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“The Arms Control Association and all of the staff I've worked with over the years … have this ability to speak truth to power in a wide variety of venues.”
– Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
June 2, 2022
EU / NATO

U.S., EU Issue Arms Export Declaration

Meeting in Washington on December 18 for the second of their biannual summits in 2000, the United States and the 15-member European Union (EU) declared they would commit "to promoting the highest possible standards of conduct and enhanced export control practices" when selling weapons. The 16 countries pledged they would base their arms exports on the "shared principles of responsibility, transparency and restraint" and that they would encourage other weapons exporters to do the same.

In the document, formally titled "Declaration by the United States and the European Union on the Responsibilities of States and on Transparency Regarding Arms Exports," the United States and the EU deemed it "crucial to avoid" weapons exports that could be used for internal repression or violation of internationally recognized human rights. They also stated that arms exports, among other things, should not be destabilizing or aggravate internal or interstate conflicts or lead to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, the United States, the world's top arms exporter over the past decade, and the EU, whose members consistently rank among the top five arms exporters, did "reaffirm the right of States to acquire the means of self-defense."

The declaration noted the United States had recently proposed the negotiation of an "international arms sales code of conduct" to promote greater restraint and responsibility in world arms sales. But the Clinton administration and a majority of Congress opposed efforts that started in 1993 within Congress to legislate a national code of conduct aimed at establishing criteria, such as a country's respect for human rights, that Washington would use to evaluate U.S. arms importers. EU members approved a non-binding code of conduct in May 1998. (See ACT, May 1998.)

U.S., EU Issue Arms Export Declaration

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers

Signatories and Ratifiers

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996.

President Bill Clinton was the first to sign the treaty that day, followed by the representatives of 70 other nations, including Britain, China, France, and Russia. To date, 160 states have signed the CTBT and 69 have ratified it.

The CTBT will formally enter into force after 44 nuclear-capable states, specified in Annex 2 of the treaty, have deposited their instruments of ratification with the secretary-general of the United Nations. Those 44 states include the five declared nuclear powers, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and 35 other states that are recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power or research reactors.

Of the 44 specified nations, all except India, Pakistan, and North Korea have signed the treaty. In 2000, four more of the required 44 states—Bangladesh, Chile, Russia, and Turkey—ratified the treaty, bringing the total number of states in this category to 30.

Also in 2000, Guyana, Kiribati, Nauru, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone signed the treaty, and Belarus, Cambodia, Gabon, Iceland, Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Lithuania, Macedonia, Maldives, Morocco, Nicaragua, Portugal, and the United Arab Emirates ratified it. The following table identifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's signatories and ratifiers as of January 1, 2001, according to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. States whose ratification is required for entry into force are bolded. —For more information, contact Philipp C. Bleek.

