" program provided the Bosnian federation with $250 million worth of armaments ($100 million from the United States), including 45 M 60A3 tanks, 15 utility helicopters and 80 M 113 armored personnel carriers. Brunei, Egypt, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates also contributed equipment, funding or training.

The Clinton administration initiated "train and equip" to provide the Muslim Croat federation with a defensive capability to ensure a stable military balance within Bosnia. Critics of the program, which include most U.S. European allies, assert that the program is creating a qualitatively superior federation force that will seek to redress its grievances through force if the international presence is withdrawn.

Ambassador James Pardew, the U.S. special representative for military stabilization in the Balkans, disputes such allegations, claiming that the Bosnian Serbs still hold the advantage because of their continued close relationship with Serbia and that, despite the federation's newer equipment, its forces lack sufficient training to constitute an effective counter against the Serbs. "Equipment is important, but it is only so much metal if you don't know how to use it effectively," Pardew said. He further stressed that "train and equip" reinforces the arms control agreement since continuation of the program is dependent upon the federation's compliance with the agreement.

However, critics argue that the program reflects the fundamental shortcoming of the sub regional agreement: any party may import new equipment or improve its force's skills as long as numerical ceilings are not exceeded. Other critics point out that the war was primarily one of small arms and small artillery—equipment not included or deliberately exempted from the agreement—and the agreement therefore does little to control the weapons that would be used if hostilities resume.

Michael O'Hanlon, a military and arms control analyst at the Brookings Institution, believes that taken independently, the arms control aspect of Dayton and "train and equip" were a success, but when factored in with lingering tensions and the lack of any real political settlement, notably the agreement over how much refugee resettlement to allow, aspects of both could be "incendiary."

With the arms control provisions of the Dayton accords now completed, attention may turn toward the accord's call for the negotiation, under OSCE auspices, of a larger regional arms control agreement encompassing more of the states in and around the former Yugoslavia. An OSCE official said that the current parties are "anxious" to start such negotiations, but other states in the region have refused to commit to the talks, and ambiguity surrounding the Dayton accord's provisions could stall the process.

CTB Treaty Signatories and Ratifiers

CTB Treaty Signatories and Ratifiers

During his September 22 address to the UN General Assembly in New York, President Bill Clinton announced that he was formally transmitting the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The treaty was opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996. On that day, 71 countries, including all five of the declared nuclear weapon states, signed the treaty. The next day, Israel—one of the three nuclear "threshold" states together with India and Pakistan—signed. As of September 1997, 147 states have signed and seven have ratified the CTB.

The CTB Treaty will formally enter into force 180 days after 44 designated states have deposited their instruments of ratification with the secretary general of the United Nations, but in no case earlier than September 24, 1998. These 44 states include the five declared nuclear weapon states, the three threshold states and 36 other states that are participating members of the Conference on Disarmament and recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power and/or research reactors.

Of the 44 states that must deposit instruments of ratification for formal entry into force, 41 (identified in bold in the roster below) have already signed the CTB Treaty. The other three states are India, North Korea and Pakistan. India has repeatedly stated that it will not sign the treaty, while Pakistan maintains that it will not sign unless India does. The list below identifies the states that have signed and ratified (ratifiers are identified in italics) the CTB Treaty as of September 1997.

—For more information, contact ACA.

Country Signature
Albania 9/27/96
Algeria 10/15/96
Andorra 9/24/96
Angola 9/27/96
Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97
Argentina 9/24/96
Armenia 10/1/96
Australia 9/24/96
Austria 9/24/96
Azerbaijan 7/28/97
Bahrain 9/24/96
Bangladesh 10/24/96
Belarus 9/24/96
Belgium 9/24/96
Benin 9/27/96
Bolivia 9/24/96
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9/24/96
Brazil 9/24/96
Brunei 1/22/97
Bulgaria 9/24/96
Burkina Faso 9/27/96
Burundi 9/24/96
Cambodia 9/26/96
Canada 9/24/96
Cape Verde 10/1/96
Chad 10/8/96
Chile 9/24/96
China 9/24/96
Colombia 9/24/96
Comoros 12/12/96
Congo 2/11/97
Congo Republic1 10/4/96
Costa Rica 9/25/96
Cote d'Ivoire 9/24/96
Croatia 9/24/96
Cyprus 9/24/96
Czech Republic 11/12/96

(Ratified 9/11/97)

Denmark 9/24/96
Djibouti 10/21/96
Dominican Republic 10/3/96
Ecuador 9/24/96
Egypt 10/14/96
El Salvador 9/24/96
Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96
Estonia 11/20/96
Ethiopia 9/25/96
Fiji 9/24/96

(Ratified 10/10/96)

Finland 9/24/96
France 9/24/96
Gabon 10/7/96
Georgia 9/24/96
Germany 9/24/96
Ghana 10/3/96
Greece 9/24/96
Grenada 10/10/96
Guinea 10/3/96
Guinea Bissau 4/11/97
Haiti 9/24/96
Holy See 9/24/96
Honduras 9/25/96
Hungary 9/25/96
Iceland 9/24/96
Indonesia 9/24/96
Iran 9/24/96
Ireland 9/24/96
Israel 9/25/96
Italy 9/24/96
Jamaica 11/11/96
Japan 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/8/97)

Jordan 9/26/96
Kazakhstan 9/30/96
Kenya 11/14/96
Kuwait 9/24/96
Kyrgyzstan 10/8/96
Laos 7/30/97
Latvia 9/24/96
Lesotho 9/30/96
Liberia 10/1/96
Liechtenstein 9/27/96
Lithuania 10/7/96
Luxembourg 9/24/96
Madagascar 10/9/96
Malawi 10/9/96
Mali 2/18/97
Malta 9/24/96
Marshall Islands 9/24/96
Mauritania 9/24/96
Mexico 9/24/96
Micronesia 9/24/96

(Ratified 7/25/97)

Moldova 9/24/97
Monaco 10/1/96
Mongolia 10/1/96

(Ratified 8/8/97)

Morocco 9/24/96
Mozambique 9/26/96
Myanmar 11/25/96
Namibia 9/24/96
Nepal 10/8/96
Netherlands 9/24/96
New Zealand 9/27/96

Country Signature
Nicaragua 9/24/96
Niger 10/3/96
Norway 9/24/96
Panama 9/24/96
Papua New Guinea 9/25/96
Paraguay 9/25/96
Peru 9/25/96
Philippines 9/24/96
Poland 9/24/96
Portugal 9/24/96
Qatar 9/24/96

(Ratified 3/3/97)

Romania 9/24/96
Russia 9/24/96
Saint Lucia 10/4/96
Samoa 10/9/96
San Marino 10/7/96
Sao Tome and Principe 9/26/96
Senegal 9/26/96
Seychelles 9/24/96
Slovakia 9/30/96
Slovenia 9/24/96
Solomon Islands 10/3/96
South Africa 9/24/96
South Korea 9/24/96
Spain 9/24/96
Sri Lanka 10/24/96
Suriname 1/14/97
Swaziland 9/24/96
Sweden 9/24/96
Switzerland 9/24/96
Tajikistan 10/7/96
Thailand 11/12/96
Togo 10/2/96
Tunisia 10/16/96
Turkey 9/24/96
Turkmenistan 9/24/96
Uganda 11/7/96
Ukraine 9/27/96
United Arab Emirates 9/25/96
United Kingdom 9/24/96
United States 9/24/96
Uruguay 9/24/96
Uzbekistan 10/3/96

(Ratified 5/29/97)

Vanuatu 9/24/96
Venezuela 10/3/96
Viet Nam 9/24/96
Yemen 9/30/96
Zambia 12/3/96

NOTES

1. The Democratic Republic of The Congo, formerly Zaire. [Back to table]

Sources: UN, ACDA, and ACA.

The Debate Over NATO Expansion: A Critique of the Clinton Administration's Responses to Key Questions

With the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled to begin hearings October 7 on NATO's planned expansion, the debate over the rationale, implications and wisdom of the alliance's decision to enlarge is now formally underway. On September 10, the Clinton administration provided written responses to questions on U.S. NATO policy contained in a June 25 letter to President Clinton from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R TX) and 19 Senate colleagues. Following the release of the administration's responses, a number of former U.S. officials and foreign policy experts, who earlier had signed an open letter to President Clinton opposing NATO's move eastward, released a critique of the responses. (See ACT, June/July 1997.) The authors of the critique (Jonathan Dean, Susan Eisenhower, Michael Mandelbaum, Jack Mendelsohn, Richard McCormack, John Rhinelander and John Steinbruner) plan to submit their comments to the full Senate sometime in October. Printed below are the questions contained in Senator Hutchison's letter, the administration's responses to the questions and a critique of each response.

1. What is the military threat that NATO expansion is designed to counter? How does expansion increase the security of Europe and the American people?

Administration's Response: Europe's security is a vital American interest, as we have seen through two world wars and the Cold War. Over the past half century, NATO has been our primary shield to protect that interest. With the Cold War over, NATO remains the foundation of trans Atlantic security. A larger, stronger NATO that includes Europe's new democracies will be even better able to provide for Europe's security and make America safer. It will help deter future threats, expand our collective defense capability to address traditional and non traditional security challenges and secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. It is a key part of our strategy to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the first time in history.

NATO's very existence is an important reason its current members and prospective new members face no imminent threat of attack. By adding new members to its strength, the world's most effective deterrent force will be even better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place.

Enlargement will help NATO address the security challenges that do arise. It will make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states. In addition, rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds continue to threaten trans Atlantic security—as we know from Bosnia. A larger, increasingly cohesive community of trans Atlantic states able to combine their security resources will be better able to address whatever contingencies arise.

Enlargement will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long range delivery systems. None of us can deal effectively with such threats alone. Enlargement will help broaden and intensify multinational coordination through NATO—one of our most effective instruments to counter these problems.

The alliance must be prepared for other contingencies, including the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely. Through our policy of engaging Russia we seek to provide strong incentives to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with its neighbors. These efforts, combined with the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development.

Finally, enlargement will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. For 50 years, NATO has helped prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy and create stable environment for prosperity. Each previous instance of enlargement—Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982—strengthened democracy and stability within the new member states and added to the alliance countries committed to defend the trans Atlantic community. Now, enlargement can do for Europe's East what it did for the West. Already, the prospect of membership has helped consolidate democracy in Central Europe, strengthen free market reform and encourage NATO aspirants to settle disputes with their neighbors.

Critique: The administration admits NATO faces "no imminent threat of attack" [emphasis added], and claims a larger NATO will be "better able to prevent conflict from arising in the first place" and better able to address "rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds," such as Bosnia. The administration does not explain how NATO might actually accomplish this. Would a larger NATO have prevented Bosnia or Chechnya or Nagorno Karabakh? Does the administration mean that, at a time when we are wavering in our commitment to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the United States would be more willing to lead a larger NATO into additional peacekeeping activities? The Bosnia experience suggests that expanding NATO will not affect the willingness or reluctance of national capitals to deal with "ethnic, racial and religious" problems.

The administration argues that expansion "will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long range delivery systems." NATO expansion is irrelevant to the spread of WMD and ballistic missiles outside of Europe, whereas cooperation with Russia on such issues as arms control, arms sales and dealings with "rogue" states is clearly critical. NATO expansion actually makes more complicated the problem of "guarding" against external threats should they arise. An expanded NATO will have more area to defend, static resources to defend it with and will require a major modernization program to integrate outdated, Soviet trained militaries.

The administration then notes that the alliance must be prepared for "the possibility that Russia could...return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although we see such a turn as unlikely." [Emphasis added.] The administration claims that "our policy of engaging Russia...the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of democratic and peaceful development." In reality, NATO enlargement has undercut Russian democrats, hampered efforts to reduce and make more secure Russia's nuclear arsenal, and made President Boris Yeltsin's political life much more difficult. The Founding Act has been equally controversial; it has been vigorously attacked by the right in the United States (for providing too much influence to Russia) and in Russia (for not providing Russia with enough influence), and its basic meaning is in dispute.

