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Statement on the Threat of Possible U.S. Strikes on Iran

Libby Flatoff — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 21:57:31 +0000

Statement on the Threat of Possible U.S. Strikes on Iran

Feb. 20, 2026

Libby Flatoff Fri, 02/20/2026 - 16:57

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https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2026-02/statement-renewed-us-military-attacks-iran-not-justified-nonproliferation-grounds

STATEMENT: Renewed U.S. Military Attacks on Iran Not Justified on Nonproliferation Grounds, Say Nuclear Experts

Libby Flatoff — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 21:45:34 +0000

STATEMENT: Renewed U.S. Military Attacks on Iran Not Justified on Nonproliferation Grounds, Say Nuclear Experts Libby Flatoff Fri, 02/20/2026 - 16:45

False Start or New Era: Trump’s Call for “Multilateral” Nuclear Talks

Libby Flatoff — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 16:16:54 +0000

False Start or New Era: Trump’s Call for “Multilateral” Nuclear Talks

Nuclear Disarmament Monitor

Libby Flatoff Fri, 02/20/2026 - 11:16

Nuclear Disarmament Monitor

February 2026

Following the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), President Donald Trump and senior administration officials say the United States seeks multilateral talks that involve Russia as well as China as a means to make progress on nuclear arms control and risk reduction.

Trump declined to take up a Russian proposal issued four months earlier by Russian President Vladimir Putin for each side to respect the central limits of New START for one year to maintain strategic stability and create time for negotiations on a new framework to supersede New START.

On Feb. 5, the day the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expired, President Trump posted on social media that: “Rather than extend New START … we should have our nuclear experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future.”

Speaking Feb. 6 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno said, “Today marks the end of one era of arms control and hopefully the beginning of a new one.”

DiNanno said a new agreement would have to, “account [for] all Russian nuclear weapons, both novel and existing strategic systems, and [address] the breakout growth of Chinese nuclear weapons stockpiles,” he said.

DiNanno did not explain where or in what format talks on such an ambitious goal can be achieved, nor did he explain what the administration believes each side might gain from such an approach.

Since 2020, China has resisted “trilateral” nuclear arms control talks with the United States and Russia and has insisted that Washington and Moscow act first to reduce the sizes of their much larger nuclear arsenals. China has not ruled out bilateral nuclear risk reduction talks with the United States and, in November 2023, senior U.S. and Chinese officials met in Washington to exchange views on the topic.

Trump previously indicated he might support parallel bilateral talks with Russia and with China in a Jan. 7 interview with The New York Times.

“I think it would be appropriate for the Chinese [to be part of a new arms control treaty], but I would do a deal with Russia without the Chinese,” he told the newspaper.

President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in April, if a looming dispute over a $20 billion arms package for Taiwan does not derail the meeting.

Another administration official, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw, suggested yet another approach in Feb. 17 comments at the Hudson Institute.

“Following the expiration of the New START [...] the United States proposed multilateral strategic stability talks as a means to achieving future nuclear arms control.

“A multilateral approach can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, limit the buildup of nuclear arms, and, as appropriate, address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons,” Yeaw said.

One possible venue for multilateral talks on new nuclear limits would be the existing P-5 Process, which is a semi-regular dialogue between representatives of the five nuclear-weapon states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The P-5 dialogue is currently chaired on a rotating basis by the United Kingdom.

Diplomatic sources indicate the UK convened a meeting in December in Cairo at the experts level, with another planned to take place before the Review Conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which begins on April 27.

Meanwhile, a temporary agreement with Russia to informally observe the central limits set by New START could still be useful, according to former New START negotiator Rose Gottemoeller, who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 3.

It would be detrimental to U.S. national security, she warned, “to have to address the Chinese nuclear buildup, while simultaneously facing a rapid Russian upload campaign.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a Feb. 11 speech to the Duma that Russia will, for now, maintain strategic force levels steady if the United States does so as well. And DiNanno’s speech indicated that the United States would only expand its own forces “if directed by the President.”

Whether the two sides have reached an informal understanding not to upload warheads in the near future remains unclear. Despite a media report that U.S. negotiators discussed Feb. 5 such a gentleman’s agreement with Russian counterparts on the sidelines of other diplomatic talks in Abu Dhabi, Yeaw declined to confirm that a temporary deal had been made.