Country

Signature

Ratification

Albania 9/27/96  
Algeria 10/15/96  
Andorra 9/24/96  
Angola 9/27/96  
Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97  
Argentina 9/24/96 12/4/98
Armenia 10/1/96  
Australia 9/24/96 7/9/98
Austria 9/24/96 3/13/98
Azerbaijan 7/28/97 2/2/99
Bahrain 9/24/96  
Bangladesh 10/24/96  
Belarus 9/24/96 9/13/00
Belgium 9/24/96 6/29/99
Benin 9/27/96  
Bolivia 9/24/96 10/4/99
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9/24/96  
Brazil 9/24/96 7/24/99
Brunei Darussalem 1/22/97  
Bulgaria 9/24/96 9/29/99
Burkina Faso 9/27/96  
Burundi 9/24/96  
Cambodia 9/26/96 11/10/00
Canada 9/24/96 12/18/98
Cape Verde 10/1/96  
Chad 10/8/96  
Chile 9/24/96  
China 9/24/96  
Colombia 9/24/96  
Comoros 12/12/96  
Congo 2/11/97  
Congo Republic 10/4/96  
Cook Islands 12/5/97  
Costa Rica 9/24/96  
Cote d'Ivoire 9/25/96  
Croatia 9/24/96  
Cyprus 9/24/96  
Czech Republic 11/12/96 9/11/97
Denmark 9/24/96 12/21/98
Djibouti 10/21/96  
Dominican Republic 10/3/96  
Ecuador 9/24/96  
Egypt 10/14/96  
El Salvador 9/24/96 9/11/98
Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96  
Estonia 11/20/96 8/13/98
Ethiopia 9/25/96  
Fiji 9/24/96 10/10/96
Finland 9/24/96 1/15/99
France 9/24/96 4/6/98
Gabon 10/7/96 9/20/00
Georgia 9/24/96  
Germany 9/24/96 8/20/98
Ghana 10/3/96  
Greece 9/24/96 4/21/99
Grenada 10/10/96 8/19/98
Guatemala 9/20/99  
Guinea 10/3/96  
Guinea-Bissau 4/11/97  
Guyana 9/7/00  
Haiti 9/24/96  
Holy See 9/24/96  
Honduras 9/25/96  
Hungary 9/25/96 7/13/99
Iceland 9/24/96 6/26/00
Indonesia 9/24/96  
India    
Indonesia 9/24/96  
Iran 9/24/96  
Ireland 9/24/96 7/15/99
Israel 9/25/96  
Italy 9/24/96 2/1/99
Jamaica 11/11/96  
Japan 9/24/96 7/8/97
Jordan 9/26/96 8/25/98
Kazakhstan 9/30/96  
Kenya 11/14/96 11/30/00
Kiribati 9/7/00 9/7/00
Kuwait 9/24/96  
Kyrgyzstan 10/8/96  
Laos 7/30/97 10/5/00
Latvia 9/24/96  
Lesotho 9/30/96 9/14/99
Liberia 10/1/96  
Liechtenstein 9/27/96  
Lithuania 10/7/96 2/7/00
Luxembourg 9/24/96 5/26/99
Macedonia 10/29/98 3/14/00
Madagascar 10/9/96  
Malawi 10/9/96  
Malaysia 7/23/98  
Maldives 10/1/97 9/7/00
Mali 2/18/97 8/4/99
Malta 9/24/96  
Marshall Islands 9/24/96  
Mauritania 9/24/96  
Mexico 9/24/96 10/5/99
Micronesia 9/24/96 7/25/97
Moldova 9/24/97  
Monaco 10/1/96 12/18/98
Mongolia 10/1/96 8/8/97
Morocco 9/24/96 4/17/00
Mozambique 9/26/96  
Myanmar (Burma) 11/25/96  
Namibia 9/24/96  
Nauru 9/8/00  
Nepal 10/8/96  
Netherlands 9/24/96 3/23/99
New Zealand 9/27/96 3/19/99
Nicaragua 9/24/96 12/5/00
Niger 10/3/96  
Nigeria 9/8/00  
North Korea    
Norway 9/24/96 7/15/99
Oman 9/23/99  
Country Signature Ratification
Pakistan    
Panama 9/24/96  
Papua New Guinea 9/25/96  
Paraguay 9/25/96  
Peru 9/25/96 11/12/97
Philippines 9/24/96  
Poland 9/24/96 5/25/99
Portugal 9/24/96 6/26/00
Qatar 9/24/96 3/3/97
Romania 9/24/96 10/5/99
Russia 9/24/96  
Saint Lucia 10/4/96  
Samoa 10/9/96  
San Marino 10/7/96  
Sao Tome and Principe 9/26/96  
Senegal 9/26/96 6/9/99
Seychelles 9/24/96  
Sierra Leone 9/8/00  
Singapore 1/14/99  
Slovakia 9/30/96 3/3/98
Slovenia 9/24/96 8/31/99
Solomon Islands 10/3/96  
South Africa 9/24/96 3/30/99
South Korea 9/24/96 9/24/99
Spain 9/24/96 7/31/98
Sri Lanka 10/24/96  
Suriname 1/14/97  
Swaziland 9/24/96  
Sweden 9/24/96 12/2/98
Switzerland 9/24/96 10/1/99
Tajikistan 10/7/96 6/10/98
Country Signature Ratification
Thailand 11/12/96  
Togo 10/2/96  
Tunisia 10/16/96  
Turkey 9/24/96  
Turkmenistan 9/24/96 2/20/98
Uganda 11/7/96  
Ukraine 9/27/96  
United Arab Emirates 9/25/96 9/18/00
United Kingdom 9/24/96 4/6/98
United States 9/24/96  
Uruguay 9/24/96  
Uzbekistan 10/3/96 5/29/97
Vanuatu 9/24/96  
Venezuela 10/3/96  
Vietnam 9/24/96  
Yemen 9/30/96  
Zambia 12/3/96  
Zimbabwe 10/13/99  

Second Review Conference on Balkan Arms Held

Meeting in Vienna from October 31 to November 2, the parties to the June 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control held a review conference to assess implementation of the agreement and reaffirm their commitment to its weapon ceilings and inspection regime. The review conference, only the second in the agreement's history, had been originally scheduled for June but was postponed when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) temporarily suspended its participation in the arms control accord. (See ACT, July/August 2000.) The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) described the review conference, chaired by the FRY delegation, as "very collegial."