The administration's final point is that NATO expansion "will help secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line." [Emphasis added.] A military alliance is not the preferred means for extending democracy in Central Europe—that task should fall to the European Union (EU). But that organization, primarily for economic reasons, has identified potential new members but is not expected to extend them membership until at least the middle of the next decade. NATO can do little, if anything, to affect the political processes in its potential new members; those are more dependent on economic (privatizing, markets, aid) and social developments (standard of living, freedom of expression, civil rights). It is worth recalling that the Marshall Plan, not NATO, helped Germany become economically strong and politically stable.

If, as the administration claims, NATO is a democratizing influence, then presumably Russia should be among the first nations invited to join. Finally, NATO expansion will not "erase" Stalin's dividing line—it was lifted by the collapse of communism. But NATO expansion could well draw another line in Central Europe, between the "ins" and the "outs," with far reaching implications.

2. How will NATO expansion strengthen stability in Europe when the nations that face the greatest potential threats to their own security, including the Baltic states and several other nations, will not be included in the first NATO expansion?

Administration's Response: NATO enlargement will enhance stability throughout Europe and improve the security of all Europe's democracies, not just those admitted first. This is true for a number of reasons.

First, NATO enlargement is not a one time event, but a process that will continue after the first round. The Madrid communique specifically notes that NATO will "maintain an open door to the admission of additional alliance members in the future." States that are credible candidates for future admission to the alliance will benefit from the knowledge that the alliance is attentive to their security.

Second, NATO is taking a range of direct steps to improve the security of states that will not be initially admitted, from enhancements to the Partnership for Peace program to creation of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the completion of a NATO Ukraine Charter.

Finally, as it has in the past, NATO will continue to promote stability and cooperation beyond the borders of its members. The prospect of enlargement has already prompted major progress in resolving disputes and tensions within Central and Eastern Europe, and encouraged many of the new democracies to contribute in tangible ways to promoting long term security, as seen by their participation in the NATO led Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

Enlargement had to start with the strongest candidates or else it would not have started at all. The Baltic states understand that NATO enlargement, as a process which extends stability toward their own borders, increases their security even though they have not yet been invited to become alliance members. They have expressed support for our policy and have publicly endorsed the decisions taken at the Madrid summit. Ukrainian leaders have taken a similar position, seeing the presence of prospective NATO members on their western borders as a contribution to Ukraine's long term security.

Critique: If NATO expansion is not a one time event, but an open door, then the United States and its allies will eventually be obligated, for example:

to defend the Baltics from an external threat (that is, Russia), a commitment that can only be carried out by the substantial deployment of troops backed up by threat of the use of nuclear weapons. (Neither policy has been discussed by the administration.);

to protect Ukraine, whose population is one third Russian, from Russia; and

to intervene between Romania and Hungary, whose ethnic quarrels have a very long history.

Moreover, Russia has made it absolutely clear that it considers unacceptable the admission to NATO of any former Soviet republic and that such a move would render the Founding Act a dead letter. Thus, if the Baltics or Ukraine are actually incorporated into NATO (and Russia is not), we risk re militarizing Europe.

Consequently, if the United States were to press to bring the Baltics into NATO, it is almost certain that our major European allies would not support that stark a challenge to Moscow. The allies have already indicated they prefer to seek the admission of Slovenia and Romania to NATO.

As a result, the United States has endorsed an "open door" policy through which only a few additional states are likely to enter. But the issue of Baltic state membership will remain the focus of active controversy inside the alliance and between the alliance and Russia.

3. Are we creating a new dividing line that will breed instability and friction in Europe?

Administration's Response: No. We are erasing the old, artificial dividing line and fostering integration and partnership in its place. Because NATO enlargement has been designed as an ongoing process rather than a one time event, states not initially invited into the alliance have no reason to believe they are permanently excluded. On the contrary, the Madrid summit sent a direct message to them that any European democracy remains eligible for membership, and that the NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process of enlargement before the end of this decade. Moreover, the alliance's outreach to the East—through the Partnership for Peace, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO Russia and NATO Ukraine relationships—is designed precisely to promote an undivided European security system and ensure that no new dividing lines are created.

Virtually all neighbors of those states invited to become members, including states that have not applied for membership, support the alliance's enlargement. Indeed, after Madrid the president and Secretaries Albright and Cohen were met with enthusiastic crowds and warm receptions in Romania, Slovenia, the Baltics, Ukraine and other states in the region that will not be in the first round of new members.

One reason for the lack of tension between states that will and will not initially be admitted to the alliance is that NATO has no offensive aims or record of aggression. Moreover, states in the region understand that the distinction between those invited and not invited for membership is based on various objective factors—such as a state's present ability to contribute to NATO's military and strategic goals, and the depth and durability of its democratic and military reforms. The distinction between those invited and not invited is unlike the arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still and declined to enlarge. And those not invited understand they have a stake in the successful integration of the first new members, whose success will contribute to the overall process.

That is why the bigger danger of instability and friction would come from a failure to enlarge NATO. That course would represent an abandonment of NATO's founding principle, reaffirmed by allied leaders at their 1994 and 1997 summits, that alliance remains open "to any other European State in a position to...contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." A failure to enlarge would set Stalin's dividing line in stone, and subject Europe's new democracies to double jeopardy—punished first by being under Soviet domination, and punished again by being barred from membership in NATO for reasons that have nothing to do with present day circumstances. With the process of enlargement that NATO has begun, no European democracy is permanently excluded; without NATO enlargement, every new European democracy would be permanently excluded.

Critique: If the "open door" process stumbles, which is likely, there will be another dividing line in Europe—actually two lines—between the NATO "ins" and the NATO "outs," and between NATO and Russia. Membership cannot be selectively extended and then defined as creating an undivided Europe.

If expansion continues—and that is a very big if—then the main dividing line in Europe will be between NATO and Russia and relations between them will in all likelihood be confrontational.

If Russia is brought into NATO, which no one—least of all Moscow—believes will happen, NATO will be so fundamentally changed that none of these arguments will be relevant.

It is unclear how "a bigger danger of instability and friction" could come from not enlarging NATO. The reality is just the reverse: The biggest danger to Europe would come if enlargement drives Russia away from the West, away from democratization, away from continuing its involvement in nuclear and conventional arms control, and into a confrontational policy.

In any case, failure to expand NATO would not set Stalin's dividing line in stone. That dividing line no longer exists: Germany has been united; the Warsaw Pact is no more; the Baltics, Ukraine and Belarus are independent; Russia accepts NATO's presence; and "no imminent threat" exists. Now is the time for the alliance to encourage the abandonment of any adherence to Stalin's dividing line rather than create a new division.

If the new democracies are being punished by the West, it is by the failure of the European Union to integrate them into the existing pan European economic and political structures, not by the failure of NATO to integrate their military forces into the alliance.

4. Under Article V of the treaty, NATO's security guarantees will extend to all new NATO members. U.S. troops will be committed to respond to conflicts involving any of the new member nations of Central Europe. Is a border dispute involving one or several of the new NATO members so vital a national security threat to the United States that we are willing to risk American lives?

Administration's Response: Article V states that members will consider an attack against one to be an attack against all. It does not define what actions would constitute "an attack" or prejudge what alliance decisions might then be made in such circumstances. Member states, acting in accordance with established constitutional processes, are required to exercise individual and collective judgment over this question.

While it is not possible to delineate in advance what NATO's response would be to a "border dispute" involving a NATO member, we do know that NATO enlargement makes such disputes less likely by creating an incentive—namely, membership in or partnership with NATO—for countries to resolve their problems peacefully. Already, we have seen 10 major accords in the region settling old border and ethnic disputes: Each of these achievements was driven, at least in part, by the desires of the states involved to demonstrate their credentials for membership in NATO and, more broadly, for fuller integration into the Western community of liberal democracies. These accords include:

The 1991 Border Agreement between Poland and Germany;

The 1991 Good Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty between Poland and Germany;

The 1992 Good Neighborly Relations and Mutual Cooperation Treaty between Poland and Ukraine;

The 1994 Good Neighborly Relations and Military Cooperation Agreement between Poland and Lithuania;

The 1996 Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Hungary and Slovakia;

The 1996 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement between Hungary and Slovenia;

The 1996 Bilateral Friendship Treaty between Hungary and Romania;

The 1996 Associate Agreement with the European Union between Slovenia and Italy;

The 1997 Joint Declaration on Czech German Bilateral Relations;

The 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Romania and Ukraine.

It is important to remember that no NATO nation has ever been attacked, and during its half century of existence NATO has never once had to fire a shot in anger in order to fulfill the security guarantees in the Washington Treaty of 1949. Bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will make it less likely, not more likely, that American troops might be drawn into another war in Europe.

Critique: Joining NATO may be an incentive for peaceably solving problems with other members, but even that argument has been sorely tested by Greece and Turkey (which have not gone to war, but neither have they resolved their dispute over Cyprus). The question is more applicable to disputes between NATO and non NATO nations, such as Hungary and Romania over minorities in Transylvania or Romania and Ukraine over Bukovina. Clearly, the potential for encountering border disputes increases as NATO moves east. But such disputes, unless they involve Russia, are not likely to pose a vital security threat to the alliance and therefore NATO will be very reluctant—if not politically unable—to intervene. As a result, an expanded NATO is just as likely to be stuck with an old set of unresolved problems on its agenda than it is to create new incentives for their resolution.

In any case, the administration does not answer the last part of Senator Hutchison's question at all—whether these disputes are so vital to U.S. security that we would risk our troops. Instead, they list a number of friendship and cooperation treaties in Central Europe—including at least three concluded before NATO expansion was even announced—as evidence NATO expansion has brought a new standard of international conduct to the region.

Despite these treaties, local distrust of neighbors still runs high and deep in Central and Eastern Europe. In its September 1996 report on public opinion on NATO enlargement, the U.S. Information Agency showed that 55 percent of Hungarians polled had "unfavorable" opinions toward Romanians, and 42 percent of Romanians (and the same percentage of Slovaks) had unfavorable opinions of Hungarians.

5. The nations of Central Europe have a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes. What guidelines will NATO establish to resolve these types of disputes or other problems that may well arise among the new member nations? What would be the impact of extending coverage of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to them?

Administration's Response: The process of NATO enlargement will make such disputes less likely and increase the chances that they will be peacefully resolved. While the alliance's core mission is collective defense, NATO's normal operation also functions as a conflict prevention mechanism. In part, this is because states must settle disputes with their neighbors as a precondition for entry into NATO. The three states NATO has decided to invite to begin accession talks—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—already have settled all outstanding border and ethnic disputes with their neighbors.

Once states join NATO, their ongoing participation in the alliance will give them a powerful incentive to resolve any future problems with their neighbors peacefully. Constant consultation in the North Atlantic Council and other NATO structures will provide members with a means to resolve any disputes. For this and other reasons, NATO has tended to moderate those tensions that do arise among its members, such as between Greece and Turkey.

While it is true that there have been many strands of conflict within Central and East European history, it would be a mistake to think of this condition as either unique or immutable. Western Europe also had a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes, and none of these flared during the half century of NATO's existence—in part, because NATO has helped its members transcend them. There is nothing in the historical record to suggest that current Central and East European disputes are more deep rooted or violent than, say, past disputes between France and Germany.

If disputes ever were to occur within Central and Eastern Europe, once again the alliance and its members would need to exercise their judgment on a case by case basis in formulating the appropriate response. NATO has never operated through mechanistic guidelines, and it should not.

The benefits that would accrue to these states would be the same that have accrued to all other members of NATO: enhanced security and the assurance of U.S. commitment to their security. The supreme guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States. During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear forces provided the principal means by which NATO deterred conventional and nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Despite the absence of an overwhelming threat today, they still fulfill an essential role in preserving peace and preventing coercion of any kind.