“I know of no such agreement,” he said in his Feb. 17 comments at the Hudson Institute.

“That is still in the President’s hands,” he said. –XIAODON LIANG, DARYL KIMBALL, LIBBY FLATOFF

U.S. Details Chinese Nuclear Test Allegations

In separate February speeches, two top State Department arms control officials said that China conducted a nuclear test of an unspecified explosive yield and sought to hide it using a technique called de-coupling.

The U.S. officials claim that the seismic signal was detected by a primary monitoring station that is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the 1996 CTBT, a treaty that the United States and China have signed, but which the Trump administration has opposed.

Trump threatened last October to resume U.S. nuclear testing “on an equal basis.”

In a Feb. 17 statement, the head of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Robert Floyd, said that: “On 22 June 2020, the CTBTO’s IMS detected two very small seismic events, 12 seconds apart” at locations more than 100km from the former Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nur.

The CTBTO noted that: “The IMS is currently capable of identifying events consistent with nuclear test explosions with a yield equivalent to or greater than approximately 500 tonnes of TNT. These two events were far below that level.”

“As a result, with this data alone, it is not possible to assess the cause of these events with confidence. Verification mechanisms [namely on-site inspections] which could address disputed claims or smaller explosions are provided by the Treaty but can only be used once the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty enters into force,” Floyd said.

ACA’s Daryl Kimball told The Wall Street Journal the U.S. should seek to resolve concerns over possible Chinese and Russian violations by starting technical talks with those countries on voluntary confidence building measures to detect and deter very low-yield nuclear tests.

“Any U.S. resumption of testing in response to such allegations would be technically unnecessary and would set off a chain reaction of nuclear testing by other nuclear-armed states,” he added.

Disarmament Calendar

Feb. 22: 4th anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine

Mar. 1: 72nd Anniversary of the largest U.S. nuclear test, Castle Bravo

Mar. 5: International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness

Apr. 27- May 22: The 2026 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, New York

UK Rejects Second Nuclear Delivery System Proposal

In response to suggestions by independent experts quoted in a November 2025 UK Parliament Defence Committee report, titled “The UK contribution to European Security,” the UK Government reaffirmed Jan. 30 that a second sovereign nuclear delivery method is not needed.

On Jan 30, the UK government said in a written response to the report that, “A submarine based system remains the most effective and proportionate means of delivering the UK’s deterrent objectives, providing the survivability, assurance, and operational independence we [The United Kingdom] need.”

The Defence committee, examining the topic of a second delivery method for nuclear deterrence, “wish[ed] to understand why the Government dismissed this option.”

The committee noted that it had “not received sufficient evidence to recommend investing in a second sovereign delivery method,” but that there was concern over the decision as “it is clear that the nuclear threat has increased in the recent past.”

Last July, following the announcement that the UK would acquire U.S. F-35A dual-capable combat aircraft and participate in NATO nuclear sharing, Defence Secretary John Healey rejected the need for a sovereign tactical nuclear weapons option when the possibility was raised in parliament.

U.S. to Expand Intermediate-Range Missile Presence in Philippines

Following the 12th session of the Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. announced Feb. 16 that the two sides had agreed to “increase deployments of U.S. cutting-edge missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines.”

In comments to the Manilla Bulletin, Lt. Gen. Antonio Nafarrete of the Philippine Army said the U.S. medium-range capability (MRC) Typhon system could be deployed for this year’s iteration of the bilateral Balikatan military exercises. The missile system previously participated in the 2024 iteration of the exercise.

Asked whether the launchers were currently present in the Philippines, Nafarette declined to comment, citing “operational security” concerns.

The MRC system is capable of launching Tomahawk intermediate-range naval- and land-attack missiles as well as shorter-range dual-purpose SM-6 anti-air and attack missiles. As a ground-based launcher, the MRC system would have been banned by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Following a Feb. 3 consultation on strategic stability between Russia and China, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned that U.S. deployment of the MRC system in Japan would trigger a Russian response.

The U.S. military deployed the launchers in Japan last fall for exercises with Japanese counterparts but withdrew them in November, according to local officials. The Chinese foreign ministry criticized the deployment, claiming that the missiles would “further undermine the legitimate security interests of other countries and pose a substantive threat to regional strategic security.”