Under the terms of the agreement, the FRY, Croatia, and the two entities comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb-controlled Republika Srpska) consented to caps on their holdings of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The governments also agreed to permit inspections of and exchange information on their weapons holdings. Since signing the agreement, the parties have met their arms limits, destroying more than 7,000 weapons in the process.

At the review conference, the parties expressed "their satisfaction" with implementation of the agreement and "their willingness to consider any measures that would increase transparency and cooperation," according to an OSCE press release. The parties have not yet used all the existing provisions for increased transparency in the agreement, however, such as the option of conducting undeclared site inspections.

Future implementation of the agreement could be affected by the change of government in the FRY. Slobodan Milosevic, who orchestrated the wars that resulted in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, relinquished the FRY presidency October 6, after demonstrators stormed government buildings to support the September 24 election of opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica. The United Nations granted the FRY membership November 1, and the OSCE followed suit November 10.

Second Review Conference on Balkan Arms Held

Belgrade Suspends Sub-Regional Arms Control Participation

July/August 2000

By Wade Boese

Upset with not being invited to attend an international conference on implementing the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina, on May 25, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) halted its participation in the June 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, which caps heavy weapons levels in the former Yugoslavia. However, Belgrade did not withdraw from the agreement and has said it will resume implementation if guaranteed a place at future Dayton-related meetings.

Modeled on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the subregional agreement requires the FRY, Croatia, and the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb-controlled Republika Srpska) to allow inspections and exchange information on their capped holdings of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. While future inspections on FRY weapons holdings are now on hold, a U.S. government official said there is "no real concern that weapon limits are in jeopardy."

A previously scheduled June 21-23 states-parties review conference of the agreement has been indefinitely postponed as a result of the FRY action. The agreement's active parties had aimed to hold an informal meeting June 20, but Republika Srpska, citing Belgrade's absence, declined to participate. The first and only review conference to date occurred in June 1998.

No provision for suspending participation exists in the agreement, but this marks the second time in two years that Belgrade has done so. In 1999, the FRY froze implementation for nearly six months in response to the U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign to force Serbian military and paramilitary units out of the embattled FRY province of Kosovo.

A decision orchestrated by Washington not to invite the FRY to a May 23-24 meeting of the Peace Implementation Council, which is comprised of 55 governments and international agencies working to implement the Dayton peace process, prompted Belgrade's latest move. U.S. Balkan policy is aimed at removing FRY President Slobodan Milosevic from power by isolating his regime internationally to the greatest degree possible. Milosevic was indicted as a war criminal in May 1999 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

An administration official explained that the United States "simply cannot and will not engage in a dialogue with the Milosevic regime," which the official claimed has violated Dayton numerous times and has been and continues to be the major source of instability in the region. Speaking on the latest developments, the official characterized the U.S. position as being flexible, although no change is being actively considered. "We want to see what concrete actions may be forthcoming from the FRY," the official said.

Belgrade Suspends Sub-Regional Arms Control Participation

EU Not to Renew Arms Embargo on Indonesia

January/February 2000

Citing "historic changes of the last few months in Indonesia," the European Union (EU) announced on January 17 that it would not continue its arms embargo and suspension of bilateral military ties with the island nation. An extension of the prohibitions-imposed on September 16 in response to the violence sweeping East Timor-past the set expiration date of January 17 would have required unanimity among the 15 EU members. Reportedly, a majority of countries favored not extending the embargo. The EU noted, however, that future arms exports to Indonesia would be governed by the 1998 EU code of conduct on arms exports, which lists eight non-binding criteria that members are to consider before making arms deals.

The EU announcement came three days after Richard Holbrooke, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, warned the Indonesian military against carrying out a coup. Washington's September 9 suspension of all arms deliveries and military cooperation with Indonesia remains in effect. In the fiscal year 2000 foreign operations appropriations bill, Congress mandated that the president report that six conditions (including the return of refugees and the trial of militia and armed forces members accused of human rights violations) have been met before foreign military financing and international military education and training programs with Jakarta may be resumed.