Critique: After arguing earlier that expanding NATO will help "counter aggression against its member states," the administration in the response to this question backs away and notes, correctly, that no preordained response exists for dealing with disputes in Central and Eastern Europe. But it is very misleading to suggest that "all outstanding border and ethnic disputes" have been settled.

The administration also makes the case against "historicism," noting that while "there have been many strands of conflict within Central and Eastern Europe, it would be a mistake to think of this condition as either unique or immutable." A valid argument, of course, but the same analysis should then apply to the possibility for democratization and liberalization in Russia.

It is true that France and Germany have been reconciled after 85 years and three disastrous wars. But this fundamental change stemmed from Germany's close association after World War II with its "traditional" enemies, not from its exclusion from European institutions. If Franco German relations set the precedent for how to change a "unique or immutable" condition, then NATO should incorporate, not isolate, Russia.

The basic question is not whether the states of Central Europe can rise above their history, but whether it strengthens NATO or weakens it and whether it is the U.S. interest to have this historical drama played out within the alliance or apart from it.

The administration's response also entirely ignores the effects that NATO expansion would have on the disposition of nuclear weapons. A NATO commitment to defend countries directly bordering on Russia would have a significant effect on nuclear weapons deployments, including tactical nuclear weapons whose overall management is of particularly serious concern. Most immediately, Russia would predictably increase its reliance on these weapons as a counterweight to NATO's unquestionably superior conventional force capabilities. Over the longer term, NATO itself might be driven in this direction in response to Russia's reaction and to any significant future investment in Russia's own conventional forces. The dangers inherent in these interactions have the potential to swamp any of the claimed benefits of NATO expansion.

6. In the administration's February 1997 "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO," you assumed that the United States would pay only 15 percent of the direct enlargement costs, with the new members paying 35 percent of the bill, and the current (non U.S.) members paying 50 percent. Will the new members or the current members pay these amounts? Will you make the cost sharing agreement part of the expansion negotiations? If not how will yours and future administrations handle shortfalls?

Administration's Response: The cost estimates in the administration's February 1997 report to Congress relied in part on standard NATO cost sharing arrangements. Under these procedures, each country pays the cost of maintaining its own national military. The February report assumed that countries would pay for their own direct enlargement enhancements, except for those programs that would qualify for common funding. As a result, the Department of Defense estimated that about 40 percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded and 60 percent could be common funded. Out of a total estimated cost of $9 billion to $12 billion, this would mean that new members would pay for approximately 35 percent ($3 billion to $4.5 billion total through 2009, or about $230 million to $350 million per year) of direct enlargement enhancements; current (non U.S.) members would pay about 50 percent ($4.5 billion to $5.5 billion over the period, or around $350 million to $425 million per year); and the United States would pay its 24 percent share of the common funded enhancements (about 15 percent of the total direct enlargement bill, or approximately $1.5 billion to $2 billion over the 2000 to 2009 timeframe), averaging between $150 million and $200 million per year.

In addition to the direct costs of enlargement, individual allies will need to continue to improve their capabilities for force projection, consistent with their commitments under the alliance's new strategic concept adopted in 1991. Force projection capabilities will take on increased importance as NATO enlarges, in view of the allies' conclusion that the defense of new members' territory will be based primarily on reinforcement in times of danger rather than through the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Because the United States already possesses substantial force projection capabilities, the United States will not bear a significant portion of this category of costs. We will continue, through the NATO collective force planning process, to encourage our European allies to continue to develop their force projection capabilities.

Past estimates of enlargement costs, including those produced by the administration, have necessarily been notional. Now that NATO has decided which states to invite to begin accession talks, it will be possible to assess more precisely their security needs and assets, and to define the implications for NATO's budgets. This process will begin immediately and will be tied closely to the accession process. While each of the three invited states has indicated its willingness to contribute to the NATO funded and national costs of membership, the accession talks will help to clarify those obligations and commitments.

Enlargement will not be cost free. However, it is affordable for both current and prospective members. In light of the enormous benefits which enlargement will bring to both Europe and the United States, it represents extraordinary value for the money.

Critique: The administration's response is disingenuously worded so that the reader concludes that "out of a total estimated cost of $9 billion to $12 billion" the United States would pay no more than $1.5 billion to $2 billion over the first 10 years. The February report actually estimates that the total costs of NATO expansion will be between $27 billion and $35 billion, of which the U.S. share, $1.5 billion to $2 billion by the administration's calculations, would be no more than 6 percent.

The administration's cost study was reportedly based on at most four countries joining NATO but eight are actually in line: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the first tranche; then Slovenia, Romania and the three Baltic states (all have been named in the NATO communique issued at the Madrid summit.) Moreover, the administration's cost estimates assume no new troop deployments. But forces would have to be deployed forward if NATO intends to guarantee the security of the Baltics.

The leaders of Britain, France and Germany, our key NATO allies, declared after the Madrid summit either that they do not intend to pay 1 cent for NATO expansion or that they expect their defense budgets to shrink. The new member states, which under the administration's most optimistic projections will have to spend $10 billion to $13 billion from 1997 to 2009, simply do not have the money for modernization. For Hungary, the $900 million cost of 30 new fighter planes must come out of a government budget that totalled $21 billion in 1995.

It is almost certain that NATO expansion will precipitate a bitter row over sharing the defense burden among the allies. In the end, either the United States will pay most of the expansion costs or NATO will be saddled with second class militaries until well into the next century.

7. Many of us view the principal threat confronting the 12 nations seeking NATO membership as less a military threat than a struggle for economic stability. Fierce competition exists among these 12 states. By conferring NATO membership on a few nations now, those nations will have a distinct advantage over their neighbors in the competition to attract new business and foreign investment. This type of economic competition and imbalance could well breed friction and instability in Central Europe. Will NATO be obligated to step in and resolve the very conflicts that could be caused by the NATO selection process? Would European Union membership be a better option to achieve the economic stability NATO aspirants are seeking?

Administration's Response: Economic challenges do remain critical for Central and East European states. Most of these states need to advance and deepen aspects of reform—from privatization, to improved regulatory regimes, to efforts against corruption. This is one reason we support enlargement of the European Union to include Central and East European states.

While the role of the EU is critical, there is no reason to insist on a choice between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Both are important. Both make independent contributions to European prosperity and security. EU enlargement alone, however, is not sufficient to secure our nation's security interests in post Cold War Europe. Unlike NATO, the EU lacks a military capability. Military capability remains the heart of NATO's strength and continues to be needed to preserve European security.

As free markets take root in Central and Eastern Europe, it is certainly reasonable to expect that economic competition among the region's states will intensify, just as it has in Western Europe and other parts of the world. There is no historical evidence, however, that would suggest NATO membership will become a meaningful distinction in economic competition within Central and Eastern Europe. NATO membership was never used over the past half century to draw foreign investment from, say, Sweden to Norway.

What matters most to firms and investors are economic fundamentals. Central and East European states will attract business through privatization, sound management of their budgets and money supply, and efforts to create a talented workforce and reduced unemployment. For those European states that are economically less developed today, the right answer for them is to deepen such reforms, and the prospect of NATO membership gives them some additional incentive to do so. In addition, NATO enlargement, together with closer security cooperation through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, will help stability take root throughout Central and Eastern Europe—in member states and non member states alike—making all of its countries more attractive to investors. Conversely, a failure of NATO to enlarge could undermine the business climate for the entire region. While firms are unlikely to invest in a country solely because it is a NATO member, they might well invest less heavily in a region such as Central and Eastern Europe if its security future were called into question.

Critique: The administration admits that "the role of the EU is critical" and that such economic fundamentals as "sound management of...budgets and money supply" matter most in attracting investment. In fact, EU membership is the most logical means of assuring continuing economic and political reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and EU enlargement negotiations will begin next year with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These countries will probably ultimately enter the EU, even though the EU has not been in a rush to offer membership to these countries because of the cost (in agricultural and infrastructure support) and the constraints placed on EU member budgets by the Maastricht criteria for a common currency.

The administration's call for "sound budget management" rings hollow when its own cost projections for expansion place a multi billion dollar defense burden (about 37 percent of the total cost) on the new members. The potential new members have themselves cut way back on their defense expenditures to provide for social welfare and capital investment: the Czech Republic's defense expenditures are running at one fifth those of Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s and the defense budgets of Hungary and Poland have taken similar cuts (one sixth and one fifth, respectively).

In brief, this is a poor time to oblige these three countries, which are struggling to modernize, stabilize and humanize their economies and societies, and to prepare for EU membership, to increase their defense expenditures in order to carry out a modernization program which the administration estimates will cost $10 billion and other analyses conclude will be considerably higher. NATO membership will, in fact, make countries less attractive to investors if their budgets are stressed by the demands of NATO modernization and if they lose the support of international financial institutions.

8. Does NATO membership by the new Eastern European democracies force them to spend money for arms, when expenditures for the infrastructure critical to economic growth are more pressing?

Administration's Response: The new NATO members will need to invest in order to upgrade their militaries. But these states were already planning to make substantial improvements in their militaries, quite apart from their possible membership in NATO. These investments were needed because these states emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare. The impact of NATO membership will not be so much to increase Central and East European defense budgets as to ensure that anticipated increases result in greater compatibility with NATO defense plans and equipment.

Moreover, alliances save money over the long term. Many leaders in the region have said their states might well spend more on their militaries if they were not included in NATO, because then they would feel less secure outside the alliance's collective defense structure. States that have remained outside of NATO in the past have not necessarily enjoyed lower defense budgets. Sweden, for example, has higher per capita defense expenditures than many of its NATO neighbors.

Central and East European countries will face difficult decisions between defense and domestic spending, as does the United States and all of our current allies. Yet the necessary investments needed to participate in the alliance do not need to take place overnight. The Defense Department's analysis foresees a gradual process of modernization, with new members attaining a "mature capability" over a period of about a decade. Moreover, projected real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in Central and Eastern Europe as high as 4 to 5 percent suggest that the new members will be able to make needed defense investments without damaging their domestic economies and social efforts. In fact, the Defense Department has urged these countries to concentrate first on personnel, training, communications, logistics and infrastructure improvement needed to make them compatible with NATO before devoting large sums to purchase new weapons systems.

Critique: The major nations of Western Europe are having difficulty sustaining their domestic economies and social efforts, and have made it absolutely clear they do not intend to increase their spending for NATO enlargement. The Czech Republic and Poland already equal or exceed the rates of NATO's European members for military expenditures as percentage of gross national product (GNP) and percentage of central government expenditures (CGE). The administration is, at best, unrealistic when it claims that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have much larger economic and social needs, can make additional investments in defense "without damag[e]." Secretary of Defense William Cohen has said that "the bulk of the costs will be borne by the three new member countries. They...will have to measure up. There is no free lunch."1

Paying the enlargement bill will not be easy for the new members. With per capita GNPs of under $10,000, the Czech Republic and Poland (but not Hungary) are already spending at or above the rate of current NATO members. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,2 in 1995:

NATO Europe had $184 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.4 percent of GNP and 5.6 percent of CGE;

the Czech Republic had $2.4 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.8 percent of its GNP and 6.9 percent of CGE;

Hungary had $1 billion of military expenditures which represented 1.5 percent of GNP and 4.6 percent of CGE; and

Poland had $4.8 billion of military expenditures which represented 2.3 percent of GNP and 5.4 percent of CGE.

9. Do Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have the military capabilities to make a positive contribution to the security of NATO, or will they be net consumers of security for the foreseeable future?

Administration's Response: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all take significant steps to reform their militaries, upgrade their military capabilities, and contribute to European security beyond their borders. The Defense Department estimates that they can achieve a "mature capability" within about a decade after joining the alliance. The new members will be expected to contribute to the range of NATO security functions and missions.

Even today, the three states bring significant assets to NATO's security work. Together, they bring over 300,000 troops to the alliance. All three have firmly established civilian control of their militaries. Their initial defense reform efforts have focused on low cost, high return enhancements to interoperability to allow effective near term security contributions. Over time, they will increase their ability to operate with NATO forces in their own countries and elsewhere.