In Case You Missed It

Preserving the Moratorium on Explosive Nuclear Weapons Testing, Lynn Rusten, Deep Cuts Commission, Feb. 20
The Growing Push to Halt and Reverse the Nuclear Arms Race, Libby Flatoff, Arms Control Association, Feb. 12
The Experts Comment: New START Expires, Bringing both Risks and Opportunities, Daryl G. Kimball, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Feb. 6
The Aftermath: The Expiration of New START and What It Means For Us All, Federation of American Scientists, Feb. 5
New START Expiry and the Value of Arms Control, Thomas Countryman, Arms Control Now, Feb. 6
Concerning Strategic Competition in an Unconstrained Post-New START Treaty Environment: Witness Testimony, Rose Gottemoeller, Feb. 3
New START’s Expiration and the Need for Continued Nuclear Restraint, Deep Cuts Commission, Feb. 3
Doomsday Clock Announcement, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jan. 27
Virtual Briefing: New Challenges and Next Steps After New START, Arms Control Association, Jan. 21
Americans Across Party Lines Want the U.S. to Keep Nuclear Limits with Russia, New Poll Finds, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Jan. 21.
Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment, George H. Miller, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, November 2025

Is Trump Jeopardizing Nonproliferation Efforts to Get A Nuclear Cooperation Deal with Saudi Arabia? A Report To Congress Suggests He Is.

Thu, 19 Feb 2026 14:43:54 +0000

Is Trump Jeopardizing Nonproliferation Efforts to Get A Nuclear Cooperation Deal with Saudi Arabia? A Report To Congress Suggests He Is. [email protected] Thu, 02/19/2026 - 09:43

The End of New START and What’s Next?

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 19:30:01 +0000

The End of New START and What’s Next?

Inside the Arms Control Association

[email protected] Wed, 02/18/2026 - 14:30

Inside ACA

February 2026

For the first time in many decades, there are no legally-binding limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and there are no active negotiations to establish new nuclear arms control constraints.

Unfortunately, we’ve heard all this before. Beginning in 2019 and since taking office again in January 2025, Trump has talked about “denuclearization” talks with Russia and China, but so far he has failed to follow through and has not advanced a coherent plan for doing so.

In the absence of New START, Trump will now be under growing pressure from some members of Congress, defense contractors, and the nuclear weapons “deep state” to begin increasing the size and diversity of the U.S. arsenal in the name of countering China’s smaller but growing strategic nuclear arsenal.

On Feb. 6 in Geneva, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Tom DiNanno, gave a lengthy speech blaming Russia and China for the current state of affairs.

He warned that “if directed by the President,” the United States is prepared for actions such as “expanding current forces, diversifying our capabilities, developing and fielding new theater range nuclear forces ….”

This approach would, of course, be dangerous and counterproductive. Deploying more nuclear weapons will not make anyone safer. With more than 1,550 warheads that can be delivered on nearly 700 missiles and bombers, the United States already has a massive, devastating, and largely invulnerable nuclear force that is more than sufficient to deter nuclear attack by any and all adversaries. More U.S. weapons will prompt Russia and China to take countermeasures.

A post-New START nuclear weapons buildup is now possible but is by no means inevitable.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Feb. 12 that Russia will continue to respect the limits of New START so long as the U.S. does, and Trump still claims that he wants some form of arms control.

If, however, Trump continues to dither on disarmament diplomacy, orders a buildup of U.S. forces, and/or follows through on threats to resume U.S. nuclear explosive testing, we are headed for a much more dangerous future.

As I outlined in a recent essay in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists titled “Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament After New START,” civil society, along with concerned U.S. lawmakers and “middle power” states, should work to steer nuclear-weapon state policies and actions in a more responsible and practical direction. This is how we can reduce nuclear dangers in the years to come.

In particular, as ACA Board member and former UN Undersecretary for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, points out in a recent essay, European governments “should move to shape U.S. policies that have vital consequences for the continent” by demanding “concrete arms control measures, replacing not only New START but also previous nuclear treaties which had been abrogated in earlier years.”

You can count on the Arms Control Association to be at the forefront, working with other experts and allies, to adapt nuclear arms control and disarmament for a new era.

As ACA’s program and policy associate Libby Flatoff outlines in a new Issue Brief, bipartisan majorities of Americans want to see their leaders cap and reduce nuclear arsenals. We are bringing together a growing alliance of civil society organizations and members of Congress who are committed to halting and reversing the global nuclear arms race.