EU Not to Renew Arms Embargo on Indonesia

NATO Ministers Skeptical of U.S. NMD Plans

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION formally briefed NATO defense and foreign affairs ministers for the first time on the proposed architecture for a limited U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system at the alliance's annual December ministerial meetings. Led by France and Germany, many European allies expressed concerns that the proposed NMD would damage relations with Russia, endanger arms control and decouple U.S. and European security. U.S. officials reassured the allies that no deployment decision has yet been made and that allied views, among other factors, would be taken into account prior to such a decision.

With President Clinton scheduled to decide on the proposed system's location and the awarding of an initial site construction contract in July 2000, many European allies were upset to be officially consulted so late in the process. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, however, assured his colleagues at the NATO defense ministers meeting, held December 2-3 in Brussels, that intra-alliance discussions on U.S. missile defenses would continue. President Clinton, for his part, has repeatedly said his July decision will be based on four criteria: technological readiness, the maturity of the "rogue nation" ICBM threat, cost factors and arms control considerations.

Washington delayed formal allied consultations because of incomplete U.S. plans and a desire to first hold strategic discussions with Russia, which has strongly opposed U.S. NMD efforts. Moscow emphasizes that the proposed system would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits a nationwide defense or the base for such a defense and which places specific restrictions on the architecture of any missile defense, including the location of intercept launchers and radars. U.S. officials have acknowledged that the planned system would require treaty modifications. Though the United States and Russia have been holding discussions exploring possible amendment of the treaty since mid-August at the Clinton administration's insistence, Moscow has repeatedly said it will not agree to treaty changes necessary to permit the proposed NMD.

Much of the opposition to the U.S. plans stems from the fact that Russia and many of the NATO allies do not share the U.S. assessment of the need to defend against the so-called rogue nation threat, which Cohen described as "real" and likely to "intensify in the coming years as countries continue to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities." To sway allied opinion, the U.S. provided a threat briefing at the start of the defense ministers meeting based on the latest U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that warned the United States—and implicitly Europe—would likely face ICBM threats from "North Korea, probably Iran and possibly from Iraq" in the next 15 years. (See ACT, September/October 1999.)

North Korea is cited most frequently by U.S. officials as a growing threat despite a September 1999 pledge by Pyongyang to suspend ballistic missile flight tests while holding negotiations with the United States to improve relations. Though currently abiding by the pledge, North Korea is "continuing other aspects of the [ballistic missile] program," a senior American defense official said at a December 2 press conference.

Secretary Cohen, who reportedly was very frank about the role of U.S. domestic politics in pushing NMD, also sought to dispel impressions that the system is targeted at Russia. He stressed that the system, which would initially field 100 interceptor missiles, would be limited and said that "it would not undercut the Russian strategic deterrent." When questioned on whether Russia would possibly halt the strategic reduction process in response to a deployed U.S. NMD, the senior American defense official claimed that "there is nothing incompatible between our concern with the growing rogue state ballistic missile threat and continued strategic stability and the arms control process."

Some European allies, however, remained unconvinced and raised the same concerns again with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the NATO foreign ministers meeting December 15-16. (Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stayed in Washington to work on the Middle East peace process.) Fears that the planned NMD would possibly spark new arms races with Russia, China or others while leaving Europe unprotected continued to top European worries.

While French President Jacques Chirac has been outspoken in his criticism of U.S. NMD plans, NATO would prefer to keep alliance differences to a public minimum. When asked to assess allied views about the proposed system after the December meetings, however, one U.S. government official admitted that "no one is enthusiastic, but no one is absolutely critical, with the exception of France."

Following the foreign ministers meeting, NATO Secretary General George Robertson noted the United States "assured the allies that it will only take decisions on a national missile defense after full consultations within NATO." Cohen stressed at the defense ministers meeting that "only one person can make the recommendation" to go forward with NMD deployment and that it would be "very much premature to speculate what will happen next year."

Executive Summary of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

Wade Boese

News Analysis

Aiming to preserve the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as the "cornerstone of European security," President Bill Clinton and 29 other national leaders signed an agreement adapting the Cold War-era treaty to the present European security environment on November 19-nine years to the day after signature of the original treaty. Despite a sweeping restructuring, the treaty objective of promoting European security and stability through lower arms levels, limits on the massing of forces and military transparency remains the same.