Moreover, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have demonstrated their readiness to contribute to security beyond their borders. Both Poland and the Czech Republic contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Poland has been a leader in its region, helping Lithuania and Ukraine develop their armed forces and creating joint units with both countries. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic now provide over 1500 troops to the NATO led [SFOR] mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Hungary provides the base from which U.S. forces deploy into Bosnia. Through individual efforts and participation in numerous Partnership for Peace exercises, the three states have begun to improve their abilities to work with NATO forces.

Each of the states will need to pursue an active and sustained program of reform and modernization in order to achieve a higher level of NATO interoperability and broader military capabilities over the next decade. Leaders from all three states have stated their willingness to do so and have demonstrated that their countries will become net security producers over time as full members of NATO.

Critique: While the administration claimed earlier that expanding NATO will make it stronger, in the response to question eight it notes that "these states emerged from the Warsaw Pact with military forces that were poorly structured and inadequately equipped for modern warfare." The administration also notes that it will take at least a decade for the military forces of the new members to achieve a "mature capability."

Unless the United States is prepared to foot most of the bill, it is certain that modernization of the forces of these three countries will take longer than a decade. In addition, since the administration claims the NATO expansion process is an "open door," much greater costs will be associated with some of the potential second tranche members such as Romania and the Baltics, (not to mention Ukraine).

Thus, for the foreseeable future, NATO expansion is likely to stress the alliance by adding sub standard forces and increasing the amount of territory and length of borders to defend. On the other hand, some would argue that, with the possible exception of Germany, most of the members of NATO are already "consumers" of security and adding three to eight more nations will not alter this condition.

10. When one looks at the threats to American national security interests, foremost among these is Russia's substantial nuclear arsenal. Considerable progress has been made to lessen nuclear tensions through dramatic arms reductions in the past decade. And, for the moment, the current leadership in Russia is becoming reconciled to the likelihood of NATO expansion. But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? By expanding eastward, are we not creating an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions and perhaps even develop an early first use nuclear policy?

Administration's Response: The objective of our trans Atlantic security policy is an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. NATO enlargement is an important part of that strategy. So is our effort to support the development of a Russia that is democratic, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors, and cooperating with us and other states on a range of security challenges, including mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. So also is our effort, which bore fruit in May in the signing of the NATO Russia Founding Act, to institutionalize a broad and cooperative relationship between the alliance and Russia.

President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement, reflecting in part a lingering misperception among many Russian political leaders that the alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. That is an issue on which we have decided to disagree, while working together to manage that disagreement. But, judging by the evidence, it is unlikely that NATO enlargement will undermine Russian reform or strengthen Russian hardliners. Those who suggest this would be the case see Russian democracy as far more fragile than has proven the reality over the last few years. NATO enlargement is not a significant concern for most of the Russian public, which understandably remains far more concerned about wages, pensions, corruption and other domestic issues.

Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, Russian reform and security cooperation have continued to advance. President Yeltsin was re elected. He brought new officials into the government who are committed to economic modernization and integration with Western and global structures. He brought in a new defense minister who supports the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. At the Helsinki summit in March, President Yeltsin agreed to press for Duma ratification of START II, and to pursue a START III treaty with further reductions once START II has entered into force. And of course, Russia joined with NATO in May to conclude the Founding Act. Indeed, as NATO enlargement has gone forward, Russia has drawn closer to the West.

These recent positive developments call into question the theory that NATO enlargement erodes Russian reform and security cooperation. In any case, it would be counterproductive to make our NATO policies hostage to Duma intransigence on START II. Doing so would send a message to the Duma that we will hold up NATO enlargement as long as they hold up START II. In that case, we likely would get neither.

Critique: The administration recognizes that "President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement," but it rather off handedly dismisses Russian opposition as based on a "misperception" of NATO as posing a threat to Russia's security. The origins of this "misperception" about NATO expansion are left unanalyzed by the administration, but they are not difficult to discern. The administration itself points out that enlargement would "make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states." And one of the principal, and undisguised, reasons the Central and Eastern European countries seek to join NATO is protection against aggression by Russia.

Another possible source of this Russian "misperception" about NATO expansion is the administration position that "the alliance must be prepared for...the possibility that Russia could abandon democracy and return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period." Although the administration, to its credit, considers this possibility to be "unlikely," other well known political figures, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that NATO expansion must be undertaken to "encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders."3 [Emphasis added.]

It is too early to tell whether NATO expansion has "created an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions," but expansion has certainly delayed Duma ratification of START II. It has also negatively affected the views of the Russian political elites on long term prospects for arms control. And expansion has complicated Yeltsin's political fortunes and made it much more difficult for the reformers to deal with the nationalists and communists. Indeed, Yeltsin has already made it absolutely clear that, although he signed the Founding act—which Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Russia's Communist Party called "a complete and unconditional surrender"—he is "categorically against" NATO offering membership to any former Soviet republic and has threatened that such a move would "fully undermine" relations with Russia.

The administration's response to this question ducks the issue of nuclear use entirely. The fact is, NATO expansion comes at a moment when Russia, sensing its deteriorating security situation, has abandoned its long standing nuclear "no first use" policy and is in the midst of a debate over whether, given the deplorable state of its conventional forces, its lack of budgetary resources and NATO's creep toward its borders, it should increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. In the worst case, Russian re emphasis on nuclear weapons could well be mirrored eventually by NATO policies.

11. What have we given up in terms of NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the expansion plan?

Administration's Response: The NATO Russia Founding Act was not an effort to buy Russian acquiescence to enlargement. It was instead driven by our judgment—and that of the alliance—that a robust NATO Russia relationship could make an important contribution toward the goal of a peaceful and undivided Europe.

The Founding Act institutionalizes this relationship and provides the basis for increased cooperation. At the same time, NATO equities remain fully protected. The North Atlantic Council remains the supreme decision making body of the alliance. The Founding Act, in establishing a Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia, provides for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, joint decision making and action. The Founding Act is equally clear, however, that NATO retains its independence of decision making and action at all times. The Permanent Joint Council offers Russia a forum in which to express its views and, where possible, to facilitate cooperation between NATO and Russia. But there is not now and will not be a Russian veto over NATO decisions or any restriction on NATO's freedom of action.

If Russia adopts a constructive approach to its relationship with NATO, there is enormous potential for cooperation on a wide range of issue, from non proliferation to humanitarian assistance. If Russia chooses not to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Founding Act, no impediment has been created. NATO retains its strength, autonomy and ability to act.

Nothing in the Founding Act restricts NATO's ability to station troops, deploy weapons or carry out any of its missions. The final section of the act contains restatements of unilateral NATO policy that existed prior to the Founding Act about how the alliance intends to act "in the current and foreseeable security environment." In its 1995 enlargement study, NATO concluded that enlargement did not require a change to the alliance's nuclear posture; on this basis, NATO declared in December 1996 that NATO members "have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy." The Founding Act also restates NATO's March 1997 unilateral declaration that it "will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moreover, none of NATO's unilateral statements regarding military policy cited in the Founding Act restricts the alliance's ability to conduct exercises, establish headquarters or build and maintain infrastructure. Indeed, the Founding Act acknowledges that NATO will "have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with [these] tasks," given that NATO's strategy now revolves around the ability of states to receive reinforcements.

The Founding Act reflects alliance policy in the current and foreseeable security environment. Should we see an unexpected change for the worse, NATO retains the prerogative to reconsider its policies with regard to nuclear and conventional deployments, and the Founding Act would in no way constrain that. It is our hope and expectation, however, that the recent very positive trends within Europe will continue and that the Founding Act will provide a vehicle for greatly expanded cooperation between NATO and Russia.

Critique: The administration response is accurate as far as it goes. It fails, however, to acknowledge that a number of ambiguities surround the Founding Act. Specifically, there is obviously a difference of views between officials and observers in Washington and Moscow over whether the act is legally binding or not, whether it gives Russia a "voice" or a "veto" within NATO, and whether it has "bought off" Russia for just the first tranche of three new alliance members or whether it represents a go ahead for NATO's "open door" expansion policy throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

In the long term, Russian "acquiescence" to the first tranche of NATO expansion depends on how these ambiguities are resolved. Russia is not likely to acquiesce to the "open door," however. Thus, with or without the Founding Act, NATO expansion is putting us on a track toward isolating Russia and orienting its foreign, domestic and security policy in an unfavorable and unaccommodating direction.

NOTES

1. See Susanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Cautions NATO's New Trio," The Washington Times, October 3, 1997, p. A15.

2. See "Table I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1985 1995," World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, ACDA: Washington, DC, July 1997, pp. 49 98.

3. See Jesse Helms, "New Members, Not New Missions," The Wall Street Journal Europe, July 9, 1997.

Bulgaria, Slovakia Still Hold SS 23s

The United States continues to press Bulgaria and Slovakia to destroy their small inventories of SS 23 ballistic missiles, but resistance from both governments has stalled U.S. efforts to eliminate one of the Cold War's remaining vestiges. Both countries apparently have rejected a low level July demarche from Washington seeking destruction of the SS 23s, which are banned under the 1987 U.S. Soviet Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The missiles are the only systems remaining from the 72 SS 23s the former Soviet Union transferred to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (24 to each country) two years prior to signing the treaty.

The United States has already achieved a primary goal of its ongoing initiative¾the destruction of the connecting sections for the missiles that would enable them to carry nuclear warheads¾and Germany and the Czech Republic have destroyed their SS 23s. But Bulgaria and Slovakia have cited financial, environmental and national security concerns as reasons they cannot eliminate the 500 to 1,000 kilometer range, solid fuel systems believed to be operational and number fewer than 10 in each country. The United States has said it is prepared to assist in the destruction of the aging missiles.

The Soviet Union claimed the transfers, which the United States did not learn of until 1990, were not a violation of the INF Treaty because they occurred before signature and the three former Warsaw Pact countries were not parties to the accord. However, the United States maintained that Moscow had acted in bad faith during the treaty negotiations because all SS 23s were to have been declared and destroyed.

The Clinton administration is seeking the destruction of the remaining missiles to fulfill the objectives of the INF Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which Bulgaria and Slovakia have agreed to adhere to unilaterally. The United States is asking a number of countries to eliminate their so called MTCR "Category I" missiles (which can carry a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers) because of their inherent capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

NATO and Russian Approaches To Adapting the CFE Treaty

 

Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland

Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland is director of the European Studies program at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. The idease expressed in this article are the author's own, and are not to be considered the policy of the U.S. government

With the completion of the Madrid summit, NATO has embarked on not only its most significant membership expansion but also a further redefinition of its purpose. It is critical, however, to remember that NATO enlargement is not an objective of Western security. The true objective is to improve overall security in Europe and establish a viable framework of stability for the future. In this context, "enlargement" is a "means" to achieve this greater "objective." While this may strike some as a question of semantics, it serves to place NATO's expansion effort in the proper perspective. It also underscores the fact that enlargement is meant to be an ongoing process that only began with the invitations to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland to join the alliance. This process must be given careful consideration over the next two years to ensure the ultimate objective of enhanced security is realized and not compromised along the way.

Fundamental in this regard are efforts to assuage Russian concerns about enlargement. Though Western policy makers have attempted to describe enlargement as non threatening, there is no doubt that most, if not all, Russian leaders still disagree. To help overcome Moscow's resistance to NATO's move eastward, the Founding Act signed between Russia and the alliance in May of this year provides for consultations, cooperation, possible joint action and a NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council, though it is still unclear exactly how this council is to operate. There have been other policy recommendations to help Russia through this period, such as a mixed NATO Russian military brigade that would build upon the experience of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. But central to meeting Moscow's fears about NATO enlargement will be radical revisions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

From Russia's perspective, the CFE Treaty provides it with legally binding assurances about the size and deployment of NATO forces that are critical to Moscow's assessment of regional security. Consequently, while adjustments to the treaty were warranted based on the dramatic changes that have occurred in Europe since its signing, the alliance's impending enlargement gives this adaptation process an added significance.