Please Make a Special Gift, Now

Thanks for your engagement and support.

Onward,

Daryl G. Kimball

Take Action: Tell Congress to Prevent a New Nuclear Arms Race After New START

Now is the time to send a message to your members of Congress urging them to speak up and oppose any attempt to build up the size of the U.S. arsenal, demand U.S.-Russia negotiations on a new agreement to cut their arsenals, urge the U.S. to pursue bilateral talks with China, and to block any attempt by the Trump administration to resume nuclear test explosions.

You can use our action alert tools to call on your elected representatives to increase their engagement and be part of the solution.

Thomas Countryman on New START Expiry and the Value of Arms Control

On the eve of New START’s expiration, ACA Board Chair Tom Countryman joined Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey, Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley, California Representative John Garamendi, ACA Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball, FAS Director of Global Risk Jon Wolfsthal, and Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis Lynn Rusten to urge the replacement of New START and a return to negotiations to prevent a new three-way arms race.

A transcript of his remarks are online here.

Informing the Debate

For the majority of the public and for many policymakers, the mainstream media is their primary source of information on weapons-related security issues. While many find their information through new and social media, mainstream press reporting shapes the conversation.

ACA continues to be a major source of news and analysis on nuclear matters, including the implications of the expiration of New START, the possibility of renewed nuclear testing, and proliferation dangers posed by states including Iran and North Korea.

In the week ending February 6, ACA experts spoke with several dozen reporters and editors from news organizations around the globe and were cited by more than 130 outlets, including: Associated Press, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Bloomberg, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, CBS Evening News, CNN, C-SPAN, The Guardian, The New York Times, NHK (Japan), Politico, Reuters, RIA Novisti, TASS, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and others.

ACA’s Daryl Kimball discussed the expiration of New START and addressed viewer questions on C-SPAN’s Washington Journal program on Feb. 7

Tensions and Talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program, Again

This week, as the Trump administration assembles a military strike force in the Persian Gulf, senior U.S. and Iranian officials will meet indirectly for a second time in two weeks to discuss possible agreements to reduce tensions and address lingering concerns about Iran’s nuclear potential.

Agreement will be difficult, if not impossible, if the two sides insist on maximalist demands, especially when it comes to some of the core issues surrounding Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities for years.

As ACA’s director for nonproliferation policy, Kelsey Davenport, said to The New York Times in their report on Feb. 6, “If Trump does insist on zero enrichment, there’s not going to be a deal, Iran is not going to forgo what it views as a national right.”

Kelsey outlines a path forward in her analysis, “Pragmatic Nuclear Priorities for Renewed U.S.-Iran Talks,” posted on our ArmsControlNow blog. A major focus, she writes, should be for Iran to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to return their inspection teams to the most significant nuclear sites, including those damaged by the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 that interrupted earlier U.S.-Iran negotiations.

For more on the latest developments, see the forthcoming March issue of Arms Control Today.

Assessing New U.S. Nuclear Testing Allegations Against China

ACA has been closely tracking new U.S. government allegations that China conducted a nuclear test explosion on June 22, 2020. In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on Feb. 6 and in another on Feb. 17, senior State Department officials said that China conducted a nuclear test of an unspecified explosive yield and sought to hide it using a technique called de-coupling.

Trump has threatened to resume U.S. nuclear testing “on an equal basis.”

The head of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Robert Floyd, issued a statement on Feb. 6 and another on Feb. 17 stating that: “On 22 June 2020, the CTBTO's IMS detected two very small seismic events, 12 seconds apart” at locations more than 100km from the former Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nur.

ACA’s Daryl Kimball told The Wall Street Journal that the U.S. should seek to resolve concerns over possible Chinese and Russian violations by starting technical talks with those countries on voluntary confidence building measures to detect and deter very low-yield nuclear tests.

“Any U.S. resumption of testing in response to such allegations would be technically unnecessary and would set off a chain reaction of nuclear testing by other nuclear-armed states,” he added.

Opposing Irresponsible Conventional Arms Transfer Policies

This week, the Arms Control Association joined more than 30 other national organizations in expressing our opposition to the United States’ reported $210 million purchase of cluster munitions from Tomer, a company owned by the Israeli government.

When used in populated areas, cluster munitions violate international humanitarian law because they cannot distinguish between civilians and combatants, and they are banned by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which more than 100 states have ratified.