More than merely eliminating references to the former Soviet Union and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact, the adapted treaty jettisons the Cold War rationale of balancing two hostile military alliances and instead emphasizes individual country rights, limits and obligations. In a package of associated political commitments referred to as the Final Act, several states also pledged additional weapons reductions and to forgo increases in future weapons levels.

The original treaty remains in effect until the adapted agreement is ratified by all 30 states-parties, at which point the adapted treaty will enter into force.

From Bloc to National Limits

Under the original treaty, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were each allotted limits of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs), 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters-materiel collectively referred to as treaty-limited equipment (TLE). With the 1991 break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the 1997 offer of NATO membership to the former Eastern bloc members of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, these bloc-limits lost all relevance. The original treaty's outdated nature is underscored by the fact that it requires the new NATO members to coordinate weapons-level changes with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact members in order to stay within the Eastern bloc limit.

The adapted treaty discards these obsolete, alliance-wide limits and replaces them with national ceilings for the same five weapons categories. For the adapted treaty, countries proposed their own limits, with the understanding that they would take a "restrained approach" and work toward the overriding objective of "achieving a significant lowering in the total amount of TLE in Europe."

Together, the 19 members of NATO lowered their cumulative national limits from 89,026 TLE to 79,967. Current NATO weapons holdings only add up to 64,091 TLE, so no actual reductions will be required. While amounting to a paper cut, this reduction does decrease the weapons build-up potential of alliance members, thereby reassuring Russia. Individually, only two NATO states, Aegean rivals Greece and Turkey, increased their weapons limits, though only in the category of attack helicopters. The United States reduced its limits by more than 40 percent, from 13,088 TLE to 7,582. But, like the alliance in general, U.S. actual holdings of 3,465 TLE (as of January 1, 1999) are far below its new limits. For its part, Russia reduced its TLE limits by transferring the entitlement for 385 weapons to Kazakhstan, which did not previously have any weapons entitlements under CFE.

Out With Zones, In With Territorial Ceilings

To guard against weapons accumulations for launching surprise, large-scale offensives, the original treaty restricts the deployment of tanks, ACVs and artillery through a concentric-zone-structure, whereby the smallest zone, located in the center of Europe, has the lowest limits, and successive zones emanating outward have increasingly large limits. Though the possibility of such an attack is much more remote today, the rationale of preventing the build-up of military forces in a specific geographic area remains sound.

In keeping with the shift from a bloc structure to a national one, the adapted treaty eliminates the zones and sets territorial ceilings for each state. These territorial ceilings cap the total amount of ground TLE, both national and foreign-stationed, that a country can have within its borders-a much more restrictive system than the concentric zones, which permitted much larger force levels greater freedom in significantly bigger areas. Explicit advance consent of the host state is required for the stationing of any foreign TLE on another's territory to guard against unwanted deployments.

Twenty countries, including Russia and NATO's three newest members, set their territorial ceilings equal to their national ceilings. In effect, this requires a country's own TLE holdings on its territory to be lower than its national ceilings if the country wants foreign forces stationed within its borders. For Russia, long-opposed to NATO expansion, this constitutes an important check on NATO ground weaponry deployed in the newest alliance members and assures Moscow that NATO expansion will not cause a cumulative rise in weapons stationed in those countries.

At the same time, however, NATO sought to ensure that it could conduct military exercises, as well as deploy forces in times of crisis, on the new NATO members' territory. As a result, the adapted treaty allows countries to host temporary deployments that exceed their territorial limits by up to 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces.

In exceptional circumstances, some states-those outside the original treaty's flank zone-may exceed their limits by as many as 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces. Though Russia strongly opposed these exceptional temporary deployments, which are equivalent to two NATO divisions, alliance members viewed them as necessary to guard against "second-class membership" for new NATO members and to preserve alliance flexibility.

NATO rejected Russian efforts to impose territorial limits on combat aircraft and attack helicopters because it viewed such limitations as unverifiable given the mobility of those weapons.

The Evolution of the Flank Zone

While making no reference to a flank zone, the adapted treaty retains the flank zone's function of limiting weapons accumulations in northern and southern Europe. The former flank countries all agreed to set their territorial ceilings equal to their national ceilings, and all are limited to hosting only basic temporary deployments.