 

The Treaty in Perspective

Signed in November 1990 by the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the CFE Treaty places numerical limitations on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft and attack helicopters—known collectively as treaty limited equipment (TLE)—for each alliance or "group" in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. These alliance wide limitations were further circumscribed by a series of geographic zones to prevent the massing of forces in specific regions. Individual limits for each treaty signatory were distributed from the alliance limits among the members of each of the two blocs before the demise of the Warsaw Pact. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those former Soviet republics within the treaty's area of application (with the exception of the Baltic states) met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in May 1992 and determined their respective TLE limits from the total allocated to the Soviet Union.

Though the CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990, its implementation was delayed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet Union and problems associated with the removal and transfer of Soviet heavy weapons. In 1989 and 1990 (before the treaty was signed), the Soviet Union had moved a huge number of weapons (estimated at betweaen 50,000 and 70,000) east of the Ural Mountains (outside the treaty's area of application) and had transferred other TLE to naval infantry and coastal defense units, actions which delayed ratification of the accord. Once these issues were settled, the treaty formally entered into force in November 1992 after Belarus became the last state to deposit its instrument of ratification. Despite this delay, by November 17, 1995 (the end of the treaty's 40 month reduction period), over 58,000 pieces of TLE had been eliminated (most through destruction), and approximately 2,700 inspections were conducted to ensure compliance.1 Russia had the greatest burden for eliminating TLE; its reductions represented roughly 20 percent of this total.

Curiously, during this transitional period the inspections may have contributed more to reducing tensions than the actual reductions. For example, under the terms of the agreement, short notice inspections were conducted of U.S. forces in Germany as they were preparing for deployment to the former Yugoslavia in 1995. Also, though the purpose of the treaty was to reduce the possibility of short warning conventional attacks, it proved particularly valuable in responding to Soviet concerns about German reunification and assisting in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. In fact, the greatest value of the agreement may be that the entire CFE system provides a forum for the major European states to debate, agree and maintain a set of rules about the deployment of conventional military power on the continent.

The treaty has also adapted to other political changes besides the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In October 1991, the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were recognized as being outside the CFE area of application once these countries regained their independence. And in January 1993, as part of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech and Slovak republics agreed on the division of the TLE of the former Warsaw Pact member.

Full and final compliance with the CFE Treaty was, however, endangered in late 1995 due to Moscow's insistence that it could not comply with limits on its forces in the accord's so called "flank" zone—an area that includes both Russia's Leningrad Military District in the north and the North Caucasus Military District in the south, where Russia had amassed a large force in its conflict with Chechnyan separatists. As the November 1995 deadline for final reductions approached, it became clear that Russia would be in compliance with its overall limits, but would not meet the flank limits. At the 11th hour, the 30 states parties agreed to a framework for resolving this issue, and a final compromise was achieved at the first CFE Treaty review conference in May 1996 in Vienna. Under that formulation, Russia is permitted higher force levels in the original areas of the flank zone and an extension from 1995 to 1999 to come down to these new levels. In addition, the original flank limits apply to a flank zone reduced in area. (This compromise was ratified by the U.S. Senate in May 1997.)

During the May 1996 review conference, NATO members indicated their willingness to consider further adjustments to the CFE Treaty, and CFE parties agreed to discuss ways to "enhance the viability and effectiveness" of the agreement. On December 1, one day before the opening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Lisbon, CFE parties approved a document outlining the "scope and parameters" for the adaptation talks, which were to begin at the Vienna based Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in January 1997.

 

NATO's Approach to Adaptation

The original CFE mandate sought a stable balance of conventional forces at fixed, lower levels and the elimination of alliance capabilities for launching surprise conventional attacks. The "Final Document" from the review conference noted the achievement of these objectives and, consequently, the focus now must be to cement these gains and build upon them. Furthermore, it seems logical that political goals now have greater salience than the military objectives that were fundamental to the original negotiations.

NATO countries agree that four essential aspects of the agreement must be maintained: ceilings on the five categories of TLE; the inspection regime; regular information exchange between treaty signatories; and a treaty structure that allows for political change. Members also accept the need for progress in these discussions to parallel the NATO enlargement process, although they oppose direct linkage or artificial deadlines.

In February 1997, NATO presented its proposal to adjust the CFE Treaty and reflect the dramatic changes that had taken place in Eastern and Central Europe since its signing. NATO proposed replacing the existing bloc to bloc and zonal limits on TLE with "national" and "territorial" limits. This change is intended to reflect the passing of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of a new European security architecture. Every country would declare its national limits for each equipment category with the goal of reducing overall force levels. Countries also would be allowed to host "stationed forces" (the forces of another state party on its soil), but the total of a nation's own equipment plus permanently stationed hardware would be limited by the new territorial ceiling. In the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, territorial limits would be set at or below current entitlement levels and, consequently, these nations, without reducing their own forces, would not be able to permanently station significant amounts of TLE from other NATO countries on their territories. (See Table 1.)

As with the treaty's current zonal limits, these stationed forces restrictions would, however, apply only to the three categories of ground based TLE (tanks, artillery and ACVs); they would place no limit on the number of combat aircraft or attack helicopters that NATO could deploy on the territories of new members (due to the rapid mobility of these weapons systems). All CFE parties would have to agree that the declared national and derived territorial levels were acceptable before being codified in an adjusted treaty.

Provisions on stationed forces would have an impact on the United States, all of whose forces are stationed (primarily in Germany). U.S. forces are allowed under the current treaty based on the United States receiving an entitlement as a treaty signatory. The adjusted treaty text would have to specify territorial totals for each signatory that included U.S. forces, and each state on whose territory U.S. forces are stationed would have to continue to agree to their presence. It is also important to consider that non German NATO forces are currently not allowed to be stationed in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic as part of the "Two Plus Four" agreement that resulted in German reunification.

The NATO proposal would also insert a clear definition of so called "temporary deployments" for military exercises and create a new stabilizing zone— encompassing the four Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Russia's Kaliningrad oblast (administrative district), Belarus and western Ukraine—where greater restrictions would apply for stationed forces. Under the proposal, territorial ceilings for ground based equipment could not be set any higher than current individual maximum levels, additional information would be provided on stationed forces or temporary deployments, and special inspection quotas would apply to certain sites.

Western signatories recognize that the introduction of an "accession clause" to allow other European states to join the CFE regime is appropriate. This could have positive ramifications for both the Baltic and Balkan regions. The exclusion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the treaty was primarily an issue of sovereignty. Baltic leaders argued that they were neither signatories to the original agreement nor successor states to the Soviet Union, and they refused to participate in the May 1992 Tashkent conference. It seems logical that entry into the CFE regime now as new members would underscore their respective sovereignty, offer additional security reassurances and could be viewed as a prerequisite to future entry into NATO.

As regards the Balkans, the December 1995 General Framework Agreement on Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton peace accord) calls for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and force reductions which mirror the CFE agreement. The resulting treaties were signed in the spring of 1996. Inspections consistent with the established measures are occurring, and reductions are being monitored. Another portion of the Dayton agreement also calls for future sub regional discussions with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. These negotiations would likely include not only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now comprising Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Austria and Slovenia. The talks might also include other states in the region that are already CFE signatories such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. A CFE accession clause would offer signatories to the Bosnian peace accords the opportunity to enter the CFE regime once they had achieved their required residual levels, which could obviate the need for separate negotiations.

NATO has also called for lower TLE entitlements throughout the area of application, and made a commitment that the total of alliance ground based equipment entitlements under an adjusted treaty will be "significantly" less than what the current NATO members are allowed. The alliance has attempted throughout these discussions and elsewhere to emphasize the view that NATO poses no threat to Russia. Despite this fact, many Russian leaders continue to view NATO with great suspicion, especially in light of its enlargement plans. In their view, a reduction in NATO entitlements would diminish not only the numerical disparity between NATO and Russian forces (which is currently greater than 2:1 in some categories), but might also serve to reduce Moscow's security anxieties. A large portion of NATO's reductions would likely be drawn from U.S. TLE entitlements, bringing these entitlements closer to what is actually present in the treaty's area of application and requiring very little actual equipment destruction. (See Table 2.)

NATO members also agree on two other issues. First, they seek an improved flow of information to all signatories and enhancements to the CFE verification regime. This must include changes to the allocation of inspection quotas engendered by the elimination of the treaty's original bloc to bloc structure. During their negotiations, original CFE NATO countries agreed that there was no need for one NATO country to inspect another. Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, however, its former members have frequently requested so called "East on East" inspections. This has reduced the available inspection quotas for NATO countries, and several states (most notably Russia) have complained that it is especially burdensome. Second, the negotiations to achieve a compromise over Russian force levels in the flank zone were both difficult and divisive; all NATO members agree that this issue must not be reopened in the adaptation talks.

Overall, the NATO proposal seeks to respond to Russian concerns by forgoing a dramatic expansion of the alliance's collective arsenal with weapon systems from new members, and the proposed stabilizing zone in Central Europe would preclude the concentration of forces on the territories of the new NATO members. An adjusted treaty consistent with this proposal should not engender significant supplementary costs because the requirement to destroy additional equipment will be low. Finally, relatively minor adjustments to the verification regime will ensure that the opportunities to cheat—and the resulting advantages—are also low.

 

The Russian Position

Moscow presented its initial ideas for CFE modification during the May 1996 review conference, and Russian officials complained throughout the remainder of the year (with some good reason) that NATO's failure to respond suggested a lack of political willingness. The ideas put forward by Moscow included a shift toward national ceilings and the accession of new members, among other things. A formal Russian proposal, presented in March 1997 at the JCG, reflected many of Moscow's early ideas and demonstrated some areas of agreement with NATO's proposal. For example, Russia supported shifting from group to national totals, the addition of an accession clause, and disposition of separate counting rules for equipment placed in storage. The Russian proposal also included:

  • limits on stationed forces that would largely preclude NATO from placing any equipment on the territories of new members;
  • the elimination of the flank zone;
  • exemptions for equipment assigned to forces involved in peacekeeping operations (as in Chechnya, for instance); and
  • a "sufficiency rule" that would place a limit on the amount of TLE any alliance (that is, NATO) could have.

Russian negotiators have also suggested the addition of new pieces of equipment to the "combat aircraft" category (such as electronic warfare, refueling and transport aircraft), and limitations on infrastructure improvements (including airfields, harbors and railways). Obviously, some of these proposals will be difficult for NATO to accept, but there are areas of conceptual agreement.

Russian officials argue that the full implementation of the CFE Treaty and the demise of the Warsaw Pact have resulted in an asymmetry in the balance of forces. This is the basis of their recommendations for an alliance sufficiency rule and restraints on stationed forces on new members' territories. Moscow maintains that under the treaty Russia is currently allowed less TLE than NATO, and this disparity would only grow if NATO expands eastward.

Such analysis is, however, flawed in several ways. First, from a legal perspective, NATO is not a party to or signatory of the CFE Treaty. Certainly, the alliance has been involved in the treaty's negotiation and implementation and is mentioned a number of times in the actual treaty text, but the treaty is still based on the participation of 30 sovereign states. Second, Moscow's balance of force comparisons are based on a Cold War security environment—pitting alliance against alliance—which no longer exists. In the new era of cooperative security, as is clearly stated in the NATO Russian Founding Act, "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries." Third, this perspective ignores NATO's stated desire—contained both in its proposal and the Founding Act—to negotiate lower force levels as an objective of the adaptation talks. Fourth, NATO currently maintains force levels that are far below its entitlements in every TLE category. It is certainly true that total entitlements for all NATO members would increase with the addition of new members, but the sum of the current holdings of NATO members plus the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would still be far below the alliance's entitlement prior to enlargement. (See Table 3.)Moreover, given the current economic conditions and budgetary pressures in NATO countries, it is difficult to imagine them expanding their arsenals so actual holdings more closely approximate actual entitlements. Fifth, Russia currently maintains lower force levels than it is allowed under the ceilings established for each category of TLE. Furthermore, the CFE Treaty only applies to Russian conventional forces west of the Ural Mountains; it has no impact on weaponry deployed outside the treaty's area of application. Russia can (if it desires) significantly increase its TLE holdings under the current treaty either by expanding its force structure in the area of application or transferring units now deployed east of the Ural Mountains. Finally, Russian officials are quick to portray their position as one of total isolation, compared to NATO's 16—and soon to be 19—members. This, however, ignores the close relations that exist between Russia and Belarus, plus the sizable CFE entitlement for the Belarusan military. (See Table 4.)