Specific limits, though relaxed, are also retained on the ground TLE Russia deploys in its northern and southern flanks, as well as on the ground TLE Ukraine deploys in its Odessa oblast. Since inception of the original treaty, Moscow has pressed for the abolition of the flank zone, claiming it is discriminatory because Russia and Ukraine are the only two states with limits on where they can deploy their own weapons on their own territory. Trying to address Russian complaints, the states-parties agreed in May 1996 to allow Russia's original flank limits of 1,300 tanks, 1,380 ACVs and 1,680 artillery apply to a smaller area, while the original zone itself would have higher limits of 1,800 tanks, 3,700 ACVs and 2,400 artillery. In the adapted treaty, parties further placated Russia by eliminating the original zone and its limits entirely, and increasing Russia's ACV allowance in the reduced flank zone from 1,380 to 2,140.

Improved Transparency

The adapted treaty also bolsters two key, but often overlooked, elements of the original CFE Treaty: extensive requirements for both inspections and information exchange.

Under the original treaty, each state-party is obligated to accept a number of inspections equal to 15 percent of its number of "objects of verification," essentially defined as sites and units with TLE. The adapted treaty increases that quota to 20 percent. The number of inspections countries are required to permit has been declining because the destruction of more than 70,000 pieces of TLE during the treaty's operation has led to a reduction in objects of verification.

Whereas the existing treaty only requires annual reports on the designated peacetime location of tanks, ACVs and artillery, the adapted treaty adds annual reporting requirements on the actual location of this TLE. Each state is also now required to submit quarterly reports detailing the numbers and actual territorial deployments of its ground TLE.

To the satisfaction of Russia, which had sought greater restrictions and transparency on NATO's air power following the alliance's air war over Yugoslavia, quarterly reports are also required on combat aircraft and attack helicopters. However, states-parties only need to supply information on total numbers for the entire treaty area and detail the countries to which the equipment is assigned for deployment, not those where it is actually located.

As a further confidence-building measure, whenever weapons levels on a state's territory change by 30 tanks, 30 ACVs, or 10 artillery pieces or more, all other states-parties must be informed within five working days. Any increase of 18 or more combat aircraft or attack helicopters in a country's holdings within the treaty's area of application must be reported within five working days.

The Final Act

The political commitments issued in the associated Final Act generally reinforce the adapted treaty's aim of keeping armament levels low in regions of historical conflict, and many specifically attempt to alleviate Russia's unease with NATO expansion.

Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine each pledged not to increase their territorial ceilings under the "current and foreseeable security circumstances."

New NATO members Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic went a step further, pledging additional future reductions in territorial ceilings (which they had already set equal to their national ceilings) totaling more than 1,500 ground TLE. Unlike the U.S. drop in limits, these reductions will require actual destruction of equipment. The Slovak Republic, a prospective NATO member, also offered a future territorial ceiling reduction of 195 ground TLE.

Moscow reciprocated by pledging that it would show "due restraint" in tank, ACV and artillery deployments in the region encompassing the Kaliningrad oblast, which is situated between Poland and the Baltic states, and in the Pskov oblast, which borders the Baltic states. Echoing a NATO commitment made in the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act concerning NATO deployments in new alliance members, Russia pledged that in the "present politico-military situation it has no reasons, plans or intentions to station substantial additional combat forces, whether air or ground forces, in that region [the Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts] on a permanent basis."

In its southern flank, Russia pledged to reduce its TLE holdings in Georgia to a level equaling a basic temporary deployment by the end of next year-a proposal to which Georgia consented. Currently, Russia has 141 tanks, 481 ACVs and 166 artillery pieces deployed at four bases on Georgian territory.

To strip away the legality of any Russian forces stationed on its territory, Moldova used the Final Act to renounce its right to host any temporary deployment. In the Act, all states-parties also "welcomed" Russia's commitment, made in the declaration following the Istanbul summit (at which the adapted agreement was signed), to withdraw or destroy all of its TLE currently stationed in Moldova by the end of 2001.

Finally, the Act states that all treaty members have "undertaken to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation can enter into force as soon as possible." At the same time, the Act emphasizes the "central importance of, full and continued implementation" of the existing treaty until the adapted treaty enters into force.

The parties pledged to review the status of all the pledges made and decisions taken at the treaty's next review conference scheduled for May 2001.

Hungarian PM Angers Moscow With Nuke Remark

Russia sharply rebuked Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban for a remark, published October 29 in The Toronto Globe and Mail, that Hungary would consider the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons on its territory during a crisis if asked to do so. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin charged that such action would be a "direct violation" of the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

In the Founding Act, which was designed to ease Russian opposition to NATO expansion, NATO members pledged that they had "no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy." Since its inception, Clinton administration officials have viewed the act as a political, not a legal, document.

Orban subsequently clarified his remark, saying that there was currently no reason to deploy nuclear weapons in Hungary, but that Budapest "always considers all requests from the international community." The Hungarian government later released a statement asserting that its "interest lies in a well-managed cooperation between NATO and Russia," but that it fully supports NATO's military strategy, "including its basic principle of regarding nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of its members' security."

U.S. and EU Suspend Military Ties With Indonesia

Reacting to the mass violence engulfing East Timor, an island-nation invaded in 1975 and subsequently annexed by Indonesia, the United States and the 15-nation European Union (EU) suspended all military ties with Indonesia in early September. Violence broke out following an August 30 vote by East Timor to reject a proposed autonomy plan from Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, who had pledged that a no-vote would give East Timor independence. The Indonesian military ignored, and in some cases participated in, post-election violence carried out by pro-Indonesia militia and gangs.

In response, President Clinton suspended all military ties (both arms sales and military training programs) with Indonesia on September 9. Sandy Berger, the president's national security adviser, explained two days later that what had not already been delivered of about $40 million in outstanding U.S. government-to-government sales through the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and some $400 million in commercial arms sales would be put on hold. A Defense Department official subsequently said the suspension would halt $7 million in undelivered FMS items. The Council of the European Union, the EU's decision-making body, followed suit on September 16 by announcing an embargo on all arms, munitions and military equipment to Jakarta until at least January 17, 2000. Bilateral military cooperation was also suspended.

Indonesia, racked by economic recession, had slowed recent arms purchases, even postponing a 1997 buy of 12 Su-30K fighter aircraft and eight Mi-17 helicopters from Russia. In its latest UN Register of Conventional Arms report, Indonesia did claim receiving 39 armored combat vehicles from Britain in 1998.

On September 12, President Habibie bowed to international pressure and invited an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. The mission, led by Australia, arrived on September 20.

The CTB Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996. President Clinton was the first to sign the treaty that day, followed by the representatives of 70 other nations, including Britain, France, Russia and China. To date, 155 states have signed the CTBT and 51 have ratified.

The CTBT will formally enter into force after 44 nuclear-capable states, specified in Annex 2 of the treaty, have deposited their instruments of ratification with the secretary-general of the United Nations. Those 44 states include the five declared nuclear powers, India, Israel, Pakistan and 36 other states that are recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power and/or research reactors.

The near-term prospects for entry into force were dealt a severe blow October 13 when the United States Senate voted against ratification of the treaty, prompting harsh international criticism and raising fears that some states might resume nuclear testing. (See press conference, and news article.) The vote came just days after states that have already ratified the CTBT held a conference in Vienna to consider measures to bring the treaty into force.

Of the 44 specified nations, all except India, Pakistan and North Korea have signed, but only 26 have ratified the treaty. Britain and France are the only declared nuclear-weapon states to have ratified. The following chart identifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's signatories and ratifiers as of October 31, 1999. States whose ratification is required for entry into force are in bold.