Basic Elements' for Adaptation

On July 23, the 30 states parties to the CFE Treaty announced agreement on certain "basic elements" for treaty adaptation (referred to informally as the "Basic Elements Document"), thus fulfilling one of the objectives undertaken by NATO and Russia in the Founding Act. In the Basic Elements Document, all states parties agreed that the CFE Treaty's original bloc to bloc structure was outmoded and should be replaced by national limits for all TLE categories. They also agreed that:

  • national limits should not exceed existing allocations for each country;
  • rules governing TLE in storage must be changed;
  • stabilizing measures to preclude force concentrations were required;
  • each state should adopt a territorial ceiling that equaled the total of national and stationed forces;
  • rules governing "temporary deployments" must be clarified; and
  • an accession clause should be added to the treaty.

It is clear that the Basic Elements Document represents a "lowest common denominator" agreement based on NATO's and Russia's respective proposals, and a final, adjusted treaty will require difficult negotiations. Both sides had already indicated their willingness to move toward national totals and to constrain stationed forces through the imposition of additional territorial limits. NATO and Russia had both also proposed the addition of an accession clause for new signatories. Other "elements" contained in the document simply clarify those areas that must be addressed in the adaptation talks (for example, rules for temporary deployments, stabilizing measures and new rules for stored equipment). But the "devil remains in the details" of how this effort will translate into an adjusted treaty all 30 parties can agree upon.

The true significance of the Basic Elements Document may be more political in nature, demonstrating the progress made in the adaptation process since the Madrid summit in July. Russia appears to have dropped for now its insistence on an overall alliance sufficiency rule and accepted several aspects of NATO's approach to treaty adaptation. Moscow has also suggested that it may be possible to achieve a framework agreement in time for the OSCE summit in Copenhagen in December.

Nevertheless, Russia was far more cautious in its response to this development than many in the West. Russian negotiators may well accept that these elements must be in the adjusted treaty text, but that may not mean they have fully given up on other issues such as an alliance sufficiency rule, removal of the flank limitation or expanding the definition of "combat aircraft." Furthermore, Russia continues to insist on greater limits on the deployment of NATO forces on the territories of new members, and geographic limits for aircraft and ground based TLE. Moscow may have also accepted the need for stabilizing measures, but it is very unlikely to embrace the proposed "stabilizing zone" in its current form. Finally, Russian officials appear to believe that they have made most of the concessions so far in the adaptation process, and it is now up to the West to respond.

 

Prospects in Vienna

The Vienna adaptation talks, as is true with any arms control negotiations, will not occur in a vacuum and will therefore be affected by other aspects of the Euro Atlantic security environment. For instance, some CFE Treaty signatories were upset over the manner in which the flank problem was resolved at the treaty review conference. Many observers, particularly in Europe, believe the United States became frustrated with NATO's inability to achieve consensus on a compromise and subsequently conducted bilateral negotiations with Russia. The resulting agreement was then forced on the alliance and other treaty signatories.2 There is concern in Europe that Washington might adopt this approach again if progress in the adaptation negotiations stalls. Serious disagreements among NATO members during the Madrid summit over which states should be offered NATO membership and over adjustments to the alliance's command structure are further indicators of strains within NATO.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine are also key to the achievement of an adaptation agreement. Moscow and Kiev were deadlocked over a final treaty on the Black Sea Fleet for over five years. While the military value of the TLE associated with the fleet's coastal defense and naval infantry forces is suspect, a final settlement remained a serious sovereignty issue, particularly in terms of the stationing of Russian forces on Ukrainian soil. A compromise agreement was achieved in the spring of 1997, but its final implementation will be of critical importance for Russian Ukrainian relations and prospects in Vienna. If approved by both national parliaments, the agreement could signal a new Russian policy toward the former Soviet republics.

Serious questions have also been raised by other CFE parties which might affect the Vienna talks. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland accepted NATO's adaptation proposal with no complaints due largely to their desire to obtain an invitation to join the alliance. These states remain somewhat skeptical, however, of the proposed stabilization zone that would place them in a separate category from other NATO members and could largely preclude the alliance from stationing forces permanently on their territories. It remains to be seen if they will continue to support NATO's proposal now that an invitation has been extended. In addition, Azerbaijan has raised repeated objections to the presence of Russian forces in Georgia and Armenia following their independence from the Soviet Union. In recent months, Azerbaijani officials have also accused Moscow of providing weapons to Armenia without announcing such transfers in accordance with existing CFE Treaty rules on data exchanges.

Finally, time itself could still become an issue. Though there is no direct link between CFE Treaty modernization and NATO enlargement, achieving an adapted treaty before the three proposed members actually enter the alliance in April 1999 is certainly a goal. Many Western officials had hoped that the framework of an adapted accord could be achieved prior to the Madrid summit, but this did not occur due largely to intense efforts to resolve many outstanding issues surrounding the NATO Russian Founding Act. While Russia did make significant concessions from its initial position for the Founding Act, some experts believe that the act would not have been concluded had Moscow not viewed CFE adaptation as the "escape valve" for any demands not satisfied. Rather than supposing that NATO negotiators will continue to say "no," Russian officials may instead believe that this increased pressure on the adaptation process will result in the sides settling their "unfinished business."

 

The Task Ahead

NATO enlargement remains a means to improve European security and not an objective by itself. In this context, efforts to adjust the CFE Treaty are simply a policy tool in this overall process and not a panacea. This endeavor is not based on Western altruism, because NATO remains in a position of strength from strictly a military perspective. Rather, it is based on the view that the foundations of European security have been inextricably altered. The NATO communiqué from the January 1994 Brussels summit that announced the alliance's enlargement clearly suggests this goal, stating: We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole. (Emphasis added.) From the perspective of NATO enlargement, CFE adaptation can make a positive contribution to the consolidation of European security if it fulfills the following requirements:

 

  • ease, to some degree, Russian concerns about NATO enlargement;
  • consider how adjustments will affect relations between NATO and its new members;
  • take into account the security concerns of the Eastern and Central European states not invited to apply for NATO membership, particularly the Baltic states and Ukraine;and
  • enhance alliance cohesion while fostering public support for enlargement.
Adjusting the CFE Treaty is critical to reducing Russian concerns over NATO enlargement. It would be a serious error to interpret Moscow's acceptance of the NATO Russian Founding Act as support for NATO enlargement. Russia's political and military elites continue to be firmly opposed to enlargement, and it remains to be seen whether the country's populist leaders will continue to trumpet their opposition as a means to broaden their support. If handled properly, an adapted agreement can offer greater security not only for Russia but for all CFE parties. Treaty revisions that consider Russia's security concerns are crucial, and must be accompanied by a coordinated effort to breathe life into the NATO Russian Founding Act as well as the agreement between the alliance and Ukraine.

The fears of prospective new members must also be considered. These countries must feel that they are entering NATO as "full" and not "second class" members. Consequently, the alliance must protect the right to deploy forces on their territories (at least for exercise purposes) while underscoring the fact that the West sees no need for the permanent stationing of large scale forces. It is important, however, to remind these states that while the collective defense guarantee is still an essential part of the alliance, the NATO of 1997 is far different from the NATO of 1987. Treaty adaptation, in concert with other efforts, will help to reshape NATO as it considers new problems of conflict prevention and cooperative security.

Obviously, an adaptation agreement is impossible absent the support of those states which do not intend or are not allowed to join NATO in the near future. Their support will be based on how well the revised treaty will improve their individual security. For the Baltic nations—and potentially the Balkan states—the possibility of acceding to the treaty will not only provide modest security assurances, but must be considered an essential preliminary step toward joining NATO in future. The move toward territorial ceilings in reality makes every country a "zone," and therefore reduces the possibility of collective large scale force concentrations in one state that are threatening to its neighbor. This move must be coupled with a mechanism to address the tough issue of stationed forces, as many former Soviet republics fear the creation of any legal basis for the potential presence of Russian troops on their territories. Furthermore, enhanced transparency measures and data exchanges should further the security of all.

Alliance cohesion throughout the adaptation process is a prerequisite as well as an objective. NATO has shown in many ways surprising solidarity in the initial eight months of the negotiations and formulation of the alliance's agreed position. Whether this cohesion will remain as the pace of the negotiations intensifies and alliance members begin to explain the logic of enlargement to their respective populations is less certain. Ultimately, the success of this process can only be measured in how well the alliance satisfies these conflicting requirements and sets a course for the future.

NOTES

1. "Final Document of the First Conference to Review Operations of the CFE Treaty and the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength," Vienna, Austria, May 15 31, 1996, p. 2.

2. Paul A. Goble, "Outflanked: How Non Russian Countries View the Proposed CFE Flank Modifications," testimony prepared for a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 1997.

 


Table 1: CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings (E/H) for NATO Invitees1

Country Tanks Artillery ACVs Helicopters Aircraft
E H E H E H E H E H
Czech Republic 957 952 767 767 1,367 1,367 50 36 230 144
Hungary 835 797 840 840 1,700 1,300 108 59 180 141
Poland 1,730 1,729 1,610, 1,581 2,150 1,422 130 94 460 384
Total 3,522 3,478 3,217 3,188 5,217 4,109 288 189 870 669
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

Back to text

 


Table 2: U.S. CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings

  Entitlements Holdings1
Tanks 4,006 1,115
Artillery 2,492 612
ACVs 5,372 1,849
Helicopters 431 126
Aircraft 784 220
Total 13,085 3,922
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

Back to text

 


Table 3: NATO & Russian CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings (E/H)1

  NATO Russia NATO+32
E H E H E H
Tanks 20,000 14,101 6,400 5,541 23,522 17,579
Artillery 20,000 14,101 6,415 6,011 23,217 17,198
ACVs 30,000 21,464 11,480 10,198 35,217 25,573
Helicopters 2,000 1,221 890 812 2,288 1,410
Aircraft 6,800 4,218 3,416 2,891 7,760 4,887
Total 78,000 55,014 28,601 25,453 91,914 66,647
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

2. Sixteen NATO members plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

Back to text

 


Table 4: Belarusan CFE Treaty Entitlements/Holdings

  Entitlements Holdings1
Tanks 1,800 1,778
Artillery 1,615 1,533
ACVs 2,600 2,518
Helicopters 80 71
Aircraft 294 286
Total 6,389 6,186
1. Actual holdings as of January 1, 1997

Source: derived from individual national data contained in Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Washington, DC: ACDA, January 1997

Back to text

NATO Expansion: A Decision to Regret

 

Jack Mendelsohn

The NATO allies, led by the United States, have taken the fateful decision to invite three nations—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—to join the North Atlantic alliance. Although the new members' formal accession is timed to coincide with the alliance's 50th anniversary celebration in April 1999, the prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control have already suffered as a result of NATO's move.

Since NATO first announced its intention to expand eastward, we have seen evidence of hardening of Russian security policy. Ratification of START II has been postponed indefinitely by the Russian Duma because of the persistent opposition to NATO expansion across the entire political spectrum, notwithstanding the promise of NATO-Russian cooperation, as laid out in the NATO-Russian Founding Act, and the five-year extension of the START II implementation schedule along with the further nuclear reductions to be negotiated in START III that were agreed to at the Helsinki summit in March.