Country Signature Ratification
Albania 9/27/96  
Algeria 10/15/96  
Andorra 9/24/96  
Angola 9/27/96  
Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97  
Argentina 9/24/96 12/4/98
Armenia 10/1/96  
Australia 9/24/96 7/9/98
Austria 9/24/96 3/13/98
Azerbaijan 7/28/97 2/2/99
Bahrain 9/24/96  
Bangladesh 10/24/96  
Belarus 9/24/96  
Belgium 9/24/96 6/29/99
Benin 9/27/96  
Bolivia 9/24/96 10/4/99
Country Signature Ratification
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9/24/96  
Brazil 9/24/96 7/24/99
Brunei Darussalem 1/22/97  
Bulgaria 9/24/96 9/29/99
Burkina Faso 9/27/96  
Burundi 9/24/96  
Cambodia 9/26/96  
Canada 9/24/96 12/18/98
Cape Verde 10/1/96  
Chad 10/8/96  
Chile 9/24/96  
China 9/24/96  
Colombia 9/24/96  
Comoros 12/12/96  
Congo 2/11/97  
Congo Republic 10/4/96  
Cook Islands 12/5/97  
Costa Rica 9/24/96  
Cote d'Ivoire 9/25/96  
Croatia 9/24/96  
Cyprus 9/24/96  
Czech Republic 11/12/96 9/11/97
Denmark 9/24/96 12/21/98
Djibouti 10/21/96  
Dominican Republic 10/3/96  
Ecuador 9/24/96  
Egypt 10/14/96  
El Salvador 9/24/96 9/11/98
Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96  
Estonia 11/20/96 8/13/98
Country Signature Ratification
Ethiopia 9/25/96  
Fiji 9/24/96 10/10/96
Finland 9/24/96 1/15/99
France 9/24/96 4/6/98
Gabon 10/7/96  
Georgia 9/24/96  
Germany 9/24/96 8/20/98
Ghana 10/3/96  
Greece 9/24/96 4/21/99
Grenada 10/10/96 8/19/98
Guatemala 9/20/99  
Guinea 10/3/96  
Guinea-Bissau 4/11/97  
Haiti 9/24/96  
Holy See 9/24/96  
Honduras 9/25/96  
Hungary 9/25/96 7/13/99
Iceland 9/24/96  
Indonesia 9/24/96  
India    
Indonesia 9/24/96  
Iran 9/24/96  
Ireland 9/24/96 7/15/99
Israel 9/25/96  
Italy 9/24/96 2/1/99
Jamaica 11/11/96  
Japan 9/24/96 7/8/97
Jordan 9/26/96 8/25/98
Kazakhstan 9/30/96  
Kenya 11/14/96  
Kuwait 9/24/96  
Kyrgyzstan 10/8/96  
Laos 7/30/97  
Country Signature Ratification
Latvia 9/24/96  
Lesotho 9/30/96 9/14/99
Liberia 10/1/96  
Liechtenstein 9/27/96  
Lithuania 10/7/96  
Luxembourg 9/24/96 5/26/99
Macedonia 10/29/98  
Madagascar 10/9/96  
Malawi 10/9/96  
Malaysia 7/23/98  
Maldives 10/1/97  
Mali 2/18/97 8/4/99
Malta 9/24/96  
Marshall Islands 9/24/96  
Mauritania 9/24/96  
Mexico 9/24/96 10/5/99
Micronesia 9/24/96 7/25/97
Moldova 9/24/97  
Monaco 10/1/96 12/18/98
Mongolia 10/1/96 8/8/97
Morocco 9/24/96  
Mozambique 9/26/96  
Myanmar (Burma) 11/25/96  
Namibia 9/24/96  
Nepal 10/8/96  
Netherlands 9/24/96 3/23/99
New Zealand 9/27/96 3/19/99
Nicaragua 9/24/96  
Niger 10/3/96  
North Korea    
Norway 9/24/96 7/15/99
Oman 9/23/99  
Country Signature Ratification
Pakistan    
Panama 9/24/96  
Papua New Guinea 9/25/96  
Paraguay 9/25/96  
Peru 9/25/96 11/12/97
Philippines 9/24/96  
Poland 9/24/96 5/25/99
Portugal 9/24/96  
Qatar 9/24/96 3/3/97
Romania 9/24/96 10/5/99
Russia 9/24/96  
Saint Lucia 10/4/96  
Samoa 10/9/96  
San Marino 10/7/96  
Sao Tome and Principe 9/26/96  
Senegal 9/26/96 6/9/99
Seychelles 9/24/96  
Singapore 1/14/99  
Slovakia 9/30/96 3/3/98
Slovenia 9/24/96 8/31/99
Solomon Islands 10/3/96  
South Africa 9/24/96 3/30/99
South Korea 9/24/96 9/24/99
Spain 9/24/96 7/31/98
Sri Lanka 10/24/96  
Suriname 1/14/97  
Swaziland 9/24/96  
Sweden 9/24/96 12/2/98
Switzerland 9/24/96 10/1/99
Tajikistan 10/7/96 6/10/98
Country Signature Ratification
Thailand 11/12/96  
Togo 10/2/96  
Tunisia 10/16/96  
Turkey 9/24/96  
Turkmenistan 9/24/96 2/20/98
Uganda 11/7/96  
Ukraine 9/27/96  
United Arab Emirates 9/25/96  
United Kingdom 9/24/96 4/6/98
United States 9/24/96  
Uruguay 9/24/96  
Uzbekistan 10/3/96 5/29/97
Vanuatu 9/24/96  
Venezuela 10/3/96  
Vietnam 9/24/96  
Yemen 9/30/96  
Zambia 12/3/96  
Zimbabwe 10/13/99  

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