If START II remains unratified, a host of other arms control issues will probably be adversely affected as well. Congress may call into question continued support for the destruction of weapons in Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program, which in turn will make it more difficult for the Russians to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Perhaps the most strategically significant repercussion from Russia's non-ratification of START II would be in the area of missile defense, where the U.S. administration's strongest argument against unnecessary and unconstrained national missile defense deployments—that it will interfere with START reductions—will become moot.

Sensing its deteriorating security situation, Russia has also abandoned its longstanding nuclear "no-first-use" policy and is in the midst of a debate over whether, given the deplorable state of its conventional forces, the lack of budgetary resources and NATO's creep toward Russia, it should increase its reliance on nuclear weapons. If Russia reemphasizes tactical nuclear systems, of which it has retained large numbers, it would make it more difficult to limit these weapons as envisaged in the Helsinki Joint Statement.

Russian re-emphasis on nuclear weapons could well be accompanied by an unsettling analogue within NATO. If collective defense continues to be NATO's primary function—and all indications are that it will—the alliance will be hard pressed to defend the longer borders of its three new members with fewer, less well-equipped conventional forces. And when NATO expands to the Baltics, which is clearly anticipated by NATO's "open door" policy, it will be unable to defend those countries except by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. As a result, NATO's military doctrine could well come to mirror Moscow's re-emphasis on nuclear weapons.

The Clinton administration has put forward a variety of arguments for NATO expansion, all of which are either unconvincing or irrelevant. The first is that expansion will foster democracy and market economies in the new member-states. But surely someone in the White House must realize that a defensive alliance facing the high costs of expansion and modernization, which the European allies have made clear they will not share and the new members can ill afford, is not an appropriate means for ensuring the growth of strong democratic market economies. If spreading democracy is the objective of the Western alliance, the European Union should have opened its doors to these nations instead of deferring the issue until at least 2002.

Another of the administration's principal arguments in favor of expansion is that it will "spread" security to Central and Eastern Europe. But as the "Open Letter to President Clinton" in opposition to NATO expansion notes (see NATO Letter), just the opposite is likely to happen. Rather than enhancing security in Europe, expansion has the potential to turn Russia against the entire post-Cold War settlement and put severe pressure on the emerging Russian democracy by giving a popular cause to the nationalist and communist opposition. Even the independent-minded General Alexander Lebed, the most popular political figure in Russia, has already expressed his view that "any partial revision of [the post-Cold War order in Europe] places in doubt all the other components, including the inviolability of national boundaries . . . ." [Emphasis added.]

The profound implications of NATO expansion for U.S. national security and U.S.Russian relations demand a rethinking of the policy by the Clinton administration, a wide-ranging public examination and a thorough hearing in both the Senate, which must approve the new members, and the House, which will have to fund the project. The nation deserves nothing less than a full-fledged debate before ratifying this unwise, and by no means pre-ordained, decision.

NATO Issues Three Invitations; Signs Separate Charter With Ukraine

 

Wade Boese

AT THE MADRID Summit, July 8-9, NATO formally invited three of its former adversaries—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—to begin accession talks with the alliance. NATO also pledged to hold the door open for other states "regardless of their geographic location," and signed a partnership charter with Ukraine. However, intra-alliance disputes over which countries to offer membership to, disagreements about burdensharing, continued Russian unhappiness with enlargement, and a growing chorus of criticism and questions within the United States, all combined to somewhat tarnish the luster of the decisions undertaken and promises made in Madrid.

 

The Summit

On July 8, NATO issued the "Madrid Declaration on EuroAtlantic Security and Cooperation," which emphasized that a new NATO was developing that would create "a new and undivided Europe." President Bill Clinton also extolled the value that NATO membership would bring to the three countries by securing the free-market and democratic gains they have made in recent years.

NATO and the newly invited states must now draw up protocols of accession (NATO is also considering drafting a single protocol), which the alliance hopes to sign at its December foreign ministers meeting. The legislatures of all 19 states will have to approve the protocols. NATO's goal is to have ratification completed by its 50th anniversary on April 4, 1999. Throughout the process, the three countries will be involved "to the greatest extent possible" in NATO activities and exercises.

President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Gyula Horn of Hungary and President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland issued a statement on July 8 expressing their "deepest satisfaction" for the invitations and hailing NATO expansion as a "historic decision paving the way to a more stable and secure Europe." The three leaders also stressed the importance of leaving the door open to additional members to prevent lines of division across the continent.

For the nine states that were not offered membership at Madrid (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), NATO and U.S. leaders offered reassurances that this round of invitations would not be NATO's final expansion. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, in a speech on July 8, articulated the alliance's "open door policy," saying, "the alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years." Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, "no European democracy will be excluded because of its position on the map." The Madrid Declaration identifies Romania and Slovenia as states that have made "positive developments towards democracy and rule of law," and recognizes the progress of the Baltic states in moving toward "greater stability and cooperation." NATO emphasized the importance of participation in the Partnership for Peace program and the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council for those states that still wish to join the alliance.

NATO also moved to solidify relations with Ukraine through a July 9 "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership." Like the NATO-Russian Founding Act (see ACT, May 1997), the charter is a political and not a legally binding agreement, committing NATO to increase military cooperation and interoperability with Ukraine and to establish military liaison missions. The charter calls for the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Commission to meet at least twice a year to explore ways to further develop the relationship.

 

Intra-Alliance Disputes

Leading up to the summit, France made a concerted push to include Romania and Slovenia in the first round of expansion. Eight states, including Canada and Germany, eventually supported the French position, but the United States, Britain and three others remained determined to limit invitations to three states in the first round. There was concern that France would withhold approval of the three invitees, but French President Jacques Chirac finally yielded only when he was satisfied that Romania and Slovenia would be top candidates for future membership.

A potentially more damaging fracture emerged over the costs and how they would be apportioned. The Clinton administration, in February 1997, estimated the total 13year cost of NATO expansion at $27 billion to $35 billion, of which the U.S. share (confined to direct costs) would be $1.5 billion to $2 billion, with the new and current members responsible for the rest. These estimates drew criticism from France, Germany and Britain as being inflated, and the Europeans declared that they would not increase their contributions. Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said exaggerated U.S. estimates were a product of the U.S. defense industry's desire to rearm the new members with expensive and unnecessary equipment. Seeking to smooth over the dispute, Clinton said, "the nations involved should pay most of the costs themselves." The Madrid Declaration said only that the "necessary resources to meet the costs would be provided." NATO will initiate its own cost study for release before the ministerial meeting in December.

 

Russian Discontent

Despite the signing of the NATO-Russian Founding Act, which is intended to ease Moscow's anxieties over enlargement, Russia still resents the process and vehemently opposes any NATO invitations to former Soviet republics. Russian aversion to the Madrid summit was clear from the outset, as President Boris Yeltsin declined to attend and sent his deputy prime minister, Valery Serov, in his place. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov reportedly characterized NATO's eastward expansion as "the biggest mistake in Europe since World War II."

NATO's expansion may have already further diminished the prospects of Russian ratification of START II. Prior to the summit, influential Russian policy-makers Aleksei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, and Ivan Rybkin, head of Yeltsin's Security Council, both warned that NATO expansion would stiffen the resolve and strengthen the hand of Russian nationalists and communists in the Duma who oppose START II. As NATO conventional superiority grows and extends eastward, Russian officials have said that Moscow may be forced to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons for security.

Yeltsin said consideration of the Baltic states would be "dangerous." Two Russian deputy foreign ministers, Alexander Avdeyev and Nikolai Afansyevsky, said, according to Russian news sources (Izvestia and Rossiyskiye Vesti respectively), that Baltic membership in NATO would force Russia to reevaluate its relations with NATO. European leaders, including Chirac and Kohl, have attempted to minimize talk of including the Baltic states in the next round for fear of antagonizing Russia.

 

Rising U.S. Domestic Debate

In addition to bickering allies and displeased Russians, President Clinton also found himself confronted with the prospects of a more contentious debate than expected in the United States over NATO expansion. A bipartisan group of 20 senators, including Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Bob Kerrey (D-NE) sent Clinton a June 25 letter posing 10 questions regarding expansion which they felt he should answer for the American people. The following day, 50 prominent foreign policy experts and former congressmen released an open letter to the president calling expansion a "policy error of historic proportions."(See NATO Letter)

Both letters expressed similar concerns with respect to expansion, including the predominant fear that NATO expansion would draw a new dividing line in Europe and prove to be more exclusive than inclusive. The letters questioned the effect of alliance enlargement on Russian domestic and foreign policy and whether expansion would reinforce current Russian intransigence on arms control issues, such as the ratification of START II. Another major concern was that expansion would require an overextension of American commitments and resources to Europe at a time when resources are contracting and domestic political mood calls for fiscal restraint.

Reflecting the mounting cost debate, the House of Representatives on July 25 voted unanimously (4140) to instruct its negotiators in conference committee on the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill to retain an amendment sponsored by Barney Frank (D-MA), that would limit the total U.S. cost for NATO expansion to $2 billion or 10 percent of the grand total, whichever is lower. In past bills, the House and Senate voted strongly in favor of expansion, but the endorsement of the Frank amendment suggests that support has budgetary limitations.

Opposition to NATO Expansion

On June 26, a group of 50 prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion. Stanley Resor, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Arms Control Association, spoke at the press conference announcing the letter, focusing on the arms control implications of expansion. Resor's remarks and the group's letter are printed below.

 

Remarks by Stan Resor:

A key, if not the key, U.S. interest in Russia is a rapid and substantial reduction in the tens of thousands of Russian strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and the hundreds of tons of nuclear material which are still deployed or stored throughout that nation some six years after the end of the Cold War.

Progress towards these goals will require comprehensive and sustained cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and a strengthening of mutual trust and confidence. The Clinton Administration's plan for NATO expansion has already undermined, and its implementation will raise further obstacles to, the establishment of the kind of relationship that is critical to success in arms control.

The START II Treaty, which would reduce Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 30003500 is awaiting ratification by the Russian Parliament. The parliament is dominated by members of communist and nationalist Parties who are hostile to President Yeltsin and suspicious of Western intentions. They have responded to NATO expansion by opposing ratification of START II.

These conservative Duma members see NATO expansion toward the Russian borders as coming at a time when Russian conventional forces are in deep trouble, badly in need of reform, poorly paid and demoralized. This is forcing Russia to consider placing greater reliance on nuclear weapons to assure its security and has raised the question of whether Russia should retain its most powerful, multi-warhead land-based missiles which START II is designed to eliminate.

At Helsinki, President Clinton sought to address some of the substantive problems Russia had raised with respect to START II by agreeing with President Yeltsin

 

—on a framework for START III which would limit both sides to 20002500 warheads each by December 2007; and

—by extending by five years the deadline for reaching START II levels.

 

While a primary reason for lower levels and the extended deadline was to lower Russian costs, the five year extension also gives Russia time to evaluate the impact on its security of NATO expansion and U.S. theater missile defense deployments before it has to eliminate its multi-warhead ICBMs.

General Rokhlin, Chairman of the Russian Duma's Defense Committee, has expressed concern that ratifying START II substantially prior to completion of the terms of START III involves risk to Russia and reliance on U.S. good faith. In this context he has asserted that NATO expansion constituted reneging on assurances given to Gorbachev and Shevernadze at the time Russian consent was obtained to German reunification and to membership of a reunified Germany in NATO.

Helsinki also laid out an ambitious agenda of nuclear infrastructure transparency and potential tactical nuclear weapons constraints. NATO expansion will make it much more difficult to establish the atmosphere of trust required for Moscow to agree to additional transparency measures for its stockpile and to abandon its increasing reliance on nuclear weapons to balance NATO's approach to its borders.

To delink START II ratification from NATO expansion and to show that NATO does not intend to isolate Russia and in fact recognizes that it must be part of an effective European security system, the United States helped design and President Clinton signed The Russia-NATO Founding Act in Paris on May 27.

The Act contains within it the potential for alienating Russia as much as integrating it into a European security system. The Act does not address two aspects of expansion which cause the greatest concern to the Russians, namely the scope and pace of expansion. NATO's current plan is open ended. It clearly contemplates inclusion of the Baltic states. But Russia has made clear that inclusion in NATO of any members of the former Soviet Union is unacceptable. Both Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have already given conflicting interpretations of The Act.

It is already clear that NATO expansion has seriously delayed START II ratification and that, unless the process is suspended, it will continue to jeopardize major arms reduction treaties as well as other vital arms control goals which we have traditionally pursued.

 


June 26, 1997

Dear Mr. President,

We, the undersigned, believe that the current U.S.led effort to expand NATO, the focus of the recent Helsinki and Paris Summits, is a policy error of historic proportions. We believe that NATO expansion will decrease allied security and unsettle European stability for the following reasons:

In Russia, NATO expansion, which continues to be opposed across the entire political spectrum, will strengthen the nondemocratic opposition, undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with the West, bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma to the START II and III treaties; In Europe, NATO expansion will draw a new line of division between the "ins" and the "outs," foster instability, and ultimately diminish the sense of security of those countries which are not included;

In NATO, expansion, which the Alliance has indicated is open-ended, will inevitably degrade NATO's ability to carry out its primary mission and will involve U.S. security guarantees to countries with serious border and national minority problems, and unevenly developed systems of democratic government;

In the U.S., NATO expansion will trigger an extended debate over its indeterminate, but certainly high, cost and will call into question the U.S. commitment to the Alliance, traditionally and rightly regarded as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy.

Because of these serious objections, and in the absence of any reason for rapid decision, we strongly urge that the NATO expansion process be suspended while alternative actions are pursued. These include:

 

—opening the economic and political doors of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe;

—developing an enhanced Partnership for Peace program;

—supporting a cooperative NATO-Russian relationship; and

—continuing the arms reduction and transparency process, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons and materials, the major threat to U.S. security, and with respect to conventional military forces in Europe.

 

Russia does not now pose a threat to its western neighbors and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are not in danger. For this reason, and the others cited above, we believe that NATO expansion is neither necessary nor desirable and that this ill-conceived policy can and should be put on hold.

Sincerely,

George Bunn Townsend Hoopes Sam Nunn
Robert Bowie Gordon Humphrey Herbert S. Okun
Bill Bradley Fred Ikle W.K.H. Panofsky
David Calleo Bennett Johnston Christian Patte
Richard T. Davies Carl Kaysen Richard Pipes
Jonathan Dean Spurgeon Keeny Robert E. Pursley
Paul Doty James Leonard George Rathjens
Susan Eisenhower Edward Luttwak Stanley Resor
David M. Evans Michael Mandelbaum John Rhinelander
David Fischer Jack F. Matlock Jr. John J. Shanahan
Raymond Garthoff C. William Maynes Marshall Shulman
Morton H. Halperin Richard McCormack John Steinbruner
Owen Harries David McGiffert Stansfield Turner
Gary Hart Robert McNamara Richard Viets
Arthur Hartman Jack Mendelsohn Paul Warnke
Mark Hatfield Philip Merrill James D. Watkins
John P. Holdren Paul H. Nitze  

CFE Parties Agree on 'Basic Elements' For Negotiating Adaptation Accord

 

Wade Boese

ON JULY 23, THE 30 states-parties to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty agreed on a document outlining the "basic elements" for adapting the accord to the post-Cold War environment, with the goal of achieving a "significant lowering" in the total amount of conventional weaponry allowed under the treaty. Some key issues and details remain unresolved, but the framework is now in place for negotiations that are scheduled to begin in September in the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group, the treaty's implementing body.

The original CFE Treaty imposes equal numerical limits on NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries (later joined by seven former Soviet republics) in five categories of heavy weapons—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—deployed and stored between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. CFE parties have agreed to replace the bloc-to-bloc structure with a system of national and territorial ceilings. The concentric zones established by the treaty, which place sub-limits on the amount of ground-based treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the center of Europe, will be eliminated and replaced by territorial limits, (comprising the sum of national and foreign stationed forces) for each state.

Prior to the opening of the adaptation negotiations, each CFE party will, "in the spirit of restraint," declare a national ceiling for TLE that may equal but not exceed its current entitlements. NATO has already pledged to significantly reduce the level of the aggregate limits on its 16 members. Russia has said it will consider reducing its entitlements to its current holdings—a level approximately 3,000 items less than its entitlements. Because many states are below their entitlements (NATO, for example, currently holds about 20,000 items less than what is permitted by the treaty), moderately lowering the ceilings may not result in actual weapons reductions, but it will diminish the potential for future buildups.

Among the outstanding issues facing negotiators is how to deal with TLE that is currently stored. The original treaty restricts the amount of ground-based TLE that can be deployed with active units and requires the excess TLE to be placed in Designated Permanent Storage Sites. Russia has argued for the elimination of the storage requirement, reflecting the fact that Russia, whose TLE holdings are higher than the allowed active deployment levels, has much more TLE in storage than NATO. Russia proposes transferring all stored equipment to active units and insists the parties committed to this action in the "Final Document" of the May 1996 CFE Treaty Review Conference. NATO has proposed two options: maintain the stored and active categories for ground-based TLE, or eliminate storage allotments by destroying at least 80 percent of stored TLE and moving the remainder to active units.

The adaptation talks will also address the issue of exceptions to the territorial limits. CFE parties have agreed to work on drafting provisions allowing states to temporarily exceed territorial limits (with the express consent of the host) in the case of temporary deployments, notified military exercises and "missions in support of peace," mandated by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the "definition, modalities, transparency, and verification" for such exceptions must still be negotiated.

In a statement attached to the "basic elements" document, NATO insisted that the territorial ceilings should only apply to ground-based TLE. Though Russia has consistently sought to apply these limits to attack helicopters and combat aircraft, a U.S. official said territorial limits on air power are unlikely because of the precedent set by the existing CFE Treaty, which does not limit air power in the sub-zones.

 

Regional Restraints

The CFE parties have also agreed to explore the possible development of regional restraints on ground-based TLE. NATO earlier had proposed setting the new territorial ceilings of Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia's Kaliningrad military district, Slovakia, and Ukrainian territory (outside of the "flank" zone) at levels equal to current entitlements. This would require their future national limits to fall below entitlements to accommodate any nonnational forces that might be stationed on their territories. Though the proposal was intended to assuage Russian concerns regarding NATO expansion, Moscow has resisted placing any limitations on Kaliningrad. The parties will discuss this issue and other possible sub-ceilings in the adaptation talks.

Despite their decision to eliminate the treaty's zonal configuration, CFE parties have agreed to retain the "substance" of Article V (as modified by the recent "Flank-Document"), which established specific limitations on ground-based TLE in the northern and southern flanks of Europe. NATO interprets "substance" as the "numerical limitations, geographic scope, scheduled dates, and transparency measures" prescribed in the Flank Document. Russia has said the flank issue will require further work.

Verification and provisions for reallocating or revising national and territorial limits under the adapted treaty were also deferred. Information exchanges, inspection quotas and the transferring of equipment between parties, which are currently based on a bloc structure, must now be adapted to reflect the interests of 30 parties.

Negotiators hope to complete an adaptation agreement by April 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are expected to formally join NATO.

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation

Paris, May 27, 1997

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia.

NATO has undertaken a historic transformation—a process that will continue. In 1991 the Alliance revised its strategic doctrine to take account of the new security environment in Europe. Accordingly, NATO has radically reduced and continues the adaptation of its conventional and nuclear forces. While preserving the capability to meet the commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty, NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political functions, and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to address new security challenges in close association with other countries and international organizations. NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with OSCE participating States in particular through the Partnership for Peace and is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO member States have decided to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.

Russia is continuing the building of a democratic society and the realization of its political and economic transformation. It is developing the concept of its national security and revising its military doctrine to ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities. Russia has carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, has withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries and withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. Russia is committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces. It is actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. Russia is contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

I. PRINCIPLES

Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states.

NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security Organization, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a Charter on European security, NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.

This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive Organization for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia will observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

 

  • development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

     

  • acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;

     

  • refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;

     

  • respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;

     

  • mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;

     

  • prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;

     

  • support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

II. MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL

To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO-RUSSIA Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.

The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia.

The shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. As the relationship develops, they expect that additional opportunities for joint action will emerge.

The Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. Extraordinary meetings of the Council will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. In this context, NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. In the course of their consultations and cooperation, NATO and Russia will inform each other regarding the respective security-related challenges they face and the measures that each intends to take to address them.

Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.

The Permanent Joint Council will meet at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the wishes of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council.

The Permanent Joint Council may also meet, as appropriate, at the level of Heads of State and Government.

The Permanent Joint Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

Under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet; meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representatives level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

The Permanent Joint Council will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia.

To support the work of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish the necessary administrative structures.

Russia will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador. A senior military representative and his staff will be part of this Mission for the purposes of the military cooperation. NATO retains the possibility of establishing an appropriate presence in Moscow, the modalities of which remain to be determined.

The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure for the Permanent Joint Council will be worked out. These arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the Permanent Joint Council which will be held no later than four months after the signature of this Act.

The Permanent Joint Council will engage in three distinct activities:

 

  • consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;

     

  • on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;

     

  • once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

     

Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.

Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the participating States to this Act, NATO and Russia will also encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

 

III. AREAS FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION

In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest. They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:

 

  • issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in this area;

     

  • conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organizations in these fields;

     

  • joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;

     

  • participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;

     

  • exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programs;

    arms control issues;

     

  • nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;

     

  • preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combatting nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;

     

  • possible cooperation in Theater Missile Defence;

     

  • enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters;

     

  • increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia;

     

  • reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;

     

  • coordinating a program of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below;

     

  • pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors;

     

  • conversion of defence industries;

     

  • developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;

     

  • conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;

     

  • combatting terrorism and drug trafficking;

     

  • improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.

     

Other areas can be added by mutual agreement.

 

IV. POLITICAL-MILITARY MATTERS

NATO and Russia affirm their shared desire to achieve greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) for the broader context of security in the OSCE area and the work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, the member States of NATO and Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account Europe's changing security environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating States. They share the objective of concluding an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as possible and, as a first step in this process, they will, together with other States Parties to the CFE Treaty, seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, consistent with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

The member States of NATO and Russia commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations, as foreseen in the Document on Scope and Parameters, in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to possible voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.

The member States of NATO and Russia proceed on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States Parties irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in Europe as a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

The member States of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

The member States of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.

Each State-Party will base its agreement to the provisions of the adapted Treaty on all national ceilings of the States Parties, on its projections of the current and future security situation in Europe.

In addition, in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening buildup of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO and Russia have clarified their intentions with regard to their conventional force postures in Europe's new security environment and are prepared to consult on the evolution of these postures in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The member States of NATO and Russia will strive for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They will comply fully with their obligations under the Vienna Document 1994 and develop cooperation with the other OSCE participating States, including negotiations in the appropriate format, inter alia within the OSCE to promote confidence and security.

The member States of NATO and Russia will use and improve existing arms control regimes and confidence-building measures to create security relations based on peaceful cooperation.

NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military establishments, will expand POLITICAL-MILITARY consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia. They will implement a program of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of reciprocity and further mutual arrangements.

To enhance their partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO's and Russia's respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint NATO-RUSSIA peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

The present Act takes effect upon the date of its signature.

NATO and Russia will take the proper steps to ensure its implementation in accordance with their procedures.

The present Act is established in two originals in the French, English and Russian language.

The Secretary General of NATO and the Government of the Russian Federation will provide the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the OSCE with the text of this Act with the request to circulate it to all members of their Organizations.

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - EU / NATO